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PREFACE
The Great Crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression found nel-Uier 
business leader», government officials, nor political eeonoodsts pre­
pared to meet the exigencies of that economic holocaust. The major 
reason for the lack of public leadership vas the absence of precedents 
for concerted action during the dovn-awing of the business cycle. 
Franklin Roosevelt enqphasized during the 1932 campaign and immediately 
upon assuming office that he intended to-provide active and experis^R- 
tal leadership. Eÿ 1933 many business leaders and economists had also 
arrived at the conclusion that the old laissez-faire policies of both 
government and industry would not restore the natiw to economic health 
as it had in the past. Some type of planning was necessary, they said, 
although there was a wide divergence of opinion on what sort of plan­
ning could be carried on and still stay within the traditional American 
free enterprise system. The prevailing view which emerged called for 
some kind of government-industry cooperation designed to end the eco­
nomic distress.
The National Industrial Recovery Act was the legislative result 
of this change in economic thought. Roosevelt deemed the act one of 
the most important and far-reaching laws ever passed by Congress, and 
the Blue Eagle became the symbol of the New Deal recovery efforts. With 
the volatile Hugh Johnson as NRA chief, a nationwide patriotic cam­
paign was conducted to raise wages and reduce hours, and to increase 
employment and purchasing power. The law also provided for industries 
tssuWLt codw of fair competition which would end the era of cut­
iii
throat compétition hy outlawing unfair trade praotieea. Finally, the NIRA 
containod the famous Section ?a which established labor's ri^t to organ» 
iae and to bargain collectively*
The steel industry, dwËLnated by twê  or three giant produeers* 
ha4 seai^t to end industrial iwfare within its ranks ever sincê  the 
turn of the oentury* And ̂ wice stability was the key to industriaL- 
peace for that industry* The Raco^ry Act allowed the steel industry 
to govern itself without the restraints of ̂ le Sherman Antitrust Act*
■This always had-been a threat to aiy previous project of steel exeou» 
tlvha in sacking indust%y-#de agreements to fix prices or limit pro­
duction* The administration knew that steel- was all-important to the 
nation's recovery and allowed the industry to write certain provisions 
into its code which were certain to cause a fluxry of public condemnation 
and tô  create future troubles for the administration* On the other hand, 
the steel industry was willing to accept the collective bargaining pro­
vision in return for a code which would allow industrial self-government* 
The story of the Steel Code and the NRA is thus the account of perhaps the 
strongest industry in the United States being allowed almost unfettered 
power over its industrial and business practices which had long been re­
cognized as illegal under existing law* Neither the NRA, organized labor, 
nor consumers were able to exercise much control over the steel industry 
during the life of the Blue Eagle,
There is a paucity of literature on the NRA, This is surprising 
not only because of its importance in contemporary history but also 
because of tt̂ e great abundance of documentary records now available*
iv
Perhaps the reason lies In a warning which Donald Riehberg- gave that 
"the stoiy of the NRA must be written as one chapter in the big book 
of social history or it will be meaningless— or worse, it will appear 
to be a silly tragedy or an heroic folly. ̂ Recently, however, his­
torians and- economists have suggested that valid generalizations about 
the NRA cannot be made until there are studies available of the indi­
vidual industiy codes. The history- of the Steel Code-and the NRA should 
afford a further step-in the final evaluation of the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act.
While my interest in the IQIA goes much further than its relation­
ship with the steel industry, I am greatly indebted to Dr. Gilbert C.
Fite who convinced me that a general history of industrial organization 
symbolized by the Blue Eagle was too large a subject for a doctoral 
dissertation if it were to be based primarily upon unpublished manu­
script sources. Professor Fite has also given unstintingly of his time 
and his advice in the direction of this study. I am also grateful to 
Dr. Donald J. Berthrong for his criticisms. I received help and advice 
from Professors John S. Ezell, Alexander Kondonassis, and Brison D. Gooch, 
the other members of my committee. I also wish to acknowledge the aid 
of Mrs. Jane Smith, Chief of the Social and Economic Branch of the 
National Archives, and her able assistant, Mrs. Jeanne V. McDonald; the 
staff of the manuscripts division of the Library of Congress; and Miss 
Opal M. Carr and Jack D. Haley of the University of Oklahoma Library. 
Finally, it is nearly impossible to thank my wife, Carolyn, for her aid, 
pàtiënce and comfort in my long task.
THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND THE NATIOm HEOOVSIY AIKENISTRATION;
AN EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
CHAPTER I
the STEEL INDUSTRY ENTERS THE GREAT DEPRESSION
On Friday»- May -24̂  1929» the members -of the American- Iron and 
Steel Institnte gathered in- the Grand Ballroom of tho Hotel Gtmaodore in 
New York City for their thirty-fifth semi-annual meeting* Charles M, 
Schwab»- president of the Institute and ehairman of the board of the 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, delivered the traditional opening presi­
dential address* Schwab radiated-his usual optimism and confidence 
over the general condition of the steel industry when he said:
The steel industry meets today under conditions distinctly favorable 
to the continuance of general prosperity* Since we last met» Herbert 
Hoover has become President of the United States* Mr* Hoover has 
taken office at a moment of fundamental prosperity in our country 
that is unparalleled* As good citizens and as representatives of one 
of the greatest of industries, we pledge him our support and coopera­
tion, feeling as we do that our country is singularly fortunate in 
having as its chief executive a man of such great ability and bus­
iness e:q)erience under whose leadership I am sure nothing will be 
done to disturb the sound business structure upon which our present 
prosperity is founded*1
Following this optimistic assessment of the present and future condition
of the industry, several other officials came to the rostrum to concur in
Schwab's remarks* Again on October 25, 1929* Schwab told the Institute:
"In ray long association with the steel industry I have never known it to
2enjoy a greater stability or more promising outlook than it does today*"
^American Iron and Steel Institute, Yearbook of the American Iron 
and Steel Institute. 1929 (New York, 1930), p* 28*
^Ibid*é p. 295*
2
This optimism s^m@d justified, Steel-mills-wep& <̂ »3P®ting- at *n 
average of 88 percent of capacity~up 5 percent from 1928 and 5^-percent 
abovi) the postwar recession year-of- 1^21.^ A-total of -56,433̂ *4-73 
tons of steel ingots and castings were produced in 1929» In addition 
41,069*416 l<mg tons of finished rolled products poured froie the ndlls 
that same year-.̂  This production, totaling $4,137,214,000 came from 
591 establishments, employing 419,534 men with total yearly wages-nf
$730,974,000.*
Schwab was no doubt echoing the sentiments of almost everyone 
connected with the steel industry, because 1929 was truly a profitable 
year. His own oon^any, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, had shown a net pro­
fit for the first quarter of operations of $9,045,590, compared with 
$3,384,718 during the same period in 1928.^ The giant of the industry, 
the United States Steel Corporation, reported net earnings of $60,105,381, 
equivalent to $5.04 a share on the company's 7,116,235 shares of common 
stock* These figures compared with $40,934,032 or $2,11 a share earned 
during the last quarter of 1926, 0, S, Steel's 1929 earnings were close
to a record high and were attributable to the high demand for steel and 
to a stable price situation. In fact the last time in which U, S,
^Iron Age. CXXVII (January 22, 1931), P* 333.
^U. S,, Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. 1930 (Washington, 1930), pp, 758 and 700,
Îbid.. p. 702, 
p. 705.
^New Yprk Times. May 19, 1929, p* 13.
Steel’s earnings were greater was in 1918 when the total earaings were
O
$86,354,000, Most of the demand in 1929 came from the automobile in-
Qdus try, which was experiencing a record year in prochiotion, ̂ Farm
implements and railroads were using less steel than the automobile-
industry, but were still ingccrtant customers* The high earnings-were
also due to advancing prices which, nevertheless, were considered
10^highly conservative price-mcvements." 8y May the business world
saw no substantial signs of ̂ e  usual summer recession in steel,^ ̂
Leading steel coi^anies-stepped-up their operations to an average-of
101 percent of rated capacity, which was a new all-time record, while
12Bethlehem and U, S, Steel were operating at IO3 percent.
The success story of the steel industry formed merely one chapter 
in the marvelous epic of the "New Era." America’s participation in 
World War I- had led to a virtual managed economy, with full employment 
for labor and prosperity for agriculture. The ending of the war saw 
a sharp recession, with industrial unenqcloyment, loss of farmers’ gains 
and the use of war profits capitalists to carry them through the 
depression and improve capital equipment. Although the farmers and cer­
tain industries, such as coal and textiles, never regained prosperity
^Ibid.. May 1, 1929, p. 1.
Q̂Production of passenger cars totaled 4,587,400 in 1929, conqpared 
with 3,815,417 in 1928. There were 771,020 busses and trucks produced in 
1929, compared with 543,342 in 1928. Statistical Abstract. 1932, p. 359.
^^Steel prices advanced to $36 per ton in J^ril, 1929, an increase 
over the previous quarter of two to three dollars. These prices compared 
with a low of $32 per ton in 1928, $35 in 1926, and a high of $45 in the 
early part of 1923. New York Times. May 2, 1929, p. 26.
l^Ibid.. May 20, 1929, p. 47. ^̂ Ibid.. May 1, 1929, p. 1.
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during the I920's, Anerioa-entered-a period nf almost unpr«rredr>ntf;d 
industrial pi'<.;;perity and expansion* Snployment was high and, although 
-wages had bee a reduced, the-drop in the cost of living meant increased 
purchasing power for workers and a higher standard of living.
The "New Era" of 1923-1929 was based-on the great increase in
efficiency of production* The scientific management theories of Frederick
W, Taylor, the moving assembly line of Henry Ford, the greater use of
mechanization and new research and sales techniques, all contributed to
this efficiency* Using 1933-1939 as a base of 100, the industrial
production index rose from 58 in 1921 to 110 in 1929, without aqy great
13expansion in the labor force. In addition to greater efficiency in 
existing industries, a host of new industries aj^eared* Aluminum and 
magnesium, chemicals and synthetics, joined with automobiles, airplanes, 
movies and the radio in adding billions of dollars to the American eco- 
nony. ^y 1929 consumers were buying 23 percent more products than in 
1923, but, considering durable goods only, the increase was 33 percent.
The most important element in this great prosperity, however, was con­
struction, both private housing and commercial building* Cities added 
gigantic skyscrapers to their skylines, while individuals filled new 
housing developments in towns and suburbs.
These new economic developments benefited almost all segments of 
the national economy. Average hourly earnings in manufacturing rose 8
^William E* Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity. 1914-1932. 
(Chicago, 1958), p. 179* Although population increased only 9 percent, 
the labor force increased approximately 11 percent; however, factory 
employment in 1929 was only *5 percent above that of 1923* George 
Soule, Presperitv Decade: From War to Depression. 1917-1929. (New York, 
1947) PP* 317-325.
5
percent from 1923 to 1929* while the product per men-heur reee 32-pereent, 
The gross national product rose to $91* 1 billion, an inerease of 23 per­
cent, Corporate profits rose 62 percent* while general commodity prices.
fell 5 percent* There was no currency inflation* but bank depoeits i ^  
oreaM4,33 percent. The federal budget shewed a consistent eurplus and 
the national debt was reduced 2^ percent during this period. Private 
enterprise under a policy of laissez faire* not paternalism* was creating 
higher purchasing power* corporate profits and full employment* at leaet 
so the nation thought. Even the government was foU(Nd.ng a "business 
as usual" policy#
It is little wonder that the American pe^le were willing to take
at face value thê  statements of their national leaders regarding the
promise of the "New Era." In his last message to Congress of December
4* 1928, Calvin Coolidge asserted:
No Congress of the United States ever assembled* on surveying the 
state of the Union* has met with a more pleasing prospect than 
that which appears at the present time. . . .  The great wealth 
created by our enterprise and industry* and saved our economy, 
has had the widest distribution among our own people* and has gone 
out in a steady stream to serve the charity and the business of 
the world. The requirements of existence have passed beyond the 
standard of necessity into the region of luxury. . . . The country 
can regard the present with satisfaction and anticipate the future 
with optimism.
In August* 1928* Coolidge*s successor* Herbert Hoover* had said in 
accepting the Republican nomination* "We in America today are nearer 
to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of 
any land."^^ This optimism was accepted by an American public which had
^̂ U, S.* Congressional Record. 70th Cong.* 2d Sess., 1928, LXX*
Part 1* p. 20.
^̂ New York Times. August 12, 1928* p. 1.
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grown we«a?y-of the progressive crusades during the first two-deoades-of-the 
twentieth century. Too much energy and financial resources had beMi ME- 
pended on "making the world safe for danocracy." It was time--to iWce 
America safe for Americans and traditional Amerioan ideals. Radical ideas 
which flourished during the war period were no longer to be tolerated.
Trade unions were now somehow suspect as being anti-American, and actu^ly 
began declining in numbers and strength. This was the age of the- ctmsumer, 
and there was much to be consumed. High wages, high profits, full esf̂ loy- 
ment, appeared to indicate that economic democracy had been realized in 
the United States,
This "economic democracy" played an important role in the great 
stock market speculation which swept the country in the 1920's. While 
the legend persists that almost everyone from the manicurist and the boot- 
black to the industrialist and the banker gambled on the rise in stock 
values, it appears that the extent of speculation on the part of lower 
income groups has been exaggerated. Only about one-fifth of stock shares 
were owned persons with less than $5,000 a year income. Most stocks 
were owned by persons of more substantial means,Yet, millions of 
persons did engage in speculation, and it was the general optimism which 
this speculation created that was the important factor in the continued 
health of the econony. The climate of opinion was that, with such great 
prosperity, anyone could invest his savings or borrowed capital in the 
market without any danger of loss.
Thus, from January 1, 1925, to January 1, 1929, the total number
^^Soule, Prosperitv Decade, p. 294.
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of shares outstanding on the Hew fork Stock Ebcchenge inereased- fz^- 
^3*449,800 to 757,302*000, and the value ef those shares Inereased- from 
$27,072,522,000 to $67,472,053,000.^^ It is also interesting ■ihat-tbere 
was little relationship between the earnings of a company «md *e-e«d.ee 
and prices-of its stock. Corporate profits and consumption-were-high, 
and this fact led investors to the conclusion that prosperity would con­
tinue and stock prices would soar indefinitely.
Yet, despite such optimism, everything was not well with the 
economy. Coal mining, textiles and agriculture were among the "sick 
industries," and no cure appeared in sight. In addition reei-dential 
construction began a steady decline in I926 and business construction 
hit a soft spot between 1926 and 1927» The production of passenger 
automobiles fell 22 percent in 1927, and the increase in 1928 did not 
match the average increases of the preceding two years. What had 
happened was that saturation had occurred in the market for homes and 
automobiles. Also consumer goods consumption declined when families 
reached the point where they felt they had incurred all of the install­
ment debt which they could handle. New investment in producers* durable 
goods declined about $770 million tgr 1928.^®
The situation in stock speculation was equally precarious. A 
slight recession in the market occurred in 1927, but was regarded as 
"merely a downward turn in the business cycle.However, the Federal 
Reserve Board lowered its discount rates from 4 to 3i percent and pur­
chased $435 million worth of securities on the open market. These
17Ibid.. p. 295. pp. 277-288. ^%bid.. p. 275»
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polioles Added- moFe-mon^—to - the speoulA'tive-boom» - eapeeielly in oomiep- 
cial constituetion, and the market rose again in 1928. Scme -eernings 
began to be heard that stock-prices were over-in^ated, but these-cries 
were drowned in the roar of the stock tickers. Corporate and bank pro­
fits were so large and were not being passed on to investors in propor­
tionate amounts, that even these surpluses were being Invested in the
market. In 1929» when call loan rates were advanced from 12 to 20 
percent in an effort to slow the speculative-mania, stock buying continued 
from the belief-that-the great profits which could be realized'from stock 
price advances would offset the interest charges. With the raising of 
the rediscount rate in England on September 26, 1929, a trigger was pulled 
which caused the debacle to begin in America.
When, in the fall of 1929, the bottom dropped out of the stock
market, most leaders of the steel industry followed the general public
through the myriad twists and turns of popular outcry which generally
accompany the befalling of a national calamity. At first the reaction
was one of determined optimism as to the quick cure of the illness and the
continued good health of the economy. The Wall Street Journal stated:
Conditions do not seem to foreshadow anything more formidable than 
an arrest of stock activity and business prosperity like that in 
1923. Suggestions that the wiping out of paper profits will reduce 
the country's real purchasing power seem far-fetched.^0
No mere dislocation of the speculative market could cause an equal dis­
location of the firm rock on which had been built the greatest prosperity 
that the United States had ever known, said most business and government 
leaders. Since the Black Friday of I869 there had been ten days of panic
OAWall Street Journal. October 26, 1929» p. 1.
9-
on thê  stock meæket, all preceded-1̂ - major business failures. Ike Panio...
of October 24, 1929, had occurred during a period of great business fwos-
perity. Nearly all observers were willing to continue beli-ev-ing-̂ yae -
optimistic statements - of President-Hoover, the- epitome of wh-i-ch-was-made-
the day following- October- 24— Black Thursday: ^̂ The fundamental-business
of the country, that-is-production- and distribution of commodities-,- is-on- -
21a sound-and prosperous basis." The public, therefore, was willing to
"sit tight" and wait for the liquidation of inflated stock values--to-take
place so- that the fundamental business of America, which Calvin Coolidge-
said was business, could continue.
And there were encouraging developments in the business world
which seemed to justify the "inflated securities" theory of the crash.
After a meeting on October 24 which several of New York's leading
bankers attended within public view at the offices of J« P. Morgan and
Conpaqy, Thomas W. Lament announced that the bankers would support the
market. Lamont added that "the selling had been greatly overdone and
22that the market fundamentally was sound." However, in spite of the 
view of the general public that businessmen in general, and the manipu­
lators of large sums of money in particu].ar, were omnisicient and omni­
potent, the feeble gesture of the Wall Street bankers was too late.^^
One of those gestures took on a comic opera aspect. After -the-announce- 
ment of the bankers' support of the market, a broker dramatically strode
^^Edward A n ^  (ed.). Oh Yeah? (New York, 1931), p. 11. This volume 
contains highly amusing statements made by business and government leaders 
during the early days of the depression.
22New York Times. October 25, 1929, pp. 1-2,
^^or a discussion of the public's adulation for businessmen and 
financiers during the 1920*s, see Soule, Prosperity Decade, pp. 290-292; 
and John Kenneth Galbraith, Thq Gii-qat Crash. 1929 (Boston, 19^1 ), pp. 48-70.
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up to Uo So Steel’s post on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange-and
shouted; "Two hundred and five for twenty-five thousand Steel!" The
24stock had been selling at 190o
The building of false optimism could not hold for long, as even- the 
large purchasers who were buoying the market were forced to unload the 
stocks held for collateral every time prices rose. Then too, a Federal 
Reserve Board release showed that third quarter industrial production 
was 10 percent above that same period in 1928, but that there had been a 
decrease in such important barometers as automobiles and steel produc­
tion» October 29 saw new selling, and this wave of liquidations omniously 
saw the paper values of the giants of American industry declining— United 
States Steel, American Telephone and Telegraph, and General Electric,
The bankers, who met again at J» P. Morgan’s office, did not announce 
further support of the market. ^
The further decline in October brought grief and gloom to countless 
American families» No only did many persons see their own invested 
savings wiped out, but the general uncertainty created a cautious attitude 
among consumers who began to postpone the purchase of non-essential goods. 
This situation caused the wheels of industry to slow their pace. And as 
the gloom gave way to despair the optimistic mood of the public turned 
to one of bitterness and even hatred, A "personal devil" had to be found 
to account for such a great catastrophe. Too many statements had been 
issued by economists, financiers and government leaders that business was
24Soule, Prosperity Decade, p. 308» 
Z^Ibid.. p. 310»
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fundamentally sound and that stock prices had fallen too low-&lrea(%p. 
Business began to look less sound and stock prices continued to fall.
The fault must lie with the professional speculator} the publie-began 
to suspecta That speculator was now selling shwt to the detrimemt-of 
a public which had entrusted their life savings to this elite-priesthood 
which had promised that every man could ensure a life of comfort living 
on earnings from speculative securities»
At the outset of the depression even Hoover was %d.lling to charge 
that America's-own economic recklessness was responsible for the crash»
His first annual message to Congress on December 3» 1929» pointed-out at 
least a part of the economic folly of the New Era when he said: "The
long upward trend of fundamental progress » » « gave rise to over-optimism 
as to profits, which translated itself into a wave of uncontrolled specu­
lation in securities, resulting in the diversion of capital from business 
to the stock market and the inevitable crash»However, when the 
depressed conditions did not abate, either through the operation of Hoover's 
trusted "natural business cycle" or the policies which he pursued, he 
moved further and further to the view that the depression had not begun
in the United St? «es but in turope and that America could only accept
27a small share of the blame for the economic disaster»
As the year 1930 dawned the need for firm leadership for the country
26Ü, S.; Congressional Record. 71st Cong,, 2d Sess., 1929, LXXII,
Part I, p. 23,
27Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade: From New Era through New
Deal. 1929-1941. (New York, 19^7/» p. 56. Also see Hoover's later re- 
flections on the causes of the depression in The Memoirs of Herbert 
Hoover: The Great Depression. 1929-1941 (New York, 1952), pp. 2-4.
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and the world had seldom been greater. However, official statements- 
publicly indicated that the econondc crisis was to be fought, for the~time- 
being at least, with optimistic utterances and platitudinous st&twnente. 
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon-, vac&timing on his yaeht-off 
Nassau, predicted to reporters that the nation would make s-teat̂ -progress 
during 1930. The "greatest secretary of the treasury since Al«tand<^ 
Hamilton" was not alone in-his optimism. A spokesman for the Aoerie-s»- 
Federation of Labor also expected 1930 to prove to be "at least a-fîdrly
pQgood year."
Hoover also indulged in the "Pollyanna game," but he did not sit 
coi^letely idle. From the outset of the debacle he initiated -several 
steps which he felt would restore the normal workings of the econony.
The Federal Reserve Board loosened credit by lowering the discount rate.
The Federal Farm Board, through commodity stabilization corporations, 
attempted to keep declining wheat and cotton prices from falling still. 
lower* Earlier conferences with business and labor leaders, which John 
Kenneth Galbraith called "no-business meetings," had been held at the 
White House, and Hoover ençhasized the need for maintaining wages.
The industrialists agreed, providing labor would keep down i-ts demands. 
Labor leaders were not in a mood to press ary points. One steel execu­
tive, George Laughlin, who attended the White House meeting pledged the 
aid of his industry through large construction programs for replacement
pO
New York Times. January 1, 1930.
^^Galbraith, The Great Crash, p. 144.
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30of antiquated and obsolete-plants « On the-day following this raeet-ing,
J. A, Caitpbell, president of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company^ commented- 
that Hoover’s policies were "absolutely sound and constructive end-for
the best interests of the nation, » . Hoover also persuaded-gov-
— 32ernors and mayors to expand public construction to all practical limits.
Hoover did, despite his frequent utterances that "prosperity was 
just around the corner," work hard at the presidency in trying to aid 
recovery along a little faster. His failure lay with his very conception 
of the economy and the roles which the government and individuals played 
in that econony. It is well-known that Hoover represented the last hold 
of the old laissez faire philosophy on the White House, As Secretary 
of Commerce during the administrations of Harding and Coolidge, he had 
promoted the efficiency of American business. His election to the 
presidency in 1928 indicated that the American people desired to continue 
the "businessman’s government" in Washington, and Hoover was only too 
willing to please the public. He felt that the greatness of the United 
States had been built on individualistic enterprise, with a minimum of 
government interference. Government paternalism, be it unemployment 
insurance or the direct dole, would weaken the tough moral fiber of the
nation. The duty of the government, as he saw it, was to keep spending
^^New York Times. November 22, 1929, p® 2.
^^Ibid,, November 23» 1929, p, 4,
^^or Hoover’s depression policies see Harris G« Warren, Herbert 
Hoover and the Great Depression (New York, 1959), pp. 114 ff.; William 
S, Ifyers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover Administration: A Documented
Narrative (New York, 1936), p, 1 ff, ; and Ray Lyman Wilbur and Arthur 
M, Hyde, The Hoover Policies (New York, 1937), p. 1 ff.
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to a minimum and keep the budget balanced. In prosperity or-d^reseion 
this was the- ■ only "American^ course.
But as 1930 wore on, the mounting uneng)loyment, the aqapearanea> of 
apple sellers on the streets, and the business and bank failures-belied 
the assurances that the depression had just about run its course. Com­
mercial failures rose from 22,909 in 1929 to 26,355 in 1930, but ba*dc 
closings during that same period almost doubled in number. At- the same 
time liabilities of businesses rose from $483*250,000 in 1929 to $66&, 
284,000, while bank liabilities jumped from $218,797,000 to $908,158,000.^^ 
Industrial production also experienced a severe decline. Cmparing July 
1929 with July 1930, and using the 1923-1925 average as 100, the general 
index dropped from 124 to 94.^ The Bureau of the Census conducted a 
survey during April, asking each person who reported a gainful occupation 
if he had been at work on the preceding day. Out of a total figure of 
48,829,900 gainful workers, it was found that 2,429,062 persons who were 
able to work and looking for a job were unemployed. An additional 
758,585 workers had been laid off without pay.^^ While these figures
S., Department of Commerce, Commerce Yes'.‘-book. 1932, II 
(Washington, 1932), p. 27.
B, Butler, Jnemnlovment Problems in the Inited States. 
International Labour Organization, Studies and Reiuu/ts, Series C, No. 17 
(London, 1931), p. 10.
S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United 
States. 1930. Ui-iemplovment. II (Washington, 1932), p. 2. Butler, in 
Unemnlovment Problems in the United States (p. 5), warns that these 
figures cannot be taken at face value, as many persons would not admit 
to being unemployed, while many others who reported "being laid off without 
pay" were simply holding out hope that they would be recalled to work.
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Indicate a general unemployment rate-of 6«6 percent for all occupations, 
manufacturing- eo^loyees showed a 12 « 8 percent unemployment rate*, ■ The 
general enqplcyment index for July 1930, using 1926 as 100, was 81.6, 
while the earnings index was 75»9«^^ A special census taken on :he same 
basis in January 1931» in twenty-one-selected urban areas containing 
9»^5»98? gainful workers, showed unemployment, due to no fault of the 
employee, at 2,298,251.^® The depression clearly was beginning to have 
physical as well as mental effects on the nation.
But what was the condition of the steel industry, the cornerstone 
of American industrialism, during this gloomy period of United States 
economic history? Because of the extreme importance of steel to the 
industrial machine of the United States, the production statistics, 
prices and profits of the steel industry were regarded by Wall Street 
as the most sensitive barometer of the general business condition of 
the country. Therefore, when the production of steel took an upturn 
early in 1930, Wall Street rejoiced at what appeared to be a leveling 
off of bad times. Brokers concluded that since the market crash in 
October business had been bad only when conçared with the abnormally good 
conditions of the latter part of 1928 and the early months of 1929. There 
was some cause for optimism when figures revealed that ingot production
^^Fifteenth Census. Unemployment. II, p. 11.
3?U. S., Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review. XXXI (September, 
1930), pp. 178-179.
3®Fifteenth Census. Unemployment. II, p. 3^6. A later figure of 
unemployment during 1930 set the average at 4,3^,000 out of a labor force 
of 49,820,000. U. S., Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics. 
1950 edition (Washington, 1950), p. 35.
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in February 1930, exceeded that of February 1929»^^ In addition, during
the- first quarter of 1930, operations rose from 70,22 percent of capacity
in January to 84.88 percent in February, then declined only slightly to
82,60 percent in Mar ch. ̂  The generally favorable production trend oon-
tinued into the summer of 1930.
All was not well with the steel industry, however, as the price
structure was crumbling, Bÿ April it was reported that prices were
4iholding on bars, plates and shapes, but not on other products. But 
even on those most in^rtant products the prices were getting softer, and 
it was generally believed in the industry that a serious price war might 
develop between competing companies for the available business. A ser­
ious omen occurred when, on April 1, Ü, S. Steel slashed prices or. pipe 
four dollars a ton. An independent manufacturer stated in response to 
the cut in price that the Steel Corporation was responding to price 
cutting below the official quotations. Independents always had been 
able to meet lean times by selling below official quotations, and U. S. 
Steel had more or less winked at such acts. Thus, the price situation was 
viewed with some concern by members of the industry. Such a policy of 
the Steel Corporation might have been explained by the fact that its
earnings for the first quarter of 1930 were $3.44 a share, compared with
42$5.04 a share during the same quarter of 1929. Nevertheless, at the
^^New York Times. March 9, 1930, II, p. 11. Ingot production in 
February, 1930, was 4,067,971 tons, conpared to 3*812,018 tons that same 
month the previous year.
40Ibid.. September 9, 1930, p. 37»
April 20, 1930, p. 31. April 30, 1930, p. 32.
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May meeting of the Amerioan Iron and Steel Institute, the president of
Bethlehem Steel, after reviewing the early 1930 upturn, could-say-:
Therefore.-and this is one of the favorable factors underlying the 
whole steel situation— prices today and for more than a year past 
have been prices on which we could firmly stand our ground. Not­
withstanding the last year's record output and demand, no price 
inflation occurred and we have therefore no reason to expeot- 
prices to fluctuate downward singly because our rate of operations 
happens to be less than it was a year ago.^3
A few minutes later, however, Schwab's rival, James A« Farrell, presi-
dent of n, S. Steel, warned:
But a decrease in prices that indicates an intensive effort to 
dispose of products in a saturated market; or that is an attenqct 
of the producer to carry on at full speed in spite of diminished 
purchasing power in his field of distribution; or that points to a 
development of conqpetltion beyond the stage of due regard for pro­
duction costs and ethics is practically certain to lead to disadvan­
tageous results.^
The optimism of Schwab and the warning of Farrell would soon be trans­
formed into open anger at the continued price cutting.
For as the year passed the upturn vanished, price competition 
became more cut-throat and uneasiness gripped the steel leaders. During 
the summer of 1930 capacity operation declined from 68.73 percent in June 
to 59.46 in August. In August 1929 production had stood at 93*28 percent
of capacity. A steady decline in production continued through the end of 
the year, falling to 38.57 percent of capacity in December 1930.^^ Busi­
ness experts noted the rather strange phenomenon of the decreases being
American Iron and Steel Institute, Yearbook of the American
Iron and Steel Institute. 1930 (New York, 1931), P* 34. 
U4 p. 38.
^^Netf York Times. September 8, 1930, p. 37*
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almost uniform each montho • The explanation, they-decided, was that cer­
tain consumers of steel, such as freight-car, farm implement, automobile, 
and rail manufacturers carried a holdover business from 1929 .nto- 1930, 
making the first quarter a favorable one, but then falling at intervals 
during the year»^ And as production declined, so did prices» The 
American Steel and Wire Con^any reduced prices on wire two to three 
dollars a ton in May. In June average steel prices were two dollars
a ton under the low point of 1927, and it was reported that even these
48prices were being shaded.
James A. Farrell put the price issue squarely before the industry 
in October:
We must rehabilitate ourselves. We must be fair in competition.
I den"t like to say that, but that is the situation in the steel 
industry today. . . .  There is no reason that when bids are opened 
on structural steel, for example, and the lowest bidder is ten or 
eleven dollars lower than the next lowest bidder, that this sort of 
thing would be continued indefinitely regardless of cost.*?
Farrell and Schwab wanted to end price cutting and reduced profits.
When the American Institute of Steel Construction met at Pinehurst,
North Carolina, in November, its members resolved to stick to the "last 
price first" when submitting bids on structural steel. This resolution 
came after Farrell had called some of the most prominent steel construc­
tion executives into private conference and warned them against continuing 
the unprofitable practice of underbidding each other.Action followed
46 47Ibid.. November 10, 1930, p. 37. *̂ Ibid.. May 5, 1930, p. 39.
Ibid.. June 2, 1930, p. 36.
4ĝYearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 1930, p. 264.
^^New York Times. November 1, 1930, p. 28.
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talk when on NovemAer 10, Carnegie Steel Company, a subsidiary^ of &. 8, 
Steel, announced a minimum price on bars, plates and shapes of $1»60-per 
hundred pounds. This was not a higher price, but it was the first defirdte 
stand to maintain prices in over a year,^^ Finally, on December 4-, aame 
the long-awaited word that U, S, Steel and Bethlehem Steel had posted new 
prices, from two to four dollars a ton higher on principal steel-products. 
Other companies soon followed the price leaders' move. Wall Street greeted 
the news saying that this development was most needed to instill con­
fidence in business and industry,Charles F, Abbott, executive-director 
of the American Institute of Steel Construction, observed: "Steel has
definitely marked the turn of the depression. That alone is the meaning 
of the price advance, , ,
The news of the price increase in steel was not universally favored,
however. Senator George Norris of Nebraska took the floor of the Senate
and denounced the increase:
In the face of this patriotic move /cooperation in combatting the 
depressior^, which everybody wishes to help and to push along, we 
are faced with the announcement that the great steel combinations, 
the great steel corporations, commencing with the United States 
Steel and running ^ 1  the way down through the entire list, have 
agreed upon an increase that amounts to more than $1 a ton in the 
price of their products. On the face of it, it looks to me as 
though such an agreement is a violation of the anti-trust laws.^^
The trade magazine. Steel, expressed amazement at this "senatorial out­
burst" and lectured Norris on his understanding of steel economics,
^^Ibid,. November 11, 1930» P- 37. ^^bid,. December 4, 1930, p. 1.
^^Steel. LXXXVII (December 25, 1930), p, 23.
S., Congressional Record. ?lst Cong., 3d Sess,, 1930, LXXIII, 
Part 1, p, 176,
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pricing policy and the general welfare. The editor said that if Norris 
had been familiar with the history of the steel industry "he would know 
that an upturn in prices after a long decline is to be welcomed Lnsteac 
of condemned," and that firm steel prices at the end of a depression 
were "a necessary concomitant of the approaching return to prosperity." 
A final blast was fired at the senator when the editorial concluded:
"As a matter of cold fact, the improvement in operations of the steel 
industry that will follow a definite, positive upturn in steel quota­
tions will do more toward relieving unemployment than can be done by 
Senators Norris and Walsh and all of their colleagues in the halls of 
C o n g r e s s . T h e  estimate of the editor might have been accurate, but 
circumstances developing in the new year would not allow the hypothesis 
to be tested.
In spite of the usual optimism expressed at the October meeting 
of the Steel Institute, it was reported that steel men gossiping in the 
hotel corridors expressed less buoyant sentiments,Many persons in 
the United States, however, would have found it somewhat difficult to 
have had too much sympathy with the steel magnates, attired in their 
black ties and tails, and their wives clad in jewels and furs, who 
attended this semi-annual meeting at the Hotel Commodore in New York 
City. These unsynq)athetic persons were the thousands of steel workers 
who were either unemployed, or were working shorter hours on Hoover*s 
"share-the-work" plan. The average index of employment for 1930, using
S^steel. LXXXVII (December 11, 1930), p. 3̂ . 
^^Ibid. (October 30, 1930), p. 23.
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1923 to 1925 as 100, was 87.1, but the payroll index was only 
The special urban census taken in Pittsburgh in January 1931» revealed 
that of 22,970 gainful workers regularly employed in blast furnace opera­
tions and rolling mills, 5*902 were unemployed and seeking a ;}ob and 
5,260 had been laid off without pay.^^ Furthermore, while the^wage rate 
was generally maintained, the average number of hours per week was de­
clining from fifty-one in December 1929 to 44,8 in December 1930,̂ .̂
Steel leaders did attempt to maintain wages and took a great deal
of pride when they acconç>lished this for as long as they did. Charles
Schwab told the Fennelvania Society of New York in December 1930!
"None of us has been obliged to reduce the daily wage and we*re not
going to. The steel industry will maintain the living scale of its
men. We’ve modernized our ideas— and that’s a modern idea."^^ That
same month, a steel trade journal editorialized:
For the first time on record industry almost as a unit recognized 
and publicly declared its responsibility for the welfare of its 
employees. Leaders in the steel industry were among the first to 
announce they would not reduce wages, that they would give employ­
ment to as many employees as possible— that "the steel industry 
will take care of its own."“^
57Ü. S., Department of Commerce, Commerce Yearbook. 1932, II 
(Washington, 1932), p. 5̂ .
CQ
Fifteenth Census. Unemployment. II, p. 395*
59National Industrial Conference Board, "Average Hours of Work 
per Week per Wage-Earner, Iron and Steel Industry," National Archives, 
National Recovery Administration Files, RG 9 (typescript). Hereafter 
cited as NRA files.
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"steel. LXXXVII (December 18, 1930), p. 23,
^^Ibid. (December 25, 1930), p. 34.
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James Farrell, president of Ü, S, Steel, later chided-those v*o-urged a 
reduction of wages corresponding to the drop in prices* "Agqpareatly 
those who advocate this solution," said Farrell, "have not stopped to 
weigh implications that, instead of tending to increase consumption of 
industrial and agricultural products, such wage reductions would inevitably 
reduce the purchasing power of the wage earner and restrict consumption."^^ 
Other steel leaders publicly agreed with Schwab, Farrell, and the trade 
journals.
The next year, 1931» was such that those noble and economically
wise sentiments expressed during a year of hope came back to plague
the very men who uttered them. For instead of the long-awaited upturn,
the economy continued to fall and the steel industry plummeted with it.
In fact, 1931 was a repeat of 1930» except that the situation became
worse. Lower levels in production, consumption, and foreign trade in
iron and steel products were reached in 1931 than in any other year in the
industry's history. The tonnage of iron ore produced was 4? percent less
than it was in 1930, totalling only 31,132,000 tons; the production of
pig iron fell 42 percent to 18,426,000 tons; and steel ingots and castings
declined )6 percent to 25,946,000 tons.^^ By August 1931» the steel
industry was producing at only 37 percent of capacity, with no indications
64of a pick-up in business. Prices continued to fall somewhat, but the 
leading coi^anies made every effort to keep prices up. Carnegie Steel
^^Iron Age. CXXVII (January 22, 1931)» P« 357.
^^Commerce Yearbook. 1932» p. 309.
^^Iron Age. CXXVII (August 6, 1931)» P» 384.
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announced a price Increase-of $1.70 per hundred pounds on bars, shapes, 
and plates in M a r c h . I n  June another subsidiary of U« S. Steel, the 
American Sheet and Tin Plate Con^any, posted a two-dollar a ton increase 
on galvanized sheets.*^ The average announced price on shapes and plates 
in 1931 was $1,62 per hundred pounds compared to $1.69 in 1930,^^ The 
fall in posted prices was actually more serious than it appeared as compan­
ies were forced to make price concessions to buyers to secure the meager 
business available.
As production and prices continued to fall corporate profits vanished. 
The aggregate net loss in 1931 of twenty-seven steel companies was $14,622, 
526, compared with profits of $168,300,646 in 1930. This was the poorest 
earnings record in two decades. Eighteen companies showed profits, and, 
with one exception, most of the losses were confined to the smaller com­
panies, This picture, gloomy as it may seem, was even worse. 0, S,
Steel reported a special non-recurring income in 1931* and, ommitting this, 
the companies* net losses were actually $33*964,185. Such solid companies 
as American Rolling Mill and Republic Steel showed net losses for 1931 of 
$3,098,445 and $9*034,153 respectively, °
Charles Schwab, however, was still able to speak with some optimism 
to members of the Iron and Steel Institute in May ‘931* even though he 
admitted that business conditions were rather hampering his usual outlook. 
"The point which is particularly encouraging today," Schwab said, "is that
^^New York Times. March 19, 1931» p. 35.
^^Ibid.. June 16, 1931, p. 5̂.
^^Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1936, p. 70?, 
^^Iron Age. GXXIX (March 24, 1932), p. 736.
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we have met this situation with muoh less fear, less distress, and with 
muoh more organized intelligence than in any previous period of hard 
t i m e s . H e  challenged executives to stabilize business, reduce overhead
costs and get good prices for their products, and then concluded:
Bc^s, we have done a real job. I know of no meeting of the Institute 
at which we have been able to point to the evidence of more constznic- 
tive effort. We have come through a severe liquidation period, and 
have adjusted our affairs in an orderly and effective way. We shall 
feel our way through the slack summer season, and if necessary we can 
face a much longer siege-without-alarm.^O
James Farrell, however, was not so charitable to the "boys" of the
Institute. In fact, Farrell delivered an icy indictment of many steel
men when he said:
When it is said, Mr. President, that wages have been stabilized in 
the industry— they have not. We are living in a fool’s paradise 
if we think that every steel manufacturer in the United States has 
maintained what is generally known as the current rates of wages. . . . 
There has been honeycombing and pinching and that sort of thing.
And even among the most talked of companies, the so-called big com­
panies, the companies in the headlines quite frequently do not pay 
the standard rate of wages when it comes to the rate per hour and 
hours paid for part time. I am not going to mention the names of 
all of the companies in this room that have cut wages; I do not want 
to erabarass them; but I think it is a pretty cheap sort of business 
when the largest companies in our industry are trying to maintain 
wages, for men who are working three days a week, and then cut that 
three days a week another 10 per cent.71
This diatribe must have fallen on many deaf ears, for numerous companies
were now cutting wages and some persons were openly advocating a further
wage cut.
A correspondent to Iron Age wrote; "All this agitation about wage 
maintenance is pure economic rot. , . . Workmen in my own factory tell me
69̂Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 1931, p. 36.
70'l]2iâ., p. 38. ^^Ibid.. p. 41.
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they can buy much more for their dollar today than they could, a yean. ago.
72Maintaining wages under those conditions is economically unsound."
The president of a small steel company also wrote to Iron Age saying that.
" . . .  we cannot agree with the current propaganda that labor- should not
absorb its proper share of the adjustment through which we are -noŵ  pass»
73ing. . . .  We must all sink or swim together," The president-of the 
American Federation of Labor, William Green, however, visualized a- situa­
tion in which there would be no wages. If wages were cut, workers could 
not consume as many products of the factories, and materials would pile 
up in unsold stock, "In the end," Green warned, "production has to
cease and then it is no longer a question of no reduction of wages but
7krather of no work,"
In spite of the arguments for and against a wage cut, U, S, Steel 
continued its policy of keeping the wage rate at its present level, A 
meeting of the steel corporation's board of directors on July 28, 1931» 
was viewed beforehand by maqy persons as being the preliminary step to 
announcing a downward revision of wages. It probably came as a surprise 
to many persons that instead of cutting wages, the corporation reduced 
dividends and announced a forthcoming reduction in salaries. Iron Age 
editorialized that "a downward wage revision by the world's largest 
steel comparer would have removed the strongest support of the policy
enunciated at the Washington conferences early in the depression,
f^Iron Age. CXXVIII (July 9, 1931), P. 136.
^^Ibid. (July 23, 1931), p. 277. ^^Ibld. (July 2, 1931), pp. 51-52.
f^Ibid. (July 30, 1931), p. 338.
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The editorial concluded in approval of the corporation’s action;
Wage rates have not advanced since 1923» whereas there have-naturally 
been numerous salary increases since that time. Moreover, wage in­
come has been on a reduced basis for months— ever since rotating of 
jobs became necessary, while the losses of salaried men have- been 
confined to reductions in incentive payments. In a word, the- wage 
earners suffered first and most severely, and it is only in line 
with principles of equity that salaried employees and stockholders 
should assume their share of the burden of the depression.'
The president of a small steel company declared that the action of U. S.
Steel established a precedent and would lend smaller industries much
77needed moral support in maintaining wages while paying smaller dividends.
Officials of the various subsidiaries of 0. S. Steel met with the
general corporation executives on September 15, and this meeting proved
78to be the preliminary step in a reduction of wages.' One week later the
New York Times announced on page one that Ü, S. Steel was cutting wages
ten percent on October 1. Bethlehem Steel announced that it would follow
this exaiiqjle. The wage break-through had occurred at last, and General
79Motors and the United States Rubber Conpany followed suit. Apparently 
U, S, Steel had had to yield on principles as it had done during the 
price wars. Profits were becoming non-existent, and too many competitors 
simply would not go along with a high wage policy. President Hoover 
declined to comment on the wage action but was reported to be shocked and 
disappointed, especially since the cut had come at a time when it appeared 
an upturn in the economy was coming.
Other persons, however, were willing to speak out on the ominous
^^Ibid. T^Ibid. (August 6, 1931), p. 391.
^®Ibid. (September 17, 1931), p. 772.
^^New York Times. September 23, 1931, P# 1.
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turn of events, William Green called the-wage outs morally w?ong and 
economically unsound, saying that the corporations "had subjeoted them­
selves to the charge of having broken a solemn pledge to President
Hoover to maintain wages and by their action have contributed' to the
80development of social unrest and industrial discontent," Another
labor leader, Patrick Fagan, head of the United Mine Workers Union in
Pittsburgh, said:
I am trying to figure out how cutting 40 cents a day from the wages 
of a steel mill laborer who is making $4 a day, or taking a dollar 
a day from the tonnage man who may be averaging $10 a day, will help 
things. The lower you reduce wages, the less the average working 
man can buy, . . , It is impossible to understand the philosophy of 
steel makers in reducing wages to rejuvenate a business. Such methods 
have been tried for centuries and history shows they were futile,
In Congress few voices, either Republican or Democrat, were raised in
defense of the wage action. Some voices were openly hostile. Senator
Thomas Walsh declared: "I have not observed that the announcement was
accompanied by any announcement of reduction in the steel companies*
prices, which means, I suppose that the reduction was for the benefit
82of the stockholders and not the consumers of steel products." But in 
late 1931 and through all of 1932, steel prices, as well as the economy 
of the steel industry in general, had a long way down to go. At the 
October 1931 meeting of the Iron and Steel Institute, Schwab opened his 
customary address by telling the assembled steel leaders: "I think it
was just 10 years ago that I addressed this assemblage as 'Fellow million­
aires', , , • It seems to me that there is no more appropriate time, after 
10 years, than to say; ny friends, former millionaires and steel magnates 
of the United States,"®^ Schwab later said: "We all regret having to take
G°Ibid.. September 24, 1931, p. 1.
^^earbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute, 1931, P* 513.
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the wage action which was general throughout the industry the early part
of this month. We held to the old wage rates as long as our balance sheets
would permit. But with the liquidation of prices and values in all dir*
84ections it was necessary to yield to economic law." Gone from this 
meeting of the "steel magnates of the United States" was the usual joking 
and bantering among the rival executives of the giants of the industry.
In fact the speeches of industry leaders were so solemn that for once a 
professional journalist, noted for his wit, was brought in to entertain 
the assemblage.
Down, down, down went the steel industry, caught up ty the depres­
sion which no one seemed to be able to solve. %  1932 a total of 12,060,
86000 persons had lost their jobs. In the iron and steel industry em­
ployment and payroll indices, using 1923-1925 as 100, fell to 5&«5 and 
30,4 respectively.®^ Ü. S. Steel cut salaries and wages of employees 15
QÛpercent in May. Only 13,681,162 long tons of steel ingots were pro­
duced, compared with 40,699*483 long tons in the unfavorable year of
1930.®^ Prices of plates and shapes declined to $1.58 per hundred pounds,
90down four cents from the preceding year and eleven cents from 1930.
®̂ I]2li,, p. 342.
®^That journalist was Strickland Gillian of Washington, famous for 
his "Off again, on again, gone again. Finnegan," who concluded the meeting 
with some fifteen minutes of jokes.
®®Handbook of Labor Statistics. 1950 edition, p. 35.
®^Statistioal Abstract. 1936, p. 325.
®®New York Times. May 24, 1932, p. 37.
®9statistical Abstract. 1936, p. 705. p. 707.
Z9-
Deflolts of steel oompanles oontlnaed to mount, and the^leading Industry 
member, U. S. Steel, reported a net deficit of $91,891,868 in 1932, while 
experiencing its lowest rate of operations since the corporation’s forma­
tion. The output of the Steel Corporation for the year averaged a meagw 
16.3 percent of rated capacity.
Seemingly the economy of the country, and certainly that of the 
steel industry, had sunk as low as it could go. However, the nation 
had been greeted at every downturn by a chorus of optimistic statements 
from governmental leaders, business executives, and professional eco­
nomists. But the events following each further slump always belied those 
fantastic outpours. As the breadlines grew longer, the number of apple 
sellers and soup kitchens increased and the forces of despair and misery 
swept the country, people stopped listening to those whom it was thought 
were the ones responsible for the great national calamity. President 
Hoover, with his insistence that state and local aid, supplemented by 
private charity, could adequately take care of the unemployed clearly had 
been proved wrong. His gestures toward stepped-up public works were too 
little and too late. While he was anxious to aid drought-stricken farmers 
to feed hungry livestock, he continually preached against dolts is )eing 
un-American, And his new-found policy of increasing prosperity by per­
mitting money to trickle down through the Reconstruction Finance Corpora­
tion, seemed too much like a "millionaires' dole,"
The public continued to search for a "personal devil" to blame for 
the disaster which had befallen them, and thqy found several "devils"
^^New York Times. March I5, 1933, P« 25,
30
disguised as stockbrokers, bankers, corporation executives and finally 
as Republican government officials themselves. Business leaders, on the 
other hand, began an expanded search for the causes of the depression and 
more especially for a cure to that depression. Th^ slowly began ïo 
reach differing conclusions from those of the general public. The bodÿ 
of business thought which developed during the early 1930's had much 
to do with the conception and eventual adoption of the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act,
CHAPTER II
THE INDUSTRY DRIVE TOWARD ECONOMIC PLANNING
The Great Depression not only proved to be an ecomonio catastrophe 
for the business of America, but it proved to be a traumatic experience 
for businessmen as well,, To be sure, traditional business thought---both 
the practical and the ideological— continued to be expressed. The 
crushing experience of seeing the world's greatest industrial machine 
fail, however, and fail because of an overabundance of production rather 
than because of scarcity, was disheartening and perplexing. The fear 
that people might become so disenchanted with a system which had promised 
but did not deliver economic democracy that they would demand a fundamental 
change was frightening. And the fear that the fundamental change might 
lead to increased governmental regulation at best, or to some form of 
government ownership at worst, led to some new currents of thought in the 
business community. These ideas were not "new" in the sense that th^ 
had never before been suggested, but in the sense that discussion was more 
widespread and acceptance of those ideas came more readily. Out of this 
myriad interplay of ideas, most of them old but some new ones as well, 
came the National Industrial Recovery Act,
The continuing dialogue, which had many pragmatic effects, was 
participated in, and in some cases initiated, by members of the steel 
industry. Early in the depression steel executives followed the usually 
accepted ideas that the economic upheaval was only a natural consequence 
of the business cycle. Since this cycle operated according to natural 
economic laws, there was little which could be done, especially by gov­
ernment, to bring about recovery. If depression was a natural consequence
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of a capitalist economic system, then recovery would also come naturally. 
Only time oould provide a cure. Governmental interference would simply 
retard recovery,
A constant theme among the utterances of businessmen, at least 
through the first two years of the depression, was that the business 
crisis was only temporary and would be short-lived. Thus, Hoover and 
his fellow governmental officials found ready agreement when they con­
tinued to reassert the theme that "prosperity was just around the Cor­
ner," Robert P, Lamont, secretary of commerce under Hoover and later 
president of the American Iron and Steel Institute, optimistically 
stated in March 1930» that "Business will be normal in two months,"^ 
However, when the following December arrived and prosperity had not 
been restored, he again asserted that, "We have already weathered the
worst of the storm and signs of stability and recovery are already
2appearing," Charles M, Schwab told the Steel Institute in mid-1930 
that, "All present indications are that 1930, in broad perspective, will 
prove a year of normal business progress,"
In addition to viewing the depression as only a temporary phenomenon 
which could not last very long, many business spokesmen attempted to pre­
sent the idea that there was, in spite of temporary hardships, something 
healthy and even beneficial about a "readjustment" in the economy, Henry 
Ford said simply, "The crash was a good thing. . . , You watch I Some
^Angly, Oh Yeah?, p, 25« ^Ibld,
^Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 1930, p. 35.
\ew York Times. October 3, 1930, p. 1.
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business leaders felt that stock prices had gone too high and that the
liquidation of inflated prices was healthy for the total econoiqy. Schwab
asserted that "business is a lot healthier today than it was six or nine
months ago because of the inevitable house-cleaning which has.taken place
An editorial in Iron Age explained the beneficial aspect of a depression
as "clearing the track of surpluses»" The editor explained:
Economic changes are controlled, to a large extent by the law of 
averages» Thus we have the cyclical swings which alternately carry 
business volume above and then below the so-called "normal" line»
When a period of inflation of demand has built up a consumption- 
production surplus, or excess over normal, it requires a period 
of sub-normal activity to strike the average» That is why time 
is a great healer of depression ills»
There were also those who saw the depression as "marking the transition
from the development stage of our economic growth to the less spectacular
nand more settled ways of industrial maturity»" Thus, the economic 
crisis was seen as an educational period during which time businessmen 
could reorient their thinking in line with the principles of a "mature 
economy»" That line of thought held that the market had become saturated, 
and future profits would have to come from replacement business and the
g
smaller sales made to a more slowly increasing population.
There were sporadic forays by industrialists into economic thought 
regarding more definite reasons for the crash's coming when it did. 
Practical businessmen, however, were more interested in how recovery 
could be achieved and how soon it would come, rather than why things
Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 1930, p» 33.
*Iron Age. CXXVII (January 22, 1931)» P» 293»
^Dgü», March 12, 1931» p. 880, ^Ibid.
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were as they were. In their willingness to propose cures for the eco= 
nomy's illness, many business leaders revealed that they were not entirely 
sold on the traditional view that the business cycle would right itself 
through natural means. Schwab himself commented that he had lived through 
the panics of 1893, 1907» and 1914, and that "People, who say that business 
learns nothing from the past, are simply too young to know what they are
Qtalking about." But the leaders of the steel industry generally talked 
in terms of these policies which would aid their own industry. The main­
tenance of prices and wages usually received top priority in industry 
leaders* speeches, but there were even more immediately practical sug­
gestions for keeping profits from disappearing. Trade journals carried
more articles than usual during 1931 on how steel companies could reduce 
overhead and eliminate waste in their operations. Companies were urged
to carry out major construction work, expand their market, and to adopt
more efficient marketing techniques.
All of this is not to imply, however, that businessmen did not 
engage in conversation on the long-range implications of the depression, 
general ways of curing economic distress and methods for perhaps insuring 
the nation against future economic breakdowns, especially of such duration 
and severity. As the depression became more severe this exchange of 
ideas increased. Naturally governmental policy received a major share of 
attention. The proper role of government was seen to be that of holding 
spending to a minimum and keeping the budget balanced. Yet, a prominent 
steel official commented favorably on public works' schemes and road 
construction undertaken by federal, state, and local governments. He
9Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 1931* P» 35«
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warned, however, that "far-sighted Industrial management recognizes that 
in the long run industry must of course rely for its recovery upon normal 
conditions; not outside aid»"^^ A trade journal editorialized: "This 
country is in no predicament warranting the expenditure of the millions 
of dollars proposed by some members of congress, , , « Work created by the 
state, further than that actually required and as part of the function of 
the state, is but a step removed from Socialism,"^^ Another journal ' 
warned in late 1931 that the upcoming session of Congress would be the 
occasion for raids or attempts to raid the national treasury for such
things as veterans* bonuses and agricultural supports and that, "there
12is even the terrifying specter of a dole to all unemployed persons,"
As an alternative to a dole, an employee of the city of Pittsburgh advo­
cated local improvement projects carried out mainly through government 
13loans, Industrial leaders generally agreed with the principle of loans 
to business and openly supported the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
established early in 1932,^^
Such favorable comments on governmental aid to business, however, 
did not extend to proposals for direct aid to the unemployed industrial 
worker, the distressed consumer, or the hapless farmer. More sugges­
tions of direct aid, especially from the government, to the unemployed
1930, P, 35. 
lasted. LXXXVII (December 18, 1930), p,
^^Iron Age. CXXVIII (August 20, 1931), p. 520.
^^Ibid, (September 10, 1931), PP» 700-701.
, GXXIX (January 21, 1932), p, 234 and(January 28, 1932)
p. 297,
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were branded as doleso Most businessmen agreed with Hoover in holding 
that the dole was un-American in that it destroyed initiative, self- 
reliance ind personal incentive. Thus, almost anything was better than 
handing out public funds to the unemployed, especially when many of that 
group were suspected of siinply malingering. However, it was only a 
minority which would have left the unfortunate to shift for themselves 
or suggested such unusual expedients as saving restaurant scraps to feed 
the needy. Most companies and their executives contributed to local re­
lief funds. One firm sold fuel to employees at cost. Another matched 
employee contributions to relief agencies, A Wisconsin firm issued 
preferred stock to its enployees to make up for a wage reduction.
The president of a New Jersey steel conpary contributed $10,000 of his 
own funds to his company for raising wages, Several steel companies 
donated land for employees to use for growing their own gardens, Beth­
lehem Steel, for example, announced in the summer of 1932 that its employees 
had 22, 2̂7,960 square feet of land under cultivation with produce valued 
at $223,000.1?
These private aids to the unemployed were sometimes offset, in the 
public's mind, however, by other company actions, Weirton Steel Qpmpany 
announced, for example, the establishment of an eighteen-hole golf course
"for the benefit of the residents of Weirton, West Virginia," built on a
18rolling plateau overlooking the main works of the company. Small
l^Ibid,. c m  (September 8, 1932), p, 382.
(August 25, 1932), p, 309, 
l?Ibid. (August 4, 1932), p, 188.
GXXIX (June 2, 1932), p. 1216.
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comfort this announcement must have been to steel workers who. were on 
short time or who were not working at alio The public image of the. corpora­
tion was also unimproved when a group of Bethlehem stockholders filed suit 
against their company to stop the payment of large secret bonuses to 
Bethlehem executiveso It was revealed that Eugene Grace alone received 
a bonus of $1,015,591 in 1930, and that from 1925 to 1928, when no divi­
dends were paid by Bethlehem to its common stockholders, bonuses totaling 
$6,800,524 were paid to directors and executives of the corporation,^^
As the depression extended into 1932 the optimistic prognostications 
of business executives gave way to statements indicating a mood of despair,
fear and uncertainty. The usually redoubtable Eugene Grace of Bethlehem
20Steel announced in Februaiy that he would rather "pray than prophesy."
The panaceas of private charity, the attençjt to keep wage rates intact 
and the share-the-work movement were not solving the problems created 
by the depression. Unemployment figures rose and more and more businesses 
closed their doors. The more severe the economic conditions became, the 
more unrest gripped the country. It was easy for a businessman to dis­
miss radical suggestions of departing from the traditional "free enter­
prise" system; however, when friends of the ^stem, and even "captains 
of industry" themselves, became critical, many business leaders began to 
see that old shibboleths would not cure the ills of the nation.
President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia called that line of 
business thought which held that the nation would automatically recover
l̂ Ibid.. CXXVII (March 26, 1931), p. 1062.
pA
B M . ,  GXXIX (February 4, 1932), p, 353.
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21"easy diagnosis and smug prophecieso" In urging business planning
Butler warned: "Gentlemen, if we wait too long, somebody will come
22forward with a solution that we may not like." Even Wallace- 
Donham, dean of the Harvard Business School, used the Soviet Union as 
an example of planning. Donham warned that, "The danger in our situa­
tion lies not in radical propaganda, but in lack of effective business 
leadership."Unemployment is a ghastly failure of industrial leader­
ship," said Cardinal O'Connell of Boston. "What is the flaw in the 
capitalist system which has governed industry for a couple of centuries 
that it creates and cannot resolve this paradox," asked the eminent
2itcleric.
It was not that various ideas for concerted methods of doing 
business had never been suggested. Soon after the onset of the depres­
sion a number of suggestions were made as to the needs and ways of 
stabilizing prices and production. As early as December 1930» Charles 
F, Abbott, executive director of the American Institute of Steel Con­
struction, told an assembled group of salesmen:
Overproduction has seemingly made it necessary for some drastic 
experiments. As important as steel is to the national existence, 
the industry has consistently refrained from restricting output 
or depriving the public of its products. In the case of copper, 
sugar, coffee, rubber, wheat, cotton and other basic commodities,
^^Nicholas M, Butler, "A Planless World." in Charles A. Beard 
(ed.), America Faces the Future (Boston, 1932), p. 11.
p. 19,
^^allace B. Donham, Business Adrift (Boston, 1931)» PP« 33-36.
Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old 
Order (Boston, 1957)» P® 181.
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efforts which seemingly had their inspiration in price fixing seem to 
be the only practical remedy
Almost two years later Abbott told another group;
Certainly no fair-minded business man wants to encourage any- inter­
ference with the economic law of supply and demand during normsl 
timeso Price regulation or restraint of competition is not to be 
desired, but when business sinks to the low levels of the past two 
and a half years then there are grounds for exceptions « Public 
welfare becomes involved and it is far better to apply war-time 
measures of relief if in doing so our business interests can be 
saved and employment preserved«26
Another steel company executive said bluntly that his industry was "suffer­
ing from the natural consequences of our own stupidity» » » » Price stabili* 
zation means, first of all, that business men engaged in the same industry 
must substitute cooperation for cutthroat coiq)etition.
It was felt by many observers, however, that the mere controlling 
of prices would not solve the problems facing the industry if productive 
capacity continued to expand faster than the ability of the market to 
consume. Just as the merger movement in the steel industry seemed to 
progress more rapidly during hard times, so too expansion was less ex­
pensive and swifter. For example in 1930 more new ingot capacity—
3,830,550 tons— was added to the industry than at any time since the war 
28boom year of 1915* The next year saw thirty-eight new open hearth fur­
naces, with an estimated capacity of 4,075,000 tcKis, built by various
29members of the industry* Many business leaders began to see this over-
^^Steel, LXXVII (December 25, 1930), p, 25, 
2^Iron Age. CXXX (July 7, 1932), p, 17. 
^^Ibid,. GXXIX (March 10, 1932), p, 628, 
^^New York Times. April 12, 1931, p. 9« 
^^Iron Age. GXXIX (January 7, 1932), p. 58,
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expansion as one of the major causes of the industry®s distresso A
correspondent of Iron À^e commented: "The weak position of most mature
businesses today is caused by over-expansion of plant capacity without
due consideration of the fundamental question of whether or not the ex-
30pension of consumer demand has been in proportiono" An editorial in
that Journal itself stated: "One of steel's contributions to the un-
es^loyment crisis has been the building of open-hearth furnaces far b^rond 
31immediate needs," The editorial concluded by asking if this were a 
wise policy.
Criticism that industry also had some responsibility for the
security of its employees led to numerous suggestions that business itself
furnish that security. In the spring of 1932 a group of railway union
officials visited Hoover, In a mood of frankness they told the President:
Mr, President we have come here to tell you that unless something 
is done to provide employment and relieve distress among the families 
of the unemployed, . , . we will refuse to take the responsibility 
for the disorder which is sure to arise. . . . There is a growing 
demand that the entire business and social structure be changed be­
cause of the general dissatisfaction with the present system,32
These apocalyptic words were not lost on some business leaders. For
whatever its worth the steel industry had been a leader in the share-the-
33work movement since the onset )f the depression. This measure, however,
3°Ibid.. CXXVIII (September 24, 1931), p. 815.
^^Ibid,. CXXVII (January 1, 1931), p. 110,
^^New York Times. May l4, 1932, p, 1.
33 So Congress, Ten^orazy National Economic Committee. Hearings 
on the_Investigation of the Concentration of Economic.Power. ?6th Cong., 
3d Sess,, 1940, p, 1450?. Hereafter cited as TNEC Hearings.
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llko 80 many others, only alleviated a portion of the total distress, 
Thus, James VTo Hook, president of tho Qeometrio Tool Company and a 
member of Hoover's Emergency Council, told industry that the maintenance 
of income of stable workers during depression was "the direct and press­
ing obligation of industry to the problem of mitigating the scourge of 
34u n e m p l o y m e n t I n  proposing that industries create unemployment re­
serves Hook said:
Society has already learned that saving a person from starving or 
freezing is not enough, and that, if such human effort destroys the 
person's self-respect and develops in him a permanent inferiority 
complex, it has made of him a continuing charge upon society and in 
some cases a menace as well. While solution of the unemployment 
problem is up to society as a whole, an important part of the solu­
tion is a definite responsibility of the industrial employer.35
The National Industrial Conference Board, with several industry 
leaders represented, proposed that a dismissal wage would be within the 
proper scope of good business practices. The Board used as an example a 
con^aiy which practiced the policy of giving severance pay to its em­
ployees when obliged to out its work force or to close a plant entirely. 
The Board concluded that this policy's result was that, "instead of turn­
ing from their doors 2000 people with a grievance, bitter and ready to 
listen sympathetically to radical doctrine, this company by its liberal 
policy justified in the eyes of its former emplcyees and those who came
into contact with them not only the particular management, but the eco- 
nomic system under which it operated."^ The NICB warned that if industr; 
failed to provide "a constructive solution at least for the more pressing
^^Iron Age. CXXVIII (August 20, 1931), p, 5H« 
^^1]^, ^^Ibid,. p, 517.
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social problems that affect its employees, it may expect the decision
Vfto be taken out of its hands on matters that it should determine. -
One businessman, however, expressed no faith in businesses' willingness
to provide such social security measures. Ernest Du Brul, former manager
of the National Machine Tool Builders' Association, told an Ohio audience:
"Unemployment insurance would help to prevent unemployment as industrial
compensation helps reduce a c c i d e n t s , D u  Brul, however, recommended
that unemployment compensation costs to business be made cos^ulsory,
because, "Business will do nothing more after this depression than it has
39in the past, unless there is some compulsion,"^
The stabilization of prices, the regulation of production and even 
the gathering of necessary data and the formulation of plans for various 
social security schemes presented what appeared to be a knotty problem 
to most businessmen who favored such schemes. The major hinderance, many 
reasoned, in developing concerted plans was the antitrust laws. Various 
industrialists had been recommending, almost since the passage of the 
Sherman Act, that that epochal law be either modified or repealed. The 
general reason usually given for this recommendation was that such a law 
was not realistic in an age where bigness had so much to contribute to 
the economic well-being of the nation. Those who favored the Sherman 
Act, however, held that it was the only method for preserving competition, 
and competition meant the preservation of free access to the productive 
market and the maintenance of lower prices to the consumer.
By the 1920's businessmen had decided that absolute free enterprise
3flbid, ^^Ibid.. CXXIX (May 12, 1932), p, 1080, ^^bid.
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meant wasteful cut-throat competition, unfair trade practices and business 
inefficiencyo The Department of Commerce, under Secretary- Herbert Hoover, 
encouraged businesses to organize into trade associations, to draw up 
codes of fair practice, and to share information on wages, production, 
construction and the like. Hoover even recommended the modification of 
the antitrust laws to allow an expansion of these activities.
The depression, and its effects on business, brought a renewed and 
heightened demand for modification of the antitrust laws. George M.
Verity, chairman of the American Rolling Mill Company, told a Chicago 
conference of industrial leaders: "When the public at large comes to a
full realization of the importance of greater stability in production, and 
how impossible it is for industry to do anything in a co-operative way to 
control that important factor, because of existing antiquated anti-trust
ilQlaws, it will demand a sound modification of these laws." In November
1930, the American Institute of Steel Construction at its annual meeting
urged Hoover to appoint a commission to study how such a modification would
benefit industry. The following month Hoover recommended that Congress
inquire into the working of the antitrust laws:
I do not favor repeal of the Sherman Act. The prevention of monopolies 
is of most vital public importance. Competition is not only the basis 
of protection to the consumer but is the incentive to progress. How­
ever, the interpretation of these laws by the courts, the changes in 
business, especially in the economic effects upon those enterprises 
closely related to the use of the natural resources of the country, 
make such an inquiry a d v i s a b l e .42
^ Steel. LXXVII (October 30, 1930), p. 44.
^^Ibide (November 6, 1930), p. 58.
42D, S., Congressional Record. 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 1930, LXXIII, 
Part 1, p. 35.
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Two days latery however, the announcement-hy steel companies af a price 
raise brought forth the wrath of such antitrust senators as George- Norris 
and Thomas Walsh who suggested that the Department of Justio mightrwell
k 'alook into violations of the Sherman Act.
In spite of Hoover's luke-warmness toward revision and the outright 
opposition of powerful political leaders, the demand for modification of 
the trust laws continued through 1931 and 1932« Virgil Jordan, an eco­
nomist for Business Week, told a smaller industries' management conference 
that antitrust laws had become "pro-trust" laws because they were fô pijig
small industries into mergers or bankruptcy, thus concentrating power in
44the hands of big units. In January, 1932, Charles F. Abbott, recommended
to President Hoover the suspension of the antitrust laws for at least two 
years as an "emergency reconstruction m e a s u re.Some  quarters, however, 
began to advise caution on the drive to get antitrust modification. The 
commissioner of the National Metal Trades Association wrote the editor of 
Iron Age;
It is my belief that under present-day political psychology greater 
freedom for industrial combinations cannot possibly be secured with­
out equivalent concessions in respect to governmental supervision 
of business. Political opinion will not at this stage of our devel­
opment extend any power to the industrialists which might result in 
oppressing the public without surrounding that power with governmental 
restraint to protect the p u b l i c .46
The commissioner warned that liberalizing the antitrust laws might aid
labor unions and lead to governmental regulation of business.^? The
^^Ibid.. p. 176. ^Iron Age. CXXVIII (August 20, 1931), p. 512.
^^Ibid.. CXXIX (January 28, 1932), p. 300.
^^Ibid. (February 25, 1932), p. 518. ^^Ibid.
5̂
editor of Iron Age concluded ;
The belief appears to be growing, in industry and business, that it 
will be well to move slowly in the matter of anti-trust law revision»
One reason is that conditions are not now propitious for legislative 
experiment in the field of economic policy. Another is that perhaps 
the administrative attitude toward these existing laws needs revi­
sion more than the laws themselves,^
The ideas contained in that editorial were answered ty the annual report 
to Congress of Attorney General William D, Mitchell, The Attorney General 
recommended that Congress consider amending the antitrust laws but that 
until Congress did act the Department of Justice had to proceed under the 
existing laws irregardless of business conditions, Mitchell-warned, how­
ever, that if the restrictions against combinations were withdrawn, the 
public would have to be furnished governmental protection against excessive 
prices.
If the antitrust laws were revised to allow some sort of collective 
action, what form would that action take and how would it be accomplished? 
Industry leaders were in general agreement on these questions. Since most 
industries in similar lines were organized in some sort of trade associa­
tion, it was thought that those associations could form the agency to pro­
mote business cooperation, A strengthened and more active trade association, 
in fact, became the concomitant panacea with modification of the antitrust 
laws in curing both the causes and effects of the depression, Charles 
Abbott asserted: "The only known relief from our present difficulties is
through the activities of our industrial trade associations. Industrial
^ Ibid, (February 4, 1932), pp. 36l-3&3°
^%bid,. c m  (December 8, 1932), p, 889,
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associations are not only essential in promoting progress, but they are a
necessary benefit to members, to customers and to the public.
A trade association was a "non-profit organization formed by inde«
pendent business competitors to promote their common advantage." The
trade association movement had its birth during the latter decades of the
nineteenth century and became especially characteristic of United States
business, as opposed to European cartelization. But like the cartel, the
trade association grew up at a time when most businessmen began to look
upon most competition as "cut-throat" in nature. This competition could
be escaped either by mergers or by agreements to stop competing. Both
methods were adopted from time to time and the trade association became
a device to at least define the ground rules for competition.
Most writers on the trade association movement make a point of
showing that after 1900 trade associations became, instead of pooling
devices, simple service organizations. As such they performed such
services as distribution to members of trade information, standardization
and grading of products, interchange of prices on past transactions and
price quotations, the establishment of uniform trade rules (usually in
codes of fair trade practices), and many other similar projects. The
United States Chamber of Commerce in 1933 listed sixty-eight separate func«
tions of the trade associations along such lines. One writer on trade
association activity, however, holds that these activities give "only a
half picture of the trade association movement." Simon Whitney writes:
Not nearly so much energy would have gone into this work if its 
only purpose had been to carry on the service activities mentioned.
It is not general advice and assistance to the members, but the desire
(July 7, 1932), p. 889.
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for industrial control, which is the driving force behind the whole 
movement. Legislative, statistical and technical aid may be helpful 
to business men, but the elimination of over-production and price 
cutting is vital. The real core of the trade association movement 
has lain in its attack on free competition~an attack in which it 
finally obtained support from the law when the National Industrial 
Recovery Act was passed.51
The effectiveness of industrial control by the trade associations, however, 
was restrictea ay tne anLiurust xaws; nenue the concurrent drive lor more 
effective trade associations was coupled with the campaign for relaxed 
antitrust activity.
Beginning in 1919 the Federal Trade Commission began holding trade 
practices conferences. Members of a particular industry would meet with 
the Commission and adopt codes of fair practices. The FTC would then 
announce that it approved the code or certain provisions of the code, thus 
committing themselves to enforce those provisions. Other provisions could 
be accepted but did not carry the enforcement commitment. A final cate­
gory of provisions could be disapproved, thus making them ineffective as 
far as the law was concerned. As the years passed more and more codes 
contained provisions which the FTC felt it could not enforce because of 
possible conflicts with the antitrust laws. Business became so enthusiastic 
over the possibilities of establishing such comprehensive codes, however, 
that in the late 1920's the trade conferences became more numerous, most 
of them being called T%r the trade associations themselves. The Commission 
decided in 1931 to call a halt to what they considered questionable 
activities of the trade associations. The FTC began a revision of the 
existing codes "to tighten up on the associations, which, it has been 
said, were leaning too heavily toward price fixing, more or less indirectly.
51Simon N. Whitney, Trade Associations and Industrial Control 
(New York, 1934), p. 38»
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COand in the direction of a lessening of competition, Even Hoover 
proved to be a disappointment to the trade associations' desire for ex­
panded activity. During his presidency the Department of Justice-launched 
eight dissolution suits against trade associations and was successful' in 
five of those suits. Thus, the trade association conferences under FTC 
auspices slackened greatly in 1932» only seven such conferences bsifig 
called,
Business leaders thus took their demands on antitrust modification 
and trade association liberties into the public arena. Iron Age edi­
torialized:
American industry is facing a period when "concerted** action will 
be found indispensable. If we are to avoid a repetition of the 
bitter experience of the past 16 months of depression, some way 
must be found to avoid overproduction, , , . The one feasible 
American way of approaching this problem is through mutual planning 
and understanding among trade associations, which bring together, 
in related groups, nearly all of our present producing units,
Very simply, stated C, H, Smith, vice president of the American Drop Forg­
ing Institute, "Price stabilization means, first of all, that business 
men engaged in the same industry must substitute cooperation for cutthroat 
competition,"^^ Smith concluded that antitrust modification and greater
eg
trade associational activities would bring that cooperation,^
Industry's proposals for its own planning, however, could not be 
kept out of the general discussion of national economic planning. For as
Journal of Commerce. CXLVII (March 31, 1931), P» 1.
^^hitney. Trade Associations.and Industrial Control, pp, 53-56, 
^^Iron Age. CXXVII (March 19, 1931). p. 952,
^^Ibid,. G X m  (March 10, 1932), p, 628, ^^Ibid,
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the depression wore on it seemed as if almost everyone had some--sort 
of a plan, ranging from single uncomplicated palliatives to the more 
radical schemes along the lines of the Soviet Five-Year Plan. A-large 
part of the public became amateur economists, interested in speculating 
on the direction which the economy should take and avidly reading the 
schemes put forth in periodicals and books by the professional economists 
and journalists. In 1931 the Book-of-the-Honth Club issued I. I, Marshak's 
New Russia's Primer» The Storv of the Five Year Plan. The Club's large 
audience was able to read:
We have a plan.
In America they work without a plan.
We have a seeding campaign.
In America thqy destroy crops.
We increase production.
In America th^y reduce production and increase unemployment.
We make what is essential.
In America hundreds of factories consume raw materials and energy 
in order to make what is altogether unnecessary,57
Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, told an audience
that, "the characteristic feature of the experiment in Russia , , , is
not that it is communist, but that it is being carried on with a plan in
the face of a planless opposition. The man with a plan, however much we
dislike it, has a vast advantage over the group sauntering down the road
of life complaining of the economic weather and wondering when the rain is
going to stop."^®
Most businessmen, however, were not buying a Soviet plan, nor indeed
^^Quoted in Joseph Dorfman. The Economic Mind in American Civi­
lization. V (New York, 1959)» p. 631,
p. 632,
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any plan which projected the government's having a dominant position in
the economyo James Hook, president of the Geometric Tool Company and
chairman of the New England Council's industrial committee, called for
planning, but cautioned:
I most certainly do not mean a Soviet Russia type of planning, con­
ceived by a central autocratic planning commission and forced upon 
industry by an all-powerful dictator. I mean rather a type of plan­
ning that stirs individual management to its highest efforts and that 
enables that management to cheek its actions and policies with success­
ful methods used and proved elsewhere to have been possible and 
effective. I mean a kind of planning that will squarely face the 
evils of unbridled competition, destructive governmental restraint, 
absentee ownership and security-jobbing financial profiteering.59
Thus, it was competition that needed to be regulated, and the concerted
action of industry itself, not governmental direction, could control
competition. The editor of Iron Age wrote: "We pride ourselves sometimes
that these are the days of law and order in which 'might' does not make
'right'! But when the big corporation uses its purchasing power and the
lever of present conditions to squeeze its small suppliers' bids to the
point where profits vanish, is it not analogous to the days of the hairy
arm and the studded club?"^^ A few months later Iron Age commented on
those who objected to planning on the grounds that it would destroy
individualism. The editorial said: "The rugged individualism of the
steel industry « . . and the insistence on sticking to the principle of
'get the business regardless of profit' has eaten away its earning power
and dissipated its assets. . . .  Less insistence on pure individualism
and more effort toward cooperation instead of cut-throat conpetition seems
to be indicated as profitably in order.
^^Iron Age. CXXVIII (September 24, 1931)i P« 835o 
60]
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Proposals for economic planning continued to fill the air and 
business interests, while still proposing their own programs, were k^t 
busy combatting those which they thought inimical to their interests.
The popular economist Stuart Chase proposed a Peace Industries Board, 
modeled on the old War Industries Board, to give government supervision 
over major industries. The labor leader Matthew Woll called for a Busi­
ness Congress, sitting continuously under government supervision, with no 
limits on their planning powers, even to the extent of fixing prices or 
combines. Charles A. Beard proposed that a National Economic Council be 
established to develop a master plan for theeoonony, with each industry- 
grouping governed by subsidiary syndicates. Iro^ Age deplored the 
"radical" suggestions being advanced and added:
Greenbackism is dead and free silver is dead, but the psychology of 
these earlier depressions is plain to be seen in the reception now 
given to various proposals for social and economic legislation. . . . 
Most of the agitation against the present economic order will do 
more to retard than to help recovery from this depression. Some 
things have been wrong with business, but defects in the structure 
or in the way it.is used are not going to be remedied by bombing 
the foundations,
One business economist was wary of almost any proposal for a planned 
economy, saying that a planning board "would be turned over to practical 
administrators, chosen primarily with respect to their ability to get 
along with men, and with respect to their aoceptibility to controlling 
political groups, and instead of economic planning we should get political 
compromise.
Appendix in J. George Frederick (ed.). The Swope Plan; Details. 
Criticism. Analysis (New York, 1931), n.p.
*3lron Age. CXXVII (February 12, 1931), p. 526.
^^enjamin M. Anderson, "A Planned Economy and A Planned Price 
Level," Chase Economic Bulletin. XIII (June 9, 1933), P» 9.
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The first con^rehensive économie plan which met most of the conditions
acceptable to the business community came from the president of General 
Electrict Gerard Swope» On September 16, 19311 Swope, who had been 
associated with Hull House and the War Industries Board, set forth his 
plan before the National Electrical Manufacturers Association» Prefac­
ing remarks by stating concern for the plight of the unemployed worker,
Swope proposed a comprehensive program for the self-regulation of business» 
He stressed that there was nothing new or original in his proposal but 
that he was only "bringing together well-considered propositions that have 
found support, including some that have been put into actual practice»"^^ 
Swope stressed that legislation would be required to put the plan into 
operation. The Swope Plan provided that all industrial and commercial 
companies with fifty employees or more doing an interstate business could 
form a trade association» These associations would establish trade prac­
tices rules, coordinate production and oonsunqption, and stabilize prices. 
Uniform accounting practices and access to con^any books would be nec­
essary for such coordination» Provision was to be made for some agency 
of the federal government to supervise the activities of the trade assoc­
iations» Workman's condensation, life insurance, pensions and unenployment 
and disability insurance were to be provided for enqplqyees through their 
own and company contributions » All cong)anies that met the legal require­
ments could adopt the plan when it went into effect. However, they were 
forced to join before the expiration of three years.Thus, Swope pro­
posed the cartelization of the major part of American industry.
^^Prederick, The Swooe Plan, p. 24. pp. 19-40.
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The reaction to Swope’s proposal was rather quick in coming and
generally favorable « Bernard Baruch endorsed the plan at a reunion of
former executives of the War Industries B o a r d » T h e  steel industry was
generally enthusiastic» Their organ of opinion, Iron Age, oonmented:
Whatever comes of the Swope plan » » » the trade association movement 
has been helped measurably by it» Industries without such organiza­
tions may see a new purpose in them. » . » Many industries probably 
need the bénéficiant dictator, or the firm referee, one who points 
the path to be followed and does not have to consider what may be 
the decisions of the courts on any law involved»""
Charles F« Abbott said: "The Swope plan in its demand for compulsory
membership in a trade association » » » and other similar movements are
all indicative of public t h i n k i n g ,
There were some observers, however, who had misgivings about the
Swope Plan, either because of its limitations or because of its entire
conception. The Outlook held that the advancement of this plan as a
means of achieving security for the workmen seemed "like using an elephant
gun to kill a wolf," The Outlook’s writer said that he was amused to see
such a plan receiving such sympathetic support from so many conservative
leaders and publications, but added that "such support is but another
illustration that conservatives can with perfect inqpunity advocate ideas
70which would get radicals shot at sunrise."' The Nation had grave mis­
givings about the cost to en^loyees of the various social insurance
"̂̂ New York Herald Tribune. November 12, 1931» P. 1.
^^Iron Age. CXXVIII (September 24, 1931)» P® 840.
^^lüâ»» CXXX (July 7» 1932)» p. 17.
0̂'»*’»“ LIX (September 30, 1931)» p« 139.
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schemes provided Toy the plan, but greater doubts still as to the amount 
of control which the government would have over production control and 
price fixin g , T h e  socialist leader, Norman Thomas, criticized the- plan
because it still eo^hasized the profit motive, "The plan is weak," said
72Thomas, "because Mr, Swope"s underlying philosophy is still weaker,"
And it was not only the "radicals" who criticized the plan, H, Parker
Willis, the editor of the New York Journal of Commerce, found no use for
any plan, saying that "almost everybody is waiting Impatiently for some
73scheme or other to be evolved which will save him from himself,"
The issue had been drawn, however, and almost everyone seemed to 
favor some plan. Business in general, and the steel industry in parti­
cular, was now constantly chanting the word "co-operation" as a means 
of alleviating the economic distress and preventing such catastrophe in 
the future. "I would like to join any kind of society or a small group 
or a large group," explained Tom Girdler of Republic Steel, "and start 
out on a 100 per cent faith in each other basis and take off our coats 
and tackle this job and make a little profit out of the steel industry," 
Price stabilization and production control were the keys to the demands 
for cooperation and planning and calls for "ethical business practices" 
mainly meant refraining from price cutting. Even the old free enterprise 
objective of competing for all the business one could get was giving way, 
A sales manager for a manufacturing company wrote to Iron Age : "After
all, the most that any manufacturer can hope to do is to supply his share 
of the available demand,"^^
f^The Nation. CXXXII (September 30, 1931). p. 323°
^^Quoted in Frederick, The Swope Plan, pp, 88-89, ^^Ibid.. p, 100.
n ilYearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 1930, p, 170, 
^^Iron Age. CXXVIII (September 24, 1931), p. 815,
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The steel industry moved forward in preparing for any eventuality 
which would give the trade association a greater role in economio plan­
ning» In August, 1932, the American Iron and Steel Institute chose 
Robert Po Lament, secretary of commeroe in the Hoover administration, 
as their new presidents Iron Age called Lament's appointment "the most
significant step the industry has taken in the 24 years of Institute 
76history," Much of the daily press speculated that Lament's appointment 
meant that the steel industry had chosen a "dictator" to enforce coopera­
tion on the industry» Again Iron Age commented that even though the 
word dictator was not accurate, yet "that word probably describes in 
part the leadership for which the steel trade is ready, in view of its 
disastrous experiences of many m o n t h s T o  assist Lamont, George H,
Charls, who had been president of the National Association of Flat
78Rolled Steel Manufacturers, was chosen by the Institute, At the only
meeting of the Institute held in 1932, Charles Schwab announced that the
board of directors of ÂISI had "determined to broaden the scope of this
body," Schwab continued: "The Institute has done good work in the past,
but in times when we have so many problems in common, it is important to
have a more invigorated policy, to extend our facilities for presenting
a united front for our industry. We have added to our personnel, added
to departments and begun to organize programs of constructive work for the
79benefit of the industry," The transition from private trade association 
to public code authority under the NRA was not difficult for the American
CXXX (August 11, 1932), p. 231.
T^Ibid, (October 6, 1932), p, 54?.
^^Yearbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 1932, p. 28.
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Iron and Steel Instituteo
CHAPTER III 
BIRTH OF THE NRA
The miaery and despair of an entire nation was capsuled into a 
few words uttered by the man who had tried to provide effective national 
leadership since the crash of 1929» On the day of his leaving office a 
weary Herbert Hoover said: "We are at the end of our rope» . = o There
is nothing more we can dOo"^ The President was a humane man and his 
spirit must have been at its lowest ebb, not only because the depression 
had grown worse in spite of his efforts, but also because the people had 
rejected his leadership by turning him out of office in the midst of the 
great crisiso
The results of the election of 1932 had never seemed to be in 
doubto The old political aphorism that the Democratic party could nomi­
nate "a yellow dog or a rag baby" and still win was accepted hy most 
Democrats as being a truism» But even though his election appeared to be 
a foregone conclusion Franklin D» Roosevelt campaigned as if he were 
fighting a tough, almost impossible battle» Besides being a consummate 
politician and well aware of the tribulations awaiting the man chosen to 
lead the nation during one of its most critical periods, Roosevelt re­
mained calm, confident, and buoyant throughout the arduous campaign»
Pledging himself to a "new deal" for the American people Roosevelt called
2for "bold, persistent experimentation" by the government» Whether because
^Quoted in Arthur M» Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order 
(Boston, 1957)» P» 1»
^Samuel I» Roseman (ed»). The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. Vol» I: The Genesis of the New Deal. 1928-1932 (New York. 
1938), p. 646» Hereafter cited as Public Papers of Franklin D» Roosevelt»
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of the dlsenohantment with Hoover”s methods and policies or because 
of some responsive chord struck in the minds of the people Roosevelt was 
swept into office in a landslides
It was a gray and dreary day on March 4, 1933» when Roosevelt took 
the oath which made him the 32nd President of the United States. The 
weather added only additional gloom to the mood of the people who had 
experienced three years of ever-mounting economic depression and decay. 
Nearly 13 million Americans were jobless and the national income was 
one-half what it had been four years before. Large numbers of factories 
had curtailed production, laid-off employees, and had finally closed 
their doors. Retail businesses began to slash prices as consumers ceased 
to purchase goods, either because they lacked the money or because they 
were saving funds for fear of eventual unenqplpyment.
The condition of the steel industry was no exception to the general 
rule of economic distress. In February 0. S. Steel reduced its regular 
quarterly dividend to one-half percent, or fifty cents a share. This was 
the first time in the company's history that dividends fell below an 
annual rate of seven percent. The justification for this reduction was 
not hard to find. The Steel Corporation had experienced a net operating 
deficit of $31»949,937 in 1932;^ ingot production had fallen from 
10,082,398 tons in 1931 to only 4,929,236 tons in 1932; and of a total 
working force of 158,032 persons only 18,938 had been employed full-time. 
U. S. Steel's total payroll in 1931 was $266,871,413, but it dropped in
i, GXXXI (February 2, 1933), p. 208.
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1932 to $133,912,8090 These statistics concerning the world’s largast
steel company applied on a smaller scale to the rest of the industry-.
The twenty leading steel companies in the United States showed losses of
$150 million in 1932 conçared to deficits of a little over $l6 million
in 1931o^ In January 1933, the steel industry was operating at I7.87
percent of capacity0 By March operations had fallen to 15o6 percent.^
On March 14, due to the banking crisis, Chevrolet closed its plants
indefinitely, while Ford’s River Rouge plant was operating only a few
ndepartments. Steel’s biggest customers had ceased to operate.
It is little wonder that the nation took heart to hear the new 
president assure them in his inaugural address that "the only thing we
Q
have to fear is fear itself. . . . "  Roosevelt made it very clear
when he asserted, "This Nation asks for action, and action now," that
9he intended to provide that action. The nation did not have long to 
wait. On the very day he took office Roosevelt issued two proclamations—  
the first declaring a nation-wide banking holiday and the second summoning 
Congress into special session. On March 9 Congress met in its first 
regular session, beginning what has been called the greatest barrage of 
presidential ideas and programs known to American history.Roosevelt 
sent fifteen messages to Congress and guided fifteen major laws to enact-
(March I6, 1933), P» 437. p. 8.
*Ibid. (^ril 13, 1933), Po 598. ^I^., CXXIX (March 16, 1932), p. 441.
g
U. S., Congress, House, Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of 
the United States. 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, House Doc. 540, p. 225.
^Ibid.. p. 226.
10Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1959), p. 20.
60
ment from the first day of the session until June 15o Generally designed 
to produce relief, recovery, and reform, these laws ranged from the 
Emergency Banking Act to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, to the Federal 
Emergency Relief Act» One of these laws sought to fulfill all three 
functions and was characterized by Roosevelt himself as "the most impor­
tant and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress 
This law, of course, was the National Industrial Recovery Act,
It was only natural that the issue of recovery would have occupied 
much of Roosevelt's thoughts and planning, both during the campaign and 
in the early days of his new administration. Perhaps the address which 
most clearly outlined the philosophy of candidate Franklin Roosevelt and 
portended much of the later New Deal was that delivered before the San 
Francisco Commonwealth dub on September 23, 1932» Roosevelt asserted that 
every man had a right to make a comfortable living as part of the general 
rights of life, liberty, and property. Thus:
The implication is, briefly, that the responsible heads of finance 
and industry instead of acting each for himself, must work together 
to achieve the common end. They must, where necessary, sacrifice 
this or that private advantage; and in reciprocal self-denial must 
seek a general advantage. It is here that formal Government- 
political Government, if you choose— cones in. Whenever in pursuit 
of this objective the lone wolf, the unethical competitor, the reck­
less promoter, the Ishmael or Insull whose hand is against every 
man's declines to join in achieving an end recognized as being for 
the public welfare, and threatens to drag the industry back to a 
state of anarchy, the Government may properly be asked to apply 
restraint. Likewise, should the group ever use its collective 
power contrary to the public welfare, the Government must be swift 
to enter and protect the public interest,1%
^^Franklin D, Roosevelt, On Our Wav (New York, 1934), P» 97»
^^Public Papers of Franklin D, Roosevelt. I, pp, 754-755o
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Other pre-election addresses amplified this theme. Speaking., at a
Jefferson Day dinner in St. Paul on April 18, Roosevelt denounced Hoover®® 
methods of dealing with the depression as a **panic=stricken policy of 
delay and improvisation" and contrasted them with the "considered-, rele­
vant measures of constructive value" enqployed by Woodrow Wilson in meet­
ing the World War I emergency. The War Industries Board, the Food and 
Fuel Administrations, the War Trade Board and other such economic planning 
and directing agencies were used as examples by the candidate to show what 
steps a democracy could take to meet a national crisis. Roosevelt con­
cluded:
I am not speaking of an economic life con^letely planned and regi­
mented. I am speaking of the necessity, however, in those imperative 
interferences with the economic life of the nation that there be a 
real community of interest. . . .  I plead not for class control but 
for a true concert of interests. The plans we may make for this 
emergency, if we plan wisely and rest our structure upon a base suf­
ficiently broad, may show the way to a more permanent safe-guarding 
of our social and economic life to the end that we may in a large 
number avoid the terrible cycle of prosperity crumbling into depres­
sion. In this sense I favor economic planning, not for this period 
alone but for our needs for a long time to come. 13
Thus, Roosevelt predicated a new direction for the government and business
if he were elected.
This insistence on collective business responsibility to the public 
did not differ in spirit from that of Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson, 
but Franklin Roosevelt had a more direct experience with a type of business 
cooperation than most of his predecessors. In the 1920®s he had worked 
with Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover in forming the American Construc­
tion Council to bring some order and stability into the huge but chaotic
Po 632,
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construction Industryo The Construction Council was in reality a huge 
trade association made up of 250 smaller trade associationso As president 
of the Council until 1928 Roosevelt saw his task as guiding the construc­
tion industry into working out its own salvation, Roosevelt said: 
"Huddling through has been the characteristic method employed by the 
construction industry for the last few years. There has been no system,
   • -    4 2#
no cooperation, no intensive, national planning." Roosevelt proposed 
that the Council develop a code of ethics, stabilize production and 
gather statistics through cooperation among industry members. He 
recognized, of course, that "a good many difficulties stood in the way, 
including the United States Government and the Department of Justice. 
Whether or not he made any lasting contributions to the construction 
industry or to trade association activities, the business of the Council 
greatly increased under Roosevelt's leadership.
To prepare for the 1932 caitpaign Roosevelt drew around him a group 
of specialized intellectuals who had one central thought in common—  
that the federal government had to take a more active role in economic 
life. Three of the four original members of this "brain trust", Raymond 
Holey, Adolph Berle, and Rexford Tugwell, were Columbia University pro­
fessors. The fourth member was Samuel I, Roseman who gradually became 
more involved in political matters and was r^laced by General Hugh S.
^\ew York Times. June 4, 1922, p. 1.
^^Quoted in Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal (New York. 1956). p. 107.
%is valuable volume contains a good discussion of Roosevelt's trade 
association activities.
63
JohnsoHo One of Roosevelt®s speech writers later told of the- relation­
ship of this unique group to the candidate:
Mr. Roosevelt had developed his political philosophy long before the 
depression began and long before he met aiy member of his brains 
trust» The brilliant gentlemen in that group were among those who 
helped to apply Mr, Roosevelt's philosophy to the specific conditions 
of 1932-33» Mr, Roosevelt did not recruit his professional advisors 
to provide him with a point of view: he drew them to him because their 
point of view was akin to his own,l6
Tugwell, in his Industry's Coming of Age, accepted the development
of increased productivity and argued that large-scale operations should
be encouraged by a watchful government. Trade associations had a role
to play in the setting of higher standards for the industry involved,
17Above all industry should serve the general welfare. His views on how 
to achieve this goal were contained in The. Industrial.. Discipline- and the 
Governmental Arts published in 1933» An effective system of planning,
including governmental incorporation of business firms, would direct
18industry into the channel of greater productivity. Berle cooperated 
with Gardner C, Means in writing The Modern Corporation and Private
Property in which they discussed the economic ramifications of the sepa-
19ration of ownership from management in the modern corporate structure. 
While Berle and Means did not anticipate the role of government in this
^^Ernest K, Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution: First Phase (New
York, 1933), P» 7»
^^Rexford G, Tugwell, Industry's Coming of Age (New York, 192?), 
pp, 118 ff,
^®Rexford G, Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental 
Arts (New York, 1933), PP» 200-216,
^^Adolph A, Berle and Gardner C, Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (New York, 1933), P» 3̂ 5»
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condition, Tugwell^s conclusions seemed to offer acceptable solutionse 
The main source of the Brain Trustas philosophy on the relation­
ship between government and business and the background ideas eventually
expressed in the NRA legislation, was Charles Van Hise's Concentration
20and Control. The brain trusters discussed Van Hise#8 ideas "endlessly"
during the 1932 campaign and finally embodied that philosophy in a 
memorandum for Roosevelt's use which Samuel Roseman delivered to Roose­
velt at Warm Springs, Georgia, on May 19, 1932« The memorandum stressed 
the belief that the federal government must play a more active regulatory 
role in the economy and develop controls to "stimulate and stabilize 
economic activity," The third point of the document rejected the Wilson- 
Brandeis philosophy of returning America to a nation of "small proprietors, 
of corner grocers and smithies under spreading chestnut trees," Moley wrote:
We agreed that the heart of our difficulty was the anarchy of con­
centrated economic power, , , , We believed that any attempt to 
atomize big business must destroy America's greatest contribution 
to a higher standard of living for the body of its citizenry— the 
development of mass production. We agreed that equality of oppor­
tunity must be preserved. But we recognized that competition, as 
such, was not inherently virtuous; that competition , . , created 
as many abuses as it prevented, 21
This memorandum became the standard for much of the economic philosophy and
policy of the New Deal,
The reaction of the business world generally to the election of
Roosevelt was not unfavorable. However, most industrialists reserved
22judgment until his policies emerged. The stand to be taken on the 
20Raymond Mol^, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 184, 
pp. 23-24,
^^or example see Iron Age. CXXX (November 1?, 1932), p. 772,
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tariff and currency caused great apprehension, but the general relation­
ship of government to business also caused anxiety. During the presi­
dential campaign there had been a call for divorcing politics from economics. 
An Iron Age editorial stated;
And politics must be divorced from economics if we are to win our 
battle with his non-partisan depression. Business this year is 
neither Republican nor Democratic, It is too hard pressed tgr 
conditions to be interested in party labels. It is no time for a 
tug of war; we must all pull together,
There were occasional murmurs from the business community about some of
the measures rushed through during the Hundred Days, but conditions had
been bad for too long and at least there was movement.
Now that an administration was in office which called for eiqperi-
mentation, there was a flurry of activity among those who had been
advancing economic planning since the depression began. The United
States Chamber of Commerce had become very active in demanding self-
government in industry. On May 5» 1932, the Chamber passed a resolution
stating its credo on this matters
Those who are best equipped to solve the problem of industry are 
those who themselves are engaged in industry. For common action 
that is timely, our industries have trade associations through 
which they can act quickly or which they can adapt for action.
Each trade association representative of its industry or branch, 
in accordance with its conditions and in conference with the 
appropriate agency of the government, should be permitted to pro­
mulgate fair rules for industrial production and distribution, 
to improve the status of labor, the industries of the nation and 
the public w e l f a r e ,24
That, in essence, was what the National Industrial Recovery Act provided, 
^^Ibid,. CXXIX (June l6, 1932), p. 1315,
phNew York Times. May 6, 1933, pp. 1 and 7.
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The culmination of this line of business thought and its advocacy» 
however, could only come in the legislative halls and, during the first 
months of the New Deal, only with the approval of Roosevelto It has 
often been pointed out that Roosevelt was no theorist and that the
25various New Deal programs eame as day-to-day projects and iirprovisationso 
The New Deal itself, however, had been foreshadowed by Roosevelt in his 
Commonwealth Club address, by the New Nationalism ideas of his Brain 
Trust and by FIH®s own underlying concept of the public good. The 
first month of Roosevelt® s administration, however, was directed toward 
banking relief and agricultural problems, with the industrial crisis 
being deferred until later. But then on April 6, 1933» the Senate 
passed the Black bill and the administration was forced to apply its in­
dustrial philosophy to a piece of concrete legislation.
The Black bill (S,B.158), introduced in the Senate by Hugo L. Black 
of Alabama, prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by 
labor working more than six hours per day and five days per week. Excep­
tions were made for those engaged in transportation, agriculture, and 
general office work. This bill was both in response to an old cançaign 
of organized labor to shorten working hours, as well as to a desire to 
meet the depression emergency by shortening hours to provide more em­
ployment. Such a scheme had been endorsed by William Green, president 
of the American Federation of Labor, James J. Davis, secretary of labor 
under Hoover, Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia and even Hoover 
himself. Industry had been enqploying a shorter work-week scheme since
^̂ James M. Burns, Roosevelt; The Lion and the Fox (New York,
1956), p. 198.
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the depression had become severe
Black defended his bill on the floor of the Senate and before com­
mittee hearings by arguing that purchasing power would be increased* 
Black commented: "Labor has been underpaid and capital overpaid* This
is one of the chief contributing causes of the present depression* We 
need a return of purchasing power* You cannot starve men enç)loyed in 
industry and depend upon them to purchase *"^^ In reply to criticisms 
that business would lower wages to meet increased labor costs, Black
asserted that public opinion and organized labor pressure would keep 
28wages up*
The Black bill passed the Senate by a vote of fifty-three to 
thirty only three days after it was introduced, having first weathered 
a proposed amendment which would have increased the maximum hours to 
thirty-six* On April 3 the House Labor Committee had also reported 
favorably a conçanion bill sponsored hy Representative William P* Con­
nery of Massachusetts. Speaker of the House Henry T, Rainey, however, 
deferred action on the Connery bill until all of the administration's 
"reconstruction" legislation had passed* The implication was that the 
Black-Connery bill was not a part of the Roosevelt recovery program*
^^Charles F. Roos, NRA Economic Planning (Bloomington, 1937)» P* 29*
^^Quoted in Ibid*. p. 30*
28Ibid* See also Ü* S*, Congress, Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary, Hearings. Thirty Hour Work Week* ?2nd Cong*, 2d Sess., 1933; 
and 0. So, Congress, House, Committee on Labor, Hearings. Six-Hour Dav—  
Five Day Week* 72nd Cong*, 2d Sess., 1933*
29Roos, NRA Economic Planning> p« 31#
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It was indeed true that the Black bill came as a surprise to Roose­
velt and caught him unready to recommend a plan of his own» Secretary 
of Labor Frances Perkins has said that when she talked with the President 
about the Black bill his mind was as "innocent as a child's" of any such 
program as NRAo^^ In addition to catching the administration off-guard, 
hearty protests arose from industrial circles. Business was generally 
favorable to a regulation of hours and wages but only as a part of a 
larger "plan" for industry-government cooperation. An editorial in Iron 
Age expressed fear of what the Black bill might mean to industry and the 
worker:
Manufacturing industry in the United States is now on a basis of 
profitless operation, despite wage reductions. The exceptions 
are so few as merely to prove the rule, A 25 per cent curtailment 
in working hours, under these conditions, inevitably mean a similar 
reduction of income of those now enployed. There being no profits, 
this dole must come from wages. It means lowering the employed 
workers* standards of living another 25 per cent,31
Robert P, Lamont, president of AISI, objected to the plan on the grounds
that it would restrict American industrial sales abroad, would allow
foreign goods to flood American markets and eventually cause the closing
32of more factories and more unemployment « ̂
These objections, plus the lack of endorsement by Roosevelt, did 
not deter the Senate from refusing to reconsider passage of the Black 
bill by a vote of fifty-two to thirty-one on April 17, Evidently, to 
forestall the passage of the bill in the House, Secretary Perkins sub-
^^Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York, 1946), p, 197, 
^̂ l£fin_Age, CXXXI (April 13, 1933), p. 597.
^̂ Ifeiào (May 11, 1933), p. 746,
69
mitted a substitute measure on April 18 providing for governmental control
of production, wages, and hours® At this point dissent came from other
quarters® William Green objected to the power given to industrial boards
33to fix minimum wages because he feared they would become maximum wages® 
Enough confusion had been injected into the picture to give the adminis­
tration time to submit its own comprehensive program for industrial 
recovery®
Such a conqjrehensive program had been the subject of many conferences 
and much work before the Black bill passed the Senate® This activity, 
however, had proceeded without the advice, direction, and knowledge of the 
President® The origins and development of the NIRA is somewhat clouded 
because of subsequent conflicting statements and because of the number of 
persons actually involved in the planning stages® Essential agreement, 
however can be found in the recollections of those who were engaged dir­
ectly or indirectly in the activities leading up to the submission of
3/lthe NIRA to Congress®
Throughout April a number of developments took place which led to 
the formation of the NIRA. Senator Robert Wagner had introduced a bill 
favoring larger RFC loans for public works® A former New York congress-
^ % 008, NRA Economic Planning, p® 32»
^^For personal recollections on the origin of the NIRA see, Raymond 
Moley, After Seven Years, pp® 184-190; Hugh S. Johnson, The Blue Eagle 
from Egg to Earth (New York. 1935)» pp® 193-204; Frances Perkins,
Roosevelt I Knew, pp® 197-200; Hugh S. Johnson, "Background of the NRA," 
Saturday Evening Post. CCVI (June 30, 1934), pp® 5-7» 87; and "Bilrth of 
the NRA," Unsigned Memorandum, NRA Papers, NA, For a contemporary syn­
thesis based on interviews with many of the principals see John T, Flynn, 
"Whose Child Is the NRA," Harper's. CXLIX (September, 1934), pp. 387- 
393»
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man, Meyer Jacobsteln, called on Wagner to explain his ideas on loans to 
industry which would be guaranteed by the government o Wagner- was • inter­
ested and suggested that Jacobsteln join Harold Moulton of the Brookings 
Institution in exploring the idea and then make a recommendatiw. The 
Jacobstein-Moulton report to Wagner recommended that the government 
make loans to light industry, and Wagner added this feature to his pend­
ing bill, Wagner then went to Roosevelt with the bill, and Roosevelt 
suggested further study,
Wagner called a meeting soon after his conference with Roosevelt, 
Gathered in Wagner's office were Jacobsteln and Moulton; David L, Podell, 
a trade association lawyer; Fred I, Kent, vice-president of the Bankers 
Trust Company; Jett Lauck, an economist with the Railway Brotherhood;
James Rand, president of Remington-Rand; Colonel Malcolm C, Rorty; 
Representative M, Clyde Kelly of Pennsylvania; Virgil Jordan of McGraw- 
Hill Book Company and president of the National Industrial Conference 
Board; and Simon Rifkind, Wagner's secretary. There were about as many 
ideas presented as there were individuals in the group, Wagner was 
mainly interested in public works, while Podell wanted a relaxation of the 
antitrust laws, Moulton and Kent favored governmental aid to business, 
either in loans or guarantees of profits. Finally, after much discussion 
and the finding of a common meeting ground, a draft bill was prepared.
This bill contained the essence of the later NIRA, minus the licensing 
clause and guarantees of labor rights. Provisions called for public 
works, trade association control of production and fair trade practices, 
shorter hours of labor, prohibitions against price-cutting, and approval 
of various agreements among business groups. The bill was sent to the
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Labor Department for review, and when it came back it contained-a clause
guaranteeing labor the right to bargain collectively<, Wagner, however,
35had many doubts about the bill and decided to hold more conferences« 
Another group in the meanwhile was working along the same lines 
as the Wagner groupo John Dickinson, assistant secretary of commerce 
and a lawyer closely identified with big business interests, had a 
number of economic plans similar to those proposed by the Chamber of 
Commerceo Somehow he was able to get together with Jerome Frank, the 
general counsel of the Department of Agriculture, who was interested in 
ideas of national economic planning advanced by Soule, Beard, and Chase» 
Frank and Dickinson were invited to join the Wagner group» In addition 
the Ü» So Chamber of Commerce, in the person of H» I. Harriraan, its 
president, and John P» Frey, president of the Metal Trades Section of the 
AFL, joined in the discussions» Most of the drafting was left to Frank, 
Podell, Dickinson and Rifkind» ^y the end of April some six draft bills 
had been prepared, none of which satisfied everyone.
By this time the Black bill was forcing Roosevelt to act. Shortly 
before, he had appointed Raymond Moley to direct the efforts toward an 
industrial recovery plan, Moley already had files of letters and plans 
which suggested methods of bringing about business recovery, but he had 
so many other responsibilities that he did not have much time to devote 
to these suggestions» He did, however, give the files to James Warburg 
and asked him to choose the best plans, to talk with their authors, and 
make a report on his findings » Warburg carried out the assignment and
^■%lynn, "Whose Child Is the NRA," p» 39O; and Rocs, NRA Economic 
Planning, pp» 38-39»
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recommended that the government guarantee industry against losses for a 
stipulated period in return for a share in any profits o He also proposed 
that the government make every effort to stimulate the movement of pro­
ducers® goods rather than concentrating on consumers® goods. Finally, 
Warburg added a draft message for the President®s use in advancing these 
ideas and arguing for the "regimentation" of industry,
Moley was not greatly impressed with these suggestions and thought 
that more time should be given for government and business sentiments to 
crystalize. He reported this decision to FDR on April 4 and the President 
agreed. However, on April 6 the Black bill passed the Senate and the ad­
ministration was forced to act. The first tactic was to allow Perkins to 
recommend her own ideas as an amendment to the Black bill. When the amend­
ment became public, however, there was such an outcry against it that a new 
direction had to be found, Roosevelt then directed Moley to get in touch 
with the various groups in Washington working on business-government 
cooperation plans, particularly the Chamber of Commerce and the Brookings 
Institution, Molqr spent two days in conversations with the two groups but 
was so pressed with other work that he made little headway. On ^ril 25 
Moley ran into Hugh Johnson in the Carlton Hotel, an event which was to have 
a far-reaching effect on the NRA and the New Deal,^®
Johnson, who had just returned from a hunting trip in South Carolina 
with his employer Bernard Baruch, had worked with the Brain Trust and then 
on the New Deal®s farm bill, Moley poured out the story of the difficulty 
he was having on an industry bill and asked Johnson; "Will you, in
^̂ Moley, After Seven Years, pp, 185-186, ^̂ Ibid.. pp, 187-188.
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heaven®s name, come over to my office and take all the material I've got
and do this job for F« Do Ro? Nobody can do it better than youo You're
familiar with the only comparable thing that's ever been done— the work
of the War Industries Board," Johnson immediately accepted and moved
39into Moley®s office, using Bob Straus as an assistante As Johnson 
later wrotes "I never went back to New York from that day to the end 
of Dçr service except to get my clothes and rarely even so much as saw uçr 
own family o"̂ *̂
Johnson was a logical choice for the task of drafting the recovery 
legislationo A West Point graduate and later an officer under John J« 
Pershing in the Mexican campaign against Pancho Villa, he had developed 
a sense of what regimentation implied» He had drafted the selective ser­
vice legislation for World War I and had served on the War Industries 
Board» Following World War I he had been associated with George N» Peek 
in the Moline Plow Company and helped Peek develop the McNary-Haugen farm 
plan. Thereafter Johnson became an employee of Bernard Baruch, serving 
as an economic adviser, researcher, and confidante»
Johnson's experience on the WIB probably had a more profound effect 
on his ideas of business-government relations than any of his other ex­
periences» As a member of the WIB Johnson became accustomed to issuing 
directives to trade associations which, according to Johnson, sometimes 
"involved an agreement to sell within certain price limits, sometimes 
to sell only under certain conditions and to certain classes of pur­
chasers, sometimes they imyolved curtailment in production and sale
39 40Ibid». P» 188, Johnson, The Blue Eagle, p, 193»
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throughout the industry, sometimes standardization of type, restrictions in 
the use of materials, and instructions as to shippingo In a few instances 
the Government actually directed a monopoly in a particular commodity» 
Johnson also thought that in an emergency the government could require com­
plete cooperation from business» Thus, he wrotes "Conservation, priority, 
curtailment, price-fixing, all required such co-operation and agreement 
within each industry that the Government was constantly exhibited as re­
quiring in its hour of peril the very things which it had been for years
42denouncing as criminal»" The WIB experience, the military discipline 
and the experience with Peek and Baruch formed the basis of Johnson*s 
work on the NIRA legislation and later as administrator of the National 
Recovery Administration»
Johnson had discussed his philosophy with Moley on March 9 on a 
train ride from New York to Washington, He told Moley that he was afraid 
that the farm bill would raise prices so fast that people in the cities 
would be met by a crushing burden. Therefore, there had to be a corres­
ponding stimulation to industrial re-employment and such emergency action
could provide the beginnings of business-government cooperation which
43would fit Roosevelt's long-range plans» Johnson used these ideas, and 
those he had developed over a year in discussion with Alexander Sachs, in 
the work he did in feverish haste in his Treasury Department office,
Douglas told Johnson that Roosevelt wanted a short bill drawn up in the 
broadest terms, Johnson therefore put his ideas on two pages of foolscap.
ill iipQuoted in Roos, NRA Economic Planning, p, 13» Ibid,
^&oley. After Seven Years, p, 185»
75
At this point Johnson found out that he was not the only person
working on such a plan^ Johnson later wrote that neither he nor Moley
had known of other efforts when they met at the Carlton Hotel, Moley
put Johnson in touch with Dickinson, then listened to their wrangling
keover the relative merits of their two bills, A couple of days later 
Johnson joined the Wagner group and promptly became the dominating 
figure, Johnson and Dickinson were soon given the responsibility for 
developing the final draft and Donald Richberg, an attorney for various 
labor organizations, was brought in to write a labor section for the 
act, A second, and longer, bill was drawn. In this measure the 
President was granted authority to organize industry, to allow trade 
associations to regulate prices, production, and trade practices, and 
to set wages and hours. The Sherman Act would naturally have to be 
suspended, but more revolutionary was the power given to the President 
to license industry,^
While this activity was taking place, Roosevelt®s cabinet became 
involved, Jim Parley, Harold Ickes, and Frances Perkins were pressing 
Roosevelt for a public works bill but were constantly opposed by Lewis 
Douglas, Director of the Budget, At a cabinet meeting Douglas said:
"Mr, President, I have heard in the last few days of a plan being worked 
out here in Washington, It is so far=reaching, so corbelling, so thought­
ful, that it takes in every economic factor, I am positive that if it can 
be developed, that it will do for our economic system in a very short time
^^Johnson, Blue Eagle, p, 193» ^^ol^. After Seven Years, p, 188,
kAFlynn, "Whose Child Is the NRA," p. 392,
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47what could never be done by the public works scheme,” Douglas, however,
would not elaborate on the plan, Perkins later learned from Isador Lubin,
commissioner of labor statistics, that a plan was being worked out in
Wagner's office. Two or three days later Henry Wallace told Roosevelt at a
cabinet meeting that he had learned of the work on such a plan and asked
the President to look into it before endorsing the Black bill, Roosevelt
answered laughingly, "The Secretary of Labor is going to testify on the
Black bill, but not wholeheartedly," Perkins persuaded Roosevelt that if
such a plan was being developed that a cabinet officer should be included,
Roosevelt contacted Rexford Tugwell and Perkins was invited to sit in with
him and Johnson, Johnson was not too happy to have Perkins around but
eventually showed her his plan. It was at this point that Perkins called
William Green, and the labor provision was added to the draft,
Roosevelt waited patiently for the result of these meetings. In
his second fireside chat, on May 7» he talked of "a partnership between
government and industry , , , not partnership in profits , , , but rather
a partnership in planning and a partnership to see that plans are carried
out," Moley, who assisted Roosevelt in drafting this address, said to
Roosevelt; "You realize, then, that you're taking an enormous step away
from the philosophy of equalitarianism and laissez-faire?" After a few
minutes silence, Roosevelt answered gravely: "If that philosophy hadn't
proved to be bankrupt, Herbert Hoover would be sitting here right now,
I never felt surer of anything in iqy life than I do of the soundness of 
48of this passage," Three days later Roosevelt called those who were 
^^Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, pp, 197-198,
^^oley. After Seven Years. p« 189.
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drafting the recovery legislation to the White House and told them -to 
look themselves into a room until they could come up with a bill gen­
erally acceptable to all»
Johnson, Wagner, Dickinson, Richberg, and Perkins hammered out 
the final version of NIRA in Douglas' office» Occasionally, Tugwell, 
Rorty, Baruch, and Henry Harriman dropped by for consultation» After 
a few sessions officials of the departments of Labor, Agriculture, 
and Commerce stopped participating because of their other duties» A 
great amount of fireworks punctuated the meetings» Douglas tried to 
knock out public works; Dickinson was discourteous to Johnson; but 
Tugwell sided with Johnson and the bill was finally completed on 
May 15»^9
The NIRA was a product of years of business thought and months 
of direct work on the specific bill» It was later charged that NIRA 
was the product of left-wing intellectuals» Johnson said, however, 
that there was not a "practicing professor in the lot»" Even though 
Johnson asked Tugwell to assist in drafting the measure, he refused»
The Recovery Act contained specific suggestions made ty the AFL, the 
Ü» So Chamber of Commerce, and the American Manufacturers Association» 
Commenting on the final bill Johnson said, "If I were asked to produce 
the sinister group that dictated it, I would have to name as part of 
it some of the ruggedest industrial individuals in the United States»"^^ 
The National Industrial Recovery Act was divided into three
^^Donald Richberg, My Hero (New York, 195*+)» pp» 164-165»
^^Johnson, "Background of the NRA," p» 87»
78
p a r t s T i t l e  III contained only some technical language concerning 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and does not concern this stu<fy« 
Title II on public works may be regarded as a separate act and likewise 
has no real interest for a study of government-business cooperation. 
Thus, "Title I - Industrial Recovery" was the heart of the law which 
brought together the marçr "plans"which had been advanced since the 
onset of the depression. The original draft of the act was passed, 
with some modification, on June 13» 1933°
Section 1 of the NIRA declared that a national emergency existed 
which had produced "widespread unemployment and disorganization of in­
dustry," thereby burdening interstate and foreign commerce, affecting 
the public welfare, ,and undermining the standards of living of the 
American people. The policy of Congress was therefore declared:
(1) to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and 
foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and
(2) to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organiza­
tion of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among 
trade groups,
(3) to induce and maintain united action of labor and management 
under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision,
(4) to eliminate unfair competitive practices,
(5) to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present 
productive capacity of industries,
(6) to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be 
temporarily required),
^^The text of the National Industrial Recovery Act used in this 
stu^y is H.R, 5755 in Lewis Mayers (ed,), A Handbook of NRA: Laws.
Regulations and Codes (Washington, 1933), PP® 4-26, This volume also 
contains other basic documents pertaining to the NIRA, Various supple­
ments were issued containing executive orders, amendments and court 
decisions under Title I as The NRA Reporter (Washington, 1933-1934)»
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(?) to increase the consumption of Industrial and agricultural 
products by increasing purchasing power,
(8) to reduce and relieve unemployment,
(9) to improve standards of labor, and
(10) otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural 
resources052
Section 2 empowered the President to establish the required agencies,
appoint personnel and delegate any of his functions and powers to those
officials 0 Finally, Section 2 permitted the President or Congress to
end the act before its two-year expiration date if either decided that
53the emergency declared by Section 1 had endedo
Section 3 provided for codes of fair competition and set certain 
standards and procedures for the code makings A trade association or an 
Industry group could present a code which the President would approve if 
he were satisfied that the trade group was truly representative of the 
trade or industry for which it purported to speak and if there were no 
inequitable restrictions to membership in the group. Furthermore, the 
codes submitted had to satisfy the President that they were not designed 
to permit "monopolies or monopolistic practices," nor to "oppress small 
enterprises0" The right to be heard was granted for "persons engaged in 
other steps of the economic process" if they belonged to a code group 
and felt that their welfare stood to be affected by the operation of such 
code. The President was empowered to approve a code subject to certain 
modifications which he believed necessary for the protection of consumers, 
competitors, and enqployees, and he could make exceptions to, and exemptions
^%andbook of NRA, p, 4, PP» -̂5«
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front) the codes when he thought It necessary. Once a code had been ap­
proved it became legally binding on the trade or industry concerned and
violators could be proceeded against by the Federal Trade Commission, 
United States District Attorneys were empowered to institute equity pro­
ceedings in district courts to restrain violations of the codes, and 
fines up to $500 for each day of violation could be imposed. Section 
3d empowered the President to impose a code on an industry after hearings 
if an industry group did not submit its own code. Finally, Section 3 
gave the President control over imports if a Tariff Commission investi­
gation revealed that such actions were necessary to make the codes 
effective0^^
Section 4 allowed the President to enter into agreements with, and 
approve agreements among or between, persons engaged in trade or industry, 
labor organizations and trade organizations which he felt would effectuate 
the purposes of the law,^^ Section 4b was limited to one year's duration 
and greatly expanded the President's power. It authorized him, whenever 
he found "that destructive wage or price cutting or other activities con­
trary to the policy of this title" were being practiced, and after a 
public hearing, to license business enterprises. As one economist stated: 
"The licensing provision, giving the President the power of life or death 
over business enterprises, was the ultimate weapon of enforcement and the
^^Ibid,. pp, 5-7.
^^Roosevelt later used this provision in promulgating the President's 
Reemployment Agreement, popularly called the "blanket code,"
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capstone of the powers granted to the President
Section 5 exempted any code, agreement, or license and any action 
complying with the provisions thereunder from the provisions of the 
antitrust laws. This section also provided that nothing in the act could 
prevent an individual from pursuing manual labor or selling the products 
therefrom, or prevent anyone from selling or trading the produce of his 
farm. Section 6 allowed the President to require certain information 
from trade associations and to employ the Federal Trade Commission to 
make investigations to enable him to carry out the provisions of the
(1) that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coer­
cion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designa­
tion of such representatives or in the self-organization or 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
(2) that no employee or no one seeking employment shall be re­
quired as a condition of employment to join any company 
union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting 
a labor organization of his own choosing; and
(3) that employers shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, 
minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment, 
approved or prescribed by the P r e s i d e n t . 5 8
The remainder of Section 7 allowed the President to approve agreements
on wages, hours, and conditions of work mutually agreed upon by employers
and employees but to impose a limited code containing provisions for those
59conditions if a voluntary one was not reached.
^^Leverett S, Lyon and Others, The National Recovery Adnjinistration: 
An Aoalysis_ and Appraisal (Washington, 1935)» p. 12.
^̂ Handbook of NRA. pp. 7-8. ^̂ Ibld.. p. 9» %̂bid.. pp, 9-10,
82
Section 8 defined the relationship of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act to the NIRAo Section 9 was a special provision for the regulation 
of the oil industry. Section 10, the final provision, authorized the 
President "from time to time /.tojcancel or modify any order, approval, 
license, rule, or regulation," and provided that every code had to con­
tain an express provision to that effect. Violation of any rule or 
regulation issued by the President to effectuate the NIRA could be pun­
ished by a fine up to $500 and/or imprisonment not exceeding six months
On May 17 Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress accompanying
this piece of legislation. The President wrote:
My first request is that the Congress provide for the machinery 
necessary for a great cooperative movement throughout all industry 
in order to obtain wide reemployment, to shorten the working week, 
to pay a decent wage for the shorter week, and to prevent unfair 
competition and disastrous overproduction. « . . One of the great 
restrictions upon such cooperative efforts up to this time has been 
our antitrust laws. They were properly designed as the means to 
cure the great evils of monopolistic price fixing. They should 
certainly be retained as a permanent assurance that the old evils 
of unfair competition shall never return. But the public interest 
will be served if, with the authority and under the guidance of 
Government, private industries are permitted to make agreements and 
codes insuring fair competition. However, it is necessary, if we 
thus limit the operation of antitrust laws to their original purpose, 
to provide a rigorous licensing power in order to meet rare cases 
of noncooperation and abuse.
The National Industrial Recovery Act was introduced into the House of
Representatives (H.R.5755) and the Senate (S.1712) that same day.
The recovery bill went almost immediately to the House Wsys and 
Means Committee, There the major activity concerned Section 7a. While 
the drafting committee had worked on the bill for some time, no one had
^^Ibid.. pp, 10-11,
U, s.. Congressional Record. 73d Cong., jst Sns3,, 1933» LXXVII, Pt, 
4» p. 35^9,
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given much thought to such a guarantee to labor. Frances Perkins had 
seen this important omission and called in William Green, president of 
the American Federation of Labor, for consultation. He thought that 
the bill as written could be used "as a method for putting the labor 
unions out of business" and suggested a guarantee of labor^s right 
to organize and bargain collectively.^^ Hugh Johnson thought that he 
was not sufficiently aware of the ramifications of such a task and at 
this point called in Donald Richberg to aid in drafting the provision.
When the bill reached the Ways and Means Committee there was danger 
that even the rather general provision concerning labor would be 
weakened.
Green came before the committee, however, and made suggestions 
which he felt would plug the loopholes. The original bill's language 
did guarantee workers the right to organize and bargain collectively, 
but Green insisted that the words be added: "And shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their 
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization 
or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection." He also insisted that the words 
"company union" replace the general term "organization" so that the 
clause would read: "That no employee and no one seeking employment shall
be required as a condition of employment to join a 'compaqy union' or 
refrain from joining a labor organization of his own choosing," The 
House committee incorporated these changes and brought the bill to the
62Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, p. 199.
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floor of the House on May 24o^^
The chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Representative Edvard 
Pou of North Carolina, introduced a resolution on May 25 calling for the 
House to resolve itself into a committee of the whole to consider the 
bill. The resolution further provided that debate on the bill would 
last only six hours and no amendments except those suggested by the Ways 
and Means Committee would be entertained, Pou announced that this was 
the procedure which Roosevelt wanted and that amendments would imperil 
the bill. With the "gag rule" thus imposed, congressmen began to discuss 
the measure. Pou led off by stating; "It is very true that under this 
bill . , . the President of the United States is made a dictator over 
industry for the time being, but it is a benign dictatorship; it is a 
dictatorship dedicated to the welfare of all the American people.
This opening gave opponents of the bill ançle room for their 
assault. Representative Harry Ranslgy of Pennsylvania cried that the 
recovery act "Russianizes the business of America." He continued;
"It makes orders from Washington final as to your business. There is 
no appeal, not even to the courts. It imposes penalties for disobedience 
of orders that will emanate from Washington. And still we call this the 
land of the freel"^^ Republican Congressman Carl Mapes of Michigan com­
pared the legislation with that which made Hitler dictator of Germany, 
and concluded; "This legislation spells Government interference with
S., House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on H.R.9759, 
National Industrial Recovery. 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1933» PP» 95-122,
64U. S., Congressional Record. 73d Cong,, 1st Sess., 1933» LXXVII, 
Pt, 4, p. 4188,
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business with a v e n g e a n c e It was left, however, to Representative 
James Beck of Pennsylvania to deliver a vituperative attack on the bill 
as one "which the ‘brain trust® has spun in its spiderlike web." Beck 
charged that Congress would be substituting a new constitution for the 
old and:
In this construction of a new form of government in progress—  
Professor Molqr takes the work of George Washington, and Professor 
Tugwell that of Hamilton, and Professor Berle that of James Wilson, 
and the old architects must yield to these new architects, who, 
fresh from the academic cloisters of Columbia University, and with 
the added inspiration of all they have learned in Moscow, are now 
intent upon rebuilding upon the ruins of the old Constitution a 
new Constitution, in which, as in the old German Reichstag, this 
Congress will be merely a debating society, and the Executive will 
be master of the destinies of the ibierican people.8?
The adherents of the bill, however, refused to be frightened ty such
visions of the death of the democracy and, even though some congressmen
deplored the "gag rule" imposed, accepted the committee's amendments,
defeated a last atten^t to send the bill back to committee, and passed
68the measure by a 325 to ?6 vote.
The Senate Finance Committee and the Senate gave the recovery bill 
a much more difficult time. Both the National Association of Manufac­
turers and the Chamber of Commerce assailed Section ?a. James A. Emery, 
representing the NAM, wanted an amendment guaranteeing the company union 
and the open shop. Charles R. Hook of the American Rolling Mill Company 
stated that he feared Section ?a would disturb the satisfactory relation­
ship existing between employers and employees. The American Iron and 
Steel Institute, speaking through its president, Robert P. Lamont,
^̂ Ibid.. p. 4190. ^̂ Ibid.. pp. 4212-4213. ^̂ Ibid.. pp. 4293-4373.
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declared itself unequivocally in favor of the open shop» Senator Bennett 
Co Clark of Missouri offered an amendment to the bill with the words 
"nothing in this title shall be construed to con^el a change in existing 
satisfactory relationships between the employees and employers of any 
particular plant, firm or corporation»"^^
The major discussion, however, centered on the meaning of Title I 
as a cooperative device for business to escape the restrictions of the 
antitrust laws» Utah Senator William H, King asked Wagner: "Is your
bill drawn largely from the philosophy of the old German cartel system?" 
Wagner replied in the negative, at first calling the bill a measure for 
a "nationally planned economy," but quickly limited his response to mean
"a rationalization of competition" based on the elimination of "the ex-
70ploitation of labor," Later, Wagner stated that he anticipated no 
71price fixing, A revolt among Senators on the Finance Committee occurred 
on June 2 when they struck from the recovery bill that provision giving 
the President the power to license business firms. The next day the NAM 
endorsed this amendment. However, by June 5 the administration had shown 
its political power, and the licensing provision was restored.
The Senate as a whole began debate on the NIRA on June 7° Wagner 
presented the bill to the Senate very simply: "Mr, President, the
national industrial recovery bill is an ençloyment measure. Its single
6q̂Philip Taft, The A,F, of L, from the Death of Gompers to the 
Merger (New York, 1959)t PP« 43-44.
70U, So, Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings on S,1712. National 
Industrial Recovery. 73d Gong,, 1st Sess,, 1933» p, 6.
^^Ifeiâo» P» 19,
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objective is to speed the restoration of normal conditions of employment
at wage scales sufficient to provide a comfort and decency level of 
72living»" Knowing that attacks on the cooperative features of Title I 
would quickly ensue, Wagner attempted to lessen the impact» He told 
the Senate:
Title I of the present bill is intended to return to the objectives 
of the antitrust laws» The first step taken ty the bill is to make 
competition constructive rather than ruinous, and to permit coopera­
tion whenever a wise policy so dictates» » » » This bill gives general 
recognition to economic realities which the Court, operating even 
under the antitrust laws, has been constrained to ac^t in specific 
instances» When viewed in this light it is clear that the bill is 
not a measure designed to curtail production or to lessen the volume 
of trade» It is a measure to expand trade and commerce by removing 
the barriers which have caused factories to close and men to walk 
the streets in idleness»73
This was the line of thought used by proponents throughout the Senate
debate.
The assault on Title I was led by the long-time arch-enemy of 
monopolies, William E» Borah of Idaho. Borah opened his attack by 
saying: "As I understand the first subdivision of the bill, it presents
a question of a change of policy of the Government toward the question 
of trusts and monopolies» ». » As I understand the measure, we are to 
have trusts and combines and monopolies, but we are not to call them 
such. . . .  My contention is that whatever may be the Senator's /Wagner/ 
contention, he is giving monopoly something it has been fighting for these 
25 years— the death of the antitrust laws. . . .  It is perfectly evident, 
then, that the provisions of the code are going to be combinations or
"̂ 0̂. S, Congressional Record. 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, Vol. 
LXXVII, Pt. 5, p. 5152.
p. 5153o
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contracts in restraint of trade, or it would not be necessary to suspend
7kthe antitrust laws»" Borah then quoted a speech of Charles Schwab
before AISI saying that such measures were needed to bring the "selfish
interests" into line, Schwab wanted this provision, Borah asserted, to
bring the few remaining independents into the steel combines. When
Wagner argued that all members of the industry would participate in
drafting the code, Borah answered:
When the time comes when the large interests in an industry, gathered 
together for the purpose of making a code, do not dominate the situa­
tion, but permit the small independent to write the code for the 
large industry, the millennium will have been here for many years.
But until that time we are to have the same old world, with its 
appetite for gain and economic power still ruthless for p r o f i t s ,
On June 8 Borah proposed an amendment, "Provided, that such code or codes 
shall not permit combinations in restraint of trade, price fixing, or 
other monopolistic practices," Wagner asked Borah if he meant that a 
code could not provide in general terms for a uniform price, prohibit 
selling below cost or abolish cut-throat conqpetition. When Borah ans­
wered in the negative Wagner agreed to the amendment minus the price 
fixing provision,The debate continued, marked by a brief filibuster 
staged by Huey Long in which the Louisiana Senator assailed Bernard 
Baruch and Hugh Johnson, A number of amendments were proposed, most were 
turned down and the Senate version of NIRA passed on June 10, The con­
ference committee of the House and Senate resolved the major differences, 
and the bill passed the Senate on June 13 by a vote of 46 to 39«^^
^ \ b i d , . p, 5162, pp. 5 1 6 4 - 5 1 6 5 .
p, 5247, pp. 5835-5861,
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The National Industrial Recovery Act was rushed to the President 
who signed the bill into law on June l6, 1933» Roosevelt stated the 
goal of this measure was "assurance of a reasonable profit to industry 
and living wages for labor with the elimination of the piratical methods 
and practices which have not only harassed honest business but also con­
tributed to the ills of labor." Calling the NIRA probably "the most 
important and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American 
Congress," Roosevelt stressed that its success would depend on the 
"wholehearted cooperation of industry, labor and every citizen of the
Nation."^®
Thus, a movement which began in the late 19th century, which 
achieved experience during World War I in the War Industries Board, 
and made gigantic strides during the 1920*s when Herbert Hoover was 
Secretary of Commerce, reached its fruition in the confusion which 
marked the early days of the New Deal efforts to relieve the effects of 
the depression. The NIRA was a piece of enabling legislation— a grant 
of power to the President to fashion what he would under broad guide­
lines. Those guidelines were the sum product of individual citizens, 
businesses and business organizations, labor leaders and government 
officials. Perhaps because of the origin of this epochal legislation, 
confusion was destined to plague the short life of the NRA, Yet, at the 
time few voices were raised in opposition to the attempt to bring some 
order into the chaotic national econony. Thus, one contemporary author 
wrote:
"̂ ®Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt. II, pp, 246-247.
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The National Industrial Recovery Act embodies a new American indus­
trial policy0 It extends into the domain of private business, legal 
and economic concepts which before its passage were restricted to 
public utilities and business affected with public interest» It 
clothes with a public interest, during the period of national emer­
gency, enterprises which formerly were protected from governmental 
interference » 79
Business in general was not unhappy to ascribe to that conclusion, Simon
Whitney shrewdly analyzed the situation:
One element , , , which should not be overlooked is that free com­
petition is the "second choice" of almost every one. Organized 
business prefers oonqpetition to government control, and the advocates 
of government control prefer competition to private combination. It 
is not known in history for a compromise, itself desired by no one, 
to carry the day» Otherwise, there is probably no logical stopping- 
place short of socialism,""
Certain business leaders had spoken out against the labor provision
of the NIRA, as well as the licensing provision. This feeling, however,
did not stop business from generally supporting the plan. George M,
Verity, chairman of American Rolling Mill Conqcany, said:
If , o , industry is now going to be permitted to intelligently plan 
its own progress under a governmental supervision, which will not 
be dictation or domination but which represents a new sort of help­
ful partnership between government and business, which will encourage 
and not throttle its initiative, and vdiich will not destroy its pro­
ductive power, better days are surely ahead and the seeming losses 
of the past can prove to be our most permanent investment, "2
Iron Age rejoiced in comparing Franklin with Theodore Roosevelt that
^^Benjamin S, Kirsh, The National Industrial Recovery Act (New 
York, 1933)f p. 11,
80Whitney, Trade Associations and Industrial Control, p. 204,
®^See Iron Age. CXXXI (June 1, 1933)» p« 875 and(June 8, 1933)» 
p. 917.
(May 25» 1933)» p. 836.
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"familiar big stick has been dusted off by a distinguished fifth counsin."®^ 
Robert L, Lund, president of the National Association of Manufacturers, 
said his organization approved of the NIRA "entirely." Perhaps some 
businessmen, and certainly most of the public, agreed with America*s 
clown-prince, Will Rogers, who said: "This whole NRA system has got to
work, or else. Or else what? Or else nothing, because if it don’t work, 
there won’t be anything else."®^
®^D2ldo* P« 825. p. 832.
®^Quoted from the television series "Biography."
CHAPTER IV 
THE STEEL INDUSTRY JOINS THE NRA
Roosevelt lost little time in implementing the powers granted to 
him by the National Industrial Recovery Act» He had asked the United 
States Chamber of Commerce before the passage of the act not to cut 
wages and then raise them as commodity prices advanced, and to cooperate 
in eliminating unfair methods of competition» The Chamber responded by 
passing a resolution proposing trade association self-regulation under 
government supervision»^ Business thus had what it wanted, with the 
exception of the labor provisions and restrictions on imports » Labor 
had once again hailed a law as the "magna carta of labor»" Government 
planners were joyous that they were at last going to be allowed to test 
their theories» The President acted quickly to please this diverse support.
Roosevelt issued Executive Order No, 6173 on the day he signed the 
NIRA into law» This order appointed the irascible General Hugh (Ironpants) 
Johnson as administrator of the National Recovery Administration under 
Title I, giving him authority to appoint personnel, conduct code hearings, 
and generally operate the NRA, A special watchdog committee, the Special 
Industrial Recovery Board, was appointed ty the President to give general 
approval to Johnson’s actions» This board was composed of Secretary of 
Commerce Roper, Attorney-General Woodin, Secretary of Interior Ickes, 
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, Secretary of Labor Perkins, Director 
of the Budget Douglas, the chairman of the FTC, and General Johnson»^
hron Age. CXXI (May 11, 1933), p. 750»
^Public Papers of Franklin D» Roosevelt. II, p» 247»
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The selection of Johnson to head the NRA was not unexpected in most 
quarters. While the bill was being debated in the Senate it had been 
rumored ma^y times that Johnson was Roosevelt's choice. This discussion 
even led Senator Huey Long to launch a vitriolic attack on Johnson as 
being a hireling of Bernard Baruch. Baruch later wrote that Johnson was 
the obvious choice for the post and that he was never consulted about the 
appointment."^ Frances Perkins has said, however, that Baruch did have some 
reservations about Johnson, Baruch was visiting in Perkins' home when he 
said of Johnson; "He's been my number-three man for years. I think he's 
a good number-three man, maybe a number-two man, but he's not a number-one 
man. He's dangerous and unstable. He gets nervous and sometimes goes 
away for days without notice. I'm fond of him, but do tell the President 
to be careful. Hugh needs a firm hand," By the time Perkins reported 
this conversation to Roosevelt the decision to appoint Johnson had been
IImade.
As early as June 6 the cabinet discussed Johnson. Two or three 
members opposed the selection of the General, but Roosevelt was adamant. 
When the President was told, however, that Johnson was already inviting 
persons to join the NRA staff, Roosevelt sent word to him not to make 
any more commitments without consulting the President. At the same time 
Roosevelt decided on the cabinet committee as a watchdog agency rather 
than accepting Ickes suggestion that Johnson be attached to the Commerce
^Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York, I96O),
p. 249.
4Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, pp. 201-202.
9^
Department0^ Ickes conferred with Daniel Roper and Jin Farley two days . 
later complaining that Johnson was acting in a "highhanded" manner by 
continuing to "leak" news of his personnel commitments to the press and 
stating that Roosevelt would make a terrible mistake if he appointed 
Johnson.^ Nevertheless, Roosevelt appointed Johnson administrator of 
Title I following a cabinet meeting on June l6o Johnson had decided 
that the industrial control provision and the public works section were 
inseparable as means of bringing about industrial recovery. When 
Roosevelt told Johnson that Ickes would administer Title II, Johnson 
ceased to smile and his face became flushed in anger. The President 
gave Frances Perkins the task of taking Johnson for a ride along the
7Potomac to keep him from exploding,
Johnson's appointment as NRÂ administrator proved to be a mixed 
blessing. He combined a penchant for military organization and a genius 
for getting others to do the work for him with a demagogue's flair for 
haranguing the nation to enlist in the great patriotic movement to end 
the depression. As a former member of the War Industries Board and later 
as an industrial researcher for Baruch, he had gained an intimate know­
ledge of industrial economics and of key men in American industry. He
Harold L, Ickes, The Secret Diarv of Harold L, Ickes; The First 
Thousand Davs. 1933-1936, (New York. 19S1). o. 48,
^Ibid,. p, 52, Donald Richberg, who later became general counsel 
of NRA, wrote that he thought Johnson was responsible for the leaks to 
the press concerning his impending appointment as NRA administrator, 
Richberg also felt that the reason Roosevelt appointed Johnson instead 
of Baruch was because FIR did not want as "strong-minded" an individual 
as Baruch, My Hero (New York, 195^)» P« 165»
7'Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, p, 202,
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also had the benefit of Baruch's advice at a time when it seemed that
aRoosevelt had no use for the elder statesman. Steel leaders were î leaeed
1
with Johnson's appointment. Even before Roosevelt appointed-Johnson to 
his post a prominent steel executive whom Johnson had met on a tour of 
steel plants in 1930 wrote the General: "As we are undoubtedly entering 
into a new era of industrial affairs, we are inspired with confidence 
to know that a man of your experience and authority will be appointed 
to such a responsible post." An appointment was made through this 
letter for Tom Girdler and Benjamin Fairless, executives of Republic
gSteel, to meet in Washington with Johnson,' Another steel executive 
wrote more to the point: "As your experience along these lines during
the war period, where it became necessary to fix maximum prices, should 
be particularly helpful during the present emergency where it would seem 
advisable to, in some manner, fix minimum prices figured above the average 
cost of production.Johnson, however, took a realistic view of the 
situation when he commented: "It will be red fire at first and dead cats 
afterward. This is just like mounting the guillotine on the infinitesimal 
gamble that the ax won't work."^^
Donald Richberg, the number-two man in the NRA and former attorney 
for railway unions, was chosen by Johnson because he was supposedly liberal
^Margaret Colt, Mr. Baruch (Boston, 1957), P« 440.
gR. J. Wysor, vice president in charge of operations for Republic 
Steel Corporation to Hugh S. Johnson, Hay 22, 1933* NRA Papers.
^^Frank R. Frost, president of Superior Steel Corporation to Hugh 
S. Johnson, June 17, 1933. NRA Papers.
^^Quoted in Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 105.
96
and had labor connectionso Richberg had been a legislative representa­
tive for the old Theodore Roosevelt Progressive Party and, as portents
for things to come, engaged in conspiratorial activities against other
12Progressive staff members. Richberg's official title was General 
Counsel, but his activities more nearly corresponded to those of an 
assistant administrator. He never accepted the fact that Johnson was 
his "boss" and insisted that he only accepted his position "at the 
direct request of President Roosevelt as an opportunity to serve him and 
his administration," At first an able exponent of the NRA who worried 
businessmen by his "tough" speeches, Richberg later became conservative 
in his utterances and consequently more accepted by business executives.
By June 20 Johnson announced that the National Recovery Adminis­
tration had been established. Roosevelt's two important administrative 
decisions at the outset had been to create the cabinet committee to 
establish overall policy (although because its members were so busy with 
their regular duties this committee never functioned very effectively), 
and the choice of a single administrator who had direct access to the 
President. The administrative organization of the NRA generally followed 
that of other governmental agencies. Assisting Johnson were assistant 
administrators for labor and industry, a general executive officer, and a 
public relations officer. The only real direction given to the administra­
tive setup ty Roosevelt was his prescription for three advisory boards
12See Richberg Papers for Richberg's Progressive activities. Library 
of Congress.
^^Richberg, Mv Hero, pp. 162-I63.
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representing industry» labor and consumer interests. Three important 
divisions dealt with legal problems, the analysis of codes and research 
and planning. An entire organization of state and local recovery and 
compliance boards was also established,^^ Finally, a number of deputy 
administrators were appointed to handle various codes. Organized into 
divisions these administrators represented the government at code hear­
ings and continued to administer the NRA end of code operations. Thus, 
Division I dealt with public utilities, mining, shipping, iron and steel, 
automobile manufacturing and rubber; Division IV with trades and services, 
textiles and clothing; and Division VII with publications and graphic 
arts,̂ ^
A number of administrative changes ensued before Johnson left the 
NRA, The President delegated almost all of his powers to the adminis­
trator on July 15, 1933, except those of approving codes, making agreements 
and issuing licenses,On November 17, 1933» Roosevelt created the 
National Emergency Council, transferring to it the functions of the 
Special Industrial Recovery Board, This new board was still essentially 
a cabinet committee which was supposed to bring coordination to all 
recovery measures, including the NIRA, the AAA, and the FERA, The func­
tion of the board was not clearly defined and as a result Johnson's power
17over the NRA became almost unhampered except by the President, The
l4See organization chart in Lyon, et al,. National Recoverv Admin­
istration. p, 49,
^^Ibid,. p, 51«
^^Executive Order No, 6205-A in Mayers (ed,), Handbook of NRA. p, 43,
^^See Executive Order Nos, 6433“A and 6513 in NRA Reporter. I 
(December 30, 1933), PP» 238-241,
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major supplementary grant of power came on December 30» 1933» when Roose­
velt granted Johnson the authority to approve all codes except those- of
major industries employing 50»000 persons or more» and to approve all
18modifications and exemptions from codes.
The administrative organization of the NRA was traditional, but
the great congressional delegation of power to the President, and by
him to Johnson, was thought to be revolutionary. Indeed an official
statement asserted:
Its trial ty the American people is a great adventure. The economic 
theories underlying it may be wrong. But that will be hard to prove. 
The mechanism provided for in the law and set up by the Recovery 
Administration may prove to be inadequate or impractical. The spon­
sors and administrators of the law claim neither genius nor divine 
inspiration,19
Indeed» Johnson later told an assembled NRA staff: "This devoted cause
is greater than one man or any other group of men. It is a myth that
20any man on earth is indispensable to aiy cause or thing." The General's
actions, however» did not indicate that he really believed his own words, 
Johnson was forced to modify his philosophy on the direction which 
the NRA was going to take almost from the beginning. He had had exper­
ience with the almost dictatorial War Industries Board and believed its 
efficiency had resulted from its powers. Moreover, he had envisioned 
the self-government of industry concept as a twin movement with the Public 
Works law. The PWA was to have been used as a bludgeon to bring industry 
into line with Title I and to pour money into the economy so that antici-
l8Lyon, et al,. National Recovery Administration, p»
^^NRA Release No, 628, September 6, 1933» NRA Papers »
20Johnson» Blue Eagle, p, 405,
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pated increased prices could have been met with a greater redistribution 
21of inoomso Johnson was also plagued with doubts over the constitu­
tionality of his powers under NIRA, Alexander Sachs, an economist who
had engaged in planning with Johnson, wrote the General on May 20, 1933»
22his belief that the law was unconstitutional.
Due to these developments and his doubts Johnson was forced to 
pursue an initial policy of persuasion rather than dictatorship. Ad­
ministration of PWA was not given to him. He was also worried that the 
NIRA might not stand a court test. Furthermore, Roosevelt had stressed 
the cooperative nature of the NRA movement and the importance of an 
aroused public opinion to assist in getting compliance,Thus, Johnson 
told a news conference in June, 1933» that code hearings would be held 
in a "goldfish bowl," The duty of the NRA was to accept codes presented 
by Industry, not to impose codes on industry, "I want to avoid any 
czaristic appearances," said Johnson, "There is a difference between the 
National Recovery Administration and the War Industries Board, There 
our problem was largely administrative. It came to be a centralized ad­
ministration of American business. This will be different,Johnson 
stressed that industry organizations would bring their own codes to a 
public hearing where minority members could be heard. These hearings 
would be conducted by a deputy administrator with no interest in that 
industry. The code had to satisfy the industry itself, labor in that
p, 210, ^^003, NRA Economic Planning, p, 331.
^^Public Papers of Franklin D, Roosevelt. II, pp, 231-236, 
2^Johnson, Blue Eagle, pp, 221 and 223,
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industry, and the consuming public. When asked if he planned to use the
licensing provision, Johnson answered that he would not if he could avoid 
25it, ^ The NRA was always able to avoid that ultimate weapon,
Johnson planned from the beginning to bring the ten big industries 
employing the majority of workers into the fold before the rest of bus­
iness, He had, therefore, conferred with the leaders of the textiles, 
iron and steel, lumber and bituminous coal industries even before the
NIRA was sent to Congress, urging each to prepare codes for submission
26immediately upon creation of NRA, Roosevelt had stressed the priority 
of putting people back to work at decent wages, and in order to achieve 
this purpose concessions had to be made to industries in their codes. 
Inflation was in the air, costs were rising and business activity was 
increasing in anticipation of even higher costs once NRA began operation. 
Therefore, the industry drive was for price and production controls, 
and they used their acceptanoe of wages and hours provisions and the 
collective bargaining feature as a "blackmail" device to reach their 
objectives,
The cotton textile industry was the first to submit and have a 
code approved. This was mainly due to the long trade associational drive 
in that industry to bring some order out of the chaos which existed in
pricing and production, and the horrible working conditions in textiles. 
The textile code contained the necessary wages, hours, and collective 
bargaining provisions, but Johnson further insisted on the abolition of
^^Ibid,. pp. 224-225, ^^Roos, NRA Economic Planning, p, 83, 
2?Ibid.. pp. 83-88.
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child labor. Although the industry argued that the minimum wage-provision 
would end child labor, Johnson's demand for a stated provision on child 
labor was finally agreed upon by the industry. The specter of increased 
costs of textiles, however, caused the NRA to approve production con­
trols which set a dangerous precedent for codes which were to follow.
The textile code, nevertheless, achieved what years of reform agitation 
had failed to accomplish and gave promise to the possibilities of what 
NRA could mean to a socially better America. Johnson himself said of 
the abolition of child labor in the textile mills: "That makes me
personally happier than any other one thing with which I have been con-
gonected since I came to Washington."
The textile code, however, was the only "big ten" industry code 
to come in immediately. And as Johnson sat in his little cubicle on 
the fourth floor of the Commerce Department building, surrounded by 
the litter of Old Gold cigarette butts and waste paper, his clothing 
askew, and his bloodshot eyes becoming puffier for lack of sleep, he 
became more irritable and tense. Excited businessmen, as many as a 
hundred a day, poured steadily into his office. Johnson flattered them, 
joked with them, bullied them, roared at them and, when all else failed, 
threatened them. He barked into the telephone at one unidentified caller: 
"I've been listening to that line of bunk from you fellows long enough. 
You'd better change your tune. G o o d - b y e . H e  flew to New York, visited 
industrial groups gathered in almost every available room in Washington
28Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 111. Also see Cotton 
Textile Code in Mayers (ed.). Handbook of NRA. pp. 95-106.
XXII (July 3, 1933), p. 14.
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trying to get the code process moving, Johnson®s associates in NRA 
almost matched his energy. To many of them Johnson was a great man.
As one said: "Had he not been the hero of the 1917 draft? And had he 
not now, as Cincinnatus, left his Moline Plow to save his country anew, 
this time for an internal enemy more insidious than the Hun?"^^ As the 
veteran Commerce Department eoployees left for home at 4:30 o'clock, 
full of distain for the brash young crusaders who jammed the elevators 
and the coffeeshop, the NRA-ers prepared to work until two o'clock in 
the morning for a great patriotic movement.
There was good reason for this frenzied activity. Industry was 
not cooperating as it had promised. Production and employment showed 
an increase from March to July, but much of this activity came from 
stepped-up buying and manufacturing in anticipation of the increased 
costs under NRA wages, hours, and regulated prices. Then too, there 
was a speculative spurt due to impending monetary inflation, Johnson 
took to the air crying: "American industry has got to save itself,"
and warned: "This danger of runaway prices is a deadly serious matter.
This is no time to get rich quick,
Johnson was beset by problems which he called "pineapples," What 
will the NRA do for labor? He answered: "The Administration is required
by the Act to obtain a fair deal for labor in any unorganized industry." 
What was his idea on a living wage? "The cost of living," he again 
answered generally, "differs in different regions, « , , The question
^^Malcolm Ross, Death of A Yale Man (New York, 1939)» p. 109, 
^^Tisa, XXII (July 3, 1933), p. 14,
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cannot be answered by any single inflexible rule." What about price 
fixing, Johnson announced: "In these codes it will be proper for an
industry to say it will not sell below cost of production. But if th^ 
use the code to fix extortionate prices, I should have to step in«"^
With all of his efforts to answer the myriad questions put to him, 
Johnson’s frenzy to bring industry under codes was achieving meager 
results,
^y mid=July Johnson decided that what the NRA needed for success 
was a mass patriotic can^aign to bring publio opinion to bear on those 
who were not cooperating. Moreover, those industries that signed codes 
earlier felt that they would be placed in a bad coiqsetitive position with 
industries which had not signed codes. Therefore, it was imperative for 
the recovery program to get all American business under a "blanket code," 
pledging themselves to maintain a $12 to $13 minimum wage for forty hours 
a week. This way, prices would not outrun purchasing power. The General 
had problems selling this idea to the Special Industrial Recovery Board. 
Some members were afraid to involve Roosevelt in such a massive program 
which could easily fail and tarnish his image,John Dickinson felt 
that the big industries should come first and "the corner groceries 
and barber shops could wait,"^^ But Johnson persuaded FIR of the urgency 
of such a program and on July 21 launched the a t t a c k , I n  a few days
^^Donald Richberg, The Rainbow (Garden City, 1936), pp. I6O-I61,
^^Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 113.
^^See President’s Re-employment Agreement in Public Papers of 
Franklin D, Roosevelt. II, pp. 308,311.
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the Government Printing Office had rushed the "partnership agreements" 
to mail carriers throughout the nation. The agreement blanks were to be 
delivered to every ençjlcyer of three or more parsons along the carriers* 
routes to be signed and returned to Washington. The cooperating employer 
was then allowed to fly the Blue Eagle emblem of compliance containing 
the motto: "WE DO OUR PART."
The President's Reemployment Agreement drive was an instantaneous 
success. Veterans of the World War I Public Information Committee rushed 
to Washington to aid in arousing public opinion behind the crusade. Cit­
izens were asked to sign cards pledging to patronize only those merchants 
flying the Blue Eagle. Bqy Scouts, clubwomen, society girls, and ward- 
heelers distributed the cards door-to-door, delivering little prepared 
speeches on the necessity of patriotic cooperation. "Four-Minute Men" 
made talks in theatres, exhortations appeared in newspapers and magazines, 
on billboards and movie screens, and ministers delivered sermons on coopera­
ting to put men back to work. The climax to the drive came in a series of 
parades held throughout the country. From Boston to Tulsa citizens turned 
out to see stockbrokers, plumbers and teachers march down avenues to the 
tune of martial music. Johnson*s mother told the Tulsa crowd: "People
had better obey the NRA because tny son will enforce it like lightning, 
and you never can tell where lightning will strike." The grand climax 
came in New York City, where two million persons watched a quarter million 
dressmakers, stockbrokers, Chinese waitresses, CCC workers, and dancing 
Indians file past a reviewing stand containing Johnson, Governor Herbert 
Lehman, and Mayor O'Brien. When the parade finally ended at midnight.
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street cleaners began to sweep up the tlekertape and signs bearing the
legends "WE DO OUR PART," the messy aftermath of the largest parade in
the nation's history.
Johnson, now more confident, exclaimed: "Wheh every American
housewife understands that the Blue Eagle on everything she permits to 
come into her home is a symbol of its restoration to security, may God
have mercy on the man or group of men who attenqpt to trifle with this
bird»"^^ By July 29 some 500 draft codes were reported to be in Johnson's 
hands. The FRA drive had generated a climate that made non-cooperation 
with the NRA seem almost traitorous, Johnson was also pulling the iron- 
hand out of the velvet glove, with Roosevelt's aid. Trade groups saw that 
the administration meant business when FDR announced that oodes for the 
silk and rayon dyeing and the printing industries would go into effect 
without public hearings* Four unreconciled committees dealing with the 
oil code were stunned when told by Johnson to look themselves in a room 
until they came up with a code,^^ The dam was finally breaking and the 
codes began to flood Washington,
The steel industry was considered hy the administration to be one 
of the, if not the, most important industries to bring under a code. It 
has already been pointed out that many leaders of this key industry joined 
with other business leaders from the early months of the depression in the
3*Time. m i  (July 31, 1933), p. 111 September 18, 1933, p, 11; 
and September 25, 1933, p, 12,
^^Schlesinger, Corning of the New Deal, p, 114,
^^Businesa Week. July 29, 1933, P< 6.
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drive for self-government of industry under suspended or repealed anti­
trust laws. After Roosevelt became President the industry generally 
supported the early measures of the New Deal, The stockholders of U, S. 
Steel, for example, voted a resolution supporting the various economic 
measures taken by the Roosevelt administration, l^on Taylor, chairman 
of the board, commenting on that resolution, said: "I have great hope,
and believe with you , , , that we are on our way to better things. We 
should rally under this banner without regard to party to save this 
country of ours,"^^ By May 1933» the industry was pushing for an indus­
trial control bill. Iron Age carried a front-page editorial calling for 
the repeal of the Sherman and Clayton acts and the substitution of co- 
operative law. Thirty large steel company executives responded to that
illeditorial with praise for its stand. When the NIRA reached the planning
stages, Charles R, Hook of American Rolling Mills, one of the leaders of
the drive for industrial self-government, became a member of the NAM
42advisory committee on the act.
The passage of the Industrial Recovery Act was publicly greeted 
by the steel industry with caution, but there was no doubt that most 
leaders were delighted with the results of their canq>aign, Charles M. 
Schwab greeted assembled steel leaders at the AISI general meeting on 
May 25, 1933, saying: "I think this morning I may greet you with more
confidence in the future than I have in three or four years, Schwab
^hron Age. GXXXI (April 20, 1933), p, 636.
°̂I)2ià, (May 18, 1933), p. 793. (June 1, 1933), PP. 871-874,
(May 18, 1933), p. 795.
^^earbook of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 1933, P, 27,
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went on to say:
The President will have strong support for his plan to assist the 
nation^s business machine through the easing of laws that are unduly 
restrictive and through substitution of cooperation instead of ruinous 
trade practices and price cutting« Speaking for the steel industry,
I say that we gladly accept this offer of partnership, because with 
this kind of support and through our revitalized Institute we should 
speedily and effectively be able to see brought into line those selfish 
interests who persist in unfair practices that are contrary to sound 
publio policy and ruinous to industry
The recently elected president of the Institute, Robert P, Lamont, was
more cautious than Schwab, Lamont told the steel group:
The success of this plan is accomplishing its stated purpose will be 
determined almost entirely by the character of its administration and 
by the spirit and manner in which industry itself carries out the 
provisions of the law. The bill possesses such vast potentialities 
for good or evil, such great possibilities of success or failure in 
atteo^ting self-government in industiy. that it challenges all our 
practical experience and intelligence,**
Lamont expressed concern for the labor provisions of the bill and thought
a serious omission was the lack of a provision to offset competition from
cheaper foreign goods.
Nevertheless, Lamont issued a call for a meeting the next day of
all steel company representatives to get opinion on whether AISI should
pursue the matter of the NIRA, He expressed particular concern for the
opinion of small manufacturers "with respect to what they shall do and
what they shall not do, so that we may properly handle the matter with the
Administrator when the bill finally becomes a law." ' Lament's fears as
to the response of the industry were dispelled the next day when the chief
p, 32. p. 72,
46Ibid.. pp. 70-71,
"̂̂ IJaiil,, p. 74.
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executives of all the steel producing companies in attendance authorized 
the executive committee of AISI to consult with NRA officials and to pro­
ceed to develop a plan of action to be taken by the industry» Meetings of 
the executive committee were called for the following week to begin the 
code-making process. It was reliably reported that while the formal 
speeches at the AISI meeting might not have Indicated the industry's
inclination to fully support the NRA, an "ovenAelming unanimity of senti-
48ment” was expressed privately by the members.
Almost six weeks elapsed, however, before the first draft code was 
submitted to the NRA by AISI, Johnson had expected the steel code almost 
as soon as the textile code and had held several preliminary discussions 
with representatives of the steel industry toward that end,  ̂ Something 
was holding the code back and that turned out to be the vocal stand taken 
by organized labor, particularly the AF of L, On June 6 and 7, 1933, a 
conference of national and international union leaders met in 1Vashing,ton 
and adopted a bill of principles to guide both unions and the NRA in 
implementing the labor provisions of the codes. They recommended a joint 
labor board consisting of industry and union representatives and, if 
industry delayed in establishing such codes, a limited code of fair 
competition was to be in^osed on the industry. Finally, national and 
regional industrial adjustment boards were suggested to adjust indus­
trial disputes,
GXXXI (June 1, 1933), p. 86?.
^^Johnson, Blue Eagle, pp, 20? and 235«
^°American Federationist. XL (July, 1933), P« 695,
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Industry in general had paid scant attention to the inclusion of
Section 7a in NIRA, especially when the labor provision was added to the
bill in the House Ways and Means Committee* The reason for this unusual
occurance was that the Chamber of Commerce and the AF of L had privately
agreed that labor would accept the trade association features in return
for business support of the labor provisions* The National Association of
Manufacturers, however, refused to give its assent* When the bill went
to the Senate Finance Committee, therefore, the NAM, and particularly
representatives of the steel industry, led the assault on Section 7&*^^
Charles R* Hook of ARMCO was supported by Robert P* Lamont when he told
the Senate Finance Committee:
The industry stands positively for the open shop; it is unalterably 
opposed to the closed shop, . , , The industry accordingly most 
strongly objects to the inclusion in the pending bill of any provi­
sions which will be in conflict with this position of the industry, 
or of any language which implies that such is the intent of the 
legislation* If this position is not protected in the bill, the 
industry is positive in the belief that the intent and purpose of 
the bill cannot be accomplished.52
After all atten^ts to include an open shop provision in the NIRA had
failed, industry continued to champion the business aspects of the code
while denouncing the labor provisions. Thus, in the same issue. Iron
Age denounced "the obvious subserviency of some of our congressmen and
senators to the wishes of an organized minority," and then praised the good
which could come from such a measure in terms of the regulation of
^^Irvin Bernstein, ÇgUftgUgg
(Berkley, 1950), p* 34*
S^Iron Age. GXXXI (June 8, 1933), P« 917.
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business
Meanwhilet Johnson recognized the rooky shoals of labor-management 
disputes on whioh the whole recovery program could crash. He-oontinually 
stated that the NRA was not going to be used to unionize any industry 
and that labor agreed with him, "If men organize," said Johnson, "that 
is all right. My job is to sit here in an iiqpartial way, I have no 
initiative in this thing. The law has given men the right to bargain 
collectively. There is no argument, I have a law to execute and I am 
going to execute it."^^ The steel industry, however, was not willing to 
accept Johnson purely at his word. The American Foundrymen*s Association 
suggested that its members "take direct action slowly but keep on the Job 
recognizing that union labor is working fast and already has definite
ideas on hours and w a g e s , T h e  NAM suggested that since the legality 
of the labor provisions was not established, every industry should con­
sider including an open shop clause in its code,^*
This delay in the submission of a code for the steel industry was 
utilized by both labor and industry in pursuing their own goals. The 
AF of L did not waver in its insistence that "under the present act it is 
unethical and illegal for en^loyers to prevent employees from carrying out 
their responsibilities under the law— that is, organization of workers into 
u n i o n s , T h e  Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers
^^Ibid, (June 29, 1933)» PP. 1019 and IO38-A,
^^ibid,. p, 10(4.7. p. 1038,
^^Amerioan Federationist, XL (July, 1933), P. 679,
I l l
lost little time in putting their organizers to work in the millsc Hand­
bills were circulated among steelworkers containing the following:
Under the Industrial Recovery Act, the workers of the Steel Mills 
are CHALLENGED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO BECOME 
MEMBERS OF A LABOR ORGANIZATION. WILL YOU BE A SLACKER, or are 
you going to help him bring back the economic security of the 
steel workers? You can do this by coi^lying with Section 7 of 
the Industrial Recovery Act,58
Many workers, however, were confused as to what Washington really expected
of them.
Steel leaders were creating that confusion by their own organiza­
tional drives, Charles R, Hook of ARMCO enclosed one of the Amalgamated 
Association's circulars to Johnson saying that it was "certainly not in 
accord with the spirit of good sportsmanship which ought to govern all 
our acts in these very trying times," Hook added that "such a misleading 
statement with respect to the President's position I believe should be 
checked p r o m p t l y , T h e  "spirit of good sportsmanship," however, involved 
a hurried drive on the part of the steel executives to bring workers under 
an employee representation plan, or company union. On June 7 Lamont Hughes, 
president of Carnegie Steel, circulated a letter among his employees an­
nouncing the formation of an employee representation plan and adding;
"We would suggest that arrangements be made promptly to have this plan be­
come effective by nomination and election of representatives, as provided
^^andbill in Department of Labor Main Numerical Series, 167/
2283, Box 158, NA,
COCharles R, Hook to Hugh S, Johnson, June 23, 1933» NRA 
Papers, NA,
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under the Plan*"^^ The steel companies were thus using Section 7» inter­
preted in their own interests, to organize workers under company plans,
With both labor unions and the companies offering organizations, some 
workers felt it necessary to write Washington to ask what they should do,^^
While this labor conflict was to plague the NRA throughout its short 
life, the steel industry was determined to get its code into effect and 
deal with organized labor later. Actual negotiations with industiy re­
presentatives were begun late in June by Johnson and the deputy administra­
tor for steel, K, M, Sinçson, Early in July the counsels for AISI and the 
NRA began their negotiations as to the legal requirements of the code. 
Numerous other conferences were held between industiy members and the NRA 
administrative, legal and advisory divisions,On July 11 Johnson an­
nounced that he escpeoted the steel code to be submitted to him the next 
day, but that he did not know whether it would be acceptable to him until 
the public hearings had been held. He warned that he was thinking of 
establishing a time limit for filing codes,Actually, the steel indus­
try had filed a draft code on July 6 which had not been acceptable to the 
administrati on,
^^Mimeographed letter from I, Lamont Hughes to Emplcyees of Carnegie 
Steel Co,, June 7* 1933» Department of Labor Main Numerical Series, 167/ 
2283, Box 158, NA,
^^Co Co Frazier to Frances Perkins, July 25, 1933, Department of 
Labor Main Numerical Series, I67/2283, Box 158, NA,
^^"Histoiy of the Code of Fair Conpetition for the Iron and Steel 
Industiy,” Exhibit A, NRA Papers, Hereafter cited as "Code History,"
^^Iron Age. CXXXII (July 13, 1933), po 46.
^^"Code History," n,p.
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The second draft code was submitted by AISI on July 12, this 
time more interest was being taken in the steel code by those outside 
the negotiating rooms. There was a pre-code upturn in the steel industry 
which saw June ingot production reach 2,597*517 tons, the largest output 
since April, 1931» The industry as a whole was operating at 45,9& percent 
of capacity, up from 15*50 percent in March, In addition prices on plates, 
shapes, and bars were holding firm and advances were made in nails, hot 
and cold rolled strips^ sheets, and train spikes. Observers acknowledged 
that these prices would mean more than indicated on the surface, as com­
panies were no longer giving secret discounts
The rise in steel prices caused many letters and telegrams to 
Johnson urging haste in the consideration of the steel code to bring 
about a corresponding rise in wages and employment,Concern was also 
shown by businesses expected to be directly affected by a code for the 
steel industry. A representative of the steel construction industry was 
anxious to talk with Johnson about the code's effect on his business,
An executive of a small steel manufacturing concern, while approving of 
the NRA, wanted to insure representation of small business in Washington.
He wrote; "The steel business is dominated by three or four corporations. 
They regard the small manufacturer as unnecessary. Therefore, the only
^^Iron Age. CXXXII (July 6, 1933), PP* 49-51*
^^See as an example the telegram from Employees Representatives of 
Wheeling Steel Corporation to Hugh S. Johnson, July 12, 1933* NRA Papers.
G. Iden, director of publio relations for American Institute 
of Steel Construction to Robert K, Straus, administrative assistant to 
Hugh S. Johnson, July 7, 1933* NRA Papers,
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hope of the little fellow rests in having a voice in Washington in the
68working out of this recovery plan,"
Johnson revealed some of the difficulties he was having with the
steel industry, and problems the members of that industry were having
among themselves in writing a code, when he told the press: "These
codes constitute the preparation of a constitution for self-government
of an industry and it takes some time to do it. They have to compose
differences within their family, and in each of these great families, I
happen to know in the steel industry th^ have been working almost con-
69tinuously to try to get something that thqy can all agree to,"
A particular difficulty in securing agreement of the entire steel 
industry was that leaders of AISI wanted a lengthy con^rehensive code 
covering all aspects of the steel business. There was general agreement 
on the open shop, but production and capacity controls, pricing policies,
I 70and wages and hours provisions caused disagreement,' Then, too, NRA
divisions would not agree on many of the compromise labor provisions
submitted ty the industry. Particularly disagreeable to the NRA was an
71open shop declaration submitted with each and every draft.
After negotiations between the industry and the administration a 
draft code was submitted on July 15 which was to become the basis of the
68Calvin E, Broadhead, president of Scranton Bolt and Nut Corpora­
tion, to Hugh S, Johnson, July 10, 1933, NRA Papers,
^^Iron Age, CXXXII (July 13, 1933)» P® 9®
^^Business Week. July 15, 1933, P® 9®
71Memorandum from NRA Legal Division to Leo Wolman, chaiman of the 
Labor Advisory Board, July 13, 1933® NRA Papers,
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approved code. The Steel Institute had summoned a meeting of steel- exe­
cutives representing over 90 percent of the industry in New York on Thurs­
day, July 13, to approve in principle the final draft to be suhnitted.
This draft, which came close to satisfying administration demands, was 
hastened by backstage negotiations the previous Tuesday between Myron C, 
Taylor of üo S« Steel and Roosevelt0 The President may have threatened 
Taylor with the imposition of a thirty-five hour week and a fourteen 
dollar weekly minimum wagOo Johnson, however, quietly contacted industry
leaders and gave them assurances that the administration was disposed to
72be cooperative/ This policy of threatening and appeasing steel leaders 
did bring results, and on July 20 the call went out for public hearings 
on the steel code to take place on July 310̂ ^
There was a feeling in business circles that the steel code was 
different from other codes already submitted. Calling it a "realist's 
code," Business Week thought that the steel code reflected a "deep- 
seated realization that the 'new deal' involves every phase of industrial 
activity" and consequently tried to cover all activities by code pro- 
visions. Business also regarded the steel code hearings as a "showdown" 
between the AF of L and industry on the open shop, with a precedent being 
established if steel was able to ram through its labor proviso,The 
industry warned that "the result, as dictated by the administration's
XOIII (July 17, 1933)» pp, 12-13,
^%otice of Hearing No, 11, July 20, 1933» NRA. Papers. 
f^Buainess Week. July 22, 1933» p, 6,
^^ron Age. CXXXII (July 2?, 1933)» p, 37,
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decisions, will determine whether industry will enter fully into the
spirit of the act or abide by the letter of the law*"^^ Johnson
made clear, however, that if any open shop declaration "qualified the
law," it would be struck from the codeo^^
It was the labor situation which had continued to cause the most
difficulty in the codification of the steel industry» Union organizers
had begun working in the mills, attempting to inclement Section ?a as
the unions interpreted it» An AF of L local was started in U» S» Steel's
Gary plant the week before the code hearings were held» There was labor
trouble in the Detroit plant of National Steel» Workers at the Gary tin
mills threatened that unless there were a thirty percent increase in
wages there would be a walkout» NRA officials were as anxious as steel
executives to quiet this labor discontent, at least until a code could
be approved, and suggested that trouble in the tin mills could be averted
Tv the companies' slowing down the work» An NRA official suggested:
"The tin plate companies have this power in their hands merely ty delaying
78shipments on some pretext»" The steel companies did grant a fifteen 
percent wage increase the week before the code hearings in an effort to 
quiet the labor opposition»^^
The NRA also worked to modify specific code provisions» Production 
control and pricing policies were grave concerns to the administration»
As one NRA official wrote: "The question will remain whether production
p. 7o p. 37.
^%emorandum of a telephone conversation between K» H» Sin^son and 
John V» W, Reynders, July 14, 1933« NRA Papers.
^%eel. XOIII (July 24, 1933), p. 12»
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and price control, evftn if subject to effective limitations, is not
prohibited by the Anti«=»Trust laws, even as modified by the National
80Industrial Recovery Act»" Nevertheless, it was Johnson who insisted
8lthat the production control sections be retained in the code» There
was still a question as to the overall control which the NRA would
have over production and prices» It was suggested by one staff member
that NRA representatives serve on the code authority with power to
82delay decisions on such matters until it received NRA approval»
The much-disputed basing point system was not challenged by the 
NRA during the code-making period, but some of the industry®s prac­
tices which brought criticism of that pricing policy were questioned» 
Thus, the method of charging only on the basis of all-rail transportation 
brought the following comment;
The denial of cheaper than all-rail transportation rates, except 
with the Board^s approval, permits uneconomic methods, emphasizes 
basing point weaknesses, and should be abolished in spite of the 
fact that water and truck rates are not uniform. Basing points 
serve a useful purpose for the members by aimplying price struc­
tures, Yet they are economically unsound from a purely price 
standpoint, A complete change to the f,o,b, now would be too 
disturbing to the existing order of things. Ultimately competi­
tion would have created the new basing points. The removal or 
minimizing of price competition may require governmental pressure 
later to establish more basing points. So far as present action 
on this code is concerned, however, the time is too short to per­
mit any proper judgment on the establishment of a large number of 
new basing points,
^^emorandum, "The Proposed Steel Code and the Law," n,a,, n,d. 
NRA Papers,
8lMemorandum from John V, W, Reynders to K, M, Sinçson, July 12, 
1933» NRA Papers,
®%emorandum from R, W, Shannon to K, M, Simpson, n»d, NRA Papers,
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The NRA thus accepted the oft criticized basing point system, with its 
taint of the old Pittsburgh-Plus controversy, to be enacted into law.
The only concession from the industry was the addition of a few extra 
basing point locations* Like many other provisions which the administra­
tion accepted, the basing point system was agreed to even though NRA 
officials realized that there was danger in accepting it. The way which 
the industry would now implement various provisions of the code and the 
public criticism which might result were risks which the NRA felt it had 
to take in order to get the code adopted. It is also certain that many 
code provisions which were accepted came from the urgency to get the 
industry under a code quickly and, to a certain extent, the lack of 
technical knowledge on the part of the NRA staff.
The steel code hearings began on Monday morning, July )1, in the 
auditorium of the Department of Commerce building, Washington was swel­
tering in the summer heat, but the interest in the proceedings was so
8kintense that no one seemed to show much discomfort, Johnson had 
chosen K, M, Simpson as the deputy administrator to handle the steel 
code and he was in charge of the hearings,Johnson opened the hearing, 
praising the industry for its long work in developing the code and for 
its cooperation with the NRA. Donald Richberg then laid down the pro-
^^Xron Age. CXXXII (August 3, 1933)» PP*
^Johnson had earlier picked a number of aides whom he called 
"industrial adepts," Although he insisted that they have no connection 
with the industry, Johnson demanded thqy be familiar with the industry 
in question so as to "not have his pants traded off him in that hearing," 
Simpson was a mining engineer and metallurgist by profession, a friend 
of Johnson's and acceptable to the steel industry. Iron Age.
(July 27, 1933), pp. 38-39.
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cedure for the hearingo He made it clear that no oral arguments would be 
permitted and that statements could be filed in written briefs. Testimony 
was to be limited to objections, modifications and additions to the draft 
code and then, only after a written brief had been previously filed. No 
cross examination by opposing witnesses was to be allowed because, as 
Richberg stated, "this is an administrative inquiry and not a judicial 
investigation.
Robert P. Lamont, president of AISI, then introduced the steel code. 
Tall, austere and slightly nervous, Lamont began his presentation by re­
citing a short history of the steel industry and the effect of the 
depression on that industry. On the drafting of the code the Institute 
president stated:
Necessarily the Code is the result of a reconciliation and accommoda­
tion of views of 130 members of the industry who have formally as­
sented to it. I think I may fairly say that the result represents a 
great accomplishment in the history of business generally, and 
evidences a genuine spirit of cooperation to perpetuate the policy 
announced in the National Industrial Recovery Act.8?
Lamont concentrated on only three provisions of the code which represented 
the major issues at point between the Industry and the NRA. Section 3 
provided that "none of the members of the Code shall call or permit any 
employee to work on an average of more than 40 hours per week in apy six- 
month period." He insisted that this represented what "the industry be­
lieves is the very lowest that can be fixed, and yet do the work that is 
required of it to do." Lamont claimed that since much of the work in the
Typescript of Steel Code Hearings, July 31» 1933« NRA Papers, 
pp. A 1-4. Hereafter cited as "Code Hearings."
^^"Code Hearings," p. B 3.
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Steel industry required skilled labor which was in short supply, shorter 
hours could not spread work to unskilled labor» He then turned to Section 
5 which provided for wage differentials ranging from forty cents an hour 
in most eastern districts to twenty-five cents in the southern district» 
Lamont defended the forty cent minimum wage as being equal to the fifty- 
three cent average rate paid in 1929 because of the drop in the cost of 
living» He justified the differentials between various regions on the
DQ
ground of sectional differences in the cost of living»
Lamont then turned to the most explosive issue before the hearings» 
The draft code contained the mandatory Section 7a of the NIRA, but the 
drafters of the code had inserted the following provision following that 
section:
The plants of the Industry are open to capable workmen, without 
regard to their membership or non-membership in any labor organi­
zation» The Industry firmly believes that the unqualified main­
tenance of that principle is in the interest of its employees»
For many years the members of the Industry have been and now are 
prepared to deal directly with the employees of such members collec­
tively on all matters relating to their en^loyment» The principles 
of collective bargaining under which certain members of the Industry 
have dealt with their employees are embodied in Employee Represen­
tation Plans, which are now in force at plants of members of the 
Industry generally» » » » It is the belief of the Industry that the 
manner of collective bargaining set forth in such plans » » » should 
be maintained; and the right of the employees and members of the 
Industry to bargain collectively through representatives elected or 
appointed and acting in accordance with such plans without inter­
ference, restraint or coercion of any sort should be preserved and 
protected#89
pp. C 1-E 4»
89Typescript of Code of Fair Competition of the Iron and Steel 
Industry, Submitted by the American Iron and Steel Institute to the 
National Recovery Administration, p. 7 B» NRA Papers» Hereafter cited 
as Draft Code.
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Johnson rose to the floor after this section had been introduced and 
stated that, although established procedure did not require changes in the 
code until after the hearings when further study had been made, he was 
required to determine if aqy provision in the code "may or may not seem 
to us to shade or qualify the statuteo” The administrator said of the 
open shop provision that "while probably it is a border-line case, it 
seems to me that that matter is inappropriate in that particular section 
of this Code, which contains the mandatory provisions of sub-section A 
of Section VII of the Rational Industrial Recovery Act»"^^
Lamont answered that in view of statements made in the press he 
had been expecting this objectiono He then read a prepared statement 
which held that the open shop proviso had been inserted in the code to 
state frankly the position of the industry "in order to avoid the pos­
sibility of any misunderstanding regarding it by anyone»" Lamont then 
said that he was willing to recommend to leaders of AISI that the section 
be omitted from the code and asked for a short recess to present it to 
them» Before the recess was granted, however, Lamont made the industry’s 
position clear:
It should be distinctly understood, however, that the omission of 
this section does not imply any change in the attitude of the 
industry on the parts therein referred to; that the industry believes 
that the employee representation plans now in effect in its plants 
are desired by its employees; that the members of the .̂ndustry will 
naturally do everything in their power to preserve a /.sis7 satis­
factory relationships now existing with their employees, and that 
the section will be omitted for the sole purpose of avoiding the 
necessity of considering at this hearing any questions that are not 
fundamental to the code»91
^^"Code Hearings," pp» F 4-5» 
^^Ibido. pp. F 4-6.
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Following the recess Lamont announced that the board of directors of 
AISI had unanimously agreed to drop the open shop statemento Applause 
rang out from those in the audience» Actually» leaders of the industry 
had been told as early as July 12 by Leo Wolman that, although Johnson 
had no objection to the inclusion of that statement in their code for 
the public hearings, the General would expect to cut it out at the 
heqrings»̂ ^
The leaders of the industry bad thus gained a two-fold victory»
They had been able to present to the business world generally, and to 
their employees, the picture of a last-ditch stand on their historic 
labor position» Secondly, they were able to serve notice to everyone, 
but to the government in particular, that they intended to continue to 
pursue the open shop policy through compare unions» An immediate victory 
was also won ty the steel industry» The hostile witnesses at the hear­
ing representing labor interests saw their chief point of attack on the 
code vanish in the air»
Thus, Frances Perkins and William Green were forced to confine 
themselves to other code provisions» Perkins demanded a flat maximum 
of forty hours a week for workers, not averaged out over a period of 
time as the code provided» Green wanted a limit of thirty hours a week» 
Perkins wanted a smaller wage differential, while Green demanded minimum 
hourly wages of sixty cents or eighteen dollars a week» The president 
of the AF of L further demanded an advisory council on industrial rela­
tions to settle labor-manageraent disputes» He suggested representatives 
of labor, management and the public be appointed to such a board by the
^^eraorandum from John V» W» Reynders to K» M» Simpson, July 12, 
1933» NRA Papers»
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Présidente Green’s only parting shot at the industry was to dwiounce 
Lamont®s statement which withdrew the open shop proviso, while asserting 
the determination of the industry to follow that polipy» He concluded 
by asserting that the New Deal meant that "the workers must be free; 
free to organize as they wish; free to designate their own representa­
tives, to represent them in collective bargaining,
The remainder of the hearings was given over to labor represen­
tatives who generally supported the statements of Green and Perkins, 
to minor objections from business leaders and to the gentle questioning 
of Lamont by Richberg, Richberg asked if the price provisions were not 
in reality administered prices, Lamont answered that he thought the code 
authority could only recommend proper prices, not compel them, Lamont 
also answered other queries to the point that the power to limit new 
producing capacity would not limit technological advances and that the 
basing point locations represented the judgment of the majority of in­
dustry leaders. But when asked if he did not think there should be some 
representation of the public on the code authority to protect the con­
sumer, Lamont answered that no one had thought it necessary. In a state­
ment that was to be used by critics of the industry for months to come, 
the Institute official concluded: "The general theory is the business
is to be conducted just as it always has been. Each industry is going
to carry on its business in just exactly the same way it has been car-
04rying it on for twenty or thirty years," Mapy people wondered, if
^^"Code Hearings," pp, G 3-K 5 and N 1-0 2, Lamont announced later 
in the hearings that southern leaders had agreed to raise the minimum wage 
rate to thirty cents an hour,
pp. K 5-L 2,
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this were true, why the administration and the industry had been so 
anxious to get the steel code.
The steel code hearing was adjourned at 5:36 o'clock on Monday after­
noon, but only the first great hurdle had been crossed. The long, tedious 
process of refining the specific content of the code and reaching the com­
promises necessary for the administration to accept the draft submitted 
by the industry, now began. The code-making process called for a study of 
the draft code by the NRA staff directed by deputy administrator Simpson, 
with a view toward making final reports to Johnson on what he should re­
commend to Roosevelt, As a staff member later wrote, the code required 
meticulous study due "to the completeness with which it provides for its 
/pteel industry/ operation in all respects0"^^
This interim between the hearings and the final submission of the 
code to the President saw a great deal of public discussion and activity. 
Some persons were openly hostile to the code as presented by the indus­
try, One correspondent thought that Lament's statements at the hearings
should not be "allowed to stand unchallenged and uncensored" by the 
96administration,' A Cincinnati veteran's organization contrasted a 
willingness to serve the nation in time of war with that of the steel 
industry in an economic crisis, "The Steel Industry takes the place of 
the soldiers of yesterday," wrote the veterans' leader, "and though their 
compliance with N,R,A, does not endanger, their lives, as compliance with 




from Henry Rodman to Franklin D, Roosevelt, August 8,
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still these ^slackers,* these persons who made most out of that war at
the expense of the life blood of the veterans, stand out today as the
obstructionists of the
Commenting on the code hearing, the trade organ of the steel
industry reflected the attitude of steel executives when it said;
The code hearings at Washington, essential as they are under the 
terms and purposes of the Recovery Act, provide a striking example 
of the futility of attempting to take industry apart and put it 
together again through a public forum« « o o The organized labor 
leaders, social minds, uplifters, downpushers and communists who 
testified, evidently believed implicitly that their ideas were 
superior to the collective experience of the management of the 
great industry of which none of them had a part, « » , Fortunately, 
codes are not settled in these public hearings which provide an 
"open season" for pot-shotting industry»”
This editorial was at least correct in stating that the public hearings 
had not "settled" the code»
After several meetings of the executive committee of AISI had been 
held steel executives including W» A, Irvin, Eugene Grace, E» T» Weir, and 
Thomas Girdler, met in the offices of Frances Perkins on August 15 to attempt 
to compromise on the hours and wages provisions of the code» Representing 
the NRA were Simpson, Alexander Sachs, Isador Lubin of the Labor Depart­
ment, Richberg emid Johnson, and R» W, Shannon, who was later to be deputy 
administrator in charge of the steel code administration» During the course 
of this meeting, William Green walked into the room, and the steel leaders 
walked out en masse and did not return until Green left» Although Green 
explained that he had only come as a member of the Labor Advisory Board
97'Raymond A, Aisance to Hugh S» Johnson, August 15, 1933°
NRA Papers »
^^Iron Age. CXXXII (August 10, 1933)» P° 9°
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and not as the president of the AF of L, Eo To Weir said that if the steel
leaders had talked with Green, labor leaders would have used the event to
goargue that the industry recognized the AF of Lo The steel leaders had 
won only a shallow victory, however, as Johnson kept them in session for 
twelve hours, with only a brief intermission for dinnero They emerged at 
the end of the evening looking glum and "shaking their heads grievouslyo"^^^ 
Johnson had presented the demands of the government to the industry 
on wages and hoursc A special committee was appointed from the assembled 
group to study wages and hours provisions in the code*^^^ This committee 
met continuously until the night of August 17» NRA representatives in­
sisted that the thirty-five cent minimum wage in the northeast district 
was too low and that the wide wage differential should be Justified by 
statistics supplied by the industryo The steel representatives, however, 
replied that they could not furnish such data, NRA members of this com­
mittee reported that the industry leaders followed a policy of non-coopera­
tion throughout most of these meetingso Further conferences were held
between the deputy administrator and other NRA officials and the steel
102representatives, but it seemed as if little progress was being made.
August 17, 1933» P» 38 and August 24, 1933» p« 36. The 
Labor Advisory Board of the NRA protested the steel executives* conduct 
to Johnson but he publicly announced that he had nothing to do with 
Green's being at the meeting: Memorandum from Leo Wolman to Hugh S,
Johnson, August 19» 1933° NRA Papers,
l°°Time. XXII (August 28, 1933), p. 9.
^^^This committee consisted of Sachs, Lubin, W, J» Filbert and A, W, 
Voght of U, S, Steel, Professor Bradley Stoughton of Lehigh University,
R, E, McMath, J, W, Larkin and F, H, Brugler of Bethlehem Steel, Shannon, 
and Victor S, von Szeliski of the Research and Planning Division of NRA, 
"Code History,"
102"Code History," Also memorandum signed by Victor von Szeliski, 
August 19, 1933° NRA Papers,
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The turning point in the negotiations probably came, however, on 
August l6 when Roosevelt summoned Myron Taylor of U- So Steel and Charles 
Schwab of Bethlehem Steel to the White House. The industry had already 
been threatened with the loss of government steel orders unless the code 
came quickly.Roosevelt now used his powers to get an agreement from 
the leaders of the two giants of the industry. When Schwab said that 
he could not accept the code because of his obligation to his stock­
holders, Roosevelt reminded him of the stockholders’ interest in the 
million dollar bonus paid to Eugene Grace of Bethlehem, while his miners 
lived in coke ovens. Roosevelt told another visitor: "I scared them the
way they never have been frightened before and I told Schwab he better 
not pay any more million dollar b o n u s e s . S c h w a b  and Taylor emerged 
from this meeting visibly shaken and refused to talk with reporters 
gathered outside.
The steel industry was now ready to capitulate and on the night of 
August 18 Johnson got an agreement on the issues which had caused 
the deadlock. Minimum wages and maximum hours represented a compromise. 
The NRA was victorious in the agreement to allow administration repre­
sentatives to attend all code authority meetings and on presidential 
control over capacity control. Above all, it was decided to make the 
code effective for only ninety days to see how it worked out.^^^ At 
one o’clock in the morning Johnson emerged from the meeting waving a
lO^Iron Age. CXXXII (August 1?, 1933), PP» 3 6-37»
IQitSchlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 117°
XXII (August 28, 1933), P» 9» ^°^"Code History."
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sheet of paper on which the agreement was written in front of the re­
porters, The steel leaders, whom Johnson called a "den of lions,"
filed slowly out of the room, refusing to answer any of the reporters'
107questions.
The next day Johnson received the formal approval of the code
from the labor, industrial, and consumers' advisory board heads, Leo
Wolman, chairman of the labor board, was not satisfied with the labor
standards but approved the code because of the eight-hour day proviso
and also because "of the great desirability of having the steel industry
108come under a code of fair practices immediately," The industrial and
consumers' boards heads gave their approval without comment, Roosevelt
109signed the code that same day.
The steel code was greeted from most quarters with approval, although
110there were varying Interpretations as to its meaning and implications. 
Official statements from the industry tried to picture the results as a 
complete victory for the industry. They pointed out that except for agree­
ing earlier to strike the open shop provision and the later agreement to 
reduce hours to a flat eight hour day when production reached sixty percent 
of capacity, the final code was almost identical to the one submitted by
^^^Pittsburgh Press. August 19, 1933» p, 1.
100Memorandum from Leo Wolman to Hugh S, Johnson, August 19, 1933,
NRA Papers,
^®^See Executive Order in Handbook of NRA. p, 12?,
110The steel code may be found in its entirety in the Appendix, 
Specific provisions will be discussed in the course of later chapters and 
all references in the text refer to the code as contained in the Appendix,
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AISIo The industry was especially happy that even though it had agreed 
to accept NRA representation on the code authority, it had written the 
provision so as to exclude any member connected with organized labor.
It was left to a steel company emplcyee to sound a note of gloom»
He wrote on the day after the code was signed; "This is a sad day for 
me and hundred of thousands of the * Forgotten Men'’ that you have preached 
about» Our idol of gold turns out to be but an idol/of common clay»" 
Saying that the code's provisions had loopholes vhtjh would not bring 
adequate wages and shorter hours, the steelworker^concluded: "The
Administration at Washington having betrayed our^trust, we can but call 
on God to help us» He, at least, should be beyond the reach of high 
finance
The steel industry, however, was now under the Blue Eagle» In 
spite of certain concessions which the industry had made, it had gained 
most of what industry leaders had wanted» Wages and hours were stan­
dardized, along with prices. Leaders in the industry had fought a long 
battle for these controls in order to bring the "chiselers" in the indus­
try into line. All manner of "fair trade" practices had been written 
into law. Production and capacity controls were now possible if it 
became necessary to use them. All of these industry controls, which 
required close consultation and cooperation among industry members, could 
now be effected without reverting to such practices as the once-used 
"Gary dinners." NRA officials optimistically believed that hy allowing
ll^Iron Age. CXXXII (August 24, 1933)» P» 35.
E» Morgan to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 20, 1933» NRA
Papers »
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industry self-government the old ch?'»' rnt-t^^oat competition would be 
eliminated» To those so inclined it seemed as if a giant step toward 
economic planning had been taken. Above all else NRA officials felt that 
they were going to be able to have their say in the way the code operated. 
This optimism was to be sorely tested in the ensuing months of the steel 
code's operation.
CHAPTER V 
THE STEEL CODE AUTHORITY AND THE NRA
Early in January 1934, the American Iron and Steel Institute moved 
from its suite of offices on the eighteenth floor of the Empire State 
Building to much larger quarters on the thirty-third floor.^ The move­
ment upward was more than symbolic, for the Institute had suddenly been 
transformed from a voluntary association of steel makers who were con­
stantly aware of the prohibitions of the antitrust laws, into the Steel 
Code Authority empowered to enforce the provisions of the Steel Code with 
little regard to the antitrust laws. The Code Authority in this new role 
was clothed with quasi-legislative, executive and judicial powers, strong 
enough to allow the Institute to direct almost every activity of the most 
basic industry in the American economy.
This great concentration of power naturally raised a serious ques­
tion of public policy. Who was protecting the public interests? While 
there was a division of the NRA vested with administrative powers over 
the Steel Code Authority, its use of those powers effectively, and in 
the public interest, was minimal. Even though NRA representatives sat 
in on Code Authority meetings, their activities were mainly confined to 
making the position of the NRA known to industry leaders. Throughout the
life of the Industrial Recovery Act the relationship of the NRA and the
2Steel Code Authority was a most tenuous one.
Îron Age. CXXXIII (January 4, 1934), p. 146.
^ y  study of the relationship of the NRA and the Steel Code Authority 
must be somewhat limited ty the inaccessibility of the Steel Institute re­
cords. Of the 757 code authorities, only 18 turned over their records to 
the NRA. Steel was not among that small group. Repeated letters from the
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The story of the Steel Institute is inextricably bound in the history 
of the iron and steel industry as a whole. Before 1898 competition in the 
industry had been keen, at times even deserving the often mentioned epithet, 
"cut throat." It was true that pools and gentlemen’s agreements were in.. 
troduced from time to time in an effort to bring some order out of chaos, 
but they generally failed because of the inherent weakness of such devices. 
From 1898 to 1900 a great consolidation movement took place in the industry, 
financed by capital interests dominated ty three Captains of Industry-.
J, P, Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and W, H. Moore. Such large companies as 
Federal Steel, National Steel, American Bridge, National Tube, and American 
Sheet Steel were organized. This move toward concentration was prompted 
ly a desire to integrate production facilities so that every step in the 
production process, from the raw material to the finished product, could 
be controlled by each of the three combines.^
The consolidation movement, however, laid the basis for a truly 
ruinous industrial war between the three giants of the industry. Therefore, 
to head-off any such internecine warfare, the principals agreed to the 
formation of the "combination of combinations"— United States Steel Corp­
oration of New Jersey, which controlled 65 percent of the nation's steel
author to the Institute asking for permission to examine the Code Authority 
files finally elicited the reply that the records were confidential and not 
open to research. These are presumably public records as are those of 
other government agencies and departments, but the attitude of the Institute 
toward scholars is much the same as it was toward officials of the NRA, It 
is fortunate, however, that there is an abundance of correspondence and 
reports in the NRA records in the National Archives covering the activities 
of the Code Authority.
^Walter Adams, "The Steel Industry," in Walter Adams, (ed,), The 
Structure of American Industry (New York, 1950)» PP* 147-148.
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capacity and was the first billion dollar corporation in history» There 
was no doubt that the Corporation wanted complete integration for the eco­
nomies such organization afforded, but it soon became more evident that 
the combine was attempting to gain an effective monopoly of the entire 
industry» The industrial depression of 190?, which brought active price 
competition, modified the Corporation's drive toward monopoly into a pro­
ject for getting competitors to accept D» S» Steel's price leadership.
This objective was achieved when Judge Elbert H» Gary, president of the 
Corporation, inaugurated his famous periodic dinners, usually attended 
by executives representing 90 percent of the steel capacity in the country. 
Gary exhorted his guests "like a Methodist preacher at a camp meeting" 
and persuaded them that cooperation with Ü» S, Steel would be more pro­
fitable than competition»^
The Gary Dinners continued until 1911 when the federal government 
filed an antitrust suit against the Steel Corporation» World War I delayed 
a decision on the case but in 1920 the Supreme Court by ? h to 3 decision 
ruled that, although Ü. S, Steel had attempter to monopolize the industry, 
it had not succeeded. Perhaps more than any other factor which saved the 
Corporation from the dissolution order was Gary's policy— which had often 
irritated his own executives— of "live and let live" as long as competitors 
followed his price leadership. During the 1920's, although the Steel 
Corporation's sales slipped in percentage to such strong independents as
h,H. R» Seager and C» A. Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems 
(New York, 1929)» PP« 229-230.
^Adams, Structure of American Industry, p. 150»
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Bethlehem Steel, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Republic and National— the 
Corporation still managed to furnish effective price leadership and "fri­
endly competition » , . endured as the basic characteristic of the 
industry,"^
As early as 1855 members of the iron industry had joined together 
to promote their common interests. The American Iron Association was 
organized in that year, but was soon succeeded by the American Iron and 
Steel Association. In 1857 the Association issued a monumental report on 
iron production in the United States. Excellent statistical analyses and 
surveys became a hallmark of the trade association. During the 1850*s 
and i860”8 the Steel Association concentrated its work largely in the 
fight for tariff protection. However, with world leadership in iron and 
steel passing into the hands of United States producers, the argument for 
protection of the "infant industry" became obsolete and the Association was 
forced to justify its stand on the tariff with arguments that the tariff
7afforded a higher level of employment and wages.
The American Iron and Steel Institute was incorporated in New York 
on March 25, 1908, with fifteen directors headed by Judge Gary and including
O
Charles M<, Schwab and W<, J, Filbert, The number of directors was in-
gcreased to thirty in 1928, The discontinuance of the Gary Dinners in 1911 
^Ibid,. pp, 151-152,
fGeorge B. Galloway, (ed,). Industrial Planning Under Codes (New 
York, 1935), p. 149.
8Certificate of Incorporation of the American Iron and Steel 
Institute, NRA Papers,
gNotice of Increase of Directors of AISI to the State of New York,
NRA Papers.
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transferred the task of promoting cooperation in the steel industry to the 
InstitutOo This was not too difficult considering that Judge Gary was also 
president of AISI, The regular semi-annual dinner meetings of the Institute
were now supplemented hy formal programs in which technical papers were 
read by scientists and engineers. Thus, not only were industry executives 
gathered together twice a year at which time prices could be discussed, 
but also the fairly free exchange of technical data led to a high degree 
of uniformity in steel mill operations and an Increasing decline of "trade 
secrets
The depression years of 1929 through 1933 saw the semi-annual Institute 
meetings providing a fox*um for the leaders of Big Steel, especially James 
Farrell of the U, S, Steel Corporation and Charles Schwab of Bethlehem, to 
exhort their fellow members to refrain from price-cutting, overproduction, 
and wage-reductiona. Once again, in the wake of a serious economic dislo­
cation, steel leaders were trying to head off intra-industry warfare. But, 
when it became apparent that mere evangelism was not going to eliminate 
cut-throat competition, most steel executives began to participate in the 
growing discussions of a "plan" for enforced industrial government. While 
most top industry officials took a wait-and-see attitude, there was no open 
hostility to such plans expressed. As early as August 1932 the Institute 
was reorganized to prepare for any expanded role which trade associations 
might play in economic planning.
When the Industrial Recovery Act became law, therefore, the Steel 
Institute was prepared to draft a code for its industry and then to perform 
as the Code Authority to administer that code. The Recovery Act provided
^°Galloway, Industrial Planning, p, 152,
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that for suoh an association to perform these two functions it must be 
truly representative of the industry and could not impose apy restrictions 
upon non-members joining. The AISI maintained that it represented over 
90 percent of the capacity of the industry and throughout the life of the 
Steel Code this statement was never challenged.
The constitution and ly-laws of the Institute provided for both 
individual and oon^any members in active or associate status. Active 
memberships were limited to 2,000 and to those persons directly engaged 
in iron and steel production, A corporation was eligible for membership 
if it were engaged directly in producing iron and steel and if it had an 
employee who was an individual member. There was an entrance fee and 
yearly dues of $20, The Institute, up to the approval of the steel code, 
was managed ly a board of directors of thirty men,^^ However, with the 
enormously increased functions of the board after it became the Code 
Authority, the organization was modified by establishing an executive 
committee elected by the Board, This committee not only was smaller and 
more efficient, but its members could meet more often as the new business 
of the Institute required. The executive committee consisted of the 
chairman of the board of directors, a president, one or more vice-presidents, 
a treasurer and a secretary, and an executive secretary.
The executive secretary had charge of all affairs of the Institute, 
particularly in seeing that criers and resolutions of the board were car-
^^Constitution of AISI, NRA Papers, NA, n«p. The board membership 
was increased to 32 in May 1934 to provide greater representation for 
smaller members of the Code, Certificate of Change of Number of Directors 
of AISI, Filed with Department of State, New York, May 11, 1934, NRA Papers.
137
12Tied out. The first executive was Walter S. Tower, a Ph.D. in economics 
from the University of Pennsylvania, He had taught economics for about 
ten years and during Warld War I was associated with the U. S, Shipping 
Board as an expert on commercial matters. Following the war he was em­
ployed the Consolidated Steel Corporation, one of the Webb-Pomerine 
Act export associations, and in 1921 Tower went to London as a commercial 
attache at the American Embassy. Tower joined Bethlehem Steel in 1923 and
in June 1933 was placed at the disposal of the committee drafting the steel
13code. As executive secretary Tower was the one man who was responsible 
for the daily practical implementation of the code. He was also almost 
exclusively the one Institute official who communicated with his counter­
part in the NRA, Robert W, Shannon, deputy administrator for the steel 
code.
Although it is generally stated that the Steel Institute was the 
Steel Code Authority, in reality the board of directors of AISI was so 
designated. Articles VI through XI of the Code of Fair Competition set 
forth the extensive powers of the Authority. Those powers, in effect, 
made the trade association board a private arm of government. Without 
the approval of the federal government it could interpret code provisions 
to its own satisfaction. Commercial regulations could be issued idiich were, 
in reality, laws binding on each code member. New unfair practices could
^^esolution by the Board of Directors of AISI, September 20,
1933» NRA Papers.
^^National Recovery Review Board, Hearing. April 4, 1934. NRA 
Papers, pp. 63-65 (mimeographed). Hereafter cited as Darrow Board 
Hearings.
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be added to those set forth in the code, and, as soon as notice had been 
given to the members and the President, they were legally binding on all 
members» Thus, the Code Authority had powerful legislative functions»
The administrative powers of the Code Authority were equally strong» 
Almost every sphere of a company®s business was subject to control from 
the thirty-third floor of the Empire State Building» The board could 
define and regulate sales of steel to jobbers (wholesalers) and even 
determine the financial arrangements of those sales and resales» It 
could allow deductions below the base or delivered price, determine the 
classification of products, and set minimum freight and arbitrary switch­
ing charges» It could establish the rate of interest on all overdue ac­
counts and authorize settlements of accounts other than those prescribed
in the code» It was empowered to issue lists of unform extras (fixed 
charges for modifications of standard types of steel) and fix deductions 
and rebates on sales to manufacturers engaged in export trade» It had 
control over sales to Alaska, Puerto Rico, the Phillippines and the Canal 
Zone» The Code Authority was truly a powerful administrative agency with 
quasi-judicial powers»
The Authority also had the teeth to enforce its powers» It could 
require constituent companies to supply statistics concerning production, 
capacity, shipments, and sales of steel products» Figures on hours of 
labor, rates of pay and other employment conditions had to be furnished on 
forms issued on a monthly basis» Failure to supply these statistics con­
stituted a violation of the code, and further power was given the Authority 
when it was allowed to conduct an independent audit of any company's re­
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cords « Violations of the oode could be punished by the assessment of 
liquidated damages in the amount of ten dollars a ton on all products sold 
in violation of the code. To insure adequate financing of Code Authority 
operations, the board could levy assessments on each member of the code 
in relation to its voting strength, and failure to pay the assessment was 
a violation of the code.
These powers were not absolute because they were always subject to 
the right of the President to modify or cancel axy order, rule, or regu­
lation issued under Title I of the Recovery Act* When the steel code was 
revised on June 11, 1934, the Recovery Administrator was given the right 
to suspend any action of the Code Authority which he deemed to constitute 
a modification of suoh board action until he had investigated and ruled 
on the action. One further check which the President had in reserve was 
that only he could approve any regulation designed to control production* 
These powers granted to the federal government were never exercised beoause, 
it appears, of the sincere wish of the government to allow an experiment 
in true industrial self-government and its desire not to raise the ire of 
the industry.
The individual members of the iron and steel industry actually had 
less control over the operation of the code than did the government* The 
code membership as a lAole had the right to vote on only three issues; 
adoption of the code, amendments to the code, and termination of the code* 
Fifty percent of the voting strength of the membership could call a meet­
ing but could then act on only one issue— termination of the code— for 
eveiy amendment had to be proposed by the board of directors* After the
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oode had been adopted the only occasion on which the members were asked to
cast a vote was at a meeting on May 29» 1934, when amendments were-proposed
14to the original code.
Even had the membership been permitted a larger share in the admin­
istration of the code, the more powerful members of the industry would 
have still dominated matters. Each member"s voting strength was deter­
mined ly dividing the total invoiced value of domestic sales of the 
previous year by 500,000, but each member was guaranteed at least one vote. 
This method of calculating votes meant a considerable concentration of 
voting power. In 1934 twenty companies had at least ten votes each and 
represented 75 percent of the total voting power. United States Steel 
Corporation alone had 25.7 percent of the total and Bethlehem Steel had 
9.1 percent. Sales had so increased in 1934, however, that in 1935 some 
forty companies had as many as ten votes each, out of a total vote for all 
members of 2,297, and the largest number held ty any one member was less 
than 10 percent of the total.
The board of directors of AISI, or the Code Authority, showed the 
same concentration of voting power as did the total membership. At the 
outset there were thirty members of the board, but U. S. Steel had four 
members and Bethlehem, American Rolling Mill, and Youngstown Sheet and 
Tube had two members each. Of the thirty voting members on the Code Author­
ity in June 1934, twenty-three wore officials in seventeen of the large
14Carroll R. Daugherty, ai^.. The Economics of the Iron and Steel 
Industry. Vol. I (New York, 1937), p. 218,
IM
Integrated oonqpaniea, while the nine largest steel conqianies controlled 
52 percent of the vote on the Code Authority» In all, the thirty directors 
represented twenty=three companies which held about 75 percent of the total 
voting strength of code members.
While the overall direction of the code was undertaken by the board 
of directors of the Steel Institute, the code empowered the board to 
delegate aiqr and all of its functions to various committees. These 
committees showed the same general domination by the large units in the 
industry. The administrative committee, which performed the functions of 
the board in the interim between the regular monthly meetings of the board, 
consisted of W. A, Irvin, president of U. S. Steel, and his associate,
W, J. Filbert; Eugene Grace, president of Bethlehem Steel; L. E, Block, 
president of Inland Steel; T. M, Girdler, president of Republic Steel;
E. T. Weir, president of National Steel; and Hugh Morrow, president of 
Sloss-Sheffield Steel, The committee on commercial matters, a powerful 
group which promulgated the commercial regulations, was ohairmaned by 
Samuel E, Haokett of Jones and Laughlin Steel, The chairman of the labor 
committee was Frank Parnell of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, and of 
the statistics committee, W. J, Filbert, vice-chairman of U, S. Steel*s 
finance committee. Each chairman appointed the committee members, and out 
of a total of thirty-six men on these three committees, seven were from 
U, S. Steel, five from Bethlehem, four from Republic and three from Jones
and Laughlin, Six other companies had two members each on one or more
17committees.
^^Daugherty, Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry. I, p. 222.
^̂ Steel. XCIII (September 11, 1933)» P« 11,
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The oligarchic nature of the Code Authority and its branches while
fraught with grave inç>lications, was never critized to ary great extent
from within the industry» One major reason was the nature of the industry
itself, in which smaller producers had been accustomed to look toward the
major producers for leadership before the code was signed» This system
had generally kept industry warfare at a minimum and, after all, the NRA
was supposed to usher in a period of great industry-wide cooperation»
Moreover, voting strength in most other codes was allocated on much the
18same basis as that enqployed in the steel code» All-in-all, the steel 
industry was and had been organized in a very general way. It wanted a 
stable price level, tariff protection, a low level of competition, and 
labor peace, A board of directors dominated by the large producers 
operated efficiently and was highly effective in promoting industry goals. 
Smaller industry members had been willing to risk occasional disciminations 
for the overall security they enjqyed. The history of the NRA does not 
reveal that the industry ever had substantial regrets for its bargain.
With industry members apparently satisfied with the organization 
and operation of the steel code it seems, perhaps, that industrial self- 
government would have been achieved. There were, however, much larger 
questions of public policy. What was the function of the federal govern­
ment and the National Recovery Administration? What part was the NRA to 
play in seeing that the interests of consumers and labor were protected?
The government's role was not only complicated by the absence of a coherent 
philosophy and program of participation in the operation of the codes, but
®̂Lyon, The .National Recovery Administration, pp» 210-214»
li>3
19also by the philosophic differences within the government itself» Even 
the most sanguine administrative supporter of true industrial self-government, 
however, did not advocate that the government had no role to pay whatever»
The National Industrial Recovery Act had established the principle that 
no code could be approved until the President was satisfied that the group 
submitting the code was truly representative of the industry and that it 
imposed no inequitable restrictions on membership in its group. Further­
more, the President had to be satisfied that such a code would not be 
monopolistic or oppress small enterprises. He could withhold his approval 
from any code until certain modifications in its provisions were made to 
satisfaction. Finally, he had the ultimate power of requiring the licens­
ing of businesses whenever he found that destructive practices contrary to 
the Recovery Act were being employed. The President could also use the 
FTC to make investigations of business practices. Section 7 forced all 
code members to recognize the right of collective bargaining and estab­
lished the principle of minimum wages and maximum hours.
Most of these provisions, however, applied to the code-making 
process. The desire of the administration to get the steel industry under 
a code had been so great that numerous compromises had to be made. Only 
reluctantly did the steel industry agree to allow any NRA representatives 
to participate in Code Authority meetings. Then, they were so wary of 
"unfriendly” persons, such as labor leaders or social radicals, taking part 
that they e:q>ressly wrote into the code that the Recovery Administrator 
and one or two other persons appointed by him could attend board meetings
19̂Chapter 8 and 9 of this study will deal with the incongruities of 
the philosophy of such agencies as the Federal Trade Commission on the one 
hand and the NRA on the other.
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as "long as they shall be persons not having or representing interests
antagonistic to interests of member of the industry," This made General
Hugh Johnson an administration member and he appointed Donald Richberg,
head of HRA'̂ s legal division^ and K, M, Simpson, a division administrator, 
20to join him. Actually, Simpson was the administration watchdog, as he
attended all but one of the board”s meetings, while Richberg attended one-
21half of them and Johnson only one.
Simpson”s appointment did not cause any anxiety among steel leaders.
He was a Columbia University graduate in mining engineering and metallurgy.
Most of his career had been spent as a private consultant, although he had
been a technical adviser to the War Department during World War I. He
22was an intimate friend of General Johnson. In his late forties, "Simmie," 
as he was called ty his friends, was described as short, stocky, quiet, 
shy, stolid, and sleepy. He gave the impression of being in a daze from 
the time of his arrival in Washington and certainly possessing no brillance. 
He reminded one, as an observer wrote, "a little of Herbert Hoover.
Simpson resigned as division administrator on June 1, 1934, in order to 
resume his private engineering practice. However, he continued as NEIA
20NRA Administrative Orders No, 11-4 and 11-5» July 20 and 26,
1934, NRA Papers.
21Division of Review, Standard Work Sheet (Investigator - J, Davis), 
March 30» 1933* HRA Papers,
^^Iron Age. CXXXII (July 27, 1933), P* 39*
^^"Unofficial Observer" iJSohn F. Carteĵ T, The New Dealers 
(New York, 1934), P» 45.
1̂ 5
2krepresentative on the Code Authority. Thus» Simpson was actually the 
only member of the NRA who was in direct contact with the Steel Code 
Authority» Even at that, his effectiveness was limited by what the board 
members were willing to discuss in his presence and by his own role, 
which was essentially to make known to the board the attitudes of the NRA 
in Washington»
A more structured part of the NRA" g role in dealing with the steel
industry was the office of the deputy administrator for the steel code
in Washington» With a staff of two aides, one clerk and two secretaries,
this was the only agency of the government which devoted full-time to the
administration of the steel code» The deputy administrator was Randolf
W» Shannon, who left Princeton in his junior year to enter the army» After
seeing active service in France he returned to the United States, took a
student°s training course with the American Sheet and Tin Plate Conqpany
and then was engaged in sales work for the same firm» He spent two years
studying production operations and metallurgy in steel mills and as a
result wrote Sheet Steel and Tin Plate, a book intended to assist consumers
2«in economical utilization of those products» Shannon was not unfriendly 
to the Industry but did try conscientiously to administer the code to the 
letter and spirit of the law. In spite of these attitudes. Shannon's 
patience and office were sorely tried in the months which marked the life 
of the code»
Iron Age. CXXCIII (May 31, 1934), P» 41» Simpson was succeeded 
as administrator of Division I by Charles E» Adams, president of the Air 
Reduction Conroany and director of some six other corporations» Ibid»
(June 7, 1934), p. 37.
^hron Age» CXXVIII (July 2, 1931), p. 46»
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The board of directors of AISI met for the first time as the Code
Authority for the Iron and Steel Code on August 29» 1933o On September
20 the board set its regular meetings for the second Tuesday of each
26month at 10s30 in the morning at the offices of the Institute, At the
first meetings which Alexander Sachs» Sin^son» and Richberg attended, the
general committees were appointed and the multitude of new problems were
discussed. Confusion during the first week in the life of the Code,
especially on matters relating to price filing, was so great that on
September 1 a general meeting of executives of the entire industry was
held to explain what was going on«^^
The original ninety day experimental period for the steel code was,
as could be expected, a period of much confusion for industry members,
the Code Authority, and NRA officials. By August 28 some I60 separate
firms had filed a mass of price schedules to meet the August 29 deadline.
This data came into New York in such a mass, that the secretary of the
Institute, George H, Charls, was not able to conqpile a composite price
list for several days. Even by the third week of code operations the board
had issued several supplemental regulations which left steel firms still
befuddled by the interpretations to be applied on prices and business 
2Ôregulations. Some people were complaining that this situation led to
uncertainty on the part of buyers and sellers and was a deterrent to 
29business. This confusion ultimately led to regional meetings at Pitts»
AISI Board Resolution, September 20, 1933« NRA Papers*
^^Iron Age. CXXXII (August 31, 1933), P« 36, and Steel. XCIII 
(September 4, 1933), P» 11,
^^Steel (September 4, 1933), P* 11»
^%ron Age. CXXXII (September 14, 1933), P» 48.
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burgh, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Birmingham, conducted by Walter Tower 
for the purpose of explaining and interpreting the terms and provisions 
of the code.There were also numbers of letters from New York to code 
members explaining individual provisions, such as one which warned mem­
bers that the shipment of products under fourth quarter contracts could 
not be extended beyond December 31, 1933»
Everything was not going too smoothly with the "monolithic” Steel 
Institute either. M, Simpson reported dissension on an important
committee of the Code Authority and recommended that NRA attempt to 
12eliminate it,^ A more important public event, however, was the resig­
nation of Robert P, Lamont as president of the Institute. In a letter 
written to the board just two days after the first meeting of the Code 
Authority, Lamont said that this action marked the beginning of govern­
ment regulation of business. ”No one knows,” Lamont wrote, "how far it 
may go." Continuing his letter by stating that the major activities from 
that point on would be to carry out obligations under the Code and to 
report to the government, Lamont concluded;
The opportunity for constructive, forward-looking studies and 
plans for the industry as a whole, that seemed possible a year ago, 
must give wsy to the present practical, immediate demands, which 
can best be met by men familiar with the vast details of the var- __ 
ious branches of the industry. I can be of little help in this work."̂ "̂
30.'iron Age. CXXXIII (January 18, 1934), p. 29, and (March 33, 1934), p. 42,
^^AISI to members of Steel Code, December 12, 1933 (mimeographed),
NRA Papers.
^^Aeenda for AISI Board Meeting of October 12, 1933 (note penciled 
in margin;, NRA Papers.
^&teel. XCIII (September 18, 1933)» PP» 11-12.
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Business sources reported that Lamont not only frankly disliked government 
in business, but that "he was weary of trying to maintain discipline among 
his pack of individualistic iron-masters«" Other reports indicated that 
he was hard-pressed to obtain the necessary funds for the operation of the 
Institute and that his own salary of $100,000 a year had been cut in half, 
that he had been given one job at the start and then had been handed the 
steel code, and that in the fight for the open shop Charles Schwab and
oilMyron Taylor had taken command,^ A further resignation was that of George 
H. Charls who resigned on November 15 and was replaced as secretary of the 
Institute by L, Vo Collings, a New York attorney,
The steel code problems, however, were actually small in comparison 
to those which began to beset the NRA In general during the fall of 1933» 
The Blue Eagle drive had been highly successful, but it had exacted its 
price. The campaign had been conducted at the fever-pitch of an old-time 
revival meeting. There was a constant appeal to patriotism; aryone who 
did not go along was at least a "chiseler"— at worse a "traitor," "We 
haven®t started to apply the heat of this thing yet," Johnson warned,
"This isn*t a campaign of a week or a month. It's a drive we're going 
to keep up until the last employer has signed up,"^^ The heat began coming 
when Roosevelt issued an executive order from %de Park which permitted 
cancellation of all government contracts with non-NRA manufacturers, Jim 
Farley talked of prosecuting violators of the Recovery Act under mail fraud
^^Time, XXII (September 25, 1933), PP» 46-4?, 
3^Iron Age. GXXXV (January 18, 1935), p, 27. 
^^Tlaa, XXII (August 21, 1933), p. 10,
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statutes» Harry Hopkins warned that relief funds would be spent on pro­
jects cooperating with the Blue Eagle» %en a Baltimore power company 
claimed exemption from NRA provisions because it did no interstate business, 
Johnson retorted that the Blue Eagle ”can®t see a State line»" He then 
warned all code violatorsî "The time is coming when somebody is going
to take one of these Blue Eagles off someone“s window and that^s going
37to be a sentence of economic death »""̂'
Maxy persons began to warn the General, however, that the mass emo­
tion engendered by popular rallies and public exhortations was beginning 
to boomerang as more emphasis was put on "cracking down" rather than 
voluntary cooperation. The NRA had become the symbol of the entire re­
covery effort of the government and Johnson was the symbol of the NRA, 
Frances Perkins has written that Johnson's energy, imagination, and drive 
were invaluable to the early success of the NRA and that "there was hardly 
aiyone else in the United States who could and would have done just what 
he had to do at the time to stir frightened, lethargic people into action,"^ 
Another observer said:
It was the job /administrator of NR^ which called for the services, 
not of a statesman nor of an economist, but of a lion-tamer and a 
breaker of wild horses» » » » The need of the moment was for a com­
bined punitive expedition, hog-calling contest, and a torch-light 
parade. The answer to that need was the combined riot-squad, ballyhoo 
and crusade led by the N»R,A,, under the totem of the Blue Eagle and 
the leadership of Hugh Samuel Johnson and his merry m e n ,39
Johnson had become overextended and the NRA overpromised»
3?Ibid, ^^Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, p, 205,
^^Carter, The New Dealers, p, 31» Carter called his chapter on the 
NRA, "The Industrial OQPÜ."
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One of the greatest problems which had developed for the NRA was 
Johnson®s inclination to be a one-man show, not only in the public view, 
but in the administration of the Recovery Act. He did not like the ad­
visory committee which had been appointed to keep NRA within bounds and 
most members stopped coming to meetings because it seemed useless. The 
General worried Frances Perkins when he gave her a copy of Raffaello 
Viglione's The Corporate State, which glowingly described the Italian 
dictatorship, and further, when he proposed that instead of having ad­
visory boards a labor man should sit at his right and a businessman at
linhis left to whom he would ejqplain the codes. Donald Richberg, however, 
thought that what the administration needed from the start was a division of 
responsibility between a poliqr-making board and an executive organization.
A struggle therefore broke out within the ranks of the NRA during 
its early months between those who wanted less of an administrative dic­
tatorship and those who were loyal to Johnson. There was also increasing 
concern that the NRA^-again many said this was Johnson'̂ s doing— was taking 
on more than it could handle. There were too many codes coming in too 
quickly. There was no time to study them carefully, to understand them or 
to administer them. Even his old boss, Baruch, told Johnson on more than 
one occasion that he was trying to do too much and repeated Woodrow Wilson®s 
admonition when Baruch was appointed chairman of the UIB: "Let alone what
is being successfully done and interfere as little as possible with. . . .  
normal processes."
^Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, pp. 205-206.
2ii koRichberg, The Rainbow, p. 113. Baruch, Publie Years, p. 253.
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Johnson seemed driven* however, toward the goal of whipping the 
depression as he had reportedly fractured the jaw of a drunken private 
in a bar-room brawl in the Philippines o Some people were amused, others 
were frightened, when newspapers and magazines carried pictures of 
Johnson greeting a crowd in a Mussolini-like salute» Some persons began 
to speculate that Johnson was "the man on horse-back" for whom the New 
Deal was preparing the way» But Johnson thought he had the people with 
him» For a while he had even silenced the voices of opposition» He 
wired Patrick J» Hurley, former secretary of war under Hoover, on Sept­
ember 1 and asked him to make a national radio address advocating a "Buy
liÜLNow" campaign and supporting the NRA, Hurlqy obliged and on the night
of September 2? told the nation:
Many honest men have misgivings as to the effect of the Act on our 
system of government, • , , But under the N«E,A, program, wages 
and profits do not go to the state. The N.R,A, plan is not Bolshevism; 
it is not socialism; it is not fascism; it is not collectivism; it isAmericanism.^^
With such support Johnson was ready to end the voluntary code-making period 
and enter the enforcement period, A reporter asked Johnson what would 
happen to those persons who refused to go along with the code, and Johnson 
replied: "They'll get a sock right on the nose,"
Still, for all the loud and confident noises being made by Johnson,
^^Carter, The New Dealers, p, 31,
2UiTelegram from Hugh Johnson to Patrick J, Hurley, September 1,
1933, Hurlay Papers, University of Oklahoma Library,
^^"The National Industrial Recovery Act," Radio Address by Patrick 
J. Hurley, Hurlay Papers, University of Oklahoma Library.
46Sohlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p, 119,
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It was evident that enthusiasm for the NRA. effort was waning in the fall 
of 1933o Conçlaints from both businessmen and workers were pouring into 
Washington* Business was not getting the profits it wanted* Workers 
were not receiving a "living wage" nor hours which they considered suit­
able* On Labor Day Johnson admitted that instead of the reemployment of 
six million men which he had anticipated by that date, only some two
lyymillion men had been put back to work. Local enforcement boards were 
not really enforcing anything* Henry Ford continued to defy the Auto
ha
Code and although Johnson threatened to crack-down, he did nothing* 
William Randolph Hearst condemned the NRA as "absolute state socialism," 
and Walter Lippmann stated^ "The excessive centralization and the dic­
tatorial spirit are producing a revulsion of feeling against bureaucratic 
control of American economic life." Even Henry I. Harriman, one of the 
early supporters of the scheme, referred to the NRA as "the bedlam that 
they have over there," and remarked that, although business had been 100 
percent behind NRA in the beginning, he knew of "no representative group
KQof businessmen today in which some do not question the whole program,"  ̂
The leaders of the steel industry, however, were not ready to de­
nounce the NRA experiment— at least not the steel code. Their code had 
originally been approved for a ninety day trial period and on November
XXII (September 11, 1933)» P» 15« Roosevelt told the nation 
in the fourth "fireside chat" on October 22, 1933» that 4 million persons 
had been reemployed, or 40 percent of those seeking work* Public Fanera
XXII (September l8, 1933)» PP» 10-11*
49̂Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, pp. 120-121*
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15 the board of directors of AISI forwarded a resolution it had just 
passed expressing satisfaction with the operation of the code and asking 
for an extension to May 31® 193̂ «'̂  ̂ The following day Johnson wrote the 
President reporting that the steel industry had met the wages and hours 
conditions of the Recovery Act, that a minimum of complaints against the 
code had been received and that th%r could be adjusted under the code.
He, therefore, recommended an extension of the code in order that a longer 
time period could be allowed to more effectively judge the effects of the 
code,^^ On November 17 Johnson telegraphed AISI, congratulating them for 
their "generous cooperation" and the "substantial public benefits" re­
sulting from that cooperation, and notifying them that Roosevelt had 
agreed to extend the code.^^
According to the steel Industry the ninety-day test period had 
mainly benefited the employees. The AISI did announce that composite 
prices had increased from 1,979 to 2,015 cents per pound for finished 
steel, and from $15*94 to $l6,6l per gross ton for pig iron, but that the 
volume of business had declined ten percent and operations at ingot cap­
acity had dropped from 46 to 41 percent. Nevertheless, the number of em­
ployees rose ly 73*000, or 22 percent, and wages increased approximately 
$6^ million, or 21 percent. Working hours dropped from an average of 39*2 
to 32,8 hours per week, but average earnings increased from 52,8 to 63,6
^^Resolution of the Board of Directors of the American Iron and 
Steel Institute, November 15, 1933» NRA Papers,
^^Johnson to Roosevelt, November I6, 1933* NRA Papers,
^^NRA Release No, 1789, November 17, 1933* NRA Papers,
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cents an hour»^^ Leo Wolman, chairman of the Labor Advisory Board, re­
ported even higher figures of reemployment. He believed that 100,000 
additional persons had been hired and that payroll increases amounted to 
more than $9 million, Wolman praised the industry for increased employ­
ment because he said that it resulted from the voluntary adoption of the 
eight-hour day, which under the code was not mandatory until the industry 
was working at 60 percent of capacity,^
Such figures as these, however, would not have brought such whole­
hearted acceptance of the code by leaders of the steel industry. With 
production figures still down and profits non-existent, steel officials 
had not become such simple dispensers of charity as willingly to follow 
the wages and hours provisions of the code without some idea that it would 
eventually bring the profits they wanted. These leaders, in fact, were 
willing to accept temporary increased costs for the privilege of ordering 
their business, under law, as they had long practiced in other ways.
There would probably have been much greater hostility toward HRA on the 
part of the industry if it had not been allowed such great latitude and 
independence in the operation of its code. The industry subscribed whole­
heartedly to the statement issued by the Business Advisory and Planning 
Council, set up by the Department of Commerce to assist the NRA* "Business 
should remain free of governmental interference and control and must be 
permitted to exercise the initiative and the agressiveness that have oharac-
■Week, November 25, 1933» P« 10.
eftStatement of Leo Wolman, n.d, NRA Papers.
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terized its remarkable development in the past»''̂  ̂ The Steel Code Authority 
was certainly aggressive.
The formal recognition of the Code Authority system was not actually 
begun until January 193^« In a form letter sent to all Code Authorities 
the NRA stated that it "was committed to the deliberate exploration of the 
possibilities of) and encouragement to self-governments and to a policy 
of strengthening the permanent association establishment of American 
industry,"'^^ Two days later the Code Authority Organization Committee 
recommended to Simpson that the board of the Steel Institute be author­
ized temporarily to administer its code, with the exception of labor 
complaints9'̂'̂ On February 1 this authorization was transmitted to AISI,'̂ ®
A more detailed communication was sent to Tower on February 5 setting forth 
the necessary steps for adjusting trade practices complaints and stating
that AISI would also be granted the right to adjust labor complaints when,
59and if) it created the necessary machinery.
The Code Authority Organization Committee set forth the Recovery Act 
qualifications for Code Authorities in a list of minimum standards. Among 
those qualifications it required that Code Authorities must promptly file 
a copy of the minutes of each meeting and a summary of all other impor­
tant actions taken. It was further required to transmit to the NEIA for 
review, before releasing to the industry, all Code interpretations,
^%ew York Times, November 3, 1933» P» 13=
^^NRA Code Authority Organization Committee, "Information for Code 
Authorities, First Release," January 22, 1934, p. 1. NRA Papers.
^^Wilson Compton to K, M. Simpson, January 24, 1934. NRA Papers,
•̂ ®R, W, Shannon to AISI, February 1, 1934. NELA Papers.
^̂ NEIA to Walter S, Tower, February 5» 1934. NRA Papers,
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60regulations9 bulletinsg manuals» and other operational data. This 
regulation was disregarded tgr the Steel Code Authority g and the NEIA 
In Washington was unable g or at least unwilling, to enforce coi#llance. 
This situation Illustrates as well as any factor the nature of the re= 
latlonshlp between the administration and the Steel Code Authority,
The Code Authority Itself had a very elaborate system set up for 
gathering statistics, A thlrty°one page manual was prepared, with the 
aid of the NEIA research and Planning Division, giving Instructions and 
sample forms for reporting data dealing with labor conditions, production 
and capacity, and Income and balance-sheet Information,^^ Host of the 
reports were due from member firms montlily and failure to provide them 
was a violation of the code. Naturally, much of the data gathered In­
volved trade secrets, therefore, most were released In general summaries 
with no Individual firms mentioned by name.
Deputy administrator Shannon was most conscious of the value of 
such statistics In any scheme of Industrial self-government or economic 
planning. For example, he gently prodded Walter Tower because the form 
AISI was using to gather production data was a quarterly, rather than a 
monthly report. Shannon wrote Tower that while he realized the dif­
ficulty of determining monthly production, even estimates were better
62than no data at all "as a better basis for planned action." AISI went
®̂NEIA Code Authority Organization Committee, "Information for Code 
Authorities, First Release," January 22, 193̂ » P» 11* NEIA Papers.
^^AISI Committee on Reports and Statistics, "Instructions for Com­
piling Data « , , and Statistics, , , ," September 6, 1933* NEIA Papers,
W. Shannon to Walter S, Tower, January 3» 193%. NRA Papers.
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ahead with its quarterly report but Shannon persisted» A month later
Shannon wrote that he agreed with the omission of some figures on the
quarterly form but "from the standpoint of planning for the Industry it
would be desirable to have a separate con^ilation of this information»"
Generally, the summaries of data gathered by the Institute came to NRA
without much delay, and Shannon wrote to Tower complimenting him on the 
6kjob being done»
When Shannon thought that he did not have all the information 
required, however, he was quick to ask for it» For example, in April 
1934, he wrote Tower, congratulating him on wage increases in the in= 
dustry announced in the public press and asking for statistics on the 
wage increases» Shannon must have been surprised and disappointed when 
Tower replied that AISI only knew what it read in the papers»^^ At 
another time when the newspapers carried monthly code statistics before 
thqy had reached NRA, Shannon quickly telegraphed Tower requesting an 
explanation»^^ This was not simple bureaucratie insistence on a lot of 
paperwork, but a recognition that only by placing the statistics in the 
hands of NRA officials could the operation of the code be fairly judged»
If there were only infrequent, though important, difficulties facing 
NRA in obtaining statistical data, such was not the case in regard to the
^%» Wo Shannon to Walter S* Tower, February 8, 1934» NRA Papers, 
6kR» Wo Shannon to Walter S» Tower, %ril 28, 1934» NRA Papers»
W, Shannon to Walter S» Tower, ^ril 3» 1934; and Walter S« 
Tower to R. W» Shannon, April 10, 1934» NRA Papers,
66Telegram from R» W» Shannon to Walter S, Tower, May 2, 1934»
NRA Papers.
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actions of the Code Authority and its numerous committees o The NRA 
JO lacking in knowledge of the organization chosen to administer 
the steel code that it initially had to write to the Institute requesting 
a list of the members of the Code Authority,Throughout the first year 
of code operation not one copy of the minutes of a Code Authority meeting 
was submitted to Washington as required. On December 6, 193^» Shannon
finally wrote to Tower requesting complete copies of the minutes of all
68board meetings "on advice of legal advisor," Tower replied that much
of the minutes was taken up with the commercial resolutions which had been
printed and sent to NRA, He went on to asy that he was preparing a memo»
randum summarizing the other action taken by the board which was not Con­
gotained in advance agendas. Shannon replied, after receiving the memo­
randum, that certain actions taken by the board had not been included and 
once again requested that he begin receiving the verbatim minutes
Several more letters passed between the two officials, requesting 
and denying information, until Tower wrote in March 1935» that such a
conçilation of information as requested took a great amount of time out
71of that necessary for the administration of the code. Shannon, with 
great restraint, replied that as long as he knew they were working on
M, Simpson to R« P, Lamont, September 8, 1933« NRA Papers,
^®Shannon to Tower, December 6, 19)4, NRA Papers.
6g'Tower to Shannon, January 8, 1935* NRA Papers,
^^Shannon to Tower, January 24, 1935* NRA Papers,
^^Tower to Shannon, March 23, 1935* NRA Papers,
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the information he was temporarily satisfied,^^ On April 3 Tower finally
sent Shannon the information requested covering board meetings through
March 14* 1935*^^ The deputy administrator accepted the memoranda, but
at this point became more demanding 8
In respect to the March 14, 1935, meeting and a U  future meetings of 
such Board, however, the summary form which you have used as a matter 
of convenience in respect to past records will not be adequate» The 
necessity for the summary form of minutes adopted previously as an 
expedient to avoid the copying of your records for the past months no 
longer exists and it is requested that you furnish me with a complete 
copy of the minutes of the meetings from March 14, 1935, and there­
after as they are compiled»'^
Tower, with his usual equivocation and rather high-handed manner, answered 
that he would "try to see that your request is complied with so far as may 
be practicable»"^^ Once again, in a warning and somewhat sarcastic tone, 
Shannon wrote t "I trust that your attenqpt to see that my request is com­
plied with 80 far as may be practicable will result in substantial compliance 
with my request»
In what must have been an exasperating and monotonous communication,
however. Tower wrote on May 2 that AISI had not prepared copies of the
minutes of the board meeting on March 14 and that he would simply submit
77a memorandum as he had in the past» ' ' Whether from despair or fraa an
^^Shannon to Tower, March 2?, 1935* ^®A Papers»
^^Tower to Shannon, April 3, 1935* NRA Papers* 
^^Shannon to Tower, April 18, 1935* NRA Papers*
^^Tower to Shannon, ^ril 19, 1935* NRA Papers*
^^Shannon to Tower, April 23, 1935* NRA Papers*
^^Tower to Shannon, May 2, 1935* NRA Papers.
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78unwillingness to press the Issue any further. Shannon accepted the situation.' 
The recital of this rather juvenile exchange between two officials Is Impor­
tant because It Illustrates so amply the essential relationship between the 
Steel Code Authority and officials of the NRA. In most matters AISI either 
Ignored, treated contemptously, or refused requests from Washington. More 
Important, In this affair, AISI defied the regulations under which It was 
supposedly operating.
Other examples could be cited of the failure of the Steel Code 
Authority to keep NRA Informed. Sometimes copies of commercial resolutions 
were not forwarded to Washington, even though they were essentially Indus­
trial laws which were binding on the Industry and which, In many oases.
Involved the public Interest.^^ This Is not to say that there were not 
adjustments to be made whloh took time and planning. Early In the life 
of the steel code. Tower wrote K. H. Simpson requesting that AISI be placed 
on a mailing list for "bulletins, reports and other literature which may be 
sent out from time to time by the Administration»"^^ The point Is that 
AISI did not have to ask again!
Another matter which caused dissension between the NRA and the Code 
Authority Involved membership under the code. The code Itself had been 
specific on what constituted a member of the steel Industry. Section 5 of 
Article I stated: "The term "member of the Industry" means and Includes
^®Shannon to Tower, May 3, 1935o NRA Papers,
^^Shannon to L. V. Collings, August 20, 1934; and Collings to Shannon, 
August 23, 1934. NRA Papers.
80Tower to Kenneth M, Simpson, November 1, 1933» NRA Papers.
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usy person» firm, association or corporation operating a plant or plants 
for the production of products, or any of them»" Products referred to pig 
iron, iron or steel ingots and rolled, drawn iron or steel products»
Article III stated that any member of the industry was eligible for member­
ship in the code and could become a member of signing a letter of assent by 
which it agreed "with every person, firm, association and corporation who 
shall then be or thereafter become a member of the Code that the Code shall 
constitute a valid and binding contract between the undersigned and all such 
other members,"
The board of directors of AISI reported in November 1933» that forty- 
three companies which were eligible for membership had not assented to the 
code» Ten of those companies eventually signed the code» It is difficult, 
however, to determine exactly how many conq)anies were eligible for membership 
and did not join the steel code» In January 1935 the NRA reported that there
were 294 members of the industry, of which 239 had signed the code agree-
8lment» These figures differ from those released by AISI on January 18, 1935»
which stated that 228 companies were members of the steel code, while 55
82additional ones were believed eligible but had not joined» On April 2,
1935» however, Walter Tower informed the NRA that 69 companies believed to 
be eligible for membership in the code had been sent letters of invitation 
to sign letters of assent»^^
81Daugherty, a LJLL»» Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry. I,
PP» 230-231»
82Ibid. » p. 10»
^^Tower to Shannon, ^ril 2, 1935* NRA Papers,
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The HRA was plagued with the problem of non=code industry members
from the beginning. In August 1933» Tor example, a steel firm executive
notified K, M. Simpson that he was not signing the code until he received
a response to a brief requesting a minimum wage of twenty-five cents an 
84hour, Simpson replied that not signing the code did not exclude a cos^aiy 
from compliance with "the labor and various other provisions,That same 
month the NRA notified another company that it was the intent of the code
that members of the industry file prices with the Code Authority whether
86signatory to the code or not.
The attitude of the NRA was thus vary clear as to their conception 
of what the code required of industry members. At the outset of code 
operation they told AISI that it must enforce observance of the labor 
provisions of the code for the entire industry, regardless of whether 
some had not signed the code,®^ In November 1933» Hoyt A. Moore, associa­
ted with Cravath, DeQersdorff, Swaine and Wood, the legal firm representing
the Institute, wrote Shannon that it was the desire of AISI to have all
eligible members come under the code. He stated that "it goes without 
saying that they /AIS^ are willing to do everything they can to force 
under the Code the recalcitrant or negligent members of the Industry, but
®\rank V, Kasel to K, M, Simpson, August 24, 1933# NRA Papers,
®^Simpson to Kasel, August 28, 1933» NRA Papers,
86R, S, Shannon to M, P, Simpson, August 24, 1933» NRA Papers, 
®*̂ Shannon to Charls, October 5» 1933» NRA Papers.
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I do not see hew they can do more than they have done," What Moore pro­
posed was that MSI determine the eligibility of firms for membership, 
urge them to join and, if they refused, turn over to NEIA the pertinent 
facts,
The NEIA did exercise a note of caution, however, when it chided 
the Code Authority for not using its full powers to force compliance 
from a non.code member. It added, however, that MSI might "want to 
be a little more cautious in exercise of a power against a non.Code 
member than would otherwise be the case."®^ Nevertheless, the NRA 
continued to Insist that non-members be forced to observe the code. When 
the secretary of the labor committee of MSI told Shannon that the Steel
Code Authority was not requiring non-code members to subnit labor statis­
tics, Shannon insisted that they must and added: "I guess we will have
90to talk that out a little and get our procedure straightened out,"
Whether or not that talk was ever held, there is no record. The 
correspondence, however, continued throughout the life of the code, the 
NRA insisting that the Code Authority administer the code for all members 
of the industry and the Code Authority insisting that it had no power to 
do so. Finally, on March 7» 1935» MSI sent a letter to industry members 
who had not signed the code, inviting them to do so. In those letters. 
Tower Implied that insistence on compliance of non-members with the code
®®Moore to Shannon, November 25, 1933» NRA Papers,
89^Shannon to Tower, January 15, 1934. NRA Papers,
^%emorandum of a telephone conversation between Grover C, Brown 
and R, W, Shannon, October 5, 1934, NRA Papers,
was a recent position of the NRA,^^ Shannon quickly reminded Tower that
this was a position which the NRA had taken frcxn the beginning, and to
another person expressed his feeling about the affair by stating: "The
writing of one letter after 18 months of apparent inactivity does not
constitute the fulfillment of the duties of the Board of Directors in 
92this respecta' Just before the NRA was declared invalid Shannon was
making another attempt to get the cooperation of the Code Authority in
93securing compliance with the code from non-members a ̂  It does appear, 
however, that companies which refused to assent to the steel code 
either followed its strictures or found themselves not getting a share 
of available businessa
Thus, there was a studied disregard, and sometimes implied contempt, 
of the NRA by the Steel Code Authority and by many steel firms tdiich re­
fused to join the NRA, That implied contempt is best illustrated by a
form letter sent to all members of the steel code by Walter Tower in which
he referred to cases where a member of the steel industry desired to
exempt itself from certain provisions of other codes. Tower advised:
It is suggested to members of the Code that, in any case in which 
they may be having difficulty due to overlapping provisions of 
other Codes, th^ should, before making direct application to the 
National Recovery Administration, consult with this office, in 
order that we may first have an opportunity to render any possible 
assistance in the matter, and also in order to avoid, insofar as
^^Form Letter from AISI, March 7, 1935» NRA Papers,
92Shannon to Tower, March 25, 1935* and Shannon to F, A. Lewis, 
April 29, 1935» NRA Papers,
^^Shannon to Tower, May 1, 1935» NRA Papers,
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possible, any confusion which might arise in the administration of 
the Steel Code by reason of any action which the National Recovery 
Administration might take on any such application,9^
Shannon naturally protested the implication that the NRA would produce
confusion and also stated that this question had nothing to do with the
QCjurisdiction of the Code Authority, Nevertheless, the Institute had 
clearly expressed its attitude toward the NRA, not only to the agency 
but to members of the industry as well.
The administration of the steel code by AISI exemplified "industrial 
self-government in practically unfettered form,"^^ The Code Authority, 
even though it sprang from the industry's private trade association, was 
intended to exercise a public, not a private trust. Yet, one observer 
wrote that "the board's activities • • • have been generally characterized 
by efficient administration of the Code as a private contract with em­
phasis upon the benefits to industry • . • but with little sense of 
responsibility for the general public interest," He went on to say that 
the Code Authority also showed "an apparent reluctance , , « to cooperate 
with governmental agencies when to do so might involve conceding ai%y seem­
ing immediate benefit to industry, irrespective of any possible ultimate 
benefits to industry which might be involved,
There were several reasons for this absence of public control over
okIf, S, Tower to Members of Steel Code, February 8, 1935p NRA Papers.
oe^^Shannon to Tower, February 11, 1935» and Shannon to Burr T, Ansell, 
February 11, 1935» NRA Papers,
96Daugherty, sdLal»» Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry.
I, p* 250,
^^"Code History," p. 13.
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the operation of the steel code* In the first place, since the NIRA was 
enacted during time of unparalleled economic crisis, greater-powers were 
given to the steel industry to regulate its own affairs than would have 
otherwise been given during normal times » Secondly, because the steel 
code was in effect for a period of a little more than twenty=one months and 
the NRA for only two years, there was not time for the administration, in 
view of the emergency problems created by the depression, to take any ac­
tion which might be described as long-range planning* Then, too, there was 
no clearly stated relationship in either the Recovery Act or steel code 
between the NRA and Code Authorities*
The NRA apparently was hampered by these factors and also a desire 
to give industrial self-government a chance to succeed. In March 1934, the 
Industrial Advisory Board informed the Code Authority Organization Committee 
that it approved the organizational set-up of the Steel Code Authority be­
cause the Board was following the principle "that industry should be en­
couraged to operate by itself as quickly as possible*" The memorandum 
went on to say that the Board did not even think that Code Authorities
should be required to conform too closely with the requirements set forth
98in the few instruction bulletins issued for their guidance.^ Such a 
policy, which seemed general during the life of the NRA, is revealed in a 
memorandum which the assistant counsel assigned to the steel code wrote on 
being transferred to another code* "In connection with this Code ijsteeiJ»” 
he wrote, "our policy is to some extent different from that with respect to
^®Memo from W. J, Barrett to E. C* Meyer, March 22, 1934*
NRA Papers.
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other codes and whoever is to handle it should get a general line-up on
this policy frcm Mr« Richberg so that no conflict will arise," Candidly
the counsel concluded: "Frankly I have not been sure as to just what our
99policqr regarding the code was to be," '
In effect there was no body outside, or even inside, the steel in­
dustry to which the Code Authority had to justify its actions. The NRA 
made no analysis of the effects of commercial regulations on the public 
and did not attempt to get consumer or labor representation on the board. 
The NRA representatives on the Code Authority only observed formal pro­
ceedings, but did not know what the all-important special committees of 
the Authority were discussing and deciding. The NRA did not have access 
to the complaints and results of investigations which came into AISI 
offices. Even the statistical data supplied to NRA by the Institute has 
been deemed by an economist who specialized in the steel industry, "either 
through design, oversight, or lack of interest , , , to be so noncomparable, 
so lacking in essential elements, and 8» meager at vital points, that they 
provide a very blunt tool for economic analysis,
The policy of the NRA deputy administrator for iron and steel seemed 
to have been a reliance on complaints from parties who claimed to have 
been injured by actions of the Code Authority, Such complaints, however, 
were relatively few in regard to the steel code. On the surface this fact 
seems difficult to understand. Although before the code tacit agreements.
^%emo from John M, Keating to John McClusky, November 27, 1933« 
NRA Papers,
^°°Daugherty, et al,. Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry.
If pe 2^6*
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price leadership and fear of retaliation had maintained a great degree 
of stability in the industry, an individual firm could legally make price, 
quality, and delivery concessions to secure a greater share of available 
business. The code, however, made the old informal uniformity compulsory 
under the law. Every act of the Code Authority had the possibility of a 
disruption of the relative competitive status of individual producers and 
a bias prejudicial to a majority of those companies.
Any prejudicial policies were possible because of the voting power 
of the members of AISI and the consequent composition of the Code Author­
ity, Since the number of votes any member of the Institute enjoyed was 
determined by dividing the dollar value of the company's previous year's 
sales by 500,000, it was natural that the large companies would exercise 
a greater degree of control of the Institute's affairs. The increase in 
steel production from month to month naturally increased the votes of the 
smaller companies and decreased that of the larger ones. Even at that, in 
March 1935» 214 members, excluding affiliates, had 198? votes. The eighteen 
members having the greatest sales, including affiliant members, had twenty- 
two representatives on the Code Authority; the forty-three members in the 
next rank had eight representatives; and the 153 remaining members were 
unrepresented. More important, however, the five largest members. Including 
affiliates, could outvote the remaining 209 members of the code,^^^
While it seems that there would have been more protests from the 
smaller members of the industry, it should be remembered that this likeli­
hood was reduced when over 90 percent of the steel producers accepted
HRA Papers,
^̂ M̂emo from Burr T, Ansell to L. M, C, Smith, March 5» 1935,
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the code in the first place. Moreover, the advantages to the members 
of the code more than offset any single discrimination perpetrated by the 
Code Authority, So far as complaints coming from consumers of steel 
products, it should be remembered that thqy, too, were operating under 
codes which permitted them to pass on price increases of raw materials 
without danger of price conpetition. It is to this extraordinary control 
of the steel industry by the industry itself, that this stuĉ y now turns.
CHAPTER Vi
THE STEEL INDUSTRY AIHINXSTERS ITS CODE
A survey taken of 2^5 manufacturers of steel products early in 
1934 revealed that only one of every three conqpanies had been able to 
offset its increased costs under the NRA regulations by higher prices» 
There was even general agreement among the respondents that price chisel­
ing, except in basic materials, had not been eliminated»^ Moreover, AISI 
reported that the steel industry was operating at only 21 percent of
capacity, but was still giving enqployment to 90 percent of its employees
2at higher wages and shorter hours per week»
The continued acceptance of the steel code on the part of these 
producers was not based on a philanthropic attitude to continue the
benefits to workers while their businesses operated at a loss, A great
majority of those producers in the above mentioned survey expected the NRA
eventually to benefit them through better trade practices and higher 
•>prices, Eugene Grace, president of Bethlehem Steel, spoke for much of 
his industry when he said that "a sounder basis has been developed for 
industry out of these hard times than it has enjoyed at any time during 
the post-war period," He particularly referred to the NRA's freeing indus­
try from the "shackles of anti-trust," and the creation of a price filing 
system which ended the old method of selling steel, Grace characterized 
that method as having had all "the confusion of the selling of rugs in a
Îron Age. CXXXIII (January 4, 1934), pp. 30-31,
^Ibid, (January 18, 1934), p, 29, %bid» (January 4, 1934), p, 30,
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4Turkish street fair." It was the introduction of open and legal la’ivate 
govwnment in tjie steel industry which held out the promise of higher 
profits through the elimination of most traditional competition» This was 
what made industry members willing to incur higher labor costs without 
immediate production and sales gains.
It was generally conceded in the code-making days of 1933 and 1934 
that the steel code was the pioneer code in length, detail, and -oompleKity-. 
Its attempt to deal with every major problem of the industry oannot-be 
understood without some attention to the industry itself. In 1^9 the 
steel industry ranked second among America’s industries in the vriue 
created by manufacturing and third in the number of employees.^ Because 
of steel’s essential importance to the entire economy, that industry was 
known as the cornerstone of American industry» Its health or ills became 
a barometer of the American economy» Such a large and important industry 
was naturally complex.
Iron and steel concerns can generally be grouped under three head­
ings. The integrated company mines its ore and coal, produces pig iron 
and steel ingots and most of the finished rolled products. The semi- 
integrated concern buys pig iron but carries on the rest of the processes. 
The non-integrated companies operate only rolling mills. Over one-half 
the steel producing capacity in the United States in 1929 was owned by 
U» S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel, while the five largest companies owned 
6 8 percent.^ Nevertheless, there were 294 individual companies eligible
\iterarv Digest. CXVII (February 3» 193^)» P* 38.
^Daugherty, et al». Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry. I, p. 20.
g
Maxwell S» Stewart, Steel - Problems of A Great Industry (New York, 
1937), p. 1.
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for membership in the NRA, and they did offer some competition. It is 
true that, while they were frequently absorbed by the integrated- concerns-, 
they were able to survive because many concentrated on production of 
specialized goods, such as high*carbon tool and special alloy steels; 
but, more importantly, because they followed the leadership of the large 
integrated companies.
Another important characteristic of the steel industry was its 
concentration in a few regions: more than one-half of its plants were in
Pennsylvania and Ohio, and most of the remainder were in Indiana, Illinois, 
New York, and Alabama, The reason for this concentration was the high 
costs of transporting the heavy raw materials required and the necessity 
of being near large purchasers of steel products. Only Alabama was re­
latively far from large consuming areas but was located economically in
7relation to its raw materials,
A final major characteristic of the industry has to do with its 
costs, sales, and earnings. Compared with most industries, the overhead 
costs tended to be high. The investment in ore and coal properties, 
transportation facilities, blast furnaces, steel works, rolling mills, 
the new continuous hot-strip mills and sales organizations represented 
staggering sums of money. It was most important to steel producers that 
they operate nearly as possible to capacity, because many expenses were 
as large when the equipment was idle as when it was going full blast. It 
was generally difficult for producers to cut overhead costs greatly. Cus­
tomers for steel showed seasonal and irregular demand, and there were shifts 
from time to time in the demand for different kinds of steel,. These factors
^I^id,. pp, 2-3,
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tended to unbalance the productive process. Thus, a ceu^any-mas under-so 
much pressure to operate as fully at capacity as possible, that it often 
engaged in price cutting and other competitive devices to gain more boeiness.
Steel producers usually sold their products directly throuj^-their-own 
sales organizations. Pig iron, however, was consumed mainly-^ the-;lant 
which produced it, and. the remainder was distributed to small, fouadrlef  ̂
by jobbers and briers. For rolled steel j^oduots the joTAer^s- function 
was mainly limited to fill-in orders for immediate delivery. Tho-^hig 
three" customers of steel in 1929 were automobiles, railroads, and builders, 
taking about one-half of all the steel produced; however, almost every 
industry in the nation used some steel products. Steel consumers, like 
the producers, also tended to be concentrated to a large degree in New
QYork, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois.
Compared with other industries, the earnings of steel companies 
were not unusually high. Between 1924 and 1929 the average profits of 
the larger steel producers were only 6.37 percent annually invested cap­
ital, and from 1931 to 1934 they showed an average net loss of 1.82 percent. 
While in some cases steel companies overvalued their assets and were able 
to claim lower profits, there is no conclusive evidence to show a great 
distortiw of these figures. Wages constituted only a small part of the 
ê qpenses of the industry, accounting for little more than one out of 
every twenty dollars received for pig iron sales in 1929* Labor costs 
in the other stages of steel production, however, accounted for 26 percent 
of the total value of production. Raw materials and fuel accounted for 
44 percent and overhead took 30 percent,*
Îb^d.. pp. 4-6. *Ibid.. pp. 6-7.
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Some, industry leaders thought that the economic difficulties of the 
early thirties were caused by unfair practices which could not be pre­
vented by voluntary policing which had always failed* One-steel executive 
also pointed to the probable reaction of industrialists to government en­
forcement of rules as one of business striving against the government 
being more important than responsibility to its fellow man. The-solution 
then was industrial supervision of fair business practices backed-by the 
power of law. "When a man knows that he will be judged by the-members 
of his own group idiile the misdemeanors are still fresh in their minds," 
wrote Thomas Foster, "he will realize that he cannot get away with un­
ethical practices.Thus, a Code Authority with great powers was 
established to administer a set of trade practices designed with a view 
toward the special complexity of the steel industry to bring stabilization 
to the industry.
The steel code itself placed a rather narrow definition on unfair 
practices. In Schedule H of the code such practices as bribing or pro­
mising rebates to a buyer, procuring trade secrets, copying trade marks, 
using inferior materials in production and circulating false information 
about a competitor, were branded as unfair. Also prohibited were attempts 
to induce a potential buyer to violate a contract with a competitor, post­
dating an invoice, using product descriptions in sales not customarily 
used in the industry and rendering free services to customers not usually 
performed. Moreover, the Code Authority was empowered to designate other 
acts as unfair trade practices when it so desired*
^̂ Iron Age. CXXXII (August 10, 1933)» p. 30.
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The steel code, formally called a "code of fair competiticai,” was 
designated to regulate all forms of coiqpetition both within and outside 
the industry* Most of the so-called "unfair practices" were designated as 
such "not because they necessarily conflicted with public policy, but 
sinqply because they were disliked by those members who sponsored the con­
t r o l s . T h e s e  unfair practices characterized a type of competition
aimed at "futile and costly struggles for available business under con-
12ditions of diminishing opportunities," Most of the controls were 
directed at price competition. Production and capacity controls actually 
served as substitutes and supplements for price controls in numerous 
c o d e s , I t  is thus the "fair trade practices" other than those listed 
under Schedule H that are of greatest interest in a study of code 
control*
The steel code did not specifically place restrictions on output 
or provide for allocation of production among its members as was done in 
some codes. It did, however, provide in Article V that if it appeared 
that the purposes of the Recovery Act were not being achieved without 
production control, that subject to the approval of the President, the 
Code Authority was empowered to "make, modify, or rescind such rules and 
regulations for the purpose of controlling and regulating production in 
the Industry," Production controls, however, were never instituted in 
the steel industry during the life of the code. According to the code,




the reason wlqr regulation of output was not instituted fro»-the beginning 
was because it was thought that "the elimination of unfair i»>aotices * • • 
XwoulijJ eliminate any overproduction . • • and any inequities in the dis­
tribution of production and sales among its memberso” The Code Authority» 
however, did attenpt some limitation of production when it found that 
some steel eonqoanies were exceeding the hours of labor provided In- the 
code and claiming that it was necessary for emergency operations. The 
Steel Institute notified members of the code that it questioned i^e nee* 
essity of these extra work hours since the demand in relation to capacity 
was so low. No concrete enforcement steps were taken, however.
Definite restrictions on the erection of new capacity were placed 
in the steel code. Article V provided that "until such time as the de­
mand for Z^tgJ products cannot adequately be met by the fullest possible 
use of existing capacities for producing pig iron and steel ingots. . . . 
none of the members of the code shall initiate the construction of any 
new blast furnace or open hearth or Bessemer Steel capacity," No restric­
tions were placed on the addition of rolling-mill capacity or electric 
furnaces. Also, nothing in the code prevented the erection of new produc­
tion facilities providing that old ones of equivalent capacity were dis­
mantled, or of modernization through reconstruction of old facilities.
The new capaci^ restrictions did prevent new enterprises from entering 
the industry unless they did so by acquiring existing furnace equipment.
While the steel code was among only three codes which prohibited
^^AISI to Members of Steel Code, March 13, 1939. NRA Papers.
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the creation of new capaeity it appears that the prohibition had- (Kûy a 
limited restriotive effect A steel wire company petitioned-the-H^ 
in March 1935 for permission to construct an open-hearth furnace to 
"overcome the monopolistic practices of the Code which legislates a con­
cern approximately sixty years old out of business when we have to b«Qr 
Wire Rods at Code prices and sell Common Products on Code Prioee»"^^ 
Walter Tower informed Shannon that members of the industry had stated 
that the wire company was operating at a high rate and had made a profit 
in 1934,^^ A Dun and Bradstreet report indicated that the applicant had
shown an increase in capital and surplus of $h26»500 in 193̂ * an increase
18over the preceding year of 23 percent. The Code Authority notified 
Shannon in April that it would not recommend an increase in capacity and 
discussion of the matter dragged on until the Scheohter decision ended 
any code restrictions. This was the only request received by the NRA 
for an exemption from the capacity prohibition in the steel code. This 
is not difficult to understand, however, as the average rate of opera-
20tiens in the industry during 1933 and 193% ranged from 25 to 38 percent.
S., NRA Division of Research and Planning, AHm4ni*tration and 
Effects of Production and Capacity Control Provisions in NRA Codes, pre­
pared by Horace B. Drury (Washington, 1935/1 PP* 113-116,
^^Paul W, Dillon, president of Northwest Barb Wire Co., to Shannon, 
March 5i 1935* NRA Papers.
^^Tower to Shannon, March 14, 1935* NEIA Papers.
18Dun and Bradstreet Report on Northwest Barb Wire Co., ^ril 22, 
1935* NRA Papers.
^^Tqwer to Shannon, ^ril 24, 1935* and Shannon to Paul W. Dillon, 
May 31» 1935* NRA Papers.
20Galloway, Industrial Planning, n. 158.
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The more sweeping regulation of the steel industry was in the 
nature of provisions concerning transportation, fabrication, midd&emen, 
sales, and uniform extras. The steel code as approved contained only five 
trade practices, with all but two subject to modification by the Code 
Authority. One which remained unmodified by the board was Section 4 of 
Schedule B. It required that before a seller could grant a deduction to 
a Jobber, a contract had to be secured in which the jobber agreed not to 
resell the products at a lower price than that at which a eode- aoaiber oog^^
sell to the same buyer. The jobber was subject to the same.liquidated...
damages as a code member— ten dollars per ton on products «aid illegany—  
in case he violated the agreement. A second unmodified code provision in 
Schedule E of Section 8 prohibited consignment sales of any product except 
pipe or products shipped to affiliated companies.
Three other original code commercial practices were later modified 
by the Code Authority. Section 4 of Schedule E provided that in the sale 
of plates, shapes, or bars for use in an identified structure, the place 
of delivery was to be the freight station nearest the place of erection, 
not the shop of the fabricator. Section 9 of the same Schedule required 
that except for products required ty a purchaser for a definite contract 
with a third party at a specified price, no contract could be made under 
which shipment was not required before the expiration of four months. 
Finally, Schedule Q set maximum rates of discount at one-half percent of 
invoiced value, excluding all transportation charges. The discount could 
be allowed on payments within 25 days if invoiced and shipped fPem plants 
east of the Mississippi River to Pacific Coast ports or within ten days
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for all other Invoices o Free credit could be extended for a-period of 45
days on shipments to the West Coast and for 30 days for all other shipments,
These latter three commercial provisions of the code were not only
modified by the Code Authority, but it also promulgated maqy eemaereial
regulations and resolutions which had the force of law. It had-been
served that the effect of the trade practice provisions of the- oode-was
"to consolidate and make explicit the pre-existing modes of behavior in
the industry, with sanctions for enforcement to be administered by -the
21Code Authority, under authority of law." This is not exactly cwrect, 
as many new commercial regulations established modes of behavior which, 
while they might have been desired before the code, were not in effect. 
Furthermore, the lack of evidence on pre-code trade practices and the 
nystery of the deliberations of the commercial committee of the Steel 
Institute limit a studly of commercial practices to a description of what 
practices were instituted and the complaints raised against them. The 
NRA suggested to the Code Authority that commercial regulations cover only
"the strategic essentials” and at the same time provide "a high degree of
22flexibility in less important factors of commercial procedure." Neverthe­
less, the commercial regulations were highly technical and complicated. 
Between August 31, 1933» and May 17, 193%, fifty-nine commercial regula­
tions were issued by the Code Authority. Ten of these e:qpired or were 
rescinded and eleven were embodied in the revised code. The remainder
^^n?ido. p. 160.
^^emo from K. M. Simpson to Hugh S, Johnson, September 14, 1934,
NRA Papers.
180
were reissued, either in their original or modified form, under new serial 
numbers.
One of the most oontroversial bodies of commereial regulations in­
volved transportation. The objective of all transportation provisions 
was to secure uniformity in delivered prices so as to eliminate "unfair" 
competitive advantages based on location. Using a detailed fright tariff 
book first issued on March 1, 1935, end periodically maintained, reduotioas 
were permitted in the delivered price where continuous water, rail-water, 
or rail-water-rall transportation was used on the Pacific Coast or through 
arqr port on the Mississippi River to place of delivery in any of the South 
Atlantic, Gulf, or Pacific Coast states. Such allowances were equally 
apjAicable to shipments from any plants located in those states even though 
there was no available water route.
Purchasers of steel products who wished to take deliveries in their 
own trucks were allowed a deduction of 6$ percent of the applicable all­
water freight rate. This only applied if they bought in carload quantities 
at one time and completed the loading of the trucks with the fuU amount 
during the next working day after loading had begun. At less than carload 
lots delivered to a purchaser's trucks at the warehouse, the seller could 
charge an arbitrary five cents per hundred pounds. Other charges were 
established for truck deliveries if a purchaser could not be reached by 
rail. These regulations varied with the product and with the circumstances, 
but in all cases arbitrary charges were designed to discourage any but all-
23Code Authority Regulation No. 4 and Code Authority Commercial 
Resolution No. 8. NRA Papers.
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rail delivery and to maintain prices at a uniform level* It should be 
noted that most mills had geared their operations to huge tonnage- movement: 
by rail, and they claimed that they did not have adequate handling and 
loading facilities for truckso Almost the only complaints made- against 
these regulations came from buyers who owned trucks and genwally it was 
more for convenience than price consideration which caused such protests* 
Nevertheless, steel companies could deliver products by truck to buyers 
even if the customer could be reached by rail* The all-rail freight rate 
was still charged, however* It appears that during the life of the code, 
mill deliveries by conqpany truck increased, while shipments by customers*
2<5trucks declined*
The transportation regulations which received the greatest numbers 
of complaints involved the use of all-rail freight rates to the exclusion 
of apy concessions to Inland water-way rates* The failure of the Code 
Authority to make any such price concession was perhaps the most blatantly 
unfair of the so-called "fair practices*" Where water transportation was 
available for delivery of steel products there was naturally a cheaper 
freight rate* Since the Code Authority would not allow it, however, the 
mill simply absorbed the difference between the all-rail freight and the 
water freight as extra profit* Thus, customers located on rivers were 
having their competitive advantage destroyed while steel mills were able 
to use the government's investment in waterways to their own advantage.
Commercial Resolutions Nos* 33» A19, 16, A3, and Ahl* NRA Papers. 
^̂ Daugherty, Pittaaofllag. I, p.
^^Ibid*. p*
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Some 107 conçallnts from carriers, fabricators, manufacturers, and 
Jobbers were filed against the board's refusal to make a rate concessiona 
This was the largest bo^r of complaints against any single operational 
feature of the codea The-Code Authority itself experienced greater in­
ternal differences on this matter than on any other, and almost every 
meeting was concerned with the question of some concession to inland 
water ratesa On April 13, 1934, a special committee on inland waterways 
reported to the Code Authority that the committee had split hy a four 
to four vote on a resolution authorizing a series of arbitrary deduc­
tions from all-rail rates ranging from $la60 to $6 a ton. The split 
occurred between those representatives of mills located on inland water­
ways and those who had more off-river millsa When the resolution was 
put to a vote of the whole board, it was overwhelmingly defeateda Only 
National Steel, Jones and Laughlin, and Inland Steel voted in favor of 
the resolutiona Sa M, Simpson told the board after the resolution was 
defeated that unless thpy took some action on the complaints, the NRA 
would do it for them,^^
Meanwhile, the Consumers Advisory Board had been watching develop­
ments on the transportation controversy but had hesitated to press the 
matter because of the technicalities of the issue. The CAB on i^ril 6, 
1934, however, wrote Shannon that whatever the merits of equalizing 
prices through the basing point system, it must not "be allowed to be­
come the excuse for collection from the consumer of freight charges never 
paid by the shipper," The memo concluded; "The Consumers Advisory Board
^^Memo from Simpson to Shannon, April 13, 1934, NRA Papers,
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regaiv.3 the adjustment of such matters as an Indispensable condition
28for the continuance of basing point systemso" The deputy adManistra» 
tor's office was not, however, avoiding the issue, and it continued to 
press the Code Authority for concessionso
Three days after the CAB memorandum, Simpson reported no change in 
the deadlock on the transportation issue, and that it appeared-for thf 
first time that the Code Authority was intentionally avoiding the mat-
90ter*  ̂ The following month Shannon wrote that he did not think the 
Board would take any action without government insistence and that he 
was considering what steps to take*^^ In December the legal adviser 
on the Steel Code notified the section counsel that over 73 complaints 
from consumers, congressmen, and federal officials had been received 
in regard to the freight rate controversy and that the refusal of the 
Code Authority to make any adjustments amounted to "a clear case of non­
f e a s a n c e , T h e  Code Authority, however, was clearly not going to take 
any action and just days before the Scheohter decision, the NRA was 
still looking for a solution to the problem*
Transportation controversies also affected the sale of steel to 
the United States government* Because of the landgrants made to the 
railroads in the nineteenth century the government had been given certain
^^emo from Corwin D* Edwards to Shannon, August 6, 1934, NRA Papers,
90Memo from Sin^son to Shannon, August 9> 1934* NRA Papers*
^^Dnsigned memo to R* W* Shannon, September 17, 193%* NRA Papers*
^^Memo from Burr T* Ansell to J* C, Latimer, December 29, 1934.
NRA Papers*
^^emo by R. W, Shannon, May 5, 1933» NRA Papers,
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preferential.rates on its shipments. Only three weeks after the steel 
code- had been signed the Department of Interior inquired of the IHIA if 
Section 4, Schedule E of the code prevented the use of land grant freight 
rates, ■ Once again the NRA pressured the Code Authority for a modifica­
tion of its rules, but the Code Authority seemed unwilling to act. The 
coiqplainta on this issue were so great, however, coming from the govern­
ment itself, that the Code Authority issued a commercial resulution al- 
lowing freight deductions on bids to the government,'̂  Nevertheless, 
the pricing result was the-same, as the resolution allowed mills to 
absorb the difference between actual freight charge of any steel company 
bidding on the contract. This resulted, barring any computation error, 
in identical bids being submitted on all government contracts.
Another attempt of the Code Authority to establish a "fair trade 
practice" which met with great opposition was concerned with the sale 
of plates, shapes, and bars to be fabricated for identified structures. 
Schedule E, Section 4 of the Code provided that "in the case of plates, 
shapes, or bars intended for fabrication for an identified structure, 
for the purpose of establishing the delivered price thereof, the place 
of delivery shall be deemed to be the freight station at or nearest to 
the place at which such structure is to be erected, and not the shop of 
the fabricator," This meant that a fabricator who had a contract to manu­
facture specific structural steel pieces for a bridge or a building was 
quoted a base-price plus freight charges to the location of the job, not 
to his shop. From 19O8 until the advent of the Steel Codes, railroads 
had been allowing fabrleation-ln-transit freight rates which gave fabrl-
qk
Commercial Resolution Al4, NRA Papers,
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calors up to $6 per ton rebates on freight charges when they presented 
waybills* no matter whether for steel simply purchased for stock or for an 
identified structure0 "The essence of an F.IoT. rate," states one eco­
nomist, "is that goods which move from their source to a place of fabri­
cation, where they are stopped, fabricated, and then moved on to the place 
of final destination, are quoted a through rate from source to final de­
stination, which is often much less than the sum of the rates for the two 
local hauls Though conqplicated i-n description, the F*IoTc rates allowed 
fabricators located either far away from steel suppliers or from the ulti­
mate location of the structure to compete on a more even footing with 
-those located at or near such points»
About nine months before the code was formulated a system of quoting 
delivered prices was instituted to modify the FoIcTo system to the ad­
vantage of eastern manufacturers. This new system was strenuously opposed 
by middle-western fabricators » The Code Authority was determined to elimi­
nate price competition on structural shapes, and on March 15, 1934, two 
commercial resolutions were issued» One required that steel could not be 
directed or reconsigned unless the delivered price at actual destination 
was identical with that at the original destination» The second defined 
an identified structure as anything which when erected in place had a fixed 
location at the point of erection» Ships and barges were arbitrarily in­
cluded in this d ef i n i t i o n O n October 10, 1934, these resolutions and
^^Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, p» 1091< 
^^Commercial Resolution No» 4$» NRA Papers » 
^^Commercial Resolution No» 51« NRA Papers»
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other detailed controls were embodied- in Regulation Number 9̂»- which was 
amended the following March, These regulations have been called the Code 
Authority's: "most ambitious attempt to force a set of new trade practices
33on a récalcitrant-industry, "
The protests against the code's handling of structural steel began 
to pour -in before the -code- hearings were even held, — One manufacturer 
wrote General- Johnson-protesti-ng Schedule E, Section 4 -beoauee-maî F mills 
had subsidiary fabricating companies or-preferred customers who were 
fabricators, and for-him to reveal the-location of a structure on which 
he proposed to-bid woul4 be inviting an-underbid, He also stated that
39much steel was bought for stock when final destinations were not known.
Other fabricators wrote almost identical letters, indicating an organized
protest on the part of independent fabricators. At the code hearings a
representative of the Central Fabricators Association also objected to the
hoproposed code provision.
The root of the opposition to Regulation 9 is found in steel mill 
domination of the fabricating industry. The president of a large inde­
pendent fabricating conpany wrote Simpson pointing out that more than 50 
percent of fabricated steel was manufactured by subsidiaries of U, S.
Steel (American Bridge Compaiqr), Jones and Laughlin Steel (Jones and 
Laughlin Fabricating Company), Bethlehem Steel (McClintic-Marshall Com­
pany), and Phoenix Iron Company (Phoenix Bridge Company). He asked the 
NRA to bear in mind "that this Code is to be distributed and governed
^®Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel, I, p. 480,
L, Aeskey to Hugh S. Johnson, July 8, 1933. NRA Papers,
40Code Hearings, pp. WlO-11, NRA Papers,
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by votes in thousand ton units, the same combination of mil-1 fabricators 
oomes into the making up of a so-called 'Fair Practice* section," The 
fabricator concluded; "This means that I will have to turn over to my 
chief competitors every private part of my books and what trade secrets
ill
I have," An attorney for a group of independent fabricators petitioned 
the NRA to amend the Recovery Act to either divorce mills from fabrica­
tion or to institute rules which would put the independents on an equal 
footing with mill-owned fabricators.
The complaints continued to beseige the NRA, but the Code Authority 
refused to move from its position of having corrected certain competitive 
"abuses" of the pre-code period. The NRA did not make strong representa­
tions for a change to the Code Authority in any case. In a letter to a 
Midwestern fabricator Shannon stated that he thought Regulation 9 was 
designed to enforce provisions of Schedule E of the Steel Code and 
created conditions of fair competition among steel mills as well as 
fabricators, A similar reply went to another fabricator who protested 
that he was not receiving many contracts for structural work because the 
mill-owned fabricators were disregarding either the rolling or fabrica­
ting profits in their bids and were thus underbidding independent concerns. 
This situation, wrote the executive, was forcing small concerns out of 
business. His solution, which appeared to be very logical, advocated
41Wo Ho Phillipps to K, Mo Simpson, September 12, 1933, NRA Papers,
42John Welsh to K, M, Simpson, September 18, 1933« NRA Papers,
43-̂ Shannon to H, A, Fitch, October 11, 1934, NRA Papers,
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that mllloovmed fabrieators be required to bid ae if they- wMW legAng the 
sane prioea to their parent oong)aniea. ae indĉ )endent8 did« delther-the 
NRA nor the Code Authority, however, ever took any action to solve this 
conflicte
The effort to eliminate all price competition in the-steel induetry 
also resulted in the regulation of sales to middlemen, or jobbwa as they 
were called. The original code had required that jobbers sign a eontraot 
pledging not to resell steel at lower prioes than the mill could sell to 
tihe same buyer. The code also ended the consignment sale of all products 
except pipe. Subsequent commercial resolutions extended the control of 
the Code Authority over jobbers, A jobber had to be a purchaser for re­
sale only within the United States without fabricating or processing. He 
also had to purchase in carload lots and maintain a sufficient stock to 
enable him to meet ordinary demands of customers. At least 75 percent 
of his yearly sales were required to be made to certain enumerated classes 
of buyers, in none of which the jobber could have a financial interest. 
Finally, a jobber had to employ at least two full-time salesmen, excluding
members of his family, who regularly called upon one or more of these classes
keof customers.
Steel product jobbers generally launched no vigorous attacks on the 
jobber provisions, mainly because it enabled them to deal with mills on a
44Tilghman H, Burr to Franklin D, Roosevelt, October 22, 1934, NRA
Papers.
^^Commercial Regulations Nos, 1, 3; 5, 6* 7 and 8 and Commercial 
Resolutions Nos, A17, A26 and A37, NRA Papers,
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46legfO, Weis as a group rather than on the basis of individual bt^gainingo
There were, -however, long and- loud protests frrnn sane quarters* A Mnnesote
hardware dealer informed the Retail -Hardware Association that base
price of nails purchased from Jobbers had risen from $2,60 in late-1933 to
$2*90 early in 1934, Although the hardware dealer claimed he had been-
oompetitive with chain catalogue houses when the price had been-$2, 25, the
higher price had put him out of the market* Jobbers had told the-dealer
that this was the best price they were allowed to offerJbether-hard-
wareman told the Association:
I can see the reason why the steel trust wishes to put us out of 
business legally hy getting the code adopted as they did, as it is 
a fact that a good many stockholders in the steel trust are also 
stockholders in the big chain stores and some have the same dir­
ectors* If something is not done quickly the harm that will be 
done to the retail merchants is so large under these trying con­
ditions that a good many will not be able to stand the strain until 
the end of this year*
Con^laints from retailers regarding alleged discriminations caused by the
Jobber regulations did not receive much attention from the Code Authority
or the NRA,
Jobbers themselves received more concern from the administration* 
Occasionally a Jobber won a government contract, and the NRA was careful
llQin certifying the Jobber's eligibility that he met the code requirements,
46Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. I, pp. 504-505.
47Bruscke and Son to the Minnesota Hardware Association, February 3* 
1934, NRA Papers,
^^enry J, Blenker to Minnesota Retail Hardware Association, February 
7, 1934, NRA Papers,
^^R* W« Shannon to South Chester Tube Company, September 29, 1934; 
and Shannon to T, W, O'Hara, October 5* 1934, NRA Papers,
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The bulk of complaints from jobbers, however, came from two oonoerns, "'ne 
conqiany claimed that thsy had lost a good sale to the government beeause 
the Code Authority had refused to allow the jobber to pay a commieslon to 
an agent to solicit the business. The correspondence between the jobber, 
the NRA, and AISI consumed several months and many sheets of paper, but 
apparently never solved the controversy, at least to the satisfaction ol 
the jobber,The other company, which claimed to be the second or third 
oldest jobber selling reinforcing bars in the country, complained that the
Code Authority would not recognize him as a jobber because he had no ware­
house, and never had, and could not maintain the required stocks. This 
jobber could not get any steel producers to nil to him and said he was 
going out of business, but no visible action was taken by either the 
Code Authority or the NRA to aid bim,^^
The failure of the NRA to take strong action was again apparent and 
not quite understandable. As an example, when a jobber who had been in 
business since 1889 reported to the NRA that he was losing his jobber 
standing because he did not employ two full-time salesmen. Shannon told 
other NRA officials that he considered the regulation faulty but that he 
did not feel "in a position to press for its revision," When these of­
ficials told Shannon that the case should be sent to the Industrial ^peals 
Board, Shannon said that he did not think that was desirable and that per­
haps Donald Richberg might "reason" with Walter Tower on that matter,
^^Correspondence file in regard to the Darbyshire-Harvie Iron and 
Machine Company, December 4, 1933» to i^ril 11, 1934, NRA Papers,
^^Correspondence file in regard to the Day and Coater Company, 
December 5, 1933 to March 9, 1934, NRA Papers,
Ç2James Cope to Wayne P, Ellis, November 21, 1934, NRA Papers,
191
This is a very significant episode in the relationship of the HRA and the
Steel Code Authority regarding the Code Authority's almost corapLete- and 
unfettered control of so-called “fair trade practiceso”
A final regulatory control of the Code Authority which was directly 
related to price maintenance was the board®s authority to determine the 
specifications for steel products sold at the filed base price. This 
meant that the board could fix uniform extra charges or deductions to be 
made for specifications which departed from normal shapes of steel and 
quantities ordered which departed from standard base characteristics.
Once the requirements on extras had been issued by the board, th@y became 
binding on all code members,Before the code period the price of extras 
was never figured on a cost basis but by arbitrary figure, and were sources 
of price concessions to buyers. It does appear that by standardizing ex­
tras, costs were Increased to steel consumers and profits to steel mills
ekwere higher on such transactions»^
The NRA expressed its views concerning extras to the Code Authority 
from time to time. In general the NRA thought that power over extras should 
be exercised with extreme caution, with as few changes as possible and, 
when changes were made, to allow the greatest degree of democratic action 
on the part of code members. By October 1934, Tower informed NRA that al­
though there had been no strict procedure followed in determining uniform 
extras, he believed few changes would be made in the future and most would
^^Iron and Steel Code. Schedule E, Section 7»
^Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. I, pp. 523-531o
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be downward revisions,Nevertheless» by December, forty-one conçlaints 
had been received from fabricators against the action of the board estab­
lishing certain quantity extras on plates and shapes. At this-point Shan­
non informed the board that if it did not rescind the action he would re­
commend that the Administration nullify the regulation. This is one of 
few times in which the Code Authority yielded to pressure and suspended 
its own action. Forty-five additional complaints were received on other 
extras schedules. The Code Authority itself adjusted twenty-four com­
plaints by an upward revision that certain extras established were not 
high enough,Just before the end of the code period the NRA had decided 
that the board^s power had to be curtailed on this matter
Thus, the fair trade practices, production and capacity controls, 
and commercial regulations were all designed and administered as con­
comitants to the pricing policy of the steel industry. Article VII of the 
steel code forbade any member of the code to sell aqy product not in ac­
cordance with the requirements of Schedule E of the code. Section 2 of 
Schedule E provided that each member of the code had to file a base price 
for each product it produced with the secretary of the Code Authority, 
Those prices, which could be whatever the company desired, would not be­
come effective before ten days had expired. Any company desiring to 
change its prices had to file a new list which again would not become 
effective until ten days had expired,
^^emo by R, W, Shannon, October 1?, 193̂ ® NRA Papers,
^^Burr T, Ansell to J, Q, Latimer, December 29, 1934, NRA Papers, 
^^Memo by R, W, Shannon, May 9, 1935® NRA Papers,
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Section 4 provided that prices quoted by code members to prospective 
buyers were to be not less than the current published base-price-t^ioh-the 
member had filed, plus the all-rail published tariff freight-rate--from the 
basing point, on which the base price had been established, to the buyer's 
place of delivery. If a customer was located at a basing point the base 
price together with a published switching charge would be quoted. Schedule 
F of the Code listed over 200 basing points for some thirty-six iron and 
steel products. The Code Authority exercised ultimate control over base 
prices, although it never used this particular p o w e r S e c t i o n  5 of 
Schedule E gave the board authority, if it considered a firm's filed 
prices lower than the cost of production, to investigate production costs 
and require that firm to file a new price list. If the firm refused, the 
board could impose new prices equal to the lowest prices filed by the other 
members.
Any discussion of the pricing policy of the steel industry under the 
code is only meaningful in the context of the history of the basing point
system. The origin of the system, although frequently treated in economic 
literature, is uncertain,Elbert H, Gary stated that the basing point 
was first fixed at Philadelphia in the I670's and then moved to Pittsburgh
gether.
^^The revised Steel Code of Hay, 1934, dropped this provision alto-
^^See for example Frits Machlup, The Basins Point Svftem 
(Philadelphia, 1949); United States Steel Corporation. TJE,E,C. Papers.
3 vols, (New York, 1940); Frank A, Fetter, The Masquerade of Monopoly 
(New York, 1931); William Simon, Geographic Pricing Policies (Chicago. 
1950), and George H, Sage, Baaing Point Pricing Systems and the Federal 
Antitrust Laws (St. Louis, 1951)»
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when that city became the main center of production»^® Whether •'Wiia- ie 
accurate or not, the FTC has established that before i860 the-general- 
practice was to sell steel f»o»bo mill, with each mill naming-its-own- 
base price0^̂  In 1880 four structural steel manufacturers allocated 
production among themselves and began to quote prices at the Pittsburgh 
base plus freight from Pittsburgh»
The next twenty years saw many pools, gentlemen's agreements, price 
zoning systems and the like which often used a Pittsburgh base price, but 
the so-called "Pittsburgh Plus" did not become firmly established on prin­
cipal rolled-steel products until after 1903» Beginning about his time 
U» 5» Steel began to dominate the industry and the pricing policy and its 
location around Pittsburgh is ample reason for the maintenance of Pitts­
burgh Plus» It became standard practice for executives of the leading 
producers of rolled-steel to meet together, and after 1906 presidents of 
various companies gathered in the offices of the Steel Corporation for 
discussion» From 1906 to 1921 there were formal agreements but price 
maintenance was upheld by the leadership of U» 8» Steel» Until 1911 the 
Gary Dinners performed this function» From 1921 until the advent of the 
code period, price cutting by independents led to the establishment of a 
number of basing points, Chicago being the first» The Federal Trade Com­
mission issued a cease and desist order against the Pittsburgh Plus system 
in 1924 and the multiple basing point system became firmly established
^®Wew York Times. July 24, 1924, p» 21.
^^Federal Trade Commission, Practices of the Steel Industry Under 
the Code. 73rd Cong», 2d Sees», 1934, Senate Doc» 159» P® 6 0 . Hereafter 
cited as FTC Resort on Steel., Industry.»
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and was continued under the code»
The operation of Pittsburgh Plus pricing was simple indeed. Under 
this system a seller quoted the Pittsburgh base price» plus freight charges 
to the purchasers location, along with standard charges and deductions for 
extras. As an example, in 1920 the Pittsburgh price for steel was $40 a 
ton, and the freight charge to Chicago was $7,60, Thus $47,60 a ton for 
steel was the delivered price of steel no matter from what mill it was 
shipped, A Chioago buyer would pay that amount for steel even from a 
Chicago mill a few blocks away, and the mill would collect "phantom 
freight" of $7,60, On the other hand, if the Chicago mill shipped a ton 
of steel to a Pittsburgh buyer he could only get the base price, and the 
$7,60 transportation charge would have to be absorbed by the seller. Thus, 
the mill net would only be $32,40, compared with $40 which a Pittsburgh 
mill would receive from supplying the same customer. After 1924 the new 
system established a number of other basing points, but the system worked 
essentially the same way, ^
The basing point system has had a very spirited defense, both in 
company propaganda and scholarly economic studies, U, S, Steel has borne 
the brunt of the attack on the pricing system, fighting the F,T,C, cease
and desist order until 1948 when it abandoned the multiple basing point 
64system, Robert P, Lament reported on the proposed Steel Code in July 
1933, that "it was the accepted view of the members of the Code that the
^^Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. I, pp, 534»54l< 
-’Adams, Structure of American Industry, pp, 163-164, 
^^achlup. The Basing-Point System, p. 72,
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practice of establishing prices for products in the Industry upon basing 
points was a sound economic practice and should be continued without sub~ 
stantial change»"*^ That "sound economic practice" was defined by U, S,
Steal in a brief filed with the Temporary National Economic Committee in..
1940, The report began*
The basing point practice in the steel industry is a sioqole method 
of quoting delivered prices, which results in the competition of 
many geographically separated steel producers at the markets for 
each of the diversified products of modern steel millso It is not 
a price-fixing medium nor does it result in high prices o It does 
not stifle competition but rather extends the benefits of such 
competition to all consumers
The secretary of AISI told the TNEC that the system actually brought per­
fect competition to the industry, for "competition is at its perfection 
of expression when all of the sellers are on the same level Occasionally,
when pressed, a steel executive argued that the basing point system did not
68really operate abolutely» An official of U, 3» Steel testified, however, 
that "the records will show that our average price over a long period of 
time, with the exception of the code period, was lower than our published 
price
These arguments are, in reality, either false or irrelevanto Eco­
nomic arguments have been advanced, however, which attempt to justify the 
basing point system. It was often argued that such a pricing policy al­
lowed producers to compete equally for distant markets and that f,o,b« 
mill pricing would create a danger of local mill monopoly. It has also
^Memorandum submitted by Robert P, Lamont to the NRA, July 31,
1933» NRA Papers,
^MnEC Hearings. Part 26, p, 13820, ^^Ibid,. Part 5, P» 1882,
^^Ibid,. Part 2?, p, 14172, ^Mbid,. p, 14165,
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been argued that because of the high capital outlay and the-high overhead 
costs, full capacity operation is necessary for reasonable profitso In 
times of low demand the tendency is to cut prices, and the industry cannot 
stand such cut-throat competition, A corresponding argument is that eince 
the demand for steel is rather inelastic, lower prices will not result in 
a higher consumption of steel. Finally, it is argued, price competi-tlnn 
would not put steel producers at the mercy of "monopsonistlc or oligopsonis-
70tic" steel consuming interests, such as auto, farm implements, and railroads.
The arguments used against the basing point system are equally varied.
The most natural and oft-stated objection is the reduction of competition 
which such a system causes. The economist, Frank Fetter, testifying at the 
steel code hearing said of the basing point system: "This is an artificial
practice, which did not prevail in the early industries, before monopolis­
tic control arose along in the 80's and 90°s, along in that era of mono­
polies," The author of Masquerade of Monopoly concluded: "If that is not
in fact a monopoly, I do not know anything about the meaning of the word
71'monopoly,'" Under the steel code price stabilization was "probably more
adequately provided for , , , than any other time in the history of the
72steel industry," The FTC reported that in 1935» in response to a call 
for bids on three big WPA projects, U, S, Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Inland 
Steel, and Jones and Laughlin quoted prices identical to the fourth deoi-
70Adams, Structure of American Industry, pp, 164-172; Galloway,
Industrial Planning, p, 161;and Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel.
II, p, 1106.
^^"Code Hearings," pp, AA5-6,
^^Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, pp, 1079-1080.
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mal p o i n t a Almost identical illustrations could be repeated over and 
over againa
Other arguments against the basing point system include those dealing 
with plant locations, transportation charges and wastefulness. It is 
argued that both steel producers and consumers tend to retain uneconomic 
plant locations because of the pricing policy of the industrya Then there 
is the waste of cross^haulingo Charles M, Schwab wrote in 1928: "It is
manifestly uneconomic for a steel manufacturer in Chicago to ship 100,000 
tons of steel to Pittsburgh at a time when a Pittsburgh manufacturer is 
shipping a like quantity of like material from Pittsburgh to Chicagoo"
Yet, this practice was what the basing point system often encouraged, A 
final argument maintains that such a pricing policy allows an industiy to 
maintain excess capacity, because inefficient producers are protected from 
price competition,'^^ It was the specific complaints against the basing 
point system during the NRA, however, which is of most concern to this 
study.
At the time the steel industry had been negotiating with the govern­
ment for its code of fair competition a number of representations were 
made in regard to proposed price controls, A major source or complaints 
came from interests in locations which had not been designated as basing 
points. Both public officials and businessmen of Johnstown, Pennsylvania,
^^TNEC Hearings. Part 5, 1897»
'^̂ Quoted in C, D, Edwards, "Basing Point Decisions and Business 
Practices," American Economic Review. XXXVIII (December, 1948), p, 840,
"̂ Âdams, Structure of American Industry, pp, 176-177°
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protested that their city, the location of large blast furnaees- which pro­
duced four percent of the steel manufactured in the United States^ had- not 
been so namedo^^ Both the General Motors Corporation and the Chrysler 
Corporation challenged the entire basing point aystemo Wo P« Qirysler 
wrote: "The Steel Code provides against charging the custcnaers too little
or giving them any favors, but does not seem to contain anytiilng against 
charging then too much if the members of the Steel Code agree to do so, or 
file high rateso" He continued that he purchased large amounts of steel 
from Detroit manufacturers and only had to pay a switching charge of sixty 
cents a ton* Under the Code provisions, however, he would have to pay the 
freight rates from Pittsburgh which was $5»60 a ton. In recommending f,o,b. 
mill pricing, Chrysler concluded: "The case therefore falls within the
Pittsburgh Plus method which was condemned by the Federal Trade Commission 
in the Pittsburgh Plus Case,"^^
Robert Lamont answered this complaint by charging that the auto 
makers wanted an unfair competitive advantage and desired to evade the 
payment of just steel prices. He did say he resented the charge by the 
auto executive that members of the steel code would charge whatever thqy 
agreed to charge, such an accusation being "somewhat veiled, to the effect 
that the members of the Steel Code propose to violate the anti-trust 
lawse”^^ Another protestant made no "veiled" charge, but wrote: "It is
76.,'Code Hearings," pp, and Z2; and E, H, Morrell to K. M, Siiqp. 
son, August 5f 1933, HRA Papers,
77W, P, Chrysler to K, M, Simpson, August 1, 1933o NRA Papers*
P, Lamont To Hugh Johnson, August 12, 1933» NRA Papers,
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notorious that for years steel prices have been fixed by agreement between 
the producing companieso" This executive suggested that s 'act 'inding 
body be appointed to determine the cost of steel production so ,he -oublie 
could be protected»
The deputy administrator's office in NRA faced the same frustrations 
in atteoqpting to exercise aqy control over the pricing policies of "Uie 
Code Authority as it did in other administrative matters» Nevertheless-» 
such officials as Shannon and Simpson were not unsympathetic to the basing 
point system or price-filing» Shannon thought that basing points served a 
useful purpose because they simplified the price structure» yet he thought 
that system "economically unsound from a purely price standpoint." The 
deputy administrator wrote that a complete change to the f.o.b. mill system 
at that time would be too disturbing to the existing order of things» but 
that the npioval of price competition might require government pressure to
ÛA
get more basing points established» Shannon did react to repeated state­
ments by steel executives in which they claimed that they would not receive 
equal conqjensation under the code for their increased labor costs because 
prices would not increase that much» Shannon wrote that published code
prices would be enforced» idiereas there had been secret price-cuts before
8lthe code. Donald Richberg» however» raised serious objections to the 
price fixing and basing point provisions before the code was approved. He 
wrote Johnson that the steel industry had not produced any evidence to
J» Hanna to Franklin D» Roosevelt, August 3» 1933» NRA Papers.
®^emo from Shannon to Simpson» /July» 1933/7* NRA Papers.
81Shannon to Simpson, August 18, 1933* NRA Papers.
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support Its proposed pricing policies and that the NRA could not Ignoro
Information In possession of the Justice Department and the PedwaOL Trade 
82Commission,
The NRA Insisted, as It had regarding other provisions of the code, 
that even steel conpanles which had not signed letters of assent to the 
code must file base prices,®^ The Code Authority, however, by the early 
part of 1935 had not been sending the regular notices of filed base prices 
to non-code members, nor had It been Including any base prices which non­
members may have filed. Shannon Informed the Steel Institute after he 
learned of this practice that It must perform both functions. Just 
two months before the NRA was declared Invalid, Tower Informed all non- 
code Industry members that unless they began filing prices within ten 
days, the NRA would deem them guilty of a violation of the Recovery Act 
and any sales made subsequently would be in violation of the Law,  ̂ There 
Is little evidence, however, that the government was contemplating such 
action or would have dared raise such a controversy In any case.
The steel Industry was among only three Industries which established
86basing points In their codes. The price filing provision In the code
^^emo from Donald Richberg to Hugh S, Johnson, August 2, 1933*
NRA Papers*
^^Shannon to Tower, August 30, 193̂ * NRA Papers*
gjL
Tower to Shannon, February 1, 1935t and Shannon to Tower, February 
4, 1935* NRA Papers.
®^AISI to Steel Industry Members, March 7, 1935* NRA Papers*
86The other two Industries were reinforcing fabricating materials 
and the steel joist industries. Daniel S, Qerig, Jr., and Beatrice 
Strasburger, Trade Practice Provisions In toe Cedes. U, S., NRA Division 
of Review, Work Materials No, 35, Part C (Washington, 193o), p, 41,
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seemed to have established price stability and generally higher prices 
which was the major objective of the steel industryo The composite price 
for finished steel showed a rather consistent rise daring the code period 
bat never equaled the high annaul average of 191 cents a pound in 1917 
or even the 2o297 cents in 1929« This is not surprising considering de­
pression conditions0 From the advent of the code in September 1933) 
until the NRA was invalidated in Hay 1935) the composite price of finished 
steel rose from 1,97 to 1,124 cents a pound. The stability of steel prices 
was also evident, with the composite price at 1,124 cents a pound for 
finished steel holding from August 1934 to September 1935.^^ During the 
code period steel ingot production rose from 25)949)000 tons in 1934 to 
33)333)000 tons in 1935.®®
Carroll R, Daugherty, in his indispensable economic study of the 
steel industry during the code period, found that price uniformity at 
individual basing points "was the rule rather than the exception," and 
that when price changes were filed simultaneously Tv groups of independent 
oonpanies at one or even several basing points, "not a single disorepenoy 
marred uniformity,He concluded that these facts "in the face of simul­
taneous and identical action among groups of independents estalalishes a
presumption that prices were altered under the Code by predetermined agree- 
90ment," The NRA Division of Review concluded that*
^^Iron Age. CXXXVII (January 2, 1936), pp, II6-II7,
8ftM d . )  p. 112,
^^Economios of Iron and Steel. II, p, 67O,
^°aUo) p. 671,
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Price filing served as an automatic impersonal mechanism to record 
and to perfect the process of price leadership, already dominant 
in the iron and steel industry» It contributed to the efficiency 
and smooth operation of the basing point control by preventing secret 
price cutting and local rebates, which had been in part induced by 
the basing point practice which tends to discriminate against pur­
chasers located near a non-basing-point mill. By requiring ad­
herence to base prices, the price filing provisions prevented open 
as well as secret departures from the basing point structure . , » 
price filing served largely as a mechanism for facilitating orderly 
changes in uniform prices, already well established by price leader­
ship and by the basing point structure,91
Thus, the pricing policy established ty the code not only retained prac­
tices established in the steel industry during the pre-code era, but con­
tinued those practices and made them more effective,
All of the so-called fair trade practices were administered and en­
forced by the Steel Code Authority, with a minimum of supervision and 
interference by the NRA*s deputy administrator’s office, A number of 
coD^laints in regard to the operation of the Steel Code did come dir­
ectly to NRA but these were usually from non-industry members affected 
by the code or in a few cases, smaller industry members who thought they
92had or could not receive fair treatment at the hands of the Code Authority, 
Most complaints from code members, however came directly to the Code 
Authority and only in the rarest cases was the NRA notified either of an 
alleged violation of the code or of the disposition of the case. Therefore, 
there is little data or evidence available to determine enforcement policy 
on the part of the Code Authority.
Rather elaborate conqxLiance and enforcement machinery was established
^^Enid Baird, Price Filing Under NRA Codes. B. S., NRA Division 
of Review, Work Materials No. ?6 (Washington, 1936), p. 258,
^^his does not take into consideration conq^aints from steel 
workers which will be considered in Chapter VII.
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by the NRA, Late in 1933 a National Conçliance Board was oreated-with 
various regional and local sub-divisionso This board replaced-the Blue 
Eagle Division and the local adjustment boards lAicb had sought volun­
tary compliance with the President's Reemployment Plan, As General 
Johnson emphasized so much during the early days of the NRA, the Gode 
Authorities were to be given maximum freedom to enforce their own codeso 
A shift from this policqr became evident in Harsh 1934 when a Litigation 
Division was established with responsibility to the General Counsel o
This new division's task was to coordinate all NRA litigation, 
renew all cases turned over to the courts and prepare and carry through 
court cases in the name of the Department of Justice, De-centralization 
was also begun, and state compliance directors were etqcowered to turn 
over cases directly to United States district attorneys* rather than 
referring them to the National Compliance Board at Washington» Finally, 
in October 1934, a single Director of Conpliance and Enforcement was 
appointed with nine regional officers to assist him. At the same time a 
special assistant to the Attorney General was designed to handle all NRA 
litigation from start to finish,*^ This continual revamping of compliance 
procedure and organization kept both NRA division administrators and Code 
Authorities confused and had much to do with the ineffectiveness of NRA 
control over Code Authorities»
Early in 1934 the NRA Compliance and Enforcement Division notified 
the Steel Code Authority that a staff had been organized in Division I of 
the NRA for expediting congG.aint procedure» The Conpliance Division em­
phasized that it was mainly established to aid Code Authorities and did
^^yoBs, National Recovery Administration, pp. 58-61 and ?4j and NRA 
News Release No» 1847, November 22, 1933» NRA Papers»
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not want to overemphasize its own enforcement powers « It suggested" that 
the Code Authority forward data on all unadjusted complaints to Waahing-
oh,ton,^ Tower acknowledged this letter by informing the HRA -that-it had
not bs#n necessary to refer alleged violations of the steel coda to
Washington and that the Code Authority's own conqpliance organization was 
oequite effect!veo The compliance organization set up Iqr the Code Authority 
was the first time such a step had been taken. The board of directors of 
AISI announced in December that Alexander Baxter and George Satterwfaite 
had been appointed as special investigators to "assist the Administrative 
Committee in seeing that the members of the Code perform their obligations 
thereunder» including the investigation of all alleged violations of the 
provisions of the Code which may be reported.
On February 2 the Code Authority adopted a resolution regarding pro­
cedure for handling complaints under the steel code. Every alleged vio­
lation of the code was to be reported to the Code Authority's enforcement 
division after idiioh an investigation would be made. If the investigators 
decided that a violation had indeed been committed» it would notify the 
executive secretary of AISI together with a recommendation for any damages. 
The executive secretary would then notify the offending con^any of the 
facts and the con̂ tany had fifteen days to affirm or deny the allegations.
A denial accompanied by some defense entitled the alleged offender to a 
gkM. J. Dodge to Walter Tower» n.d. NRA Papers.
^^alter Tower to M. J. Dodga» June 4» 1934. NRA Papers.
^^emo from R. W, Shannon to NRA Oonqoliance Division» January 11»
1934, NRA Papers. Baxter was formerly with a firm of certified public 
accountants and Satterwhite had been with an independent steel firm.
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97hearing before the board of directorso
Such an organization and procedure for handling complaints have
been efficient but it did not strictly conform to NRA compliano»^ pz«ocedurea« 
Three days after the board's resolution, Shannon wrote Tower that-̂ the--Steel 
Code Authority had been authorized to administer fair trade -practices- com­
plaints, but that such coit̂ laints should be filed with the s-tate-director 
of the National Emergency Council who would then refer them -to the-Code 
Authority0 The Code Authority would be expected to keep the state direc­
tor informed of progress and if the complaint was not handled within a
9 8reasonable time, the state director would take over.
Tower turned this regulation over to AISI's attorney for reply.
Once again this reply illustrates the attitude of AISI toward officials
of the NRA, The counsel of AISI wrotet
As I said to you last Friday, I believe that we are all trying to 
aocomplish the same purpose, I know that the Board of Oireotors 
of American Iron and Steel Institute, which is charged with the 
duty of administering the Steel Code, and the machinery which it 
has set up to help it in the work are working hard and, I believe, 
effectively. If conplaints are made, the Board desires to know of 
them, to the end that it may do whatever should be done to see that 
the causes of them shall be eliminated, if the cosplaints shall have 
real merit. Nothing can be accomplished, however, by any attempt 
to take away from the Board of Directors the authority idiich the 
Code, and, therefore, the law, has given to it, or by attempting 
to divide the responsibility which the Code makes only that of the 
Board of Directors .99
Thus, the Code Authority took the position that it should be the sole
agency which handled complaints on the steel code and that it did not
9 7'Code Authority Resolution of February 2, 193%. NRA Papers,
9 8Shannon to Tower, February 5» 193%» NRA Papers.
^^Hoyt A, Moore to William J. Hoff, February 14, 1934. NRA Papers.
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have to answer to the NRA for its disposition of thetuo Snch a-position 
was no doubt communicated to industry members» for an attorney for a 
large steel company which had been notified of a violation charge -called 
on a local NEIA compliance office not to answer the complaint but to tell 
the adjuster that he had no authority or jurisdiction in the matter,^^^
In April, 1934, General Johnson addressed a letter to all Code 
Authorities commenting that up until that time very few cases of non- 
conpliance warranting court action had been received by the NRAo "This 
has caused," Johnson wrote, "an uncertainty and a wide-spread feeling 
that the government is not backing up the Code Authorities» » » » This 
uncertainty must stop»" Then, very bluntly, Johnson stated: "In order
to move forward on a wide front, we are looking for good cases in each 
trade and industry supported by facts on which we may begin litigation 
immediately» The General had just wasted his time and the paper 
on which the letter was written as far as the Steel Code Authority was 
concerned» As late as March 1935f not one single case had been referred 
to the NRA Litigation Division by the Code Authority regarding the steel 
code»̂ ®̂
This is not to imply that there were not numerous complaints made 
both against the code itself and against violations of the codecs pro­
visions» NRA deputy administrator Shannon reported that 903 conqplaints 
were received by his office against the code during the life of the
^̂ Ânsel R» Cleary to John Swope, January 4, I933» NRA Papers.
^^^Hugh S. Johnson to All Code Authorities, ^ril 6, 1934» NEIA Papers. 
102J» Ho Gutride to R» W» Shannon, March 6, 1935» NEIA Papers.
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NFUo Of this iramber 290 were adjusted, 205 were rejected as balng without 
foundation, 57 were not pressed by the coB^laintants and 351 wore uhad- 
justedo^^^ This was perhaps a fair average of adjustment of a rather Low 
number of c o m p l a i n t s T h e  deputy administrator’s office, which was 
oommitted to a poliqr of industrial self-government, generally could only 
proceed as fast as, and to the extent that, the Code Authority was willing 
to gOo Division administrators were also occasionally warned about com­
pliance procedures» In Febrwry 193%* they were told that only in the
rarest of cases should members of industry divisions even communicate with
Code Authorities or members of the industry regarding complianceThus, 
the NRA member responsible for the steel code could only work quietly, 
nearly always with his counterpart at the Steel Institute, and hope for 
voluntary agreement»
The Code Authority, on the other hand, was not so hamstrung. De­
finite enforcement powers were contained in the steel code, and it had 
an enforcement division to gather evidence of violations» On March 1,
1935# the board’s enforcement division consisted of two supervising in­
vestigators with twelve assistants, a lawyer, and two clerks. This divi­
sion spent almost $66,000 on enforcement from January 1 to December 31»
1934, There is no available evidence to indicate the number or nature
Analysis of Con^laints," n»d, NRA Papers»
*̂̂ T̂he 903 coDÿlaints against the Steel Code can be compared with such 
large numbers as 15,795 in retail food; 16,681 in restaurants; 10,410 in re­
tail trade; and 3,704 in lumber and timber. Unsigned Memo, May 27, 1925,
NRA Papers,
^^^emo from Donald M» Nelson to Division Administrators, February 
13, 1934» NRA Papers,
lûésteel Code Authority Budget, March 1, 1935, NRA Papers,
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of conqplalnts received ly the Code Authority, Once a violation had been 
determined, however, the guilty company was assessed liquidated -damages 
of $10 for each ton of steel sold in violation of the code. A total of 
$44,999*75 was assessed against thirty-five separate companies*
Altogether the Steel Code Authority administered, legislated, and 
enforced its own fair trade practices in the interest of members of the 
steel industry. There is no appreciable evidence that the Code Authority 
unduly discriminated against the smaller members of the Industry. This 
was not true in regard to independent steel fabricators, jobbers, and the 
consuming public. The NRA generally followed a hands-off poliqy on code 
administration, but when it did attempt to assert itself it found that it 
was either ignored or challenged by the Code Authority. The operation of 
the steel code can truly be designated as industrial self-government in 
the sense which many industrialists had talked of in the early days of 
the depression. The major area of the Recovery Act which the Steel Code 
Authority left to the NRA was the labor provisions. The Code Authority 
did not try to enforce collective bargaining. Indeed, it was totally 
opposed to unionization, except in company unions, and it left any 
attempts to enforce Section ?a to the NRA. The twenty-one months' life 
of the steel code witnessed a continual struggle between the steel industry, 
organized labor and at least some segments of the government.
107Unsigned Memo to R. W. Shannon, May 20, 1935* NRA Papers.
CHAPTER VII
THE STEEL CODE LABOR PROVISIONS
The American Federationist expressed the hopes of many of its
members when it carried the following lines in its October 1933 edition;
Now swells the glad voice of the nation.
Now breaks the bright dawn of new dagr;
Black hopelessness yields to elation,
Exultant thy cry, NRAf
Lo, labor again rolls its thunder.
Lifts choral in vast roundelay;
Lo, powers of greed fall asunder.
By blue eagle rent, NRAI1
Three months earlier Iron Age had editorialized:
Organized labor is but a small fraction of our working population 
and a still smaller fraction of our public» » » » It is a little 
fellow with a loud voice. This little fellow is now trying to 
increase his stature by climbing on the load that Uncle Sam with 
the help of capital and real labor is struggling to lift from the 
backs of the public, , » , Industry cannot be expected to enthu­
siastically strain its back in order to give an agressive and 
unpopular minority « free ride,2
The gauntlet was thus thrown down by the steel,industry, and it remained 
there confronting union leaders throughout the life of the NRA, The third 
"countervailing power," the government, seemed to have had almost no con­
sistent policy at all, thus adding a great amount of confusion to the 
industry-labor struggle.
There were two objectives of labor provisions of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act and the various codes. The first consideration 
arose from the exegiencies of the national economic emergency and was 
concerned with getting people back to work and trying to get wages up
Âmerican Federationist. XL (October, 1933)# PP» 1076-1077°
Îron Age. CXXXII (July 6, 1933), PP° 13-14°
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to provide a decent standard of living and to create more ..purchasing 
power. The steel industry had been-among the leaders in cutting hours 
to spread available employment, but it nevertheless opposed the Black 
Thirty Hour bill as being impractical. Even with the spread*the-work 
movement, from 1929 to 1934 steel workers enjoyed fewer hours of work 
and a greatly lowered standard of living.
At the peak of prosperity in 1929 there were about 440,000 per- 
sons employed in the steel industry; by 1933 there were only 330,700.^
In 1929 wages for unskilled workers averaged about 40 cents an hour, but 
wage cuts during 1931 and 1932 reduced the average to 30i cents. The 
average hourly wage for skilled and unskilled workers was 63i cents in 
1929 and 48^ cents in 19330̂  The average annual wage of employees in 
the steel industry was $1,620 in 1929 exceeded only by the chemical 
industry among the major industrial groups. During the low point of the 
depression, average annual earnings dropped to $360, lower than that 
for auy comparable industry. Using estimates of family earnings required 
for a minimum decency standard of living, it appears that steelworkers 
with smaller families were achieving that standard in 1929 but fell much 
below that level in 1933° For a level designated "comfort" they did not 
achieve such a standard in either year.^
Naturally, individual complaints and pleas for aid poured into 
Washington even before the steel code became effective. A young daughter 
of a steelworker who had a family of six told how her father had not
D̂augherty, Economies of Iron and Steel. I, p. 113.
Ŝtewart, Problems of A Great Industry, p. 14. Îbid.. p. 15,
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worked In ten months « She charged that he had been given a grocery 
credit of five dollars which he had to work off at the mill, but that 
the mill superintendent was in league with the grocer so that the credit 
would only really buy two dollars worth of groceries» When the family 
asked for a credit on a cheaper store, the superintendent reportedly told 
them: "I don't care if you hunky®s /sig/ live or die," The young girl
concluded by telling how a local doctor found the whole family in bed 
starving to d e a t h A  southern steelworker's wife told how her husband 
worked ten hours a day, six or seven days a week at 26 cents an hour.
Yet, rents on company houses were advanced a dollar a month, and flour 
prices increased 30 cents for a 24 pound sack at the company store,
"We are not tramps," she wrote, "but we are slowly being demoralized and
nlosing all personal p r i d e , A  Carnegie Steel employee whose wages had 
been cut wrote: "Living expenses are soaring and life soon will be
g
impossible. Where is the New Deal?"
Then came the NRA and the President's Reemployment Agreement,
The steel industry on July 15 voluntarily raised wages 15 percent 
generally, but still workers continued to suffer. One steel mill employee 
wrote that after the NRA had become law his hours were cut from seventy 
to forty a week and his hourly wage raised from 30 cents to 40 cents an 
hour. The mill was considering, however, a shift to the piece work basis, 
and the worker averred that it would be impossible under that system to 
earn more than 30 cents an hour, "As I see it, this violates all the
^Alice Hanella to Hugh Johnson, July 6, 1933° NHA Papers,
7Ruth E, Maise to Hugh Johnson, July 15, 1933° NRA Papers,
g  ........
Charles J, Robson to Franklin D, Roosevelt, July 17, 1933° NRA
Papers,
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principles of the president’s recovery plan,** he stated, "W* «â l 
worship President Roosevelt for the great fight he is making'on-our 
behalfo We don't wish to embarass him but when the steel compaiy won't
grespect anything but force, what are we to do?"
As the Recovery Act became a reality and the steel industry sub­
mitted its code of fair conqpetition, workers continued to express their 
opinions0 In July several hundred employees of the Wheeling Steel Corp­
oration petitioned Johnson to bring about a code for the steel industry 
"with all possible speed," because of the abrupt advance in oommo<U.ty
prices. These employees called for a six hour day and a five day week
10with wage increases to equal the rise in the cost of living. An
employee representative in a company union protested that the 15 percent
wage increase was insufficient because working hours had been out 20
percent. The steelworker added:
Trouble is brewing at this plant, meetings have been held, what the 
outcome will be is hard to tell. Only a match is needed to start 
things off which I dread to see come, I am too old to get into any 
labor troubles. We all want an eight hour day but with not only a 
living but a saving #age,H
The conditions which were "brewing the trouble" were graphically described 
by a Pennsylvania steelworker who reported that he and his fellow employ­
ees were working under sweatshop conditions," Wages had been advanced 11 
percent but the reduction in hours left him $1,50 to $2,50 less pay per
g^Francis Cesario to Frances Perkins, August l6, 1933» Department of 
Labor Main Numerical Series 167/1183, Box I58, NA»
10Petition to Hugh S, Johnson, July 15, 1933» NRA Papers.
^̂ 0, H. Leidy to Hugh 3, Johnson, August 3, 1933» NRA Papers,
dayo "You can see for yourself we are not getting a fair deal," he con­
cluded, "the men are only waiting for some kind of a code that will help
12them out of their troubleso"
The demand for shorter hours and higher wages from worker», however,
was met tqr other voices of protesto A steel company stockholder, claiming
to represent millions of stockholders of the "great, self-respeoting middle
class" who depended on dividends, protested the "uneconomic wage demanded
by Miss Perkinso" The female stockholder raged:
We protest her callous disregard of the welfare of the company, its 
earning power, its power to pay dividends and would remind her that 
the capital investment of this company represents the careful saving of 
a multitude of people, , , . We, the taxpaying middle class, have had 
our lifetime savings wrenched from us during that time. These companies 
have employed millions of workmen at a loss of hundreds and millions of 
dollars. This money was our money, the stockholders. The loss was our 
loss, , , , It was right, but it is not now right to further confiscate 
our savings to pay an uneconomic wage to workmen,13
A steal manufacturer wrote Roosevelt that he had always supported higher
wages and lower hours, but for him to sign the proposed code would be his
"economic death warrant," The businessman told of paying $22 for a 44
hour week while many of his competitors bragged of cutting salaries 55
14percent, but he said $22 for a 35 hour week would ruin him.
When the steel code finally came to the public hearing on July 31 
there had already been a great amount of bargaining between NRA representa­
tives and steel leaders. The NRA Legal Division told Leo Wolman that al­
though the steel industry boasted of having spread available work since
^Marshall Criswell to Prances Perkins, August 15, 1933= Department 
of Labor Main Numerical Series I67/II83, Box 158, NA,
^^Telegram from Alice MoAdoo to Robert P, Lamont, July 31, 1933»
NRA Papers,
^^Charles Q, Connors to Franklin D« Roosevelt, August 6, 1933»
NRA Papers,
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the onset of the depression, "the amount of actual income received by 
each worker was, in maiy instances insufficient to sustain life on a 
decent minimum basiso" The legal advisor recommended against allowing- 
a statement approving this policy to be inserted in the code,^^ The NR.A 
was working for an eight=hour day provision for the code, however, but 
the steel industry was arguing that the forty=hour week should be averaged 
over a six-month period so that enough skilled workers would be available 
during active production periodso Steel leaders claimed that they had 
reached the limit of the share-the-work movement because unskilled men 
could not be readily shifted to semi-skilled or skilled tasks. Shannon 
thought that too much premium was being placed on prompt delivery of 
steel orders and that a delay in filling orders would be healthy for the 
industry. If buyers were forced to wait for delivery they would begin to 
plan their purchases more systematically which would level peak loads and 
encourage steel producers to institute more effective training programs 
for semi-skilled and skilled employees,This was one of the few, 
conscious long-range effects of a limit in the number of working hours 
contenq)lated by NRA officials.
The NRA rather consistently bargained with the steel industry for a 
forty-hour week, Simpson calculated that with 272,000 steelworkers em­
ployed at an average of ^3 hours a week in July, the number employed could
17be increased to 325,000 if hours were cut to forty. Organized labor.
^^NRA Legal Division to Leo Wolman, July 13, 1933= NRA Papers,
^̂ R, W, Shannon to K, M, Simpson, August 17, 1933. NRA Papers, 
17K, M, Simpson to Hugh Johnson, August 25, 1933. NRA Papers,
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however, held out for the old Black bill thirty-hour limitation, and
William Green and other labor officiale represented this viewpoint at the
l8hearings0 Frances Perkins, while backing the unions on most demands,
asked for a forty-hour limitation on weekly working hours. She wanted
those hours to be the absolute maximum to encourage the use of extra
shifts, and not averaged over a period of time as the steel industry
was asking. If averaging were allowed, said Perkins, "these members
of the Institute who have agreed upon this Code will find an infinite
variation of ways in which their members translate the meaning of the
19average hours over the six-months period,"  ̂ After much bargaining 
between the Industry and the government, with final pressure exerted by 
Roosevelt, the code provision on hours finally represented a compromise. 
Hours of labor could not exceed forty in any six-month period or more 
than forty-eight in any six day week. The government was able to get 
the industry to agree, however, that whenever a member of the code was
operating at 60 percent of capacity, the eight-hour day would be estab-
20lished for all employees.
The struggle over the wage provisions was just heated. The industry 
proposed a scale of minimum wages ranging from 30 to 40 cents an hour, 
depending on the section of the country involved, as a substitute for 
their first proposal of 25 to 40 cents. This was an average hourly wage 
of 38,5 cents. On July 1, 1929» the average hourly wage had been 4-2.5 
cents, and on July 1, 1932, it had been 31«8 cents. The economic advisor
^®"Code Hearings," pp, N2-3» ^̂ Ibid,. p, G4-,
on"Steel Code," Article IV, Section 2,
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for the steel code found this proposal generally satisfactory, although
with a reduction in hours the worker's average weekly wage-would-be--only
$17 as compared with $22<.60 in 1929» The economist thought, however,-that
an average wage rate of 42,5 cents an hour would increase coats too much,
21and therefore recommended a 40 cent weighted minimum wageo
William Green demanded a minimum wage rate of 60 cents an hour or
$18 per 30 hour week, while Frances Perkins advocated a weekly minimum
wage which would allow a worker to support his family with the same total
22purchasing power which he enjoyed in 1929° The real compromise» had-to
be made, however, on several minimum wage rates for the various regions
of the nation» After much negotiation wage differentials were written
into Schedule D of the code ranging from 25 cents an hour in the Southern
District to 35 cents in Kansas City, Los Angeles, and Eastern Districts,
to 40 cents in the Pittsburgh, Chicago, and various Ohio Districts» At
the Code Hearing Secretary Perkins challenged the wage differentials as
"simply perpetuating what has been an unfortunate practice, and there is
not sufficient difference in the actual cost of living to the wage earners
in the different parts of the United States to justify" such wage differen- 
23tialso Nevertheless, the steel industry defended such differentials as 
justified because of differences in the cost of living and necessary be­
cause of variations in costs in various areas» A southern steel executive, 
for example, wrote that his company frequently imported skilled laborers to 
his plant from northern cities and that "no difficulty has been experienced
21"Labor Provisions of the Steel Code," Memorandum by Victor von 
Szeliski, August 19, 1933° NRA Papers»
^^"Code Hearings," pp» N3 and H2» ^̂ Ibid». p, HI.
218
in bringing these men to the South, or having them remain at the wage
oh,differential that has always existed»”
Complaints regarding wage differentials still came into HRA head­
quarters irregardless of that view» A group of southern steel workers 
protested Schedule E of the code, stating that "the rates of pay for
skilled workers, in this district, under the proposed code, will be only
2*5slightly above that for unskilled labor in other districts»" A southern
steel mill employee was more specific in charging exploitation by mill
owners. Claiming that southern steelworkers were living on the brink of
poverty and constantly in debt to the company-owned commissary, he wrote
of the steelworkers' homes:
Bare walls, carpetless floors, no baths, outside toilets, in fact 
every condition that makes the South known for what it is today—  
the home of typhoid, tuberculosis, pallegra and other diseases 
associated with poverty and distress. These conditions are not 
the result of the depression. They have always existed and will 
continue to exist just so long as the southern capitalistic sys­
tem is allowed to pursue its greedy, life-strangling c o u r s e » 2 o
Negro spokesmen also protested the low level of southern wage rates as
discriminatory against members of their race, because four-fifths of all
27steel employees in the Birmingham District were Negroes. '
Protests against the wage rates also came from persons representing 
other points of view. A northern steelworker protested the low southern 
wage because he thought that D» S» Steel would then shift its production 
ohStatement of L« E» Qeohegan to the NRA, n»d» NRA Papers»
^^Ag E, Horn to Hugh Johnson, n»d. NRA Papers»
^^Ralph C» Hudson to J» E, Addicks, December 12, 1933® NRA Papers*
Alfred C» Bliss to Hugh Johnson, April 28, 193̂ » and John P»
Davis to K» H» Simpson, November l6, 1933« NRA Papers.
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28to the southern mills to take advantage of lower labor costso One steel
product manufacturer claimed that he should be allowed to pay a smaller
wage because he had to pay more for his steel and should be allowed to
29make up the costs in labor savingso Another steel manufacturer in Penn­
sylvania requested a 25 instead of 35 cent wage rate because his plant 
was old and inefficient making labor costs higho^® The NRA generally re­
plied to business requests for lower wage rates by quoting Roosevelt's 
statement that "no business which depends for existence on paying less 
than living wages to its workers has aqy right to continue in this 
country," and adding that to accomplish the aims of the Recovery Act 
"there cannot be avoided some individual cases of hardship owing to 
the readjustment required by Codes under the Recovery Acto"^^
The NRA was not satisfied with the minimum wages established by
the code but believed that they were the best obtainable under the pre-
32vailing conditionso There was also the consideration that the wage 
differentials which had been established were the highest possible which 
the steel industry would accepte When the ninety day observation period 
of the Steel Code was ending Secretary of Labor Perkins called upon R, W, 
Shannon to explicitly state that the NRA believed the southern wage rates
J» To Murphy to NRA, July 31, 1933̂  NRA Papers.
29Po Wo Dillon to Hugh Johnson, Febiruaiy 24, 1934* NRA Paperso 
^^Frank V. Kasel to K„ Simpson, August 24, 1933® NRA Papers.
M, Simpson to Frank Vo Kasel, August 30, 1933° NRA Papers.
^̂ R, Wo Shannon to Ralph C« Hudson, November 9, 1933* NRA Papers.
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33inadequate and to make clear that they would not be permanent* Shannon 
stated that although he, Johnson, and Richberg agreed with her, he hoped 
it would not be "necessary and advisable" to issue such a statement Just 
as the code was being extended* The Industrial Advisory Board of the 
NRA continued to maintain, however, if wages were all set at-the same 
rate, northern labor could establish the fact that it was underpaid* This 
was because of the higher transportation and mining costs in the north
and the relative unproductivity of labor because of prolonged high temp-
35eraturesc
Steelworkers continued to feel the press of economic conditions 
throughout the life of the code and hundreds voiced their complaints to 
administration officials0 Invariably a steelworker in the course of his 
letter would ask what Roosevelt and Johnson meant by a "living wage" and 
the other objectives of the New Deal* One employee of Jones and Laughlin 
stated that he had been making $22*08 a week on July 1, 1933, had received 
a 13 percent wage increase on July 15, but on September 1 was receiving a 
weekly wage of only $21*20* He said that with the company store squeezing 
him for payment, how could he participate in the "Buy Now" program, or even 
support the other New Deal measures*^ Another steelworker complained that 
since the code was established his wages had decreased 3»3 percent.These
^^Frances Perkins to K* M* Simpson, November 24, 1933° NRA Papers.
34K* M. Simpson to Frances Perkins, November 27, 1933° NRA Papers*
^^leonard N* Thompson to Luther Becker, January 29, 1935° NRA Papers.
^^Sylvester Young to Hugh Johnson, September 4, 1933° NRA Papers.
37J* C* McMurry to Hugh Johnson, September 9, 1933° NRA Papers.
221
hardships were caused not by reductions in wage rates but by reductions
in working hourso But it was difficult to convince a worker that it-was
necessary to limit his hours so that unemployed workers could also be
given some employmento It was almost impossible for a man, such as one
who wrote that he received $l4o80 a week in wages-=but paid $4 for rent,
$5 for groceries, $2 for medicine for his wife, $lo39 for electricity,
and $lo02 for gasoline--to understand that part of what he once made by
working longer hours now went to someone who had not had any income o''
Many workers who had looked to the steel code with hope for better
pay became disillusioned when their conditions did not immediately take a
turn for the betterc A Carnegie Steel employee said he had worked less
since the company joined the NRA than before» From what must have been
the depths of despair this man wrote:
I have always tried to be honest all ny life» But if things keep
going in this way and I can't get no clothes for my wife or son 
I think that I will just start stealing for what I need as I do 
not get enough work to pay rent, buy food and clothes » Do not 
think I am a Radical or Communist » But I would like to see the 
forgotten man get a chance»39
Or firom another Pennsylvanian who told of having worked only four days in
October and then being laid off» ”I have a wife and two children," he
wrote, "and have fifteen days until I will be asked to vacate by the
landlord our only shelter» I would like to have you advise me what to
do»" It was not much consolation to hear from the agency which repre­
sented the much-vaunted Blue Eagle that: "Unfortunately, steel making
operations have declined» » » » We are hopeful, however, that this situa-
^®Otto Amsman to Hugh Johnson, September 27, 1933° NRA Papers.
^^Dennis To Shay to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 30, 1933» NRA Papers, 
^William McDonald to Hugh Johnson, October 30, 1933° NRA Papers.
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tion will improve with the general return of more normal busines» conditions 
What comfort could be given to a young fourteen year old daughtw of a eteel— 
worker whose mother was dead and whose father was attempting to support 
six children working one day a week at a Carnegie Steel mill*
As conditions gradually improved, the volume of complaints declined.
Everyone, however, was not benefited alike. Only two months before the
Schechter decision, a steelworker wrote Donald Richberg:
How in the Hell do you and this present Democratic Administration 
expect us men to keep our families on these hours imposed on us 
under the present wages paid in the Steel Industry. We are unable 
to buy proper clothing for our wives or children, unable to pay 
taxes on our homes. We must exist like cattle under these condi­
tions. If your government has no power to raise wages you surely 
should not out the hours beyond an existence. If you cannot force 
a raise in wages you should bring this NRA to a close for you are 
destroying the lives of these workers body and soul. . . .  I wish 
to tell you and Mr. Roosevelt that if you keep up your present policy
you are sure of defeat in 1936.^3
One of the reasons iday these sentiments were not more widespread among
steelworkers was because many had had nowhere to go but upward in wages
and hours.
Working conditions showed a distinct improvement during the life of 
the steel code. In June 1933, there were 305,239 wage earners in the steel 
industry working an average of 39»% hours per week at an average hourly
wage rate of ^7.3 cents and an average weekly wage of $18,64. By April
1934, 392,069 persons were employed for 33*7 hours a week at 64.8 cents 
an hour, averaging $21.84 per week.^ In June 1934, 415,547 persons had
41K« H. Richards to William McDonald, November 2, 1933* NRA Papers.
42Anna Tiberio to Franklin D, Roosevelt, February 19, 1934. NRA Papers.
^^ernard Wittenauer to Donald Richberg, March 24, 1935* NRA Papers.
biiNRA Release No. 5418, May 31, 1934. NRA Papers.
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employment, were working 35<>7 hours a week and taking home an̂  average-of 
$22(s8lô  ̂ A few months before the code was scrapped, hours had rwialned 
the same as those in June 193̂ » but hourly wages had risen s» that the 
weekly wage was $23o^2»^ Thus, the wage and hour conditions in the steel 
industry, from whatever cause, had improved materiallyo More men were 
given work at lower hours and better wages. Steelworkers still had maqy 
causes of complaint, however, and the drive for organization of steel­
workers benefited greatly from these long and deep-seated grievances.
The second branch of labor provisions in the steel code dealt with
the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively. Section ?a
of the Recovery Act had stated that this was the right of labor and once
again labor had deemed a victory as its "Magna Carta," The legislative
history of this section has been discussed in Chapter III, This labor
legislation was called a victory for organized labor, especially for the
American Federation of Labor, when Conr^ess put its stamp of approval on
collective bargaining under the codes,Yet, the outstanding scholar on
labor policy during the New Deal era has stated:
Section 7(a), a short and seemingly clear declaration of policy in 
a statute otherwise marked by complexity, lifted the lid of Pandora's
box. The haste and inexperience from which it was derived were
breeding grounds of ambiguity; it raised more questions than it 
provided answers. Latent antagonisms between unions and employers 
gained a point of focus and a furious battle was to rage for two 
years over its interpretation. The President, his advisers, and 
Congress, to win the support of both management and labor for the
^^NRA Release No, 6998, August 5» 1934* NRA Papers,
"Code Histoiy," Table I, p, $ko
^^Lewis L, Lorwin and Arthur Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards 
(Washington, 1935), p, 4?,
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recovery program, had committed themselves, probably without 
realizing it, to a broad policy of intervention in collective 
bargaining that was to lead far beyond 7 (a)o^
Section 7& set forth the principle, but it did not define the methods-of
choosing labor representatives or of the responsibility of msu»gement~ in
dealing with them» Moreover, there were no defined powers of «ifwcement
of the labor section»
The weaknesses of Section 7a were only part of the difficulties 
which were to beset the NRA^s role in labor relations» Industry leaders 
had vowed either not to recognize apy union in their establishments or to 
inaugurate company unions which they pronounced as fulfilling the letter 
of the lawo The steel industry was in the forefront of those making both 
avowals0 As one labor historian has stated: "The United States Steel
Corporation » » « emerged from the struggle ^steel strike of 19127 as the 
recognized champion of the American conservative tradition as well as
IxQthe primary industrial bulwark against unionism»**  ̂ As the recognized 
leader of the steel industry, the position of U» S» Steel would certainly 
dominate the entire industry» While steel trade Journals railed at the 
proposal for collective bargaining, steel leaders, such as Robert Lamont, 
reaffirmed the industry's refusal to deal with "outside organizations of 
labor or with individuals not its employees»" Lamont added that "if this 
position is not protected, the industry is positive in its belief that the 
intent and purpose of the bill cannot be accomplished»
Bernstein, New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, pp. 38-39»
^^Robert K» Murray, "Communism and the Great Steel Strike of 1919i" 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XXXVIII (December, 1951), P» 464.
5°Senate Hearings on National Industrial Recovery, p» 288.
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Yet, the great desire of the steel industry to get its code- of fair 
competition under force of law required it to make concessions "contrary 
to the deeply rooted traditions and habits of mind of the steel companies, 
Coming into the code hearing with a provision written into the- draft code 
openly calling for the company union, AISI leaders allowed an already- 
drawn statement of withdrawal of that provision be read by Lamont, Even 
at that, Lamont announced the industry's intention of maintaining the open 
shop and further developments indicated that at most the industry intended 
to maintain the esqployee representation plans. But, because Section ?a 
was written into the steel coda with the government's insistence, the steel
industry faced a long struggle with workers and unions over what that sec­
tion meant.
The NRA itself was a signal for labor to begin its organizing cam­
paign and its first target was deemed to be the steel industry, "that 
open shop fortress against which union labor had repeatedly smashed it­
self to bloody bits,"^^ Ry July 1933, sporadic local strikes and labor 
disturbances had erupted in almost every section of the United States, 
Michael Tighe, president of the leading steelworkers’ union, declared 
that Section ?a removed "the shackles of industrial dependence from the 
limbs of those who for years have been the subjects of a system that made 
serrvility, no capability, the merit for employment," But Tighe added:
"Bear this well in mind: The movement that the Amalgamated Association of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers is now engaged in, to organize the workers in
^4ime. m l  (July 31, 1933), p, 12,
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the iron and steel mills, is not a revolutionary action, nor can it be 
termed unusual on the part of the association*"^^ But whether Tighe 
realized it or not, and his failure to realize this fact was one of the 
great weaknesses of the organizational drives in the steel industry, the 
movement was revolutionary. It was revolutionary because the steel.in­
dustry had with one voice dedicated itself to a total hostility toward 
non-company unions and their activities* Yellow Dog contracts, black­
lists, lookouts, company police, strikebreakers, labor spies, Pinkerton 
detectives, all the anti-union devices developed during the 19th century, 
were still used effectively in the steel industry in 1933, These methods 
were joined with the more sophisticated devices such as company welfare 
measures and company-sponsored employee representation plans, but they 
were all directed toward the goal of thwarting any attempt of "outsiders" 
to control steelworkers. Steel union leaders must have been aware of their 
problems, but the top leadership insisted on walking softly.
The disadvantage at which both workers and government officials 
found themselves is perhaps no better illustrated than Frances Perkins' 
tour of steel towns to gather information prior to her testimony at the 
Steel Code Hearings, Perkins cleared the trip with Roosevelt, and before 
she left, Ityron Taylor and Eugene Grace promised that she would receive 
cooperation from local plant officials and have an opportunity to talk 
with company enqcloyees. In several towns the cooperation was extended
but at Homestead, Pennsylvania, trouble erupted. The Burgess of Homestead 
allowed Perkins to hold a meeting in the Hall of Burgesses where a question
^^Amalgamated Journal. Undated Clipping in NRA Papers.
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and answer session was held with steelworkers and newspapermen» At the 
conclnsion of the meeting, however, Perkins heard a commotion in the 
street and learned that steelworkers deemed "radical” by the Biirgess, 
had not been allowed into the hall, When Perkins expressed a desire to 
address them on the streets, she was told by the Burgess: ”No, no, you*ve
had enough. These men are not any good. They"re undesirable Reds, I 
know them well. They just want to make trouble," The Labor Secretary 
then spied the American flag floating over a post office and adjourned 
the meeting to there, knowing that local officials could not prohibit 
her speaking on federal property. After a short meeting Perkins departed 
"with handshaking and expressions of rejoicing that the New Deal wasn't 
afraid of the steel trust,
The condition of organized labor in general, and of steelworkers' 
unions in particular, was extremely weak in mid-1933» The membership of 
the American Federation of Labor had fallen to about two million. In the 
steel industry three labor organizations operated: the Amalgamated Associa­
tion of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of North America, the International 
Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers and the Steel and Metal Workers' 
Industrial Union, The first two organizations were affiliated with the 
AFL and the third, at first called the Metal Workers Industrial League 
when organized in 1929, was a part of the Trade Union Unity League, a 
Communist dominated organization. The Industrial Union claimed less than 
two percent of the steelworkers, both employed and unemployed. The Smelter 
Workers, who had concentrated on blast furnace employees among steelworkers 
but were at present concerned with western miners and smelters, had a
^̂ Perkins, Roosevelt I Knew, pp. 215-221,
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negligible membershipo Both these groups were more effective in organizing 
temporary protest movements for specific grievances.
The Amalgamated Association was the old-line steelworkers' union, 
but it reached its height and decline in the years immediately preceding 
and following the great steel strike of 1919* In that fateful year 200 
lodges, embracing 29,786 steelworkers held agreements with 4̂1 companies,
Bty 1929 there were only 100 lodges with 8,605 members holding agreements 
with 25 companies,The major explanation for this weakness, of course, 
was the implacable opposition of the steel companies, but an additional 
factor was the conservât!vism of the Association's president, Michael F, 
Tighe, called "Grandmother" Ty many of the workers. One of the new mili­
tant steelworkers told Tighe that he was "too damn conservative to be an 
I r i s h m a n , T o  add confusion Tighe was plagued with hostility from both 
the AFL and the rank-and-file steelworkers during the steel code period 
and finally lost control of the entire u n i o n , B u t  even many of the 
Amalgamated members expressed the more conservative old-line Samuel Qompers* 
viewpoint, A member of the AA who had come into contact with organizers 
of the Industrial Workers' Union stated that steel companies should be 
willing to deal with the AA because the Industrial Union "is like the 
trust— they believe in direct action to gain their end. We as bonafide
^^Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, p. 9#.
^^Robert R, R, Brooks, As Steel Goes (New Haven, 1940), p. 50.
^^During the pre-code period two left-wing groups worked within the 
Amalgamated Association attempting to instill militancy into the workers 
and unseat the national leadership. One was the Conference for Progressive 
Labor Action, and the other called itself the American Federation of Labor 
Rank and File Committee,
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union men, do not believe in irtiat they call direct action. We-believe in
collective bargaining, vhere employee and employer, meet on common ground
and settle their differences."^^
The industry, realizing its strength and the weaknesses of the unions,
had no intention of dealing with any labor union, conservative or radical.
It intended to frustrate union organizational efforts and Section 7a by
extending its employee representation plans, or company unions. The first
of these was that Inaugurated by John D. Rockefeller in his Colorado Fuel
and Iron Company in 1915 and followed by those of Bethlehem Steel and
Youngstrown Sheet and Tube in 1918=1919»^^ By 1932, however, there were
only seven formal employee representation plans operating in the steel
industry.The Bureau of Labor Statistics wrote of such organizations:
The great majority . . . were set up entirely by management. Management 
conceived the idea, developed the plan, and initiated the organization 
0 o o 0 The existence of a company union was almost never the result 
of a choice by the employees in a secret election in which both a trade 
union and a oonq)any union appeared on the ballot.
Usually company unions were initiated by the company which called a meeting 
of a small group of workers known to be friendly to management and ex­
plained the nature and puz*poses of such a plan. If the workers* group was 
agreeable to the plan it was asked to select election committees and to 
"sell" fellow-employees on the idea. Then a notice would be sent to em­
ployees telling them of the plan. A typical notice was one sent to
58, s,. Undated Clipping in NRA Papers.
^^Galloway, Industrial Planning, p. 153» 
éoDaugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, p. IOO5. 
^^Bernstein, New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, p. 12.
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employees of the Carnegie Steel Company on June ?, 1933» which read:
It gives me great pleasure to announce that Carnegie Steel Company, 
adhering to the principles set forth in the National Recovery Act 
sponsored by the President of the United States, has inaugurated a 
plan of Employee Representation under the provision of which the 
employees of our various plants and operations will have a voice 
in matters pertaining to Industrial relations. The wholehearted 
support of the plan by you and your fellow employees will beappreoiated,62
Host plans were not submitted for approval to employees but were considered 
accepted when employees voted for representatives in an election. ^
Many steel company unions were patterned closely after that of 
Bethlehem Steel. A typical plan was that of American Rolling Mill. It 
provided for one representative for each fifty employees to be nominated 
and elected each year in December. Elections were supposed to have been 
conducted by the employees, "with such assistance from the Management as 
the employees may request," and by seoret ballot. Each department was 
to choose a chairman, and all chairmen formed the Employees Executive 
Committee which could appoint sub-committees for special purposes and 
acted as an overall executive branch. The management could also appoint 
representatives to work with the employee representatives. Meetings 
were scheduled periodically and workers were paid their usual hourly wage 
rates for time lost in attending such meetings. Any complaint which a 
worker had could be brought by the worker himself or his representative,
^^Notice from I. Lamont Hughes to All Employees of Carnegie Steel, 
June 7» 1933° Department of Labor Main Numerical Series I67/2283, Box 
158, NA.
^Interviews conducted by Daugherty with various steel executives 
elicited the following replies as to why workers had not been asked to vote 
on the plan itself: "We were in a hurry, " or "The bulk of the men were too
damned dumb, and still are to know what it was all about," or "We couldn't 
afford to risk anything at that stage (Economics of Iron and Stqel. II, 
p. 1012,).
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going through a chain of command from the plant superintendent, to the 
management’s representative and finally to top management « If a settle­
ment was not effected, it could be submitted for arbitration» This par­
ticular plan was designated to remain in effect during the term of the 
Recovery Act and could be terminated thereafter by the management or 
majority of the workers upon three months® notice»
Union leaders warned steelworkers "to beware of the snares and
pitfalls that are being planned to entrap them»"^^
Some companies that have utterly ignored workers® rights before are 
trying to placate workers by company unions— which are only an ex­
tension of the companies control» These and other industries which 
fail to cooperate were characterized by the President as slackers»
On the other hand, workers owe it to their industries and to 
national welfare not to accept a fictitious organization when they 
have a right to a real labor union and rights idiich the government 
guarantees them» If they fail to join the union to which they are,, 
eligible or to form a union when necessaryi they too are slackers»"*
Steelworkers, too, were quick to complain to Washington of company organi­
zations» Even before the steel code was approved some employees protested 
the rapidity with which company unions were being inaugurated»^^ Others
complained that whan the company did not obtain the results it wanted from
68one election, it simply called another. Then there was the question of 
what group was to be recognized as the collective bargaining agent. An 
Indiana steelworker wrote Leo Wolman for advise when his plant split 
between those who wanted an AFL affiliated union, those who wanted a
^^"Hiddletown ARHCO Plan of Employee Representation,” December,
1933, pp. 1 passim»
^^Amalgamated Journal. Undated Clipping in HRA Papers»
^^American Federationist. XL (July, 1933), p. 679.
'̂̂ Qeorge Ellison to Frances Perkins, Jane 26, 1933. ERA Papers.
66James F» Malloy to Frances Perkins, June 23, 1933. ERA Papers.
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company union, and the other third ("Mexicana, southern Negroes and 
foreigners") who did not know what it was all a b o u t S o m e  workers 
thought that elections had been fairly conducted, but said: "It can
hardly be expected that such employees representatives speak and act
70without being influenced by the fear of reprisals from the management, " 
Others were simply perplexed, A group of newly-elected employee repre­
sentatives of the Illinois Steel Company wrote Johnson "to find out
the proper procedure to voice the claims of our constituents for adjust-
71ment after all requests to the management have proved futile,"
Even with these complaints and the confusion which existed in raapy 
workers* minds, the company unions flourished in the steel industry. 
Twenty-eight such plans were established in June 1933» twelve in July; 
six in August; and from one to four each month through January 193̂ , By 
December 1934, ninety-three companies had inaugurated employee repre­
sentation plans. These companies employed 337,414 employees who were 
eligible to vote under the plan, and 301,175 had exercised that privilege,
An Iron Age survey in October 1934 revealed that company unions in 35 leading 
companies had held 5,791 meetings, discussed 12,709 complaints from employ­
ees and had settled 71,1 percent in the employees * favor,While it would 
be inaccurate to state that many employees were not satisfied with company 
unions and that many companies did not actually see company unions as valid
69F, A, Nelson to Leo Wolman, June 25, 1933» NRA Papers,
70Sc H, Foss to Hugh Johnson, August 11, 1933» NRA Papers,
71John E, Barton to Hugh Johnson, August 29, 1933» NRA Papers,
72Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, p, 1006«
f^Iron Age. C3CXXIII (October 25, 1934), p, 46.
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alternatives to "outside” unions, there is too much evidence-not to conclude 
that comparer unions were hastily put into effect after Section 7a was enacted 
and that employers used a variety of devices to keep employee representa­
tives "under their thumbso” As one representative wrote: "We didn't need
a treasurer because we had no dues and no money," When he and fellow- 
representatives were told that the plan could be terminated at the will of 
the company, he said that "this was a hell of a union; and it reminded me 
of being at a funeral when the minister said, "The Lord giveth and the Lord 
taketh away,®"^^
The steel industry, even with its flourishing company unions, still 
had to fight a pitched battle with organized labor and reacted, at times 
with pleasure and at times in anger, to the government's labor policies.
The Recovery Act, which seemingly was so all-inclusive in establishing 
directions for industry and labor, made no provision for machinery to handle 
labor disputes. There were several reasons for this ommission. First, the 
administration had a single-minded objective of codifying industry with all 
possible speed. Secondly, the period since 1925 had been one of industrial 
peace and the chances of labor strife in the midst of a depression seemed 
remote. Thirdly, the wages and hours provisions in the codes seemed to 
have removed most of the causes of strikes. And, finally, those persons 
connected with Section 7a did not fully realize the implications of their 
guaranty of the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively. When 
in July 1933» a wave of strikes swept the nation, however, most of them de­
manding employer recognition of unions, some type of conciliatory machinery
7kBrooks, As Steel Goes, pp, 4-5,
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had to be establishedo Therefore, the Industrial and Labor Advisory 
Boards of the NRA recommended a National Labor Board to the President and 
on August 5» 1933» Roosevelt gave such a board his approval/^^
The NLB was composed of William Green, John Lo Lewis, and Leo
Wolman from labor, Gerard Swope, Louis Kirstein, and Walter C, Teagle 
from industry, and Senator Robert Wagner as chairmaoo The President 
did not issue any executive order pertaining to the powers of the 
board until December when he declared that the NLB was limited to 
"differences and controversies" arising out of the President’s Re­
employment Agreement* The board, however, did not limit itself to the 
PRA disputes, but assumed jurisdiction in labor controversies arising out 
of the codes. In such a role the NLB acting in a quasi-judicial capacity 
established a body of precedents, as well as performing as a mediator and 
conciliator in a number of cases. From time to time Roosevelt issued 
further executive orders which attempted to clarify the role of the NLB, 
but the whole experiment was destined to failure because of the complexi­
ties of industrial-labor relations.
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CHAPTER VIII
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY
Meanwhile, steelworkers were becoming active in their drive for 
unionizing the steel industry, although it appears that the international 
officers of the Amalgamated Association were not prepared for an all-out 
drive in the steel mills» Tighe replied to a telegram from William Green 
urging the Amalgamated to take advantage of the "wonderful opportunity" 
afforded by the Recovery Act that his finances were drained and he sug­
gested that the AFL enter the drive in steel» A few days later Tighe 
asked Green for advice as to whether the Amalgamated should presume to 
protest to steel corporations over company union tactics when the Amalga­
mated had not organized many of those plants» Other communications from 
Tighe to Green concerned minor questions about what the Recovery Act and 
Section 7a meant»^
Tighe finally was forced to yield to pressure from both the workers 
and the AFL, and late in June two organizers were sent into the Chicago
area» Their success was so great that other representatives were sent into 
the field and by September 106 men were working around steel mills» The 
expense of this organizational drive, however, was so great that in Novem­
ber twenty-five organizers were called in and by May 1934 only fifteen
2were left in the major steel centers» A movement among the local workers 
themselves was growing in steel mills but it was meeting the usual company




hostility» Some 350 employees of National Steel met in early July but 
reported that "attempts have been made in various ways to prevent this 
meeting, all by the management which is trying to place us under the 
sharp representative plan commonly known as the company union»" Other 
Amalgamated lodges reported that steel con^anies were simply refusing to 
recognize them»^ Some workers who "talked union" were summarily dis­
missed by plant superintendents»^ In some cases Amalgamated organizers 
could not come into contact with the rank-and-file» Two such organizers 
protested that when they went to Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, workers would 
not talk with them because they were constantly followed by two Jones 
and Laughlin company policemen» They further stated that the Burgess of 
Aliquippa would not let them distribute handbills containing the words of 
Section 7a»^ With all of these problems, the Amalgamated made only modest 
membership gains» However, some 50*000 new members in I30 lodges were 
added by February 1934»^
Meanwhile, the administration was not acting coherently or decisively 
in formulating principles which could be used in solving labor-raanagement 
problems» Johnson has written that "after the creation of the National 
Labor Board, NRA never had any duty— or even any business— to intervene in
g
strikes»" However, Johnson did intervene from time to time in labor
^To I, Lewis to Frances Perkins, July 6, 1933» Department of Labor 
Main Numerical Series I67/2283, Box I58, NA,
^Earl E» Jones to Hugh Johnson, July 16, 1933» NRA Papers.
^Lucille Stevens to Hugh Johnson, August 3» 1933» NRA Papers,
^Notarized Affadavit of Frank Dobbin and Frank Dixon, n»d, NRA Papers<
<7Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, p» 9^9»
Q
Johnson, Blue Eagle, p» 311»
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Qdisputes, often times angering Perkins and other Labor Department officials. 
The General had said from the beginning that his task was not to unionize 
any industry and that the Recovery Act provided that a man could not be dis­
criminated against whether or not he belonged to a labor union,When the 
controversy came up over the AISI draft of the steel code, however, Johnson 
declared that the words "open shop" and "closed shop" had been "erased from 
the dictionary of the NoRoA,"^^ Johnson^s military outlook would not permit 
him to look favorably on such disruptive factors as strikes and, according
to Perkins, he thought that the Labor Advisory Board "ought to rush out and
12give orders that no one was to strike," Johnson did think that workers 
should be free to choose their own collective bargaining agent and this 
position led his deputy administrator for industry to resign in September 
1933o^^ The General's attitude toward workers* rights evidently did not 
extend to the employees of NRA because when one John Donovan attempted to 
meet with Johnson on a union of his employees, Johnson refused to keep the 
appointment. For a few days "Washington watched pickets marching around- 
the Commerce Building with placards declaring General Johnson unfair to 
organized labor,
%ichberg, Ijy Hero, p, 180; and Michelson, The Ghost Talks, p, 126, 
^°Iron Age. GXXXII (August 3, 1933), Po 40,
(August 31, 1933), Po 32,
12Perkins, Roosevelt_X. Knew. p. 237,
^̂TiPie. XXII (September 11, 1933), P» l6, 
^^Ross, Death of A Yale Man. pp, 150-151»
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The real task of keeping the labor peace, however, rested with the 
NLBo It had enjoyed some success in mediating labor disputes in the fall 
of 1933 and out of one of these controversies emerged a clarification of 
Section 7a called the Reading Formula, This policy grew out of a strike 
in the hosiery mills in Berks County, Pennsylvania, and became an integral 
part of the policy of the NLB, The Reading Formula called for the strike 
to end, reinstated the striking workers, held an election in the mills for 
collective bargaining representatives and provided that all differences 
arising under the agreement would be submitted to the NLB,^^ In October 
and November the Board was able to settle several strikes in this manner, 
but hostility of employers and the National Association of Manufacturers 
toward the Board had been aroused. In December two cases of outright 
defiance of the Board occurred.
One of the acts of defiance came from Weirton Steel Company, a 
subsidiary of National Steel, and was to become a test case of Section ?&<> 
In June 1933» an employee representation plan had been inaugurated in the 
Weirton plants, Weirton issued a notice to its employees in September 
stating that the company was living up to the NRA and the iron and steel 
code but that it would only adjust complaints in accordance with the con­
stitution of the company u n i o n , I n  the meantime Amalgamated organizers 
were active in the Weirton plants and complaints began to come into 
Washington in regard to Weirton’s opposition. One organizer wrote that
^^Lorwin and Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards, pp. 96-99,
^̂ Weirton Steel Company, Notice to Employees, September 13, 1933»
NRA Papers,
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17"unless something is done at once serious trouble will occur," Another
correspondent wrote Roosevelt that Weirton officials were calling the NRA
iSa "false low down thing," On September 26 a strike was called because 
Ernest T, Weir, company president, refused to meet with Amalgamated re­
presentatives » The plants were closed for two weeks, and on October 16 
the NLB got Weirds signature on an agreement based on the Reading Formula. 
Weir had agreed that elections for representatives for collective bargain­
ing would be held in December, However, on November 15 a group of enq)lqyees
filed an affidavit charging that the company was using the time to coerce
20them into voting for the company union, Weir claimed that his interpre­
tation of the October l6 agreement was that the NLB would simply conduct 
elections for the Weirton company union, while Earl Long, the Amalgamated
representative, claimed that the election was to be a choice between his
21union and that of the company»
The NLB sent two representatives to Weirton and thsy consulted with 
both the Amalgamated officers and with Weirton management. The NLB de­
cided that a slate of candidates from both the Amalgamated union and the 
company union should appear on the ballot and that the election should be 
held outside the company^s gates. Meanwhile, the employee representatives 
had made preparations to conduct their own election within the plant,
^^Joseph Bowen to Roosevelt, November 16, 1933» NRA Papers,
^®Billy Pappas to Roosevelt, January 3» 193^» NRA Papers,
^^NRA Release, October l6, 1933» NRA Papers,
20New York Times. November l6, 1933» P» 1»
S, V, Weirton Steel Co., Del, 1060 U, S, (1935)» P» 41,
Hereafter cited as Weirton Decision,
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ommltting the Mmagamated slate o On December 6 the NLB notified repre­
sentatives of the company union to appear in Washington the next day. At 
this meeting sharp exchanges occurred between Long and the employee repre=>
sentatives, and Wagner finally presented a set of rules for the election,
22Long accepted the regulations but the employees* committee did not. When
asked if they intended to flout the government the employee representatives
23answered "if that*s the way you take it, yes," On December 11 Weir
wrote that he did not feel bound by the October l6 agreement and that the
election would be held under employee representative direction, Wagner
replied that the NLB intended to see that the agreement was carried out
and on December 14 Johnson informed Weir that "in my opinion you are about
to commit a deliberate violation of federal laws, and that if you do so, I
shall request the Attorney General to proceed against you," That same day
Wagner referred the case to the Justice Department and ordered Weir to
24postpone the election.
The employee representative elections were held as scheduled on 
December 15 at the Weirton plants in Weirton, Clarksburg, and Steubenville, 
In this election 11,443 employees were listed as eligible voters and 9,336 
went to the polls. The employee representative election committee accepted 
6,818 ballots as valid and a government audit added only 18? to that number. 
Even with this impressive turnout, NLB members charged that the company had 
used threats, intimidation, discharges, demotions and layoffs to get employ*
^^Ibid,. pp, 46=47, ^^NRA Release No, 2149» NRA Papers, 
24Lorwin and Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards, p. 104 
^Veirton Decision, pp, 48-49,
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ee acceptance of the company union»^^ Early in January, therefore, a
White House conference was held at which it was decided that the Weirton
27case would be taken to the courtso Soon thereafter a delegation from
the Amalgamated Association came to Washington to protest the administra­
tion's handling of the case and threatened a general walkout of steel­
workers throughout the country unless the case was decided in favor of the 
28union. One unidentified person wrote Roosevelt that if the case were
not settled the situation would result in "bloodshed which may be the
29forerunner of a Revolution,"
By March the NRA was considering depriving Weirton of its Blue 
Eagle but the case was being argued in the courts The NRA was not 
very certain of its case, however, and less sure of its handling. An NRA 
memorandum read:
For your information in regard to the Weirton Case, I understand Newton, 
the district attornsy, is not much of a lawyer, ^n fact pretty bad and 
is a republican, I understand that Judge Nils /sigy is a former student 
of Layton of the firm of Richards and Layton, who are attorneys for the 
defendants. He is also a republican,
Such doubt was justified, for on May 29, 1934, Judge Nields refused to
grant a preliminary injunction on technical grounds. On February 2?» 1935»
he refused to grant the injunction on the merits of the case and the appeal
^^Ibldo. p, 6, ^̂ Iron Age. CXXXIII (January 18, 1934), p, 32,
2^Ibid, (February 1, 1934), p, 41.
29̂Anonymous Letter to Roosevelt, February 10, 193^, NRA Papers.
^^William H, Davis, National Compliance Director, to Milton Handler, 
April 2, 1934* NRA Papers,
^̂ L, H, C, Smith to John McKnight, April 15, 1934. NRA Papers,
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of the so-called test case of Section 7a to the Supreme Court remained to
32be taken when the Schechter decision was rendered»
This open act of definance by the steel company, together willi oLher 
factors, was reducing the NLB to impotency. Industry was growing increas­
ingly hostile toward the NRA's collective bargaining provisions by early 
1934» Iron Age pointed out that the AFL had gained all the ground, it had 
lost in the past fourteen years and deplored the strikes for union recog­
nition which had occurred in late 1933»^^ Nevertheless, Wagner was aware 
of the crisis which the Weirton defiance would cause, and thus early in 
February Roosevelt issued two further executive orders empowering the NLB 
to conduct elections in plants under majority rule and providing that, if 
the employers refused to accept the results, cases could be turned over to 
the NRA Compliance Division or the Attorney General» The press release 
accompanying the orders stated that the new policy grew out of the growing 
tendency of management to build up company unions, "These unions are
operated by employees* representatives chosen by the employer rather than
34by the employees themselves," concluded the statement»^
The Steel Institute immediately condemned the executive orders and 
the press release "as a direct threat against the peaceful industrial re­
lations long prevailing in the Steel Industry" and as threatening "the 
whole national industrial recovery program»" Such powers as granted to 
the NLB would allow a small minority of workers to create confusion in
^^orwin and Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards, p» 105» 
^^Iron Age. CXXXIII (January 4, 1934), p» 34»
^^Ibida (February 8, 1934), p» 41B»
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labor-management relations» thought the Institutec The \TST statement 
concluded:
We regard it as a violation of public trust for a government agency 
to issue such a statement to the publico It can indicate nothing 
other than an intention to accomplish a complete domination of all 
industry, affecting the lives of millions of people, by union organ­
izations which represent less than 10 per cent of the industrial 
en^loyees of the Nation»35
Senator Wagner, however, said that the executive order was a result of
NLB*s dispute with Weirton and of the AISI statement declared: "The Board
heard all that argument last Autumn and went right on sticking to its
work and will continue to do so,"
Wagner was playing a game of bluff, however, because events were
rushing quickly over the NLB's position. Just two days after Wagner*s
statement, Johnson and Richberg issued a statement of their own repudiating
the doctrine of majority representation in favor of multiple representation
and adding that "in so far as the statement in the press release might be
read as saying that employees' representatives in all compary unions are
chosen by employers it was not intended as there is no evidence of such a
case,"^^ On February 27 the Board referred the Weirton case to the Justice
Department and two days later asserted the majority rule principle in the
Denver Tramway case. The breach between the NRA and the NLB had become
irreconcilable,^®
In March 1934 the United Automobile Workers presented demands on
behalf of its 50,000 members for elections and bargaining. The NLB and
^^AISI Press Release, February 2, 1934, NRA Papers,
3®Iron Age, CXXXIII (February 8, 1934), p, 41C, ^^Ibid,. p, 4lB, 
3®Bernstein, New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, pp. 59-60,
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Johnson stepped in and tried to arrange a settlement but the automobile
makers made it clear that they would not accept the principle of majority
ruleo Roosevelt now intervened in the controversy to prevent a strike
which could not be permitted in such a vital industry. On March 25
Johnson worked out a settlement with Roosevelt's ing)rimatur, providing
39that employers would bargain with groups pro rata to their membership.
This ruling, of course, went directly counter to the RLB Denver Tramway
decision and was so damaging to the prestige of the Board that it "lapsed
40into a lethargy and torpor from which it never emerged,"
Wagner had already become convinced, however, of the need to have 
the NLB policies written into a permanent statute outside the NRA struc­
ture, and the AFL concurred. Drafting of such a law began in Wagner's 
office in January 1934, and when it was finished in late February it had 
provided for a new labor board, majority rule and the legality of the 
closed shop, Wagner introduced his Labor Disputes bill (5,2926) into 
the Senate on March 1, 1934, It was not long before business opened up 
a barrage of criticisms against the bill. The NAM urged trade associa­
tions to combat the Wagner bill by sending employee representatives to 
Washington to testify against it and to issue press releases in opposi­
tion, On March 20 NAM representatives called upon Roosevelt to kill the
41bill and his office was flooded with telegrams to that effect. Iron Age 
took its cue when it editorialized:
^^Sidney Fine, "President Roosevelt and the Automobile Code," 
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. XLV (June, 1958), pp, 28-36,
40Lorwin and Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards, p, 113,
^^Bernstein, New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, pp, 62-6?,
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The Wagner bill Is patently a political measure* It is a bid for 
the votes of a veil organized minority group* Its defeat will not 
become certain until en^loyers muster all their forces to achieve 
that end* It is not time for temporizing and no time for inter­
industry dissention. United action, and forceful action, must be 
taken, not to gain special favor or privilege, but to win a square 
deal.*2
While the bill was before the Senate Committee on Labor from mid-March 
through mid-April, some nine steel companies had enqcloyee committee of 
representatives to testify in opposition. AISI prepared a digest of this 
testimony and circulated it among its members for distribution to employees. 
In addition the Steel Institute wrote to all members that they should con­
tact their senators and representatives to express disapproval of what 
was "believed to be the most drastic, and, therefore, the most important,
proposal from the point of view of the Iron and Steel Industry . . .  as
44has ever been put forward in this country.
Conditions at the time, however, were not such as to give the Labor 
Disputes bill mueh hope of passage. Perkins was ambivalent because she 
wanted any labor board put under her control, Johnson was equivocal when 
he declared in an open letter that "the government should not favor any 
particular form of organization." but also that "freedom of choice could 
not exist where management maintained dominance over employee organiza­
tions once established."^^ In addition Roosevelt knew that the slight
Aae. CXXXIII (April 5, 1934), p. 13.
^^Walter Tower to Members of AISI, April 26, 1934. NRA Papers,
/iiiL, V, Collings to Members of AISI, March 15, 1934. NRA Paper; 
^^ernstein. New Deal Collective Bargaining Poliov. pp, 68-69,
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economic recovery depended on the cooperation of business and, further, 
his concessions to the automobile industry had already put a damper on 
the Wagner legislation» Nevertheless, the decline of the NLB had created 
an ominous strike situation, particularly in steel, and, therefore, 
Roosevelt approved Walsh*s revising the bill» Walsh removed some of the 
more objectionable features of the Labor Disputes bill and provided for 
the creation of a National Industrial Adjustment Board within the De­
partment of Labor» The Senate Committee reported the bill favorably and, 
for once, Roosevelt, Perkins, Wagner, and Johnson all approved» The 
opposition, however, including business, the press, and the AFL, attacked 
the bill until it appeared as if this measure might also be lost»^ The 
situation in the steel industry dictated otherwise»
The 100,000 new members who had swelled the ranks of the Amalgamated 
Association since the enactment of the NIRA had become increasingly dis­
couraged with the fumblings of Tighe» Such local leaders as Earl Forbeck 
of McKeesport, Bill Long of Weirton, and William Sprang of Duquesne began 
a program of opposition to their international leaders. These men called 
a meeting in Pittsburgh on March 25» 1934, which was attended by 257 dele­
gates from fifty local lodges. Ostensibly called to discuss the effect of 
the NRA on steelworkers, this meeting organized the militant Association 
members for a frontal attack at the upcoming Amalgamated convention in
April, The Pittsburgh meeting was the beginning of the Rank and File 
47committee, ' With Forbeck as chairman, a committee of ten was appointed 
to carry back to the lodges four questions to get an expression of mem­
bership feeling. The questions read:
46 47pp. 70-75. 'Brooks, As Steel Goes, p, 51.
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' . ) ,,pul.es Bill passes» will all new lodges
ask iOi' recognition at the same time?
2. If the v/agner Bill is defeated, what will the new lodges do to 
gain recognition
3* How much time should be given to the management of the steel 
industry to meet such demands « . . before the latter take 
definite offensive action to obtain such demands, otherwise 
unobtainable?
4. Will the steelworkers cooperate with the Auto Workers* Union,
Mine Workers, and Railroad Workers in the event united action 
becomes necessaiy to gain collective bargaining for any onegroup?48
These questions were presented to the lodges, and the sentiment was gen­
erally for united action in securing recognition, and, if necessary, by 
striking,
When the annual convention of the Amalgamated met in Pittsburgh on 
April 17 the Rank and File leaders were in control. The night before the 
meeting opened the militant leaders met in caucus, in violation of con­
vention rules, and, with the aid of four men from outside Amalgamated 
ranks who "all had good liberal political connections in Pennsylvania 
and one, at least, had an inside track in Washington," the Rank and 
File formulated their plans. When the convention opened Tighe was ready 
to refuse seats to many local delegates and to expel other lodges for 
non-payment of dues, but the militants won over their president in a test 
vote. Then, although many of the Rank and File leaders knew they were 
not prepared for a strike, either organizationally or financially, the 
convention voted on May 1 a Seven-Point Program.This plan provided:
Point 1. All New Lodges to ask for recognition at the same time.
Point 2. Our demands to be presented to our employers on Hay 21, 1934.
1̂8Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, p. 960.
^^Brooks, As Steel Goes, p. 51. ^̂ Ibid.. pp, 52-54.
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Point 3« If our demands are not met in accordance with Section 7(a)
of the National Industrial Recovery Act, we will be forced 
by concerted action to declare a holiday during the middle 
of June, 1934o
Point 4o Secretary of the International Lodge is hereby instructed
to send a letter to each sub-lodge outlining this program 
of action and also, to send a similar letter to President 
Roosevelt, Senator Wagner, and to General Hugh So Johnson» 
Point 5° It is also the sense of this Committee that our demands be
popularized through the public press*
Point 60 That the Committee or group of men who conduct any offen­
sive action, which may be necessary, should be included 
in aiy negotiations that may arise out of this program 
of concerted action*
Point 7o No lodge shall be allowed to sign an agreement for recog­
nition until all lodges shall have assurance of recogni­
tion* 51
As one of the Rank and File planners suggested after their victory, "we 
were like a good bunch of football players going into the biggest game 
of our lives with no plays, signals, quarterback, or captain*
The next few weeks were spent by the Rank and File committee in 
trying to find ways and means of putting its program into effect* The 
international officers had to take a backseat* Tighe wrote bitterly to 
a friend that "for many years, I may say during my entire lifetime, I 
have been an apostle of peace in all lines of industry, in fact it has 
became £sifi7 proverbial that M* F* Tighe is so conservative that he has 
lost his grip on what is known as the rank and file of his workers*" 
Tighe continued:
In our late convention wh^ch was controlled very largely ly the new 
elements that have came ^sig/ in to the organization since the NRA, 
was adopted, this was shown to be the sentiment, as they controlled 
the convention and passed all resolutions that appeared to them to 
be what is known as progressive* To add to the situation, there 
were outside parties who under assumed interests, but communistic,
^^Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, p* 1039*
^^rooks. As Steel Goes, p* 54*
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were constantly guiding these new representatives, and all against 
the best interests of the present organization, as it was the plan 
to do so disrupt the old A*A* as to form it into the communistic 
classo However, as you know the officials of the organization really 
have no powers, and we will have to abide by the decision of the 
convpention /.sic/«53
Tighe stepped aside to let the young radicals have a go at it.
Late in May some 200 new Amalgamated lodges sent identical letters 
to steel companies requesting recognition and demanded replies by June 10. 
Then while waiting, the Rank and File Committee held a number of meetings. 
One meeting on May 20, was held with representatives of the Communist- 
led Steel and Metal Workers' Industrial Union to explore possibilities 
of informal concerted action. When the Industrial Union's representatives 
demanded a more formal arrangement, however, it was decided that the two 
groups would only cooperate on a local basis whenever practicable. At 
that same meeting it was decided that the strike would begin on June l6 
if demands were not met. That night a committee was formed to present 
demands to Tighe and a telegram was sent to the Amalgamated president 
requesting a meeting with him and the executive board on May 22.^
On May 21 the steel companies flatly rejected the Amalgamated 
demands for recognition, returning the letters to the various lodges 
unopened. The next day the Rank and File Committee called on Tighe and 
demanded $100,000 to conduct the strike and the use of the Association's 
complete machinery. In addition Tighe was requested to demand that the 
NRA conduct an immediate hearing on the proposed revision of the steel 
code. After much shouting and name calling which lasted from nine
^^Tighe to Ralph Easley, June 12, 1934. NRA Papers.
^Srooks, As Steel Goes, pp. 54-55<>
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o»clock until two o'clock with Tighe refusing to acede to the Rank and 
File's demands, the militants left, convinced "that the officers were 
going to sabatoge the strike and that we were left on our own resourceso"^^ 
Tighe did, however, finally request that code hearings be held, but he was 
refused by Johnsono^^
With the two Amalgamated factions at loggerheads and with the steel 
industry adamant in its stand, the scene of action switched Washington,
On May 24̂  Forbeck wired the NRA protesting that 0, S, Steel and its sub­
sidiaries refused to even receive union representatives requesting recog­
nition for collective bargaining, although the union represented 110,000 
steelworkers,^^ That same day Forbeck addressed a meeting sponsored by 
the League for Social Justice and declared that "if we go out on strike 
or holiday there will be no letup until there is a complete breakdown of 
the Iron and Steel Institute," Forbeck also demanded a six-hour day, a 
"saving not merely a living wage" and the end of company unions. The 
Philadelphia Record editorialized: "Once again II, S, Steel has defied
U,S.A«," and called upon Roosevelt to compel the steel industry to obey 
the law«^9 One person wrote the President that "the workers of this 
country demand a true 'new deal*— or elsel"*^ Feelings were running so
^^Ibldc. po 560
^^Tighe to Johnson, Hay 28, 1934; and K. M, Simpson to Tighe, May 
28, 1934. NRA Papers, Tighe had earlier requested of the NRA a chance 
to be heard on the revised Steel Code (Tighe to Simpson, May 10, 1934),
^^Forbeck to Simpson, May 24, 1934. NRA Papers.
^^Pittsburgh Post Gazette, May 24, 1934, p« 1,
^^Philadelphia Record. May 26, 1934,
C, Aldrich-Ames to Roosevelt, May 26, 1934, NRA Papers.
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high that Wagner telegraphed Tighe and Forbeck asking them to bring dele­
gates to Washington for conferences with the NIB,
On May 29 both Forbeck and Tighe appeared before the Board and de­
manded that Roosevelt call a conference between the Amalgamated and the 
Steel Instituteo Wagner promised he would comply. It was reported that 
Wagner went to the President with the union’s demand and that Roosevelt 
told the NLB to handle the situation. The next day, however, Roosevelt 
approved the revised steel code and stated that he would promptly call for 
representation elections in the steel mills under government supervision.
The Rank and File representatives immediately issued a press release saying 
that Roosevelt's promise of elections had alreaĉ y proven to be "just so much 
bunk" because he could not enforce such elections and that they did not 
guarantee recognition when held, Tighe repudiated the statement and said 
that the Rank and File members were on their own. The next day in a press 
conference Forbeck called Johnson a "big windbag" and later in the day 
Johnson called Tighe "yellow" and Forbeck "green." Thereupon, the Rank 
and File delegates went back to their lodges to sound out their members.
The militants were back in Washington on June 4 and promptly issued 
a statement demanding a six-hour day, a five-day week and a dollar an hour 
minimum wage, and stating "there is no beating around the bush about it, 
steelworkers of this country are going to get what they want," Sprang 
said of Johnson: "We'd like to see him walk up to an open hearth furnace
and get his pants scorched for $21,84 a w e e k , O n  June 5 Johnson had 
6iBrooks, As Steel Goes, pp, 58-62,
^^Iron Age. CXXXIII (June 7, 1934), p. 42D,
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two conferences with Wo A« Irvin of Uo S» Steel and proposed a steel 
labor board such as the one used in the automobile industry» Other meet­
ings were held that day involving both factions of the Amalgamated, Roosevelt, 
Wagner, and Johnson» The General stated that he did not think the steel- 
workers had laid the proper groundwork for the controversy» June 6 
and 7 were spent by the union representatives in meetings with Perkins 
and Johnson» They also demanded an audience with the President» On the 
second day they finally got as far as Roosevelt's inner office but a 
presidential assistant referred them to a special board which Roosevelt 
had created to deal with them, consisting of Johnson, Wagner, Perkins, and 
McGrady» The workers had gone to the White House in a fighting mood but 
were overawed to be in such an historic place that they left as did other
<h,tourists with matches from the President's desk in their pockets»
The next day, Johnson offered the steelworkers a three-man Industrial 
Relations Board which would conduct elections but could not force recogni­
tion» He said that the Steel Institute had already accepted the proposal 
and that acceptance of it by the union would allow Amalgamated the oppor­
tunity to become a collective bargaining agent where it had a majority.
The militants firmly rejected the proposal, declaring that th^ had "had 
nine months of stalling and we're not going to stand for any more»" That 
night Johnson went on the radio and strongly hinted that the rank-and- 
filers were Communists » The next day the Amalgamated group left Washington,
As representatives departed they gave the press an open letter to Roosevelt 
denouncing Johnson's charge that thgy were Communists as an "unvarnished
^̂ Ibid». pp. 42-44 and 63. ^̂ Brooks, As Steel Goes, pp. 63-64,
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lie” and his strike settlement proposal as "an insult to every worker in
this countryo" They concluded the news release by stating:
Mro President, the least you can do is to throw the Iron and Steel 
Institute's barren company union proposition into the waste basket.
And if you really mean to abide by your own recovery law, the least 
you can do is to summon the steel manufacturers to Washington for 
a genuine collective bargaining with the steel w o r k e r s ,
Thus, the Rank and File members had tried a bluff in the capital and had
failed. Yet, the strike was still scheduled for June l6 and some solution
had to be found hy one of the parties to avert that strike.
It was from the camp of labor itself that the solution came. Tighe 
had issued a call for a convention of the Amalgamated on June 8 to meet in 
Pittsburgh on June 14, two days before the strike deadline. When the con­
vention opened the militant spirit was evident, but on the second day 
William Green addressed the convention as an emmissary of Roosevelt.
Green told the Amalgamated delegates that they could not win such a strike 
until they were stronger and urged a postponement until July 1 to see what 
action might be taken in Washington, He then recommended a four point pro­
gram to be submitted as an ultimatum to Roosevelt because it "would cause 
consternation to the steel corporations and mobilize public opinion behind 
you," That program called for an impartial board to receive complaints 
arising under Section ?a and to adjust and mediate disputes. The board 
would also conduct elections in plants for collective bargaining agents.
^^Daugherty, Economics of Iron and Steel. II, p. 106l; and Iron Age. 
CXniII (June 14, 1934), p. 40.
^^Brooks, As S^eel Goes, p. 6?, Milton Berber and Edwin Young state 
that Green was given the task of settling the controversy by the code auth­
orities (Labor and the New Deal, p. 53),
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Green assured the delegates that the President would approve the proposal
and the convention adopted the proposal almost unanimously
Roosevelt had already begun steps toward creating the machinery called
for in the strike settlement. He was convinced of the need for a new
agency because of the failure of the NLB, but what he wanted was "nonoon-
troversial bill that would move through both houses quickly, preferably
68with Republican support,” On June 11 Richberg gave Roosevelt the draft 
of a bill which authorized the President to create a National Labor 
Relations Board in the Department of Labor, and on June 15 Public Resol­
ution 44 was submitted to Congress, On June l6, with little debate, the
69bill was passed and was signed into law on June 19» Roosevelt stated
that under Section ?a, workers had the right to choose anyone to repre­
sent them, "whether their choice is the King of Siam, the National 
Geographic Society or any organization under the sun,”̂ ^ That same day
Tighe and Green called on the President and immediately thereafter Perkins
71was appointed to begin negotiations to avert the strike,
Roosevelt revealed the result of those negotiations when he issued 
an executive order on June 28 creating the National Steel Labor Relations 
Board, This three-man group, composed of Judge Walter P, Stacey, James 
A, Hullenbach, and Admiral Henry A, Wiley, was empowered to investigate 
and determine the validity of charges that employers were restraining,
^^Barnstein. New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, p, 77; and 
Iron Age. CXXXIII (June 21, 1934), p, 70.
68Bernstein, New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, p, 77»
PP» 78-81, ?°Iron Age. CXXXIII (June 21, 1934), p, 40,
^̂ ijjii,, p, 43.
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interfering with, or coercing employees in exercise of their rights under
Section The Board was to mediate any dispute between ei^l<yers and
employees and to arrange for collective bargaining conferences-» If disputes
were voluntarily submitted, the NSLRB would serve as an arbitration board»
Section 3 of the order provided that the board could conduct elections in
plants to choose collective bargaining agents for the majority "without
thereby denying to apy individual employee or group of employees the right
to present grievances, to confer with their employers, or otherwise to
associate themselves and act for mutual aid or protection." To carry out
such elections the NSLRB could obtain from company payroll and other doc-
72uments to certify lists of employees eligible to vote,' This plan and 
the board members had been approved by the Steel Institute in conference 
with Perkins, and the industry termed it a compromise marking "a new step 
in relations between the industry and organized labor, though it does not 
mean recognition»"^^
The members of the Steel Board had years of experience in mediatory 
activities and that is probably the reason they were chosen for their 
posts» The administration still could not afford a direct confrontation 
with so powerful a segment of the economy as the steel industry at a time 
when economic recovery was the keynote of the New Deal, and the Board 
seemed to have tried to avoid a direct confrontation» From July to the 
end of 1934 the NSLRB attempted to bring management and labor together
^^Executive Order No, 675I» June 28, 193%» NRA Papers. 
f^Iron Age. CXXXIV (July 5, 1934), P» 4?»
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for conferences to solve outstanding problems» One example of this
activity was the Board®s mediation of a dispute between Republic Steel
and various lodges of the Amalgamated» Republic had had a contract with
the union on wages for several years, but when it expired on June 13
the company refused to negotiate a new contract» The NSLRB was able to
persuade Republic to agree to maintain the old contract, although Republic
denied that the agreement implied recognition of the union»' In another
mediatory activity the NSLRB persuaded a small steel producer to reinstate
a union member after the company had discharged him for organizational
aotivity»^^ In the only election held under Board auspices before the
first of the year the Amalgamated Association was declared the bargaining
agent for employees of the West Virginia Rail Company for one year»^*
The Board was also able to adjust disputes involving Apollo Steel, Clayton
Mark and Company, and Bethlehem Steel»
Steel companies, however, had not had a change of heart. As an
Iron Age editorial stated:
Organized labor, be it observed, has not been primarily interested in 
reemployment» Its main aim has been to swell its power— to rise to 
a position of dominance where it can dictate, rather than bargain for, 
wages and working conditions» In its greed for power it has plunged 
the nation into a state of constant turmoil, punctuated by strike afterstrike»77
Nevertheless, Perkins was able to announce in October that the NSLRB had 
solved disputes directly involving 15,000 workers, and many more workers
^^Ibld» (August 2, 1934); p. 57; and (August l6, 1934), P« 41.
^^ibid» (September 6, 1934), p» 4?»
^^Ibid» (September I3, 1934), p. 72»
f^Ibid» (August 16, 1934), P» 9»
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indirectly, in its first three months of operation,Events once again, 
however, were beginning to modify the few months of labor peace.
Operations in the steel industry had begun to turn upward in late 
Autumn and labor unrest began anew. On November 18 steel leaders announced 
that they were ready to deal with the Amalgamated representatives but still 
insisted on proportional representation. The Amalgamated demanded majority 
rule, however, probably at William Green's insistence. At a recent con­
vention at San Francisco the AFL had denounced Amalgamated for its lack of
aggressiveness and had authorized the creation of a new and separate verti­
cal union in the steel industry. The union's rejection of the industry 
offer was condemned and some steel leaders suggested "that too much has 
been conceded in view of the manifest weakness of the Amalgamated union 
among iron and steel employees," The threat was voiced that if the indus­
try's proposal were rejected, further efforts of the NSLRB "to intervene 
in the labor relations of the steel industry will be fought to the last 
courts,"^*
Once again the threatened breakdown of labor peace was referred to 
the White House, On December 18 Roosevelt called top steel executives, 
including Grace and Taylor, Perkins and McGrady, Stacey and Wiley, and 
Tighe to his office for a conference. Before the meeting convened Steve 
Early reported that the NSLRB had been working on a settlement formula for 
several months but that it was not "quite agreeable" to either industry or
(October 4, 1934), p, i»3o 
(November 29» 1934), pp, 43-44,
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80Amalgamated» The conference lasted about an hour, during which time 
the union representatives were urged to accept a plan by which the en^loyers 
would bargain with all groups of employees and the NSLRB would act as an 
arbitration agency» Both sides were asked to agree to a six-months truoe 
during which time no elections for labor representatives would be held»
This proposal indicated that the administration was ready to abandon the 
June truce in favor of a new plan, but the AFL and the Amalgamated re- 
fused to agree»
The NSLRB, therefore, entered a new phase of activity at this point- 
using its powers to order elections in steel plants » On December 31 the 
Board ordered elections in two plants of Carnegie Steel and requested 
payrolls to determine the list of eligible voters» Carnegie officials 
refused to produce the records and the Carnegie company union went into 
court asking that the election orders be set aside» On March 5 the court 
dismissed the company union^s request after an agreement was reached be­
tween all parties» Three days later the Board dropped its election order 
because once again factional strife with Amalgamated had led Tighe to 
expel the lodges requesting the Carnegie elections» Other election orders 
were issued during 1935 but they were generally ignored or appealed to the
courts» Several of these appeals were pending when the Schechter decision
8?was handed down»
Thus, the NSLRB, like the NLB before it, had failed to accomplish
^^Ibid» (December 20, 193%), p. 57®
8lLorwin and Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards, pp» 341-3^2»
pp. 342-347.
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much in applying Section ?a to the iron and steel industry. One reason, 
as already stated, was the policy of expediency followed ly the adminis­
tration. The steel industry was an important key to industrial recovery 
and its cooperation was necessary to that goal. Then too, the condition 
of the strike threat in June 1934 through June 1935 the union steadily lost 
in both numbers of local lodges and total membership. While many of the 
old Rank and File members became more closely tied with Communist and other 
left-wing groups, Tighe carried out a systematic purge of those who had so 
successfully revolted against his authority in mid-1934. It would take the 
Wagner Act, the CIO, and the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee to finally 
bring the steel industry to its knees, but this was three or four years in 
the future.
The Steel Code Authority and the NRA deputy administrator had not 
been Involved in Section ?a disputes to any great extent. For the deputy 
administrator's office at least, the entire matter was probably too big 
and besides was out of its hands. Shannon had formulated his own inter­
pretation of the code's labor provisions early in M s  term. He believed 
that working time was to be limited to increase the number of jobs and 
that minimum wages had been set to prevent starvation. Shannon believed 
that collective bargaining according to Section ?a was necessary to adjust 
wage scales above the minimum. Shannon wrote of these principles:
Departure from and amplification of the foregoing simple principles 
has resulted in confusion, both as to the aims of NRA and in the 
actual means of obtaining these, that is in the provisions of var­
ious codes. There is much diversity of method and of opinions among 
the different elements of NRA. The writer believes that adherence 
to the above-stated fundamental principles with the least possible 
amplification is essential to clarity of thought and purpose.^3
®^Shannon to Simpson, September 28, 1933» NRA Papers.
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Thus, Shannon had a clear and simple policy* but he had little Of^rtunity 
to put it into practice0
Very early in the code period Shannon informed AISI that the Code
84Authority was to enforce observance of labor provisions of the steel code. 
Thereupon, for several weeks Shannon referred wages and hours complaints to 
AISI requesting investigations of the facts. The Steel Institutey how­
ever, generally declined jurisdiction or denied that any violations had
86occurred under the steel code. Nevertheless, the secretary of the labor 
committee of the Institute wrote to a code member that wages and hours 
complaints should be referred to the Code Authority and not to an NRA 
compliance board. As to Section 7a* however* the AISI official stated 
that "the Iron and Steel Authority recognizes this provision but does not 
undertake to enforce it." Thus* the committee chairman concluded* "problems 
arising under this section are matters for independent adjustment between 
employers and employees and in some oases they involve dealings with the 
National Labor Board.
Since AISI did not establish machinery to deal with Section 7a mat­
ters, it was only authorized by NRA to administer the code in respect to 
trade practices. The Institute was informed that if it set up labor ad­
ministration machinery, it would be granted the authority to handle code
ÛO
labor provisions. The Steel Institute regularly supplied statistics to
84Shannon to George H. Charls, October 5* 1933» NRA Papers.
^^Simpson to AISI, October 7* 1933* and Shannon to AISI, October 
13* 1933o NRA Papers.
86Tower to Simpson* November 13* 1933» NRA Papers.
®^Qrover C. Brown to J. T. Hanley* January 11* 1934. NRA Papers.
go
NRA to Walter Tower, February 5> 1934, NRA Papers,
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the NRA on wages» hours» and working conditions but ignored requests for 
records of congilaints made to the Institute by code members of alleged 
labor violations0 "This is another of the numerous oases indicating that 
the Institute refuses to recognize any responsibility in the administration 
of the Code»" wrote Shannon» "other than specifically included within the 
contractual agreement among those signatory to the codeo"®^ Tower» in fact» 
had already made it clear that the steel code carried no penalties for vio­
lation of code labor provisions and that "penalities must be found in NIRA,"^® 
Nevertheless» NRA representatives on the Code Authority insisted that closer 
liasion be established between the Authority and NRA regarding labor provi­
sion violations0 Board officials reported to the NRA representatives» how-
91ever» that they were receiving no labor complaints at alio
The only real occasion when the deputy administrator's office tried to 
enforce an NRA regulation regarding Section ?a on the steel industry once 
again reveals the one-sided relationship of the two protagonists. When
Roosevelt renewed the steel code during the strike threat in the summer
of 1934» he issued a statement in which he promised to institute elections
9 2in steel plants to assure collective bargaining. On June 29» 1934» Wil­
liam Green wrote to Johnson that he thought this statement should be in­
cluded on posters being prepared for setting forth the provisions of
^^Memorandum by Shannon, "Steel Code» Active Problems and Questions," 
February 12» 1935» NRA Papers,
^^Tower to Shannon, October 23, 1934, NRA Papers,
^^Memorandum by K, M, Simpson, February 14» 1935* NRA Papers,
^^Lorwin and Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards, p, 333°
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93Section 7a to be placed in steel plantso On September 1, Johnson issued 
an executive order to this effect» Soon thereafter, Hoyt A» Moore, counsel 
for AISI, wrote Richberg stating that such a statement had nothing to do 
with the labor provisions of the steel code and that it "would be provoca-
q / ltive of labor troubles»" Richberg recommended to Johnson that instead 
of Roosevelt’s statement it would be more appropriate to call attention on 
the posters to the new Steel Labor Relations Board»^^ Some officials of 
the NRA were fearful that there was no way to force the steel industry to 
post the notices
The Labor Advisory Board asked Charlton Ogburn, counsel of the 
Amalgamated Association, his opinion on the advisability of forcing the 
industry to display the posters» He replied that he was reluctant to 
take such action because, since all provisions of the code were supposedly 
voluntary, forcing one point and not others would give the steel industry 
a good argument in a court fight»^^
Well into 1935 all branches of the NRA argued whether the steel 
industry should be forced to accept the labor posters. The Labor Advisory 
Board was willing even to go into court to force compliance, but Richberg 
and the Industrial Advisory Board wanted to drop the President’s statement. 
The Steel Institute simply remained silent and refused to accept the
^^Green to Johnson, June 29» 1934» NRA Papers»
qkMoore to Richberg, September 14, 1934, NRA Papers,
^%ichberg to Blackwell Smith, September 18, 1934» NRA Papers.
^^emorandum by Blackwell Smith, October 8, 1934» NRA Papers,
97Gustav Teck to Charlton Ogburn; and Ogburn to Teck, October 16,
1934, NRA Papers,
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posters for distribution to its memberso Finally, on March 25» 1935»
Shannon notified Tower that the President's statement would be ommitted
and that only the labor provisions contained in the code would appear 
98on the new postero
Enforcement of the labor provisions of the Recovery Act and the 
steel code depended, therefore, as did the trade practice provisions, on 
the willingness of the steel industry to complyo Roosevelt, "wedded to 
NRA as his basic recovery policy," refused to take any decisive action
gowhich would alienate the steel magnates complete»Johnson, although 
holding a personal affection for ma^y labor leaders, could not tolerate 
strikes which, might disrupt his patriotic Blue Eagle campaign» The 
unions themselves were too weakened by conservative leadership and in­
ternal strife to play a major role» Thus, a shift in the policies of 
both government and labor was necessary before the steelworkers could 
achieve what had been promised them by Section ?a of the National 
Recovery Act»
98Shannon to Tower, March 25» 1935» NRA Papers»
99Bernstein, New_ Peal Collective Bargaining Policy, p» 82.
CHAPTER IX 
THE REVOLT OF THE "LITTLE FELLOW"
The labor controversy was not the only difficulty which beset the 
NRA and the steel code from 1934 through the Schechter decision in May 
1935» The patriotic Blue Eagle campaign and the fervent hope for re­
covery engendered by the frenzied condification period had kept criticisms 
of code provisions, the operation of Code Authorities, and the antics of 
Hugh Johnson at a minimum » By the fall of 1933» however, there was wide­
spread discontent with the NRA. The much-promised recovery was not mat­
erializing, and there had been no real "crack-down" on code violators.
The real crux of NRA"s problem was price policy. Businessmen chafed at 
barriers erected by the administration against price rises, while con­
sumer representatives charged that industry had been given too much 
control over prices and were raising them too high. Moreover, once the 
codification period had ended, the problems became those of enforcement 
and administration. But the organizing genius of Hugh Johnson seemed 
Inadequate and his eccentricities intolerable. As protests poured into 
Washington from businessmen and consumers, their cause was taken up by 
congressmen, government agencies and even by some within the NRA, Clearly 
the NRA was going to have to make changes, or fall by its own weight,
Hugh Johnson has written that early in the life of NRA "two or three 
young politicians discovered the Little Fellow,"^ The NRA chief was 
referring to Senators William Borah and Gerald % e  as the "young politicians" 
and to the small independent businessman as "the Little Fellow." Johnson
^Johnson, Blue Eagle, p, 271,
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inferred that the discovery was simply a political issue for the two Pro­
gressives* This charge, however, was unfair, as both men, along with other 
congressmen, had been concerned from the start with possible monopolistic 
practices arising from the codes* Borah had said that the bill, as written, 
gave industry "the right to combine, to fix prices, to restrain trade, to 
lay on the American consumer every cent the traffic will bear*" He also 
warned that the government could not approve a code for an Industry and
2later go into court and charge that industry with monopolistic practices* 
Both men probably were heartened in their attacks on the NRA by a mounting 
volume of protests coming into their offices. By December 1933» % e  had 
received 15»000 letters on the subject*^ Borah reported that he had re­
ceived "over fourteen thousand letters . « * from small businessmen all 
over the country, many of whom have been driven out of business and others
kstruggling to hold on."
Increasing criticism from Capitol Hill was reinforced ty criticism 
from other quarters* While Johnson refused to acknowledge that NRA codes 
were oppressing small business, he was at least hearing the charges* A 
typical complaint charged that any code, such as for the steel industry, 
which allowed price fixing "will cause great monopoly thus helping the 
large concerns and oppressing the small ones*"^ Another writer protested
So Congressional Record. 73d Congo, 1st Seas.» 1933» UCXVII,
p. 58^2*
%oo3, NRA Economic. Planning, pp, 373-376.
^Borah to J* Francis Merrell, March 1, 1934, Borah Papers, Library 
of Congress*
^Merrill and Dsher Conç>any to Johnson, January 23» 1934* NRA Papers*
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that the Steel Code Authority's control of prices was going to force his 
company to suspend operations»^ George Creel, the former head of Wilson's 
Committee on Public Information and California's state director of the 
National Emergency Council, wrote Johnson that the steel code's "logical 
result will be the elimination of independent steel fabricators»"^ The 
"deal cats were flying" as Johnson had predicted they would and the 
future of the NEIA depended on the administration's response to the 
mounting complaints»
When the Recovery Act was enacted Roosevelt had emphasized that 
the law was designed to increase consuming power and that if prices in­
creased as fast as wages the whole effort would be for naught. Johnson 
echoed these sentiments when he stated: "We are going to ask something
in the nature of an armistice on increased capacity and prices until we 
get this thing started»" Shortly thereafter, he warned: "This administra­
tion sinqply will not stand for that /increased prioeg/»"® But the nec­
essity for compromise forced Johnson bo make price concessions» On 
June 23, 1933* he announced that codes could include agreements not to 
sell below cost of production and the steel code certainly contained all 
of the elements of price fixing» Within the NRA the Special Industrial 
Recovery Board opposed the drive toward fixed and higher prices» Rexford 
Tugwell, an outspoken advocate of planning, averred: "One test of the
goodness of business is the lowness of its prices." He was continually
^Wo C» Downey to Johnson, February 22, 1934. NRA Papers.
^George Creel to Johnson, February 26, 1934. NRA Papers.
Q
Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 122.
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badgering Johnson about price policy and toward the end of 1933 suggested 
that if competition was not to keep prices down, "it would mean that the 
industries would logically be forced to accept full public control over 
their prices o" Johnson was angered, but Wien SIRS proposed that it re­
view codes before final approval, Johnson persuaded Roosevelt to end the 
board's life.^
The furor over prices began to have its effect on the administration» 
In early January, Roosevelt announced after a conference with Johnson, 
Borah, and % e  that he was planning a revision of the NIRA and that he
wanted to establish closer contact between the NRA and the Congress»
A few weeks earlier a Committee on Small Industries had been established
by Gerard Swope, chairman of the Business Advisory and Planning Council
of the Department of Commerce, to study the effects of the Recovery Act
11on small industries» These moves were still not sufficient for critics 
of NRA policies» The Consumers Advisory Board had taken the role of chief 
critic of NRA policy from the SIRB and through its pressure Johnson reluc­
tantly agreed to allow the CAB to hold price hearings in Washington,
The CAB price hearings were held in Washington from January 9 
through January 12» The board had been working for some time on a study 
of price movements in several important industries which revealed that 
private price control was leading to unfair price increases and uniformity.
^̂ Iron Age. CXXXIII (January 4, 1933)» P» 148.
^̂ Ibid» (January 11, 1934), p» 45»
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The CAB was shocked, however, when Johnson refused to allow them to re­
lease the report and that he had chosen division administrator Arthur D* 
Whiteside of Dun and Bradstreet, one of the most outspoken champions of 
price fixing in the country, to conduct the hearings. Nevertheless, the 
CAB presented a thirty-two page brief enumerating conçlaints it had re­
ceived, and several state and municipal purchasing agents testified how 
codes were affecting their operations. The steel code was attacked for 
its basing point system and other trade practices. In his report on the 
hearings Whiteside told Johnson that additional hearings would be nec­
essary to investigate specific complaints against price provisions in 
12some codes.
Although Whiteside had conducted the price hearings "on ground rules 
designed to keep the findings as obscure as possible," %-e and Borah were 
furnished additional material for their attacks on NRA.^^ On January 18 
% e  rose on the floor of the Senate and opened a debate on price and pro­
duction policies under NRA, %re, not hostile to the general purposes of 
the Recovery Act, held that the program being developed by the administra­
tion would defeat those purposes. He said that the thousand pages of 
testimony taken at the price hearings revealed that small enterprises were 
dominated by the larger, that prices were being fixed 67 trade associations, 
that Code Authorities were intimidating hesitant members and that consumer 
prices had risen at a rapid rate, in many instances higher than those of 
1929• % e  urged congressmen to study the hearing reports and added that
^^Persia Campbell, Consumer Representation in the New Deal (New 
York, 1940), pp. 7O-7I; and IcQQ_Ag&, CXXXIII (January 18, 1934), p. 30.
l^Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. I3I.
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he feared for the entire recovery program if the defects revealed were 
not correctedo Senator Borah followed %re and proposed an amendment to 
the NIRA reimposing antitrust restrictions on industry whether under codes 
or noto^^ A few days later Borah intorduced Senate Resolution l66, which 
was passed; that directed the Federal Trade Commission to make a study of 
prices under the steel code and report back to the Senate
The NRA reply was the usual mixture of calm official pronouncement 
on the one hand; and the blustery denunciation by Johnson on the other.
On January 21 Richberg announced that it was "an appropriate time to re­
call to the attention of the public and to those industries now operating 
under the codes the fact that the provisions of the anti-trust laws of 
the United States are still in full force and effect and that monopolistic 
practices are not permitted even under the provisions of codes 
Johnson; in his characteristic manner; denounced the antitrusters in a 
speech before the National Retail Dry Goods Association as having "really 
nothing to support them but the width of their mouths and the volumetric 
capacity of their lung power," He then stated:
There will be a distinct movement to repeal this Act under the 
slogan of 'oppression of small enterprises,' It won't be a 
forthright and open motion for repeal. These gentlemen do not 
dare do that. Some of this will be done by a Senator whom I love 
for his intestinal fortitude perhaps more than any other Senator 
other than Carter Glass; but yet I shall oppose him on this paradox 
as long as breath within me lies. It will be an attempt to put in 
the act about three lines forbidding action by any industry and. in 
effect; substituting the Federal Trade Commission for the NRA.l?
^^Typescript of Senate Resolution No, l66, NRA Papers,
^^NRA Release No, 2850; January 21; 1934, NRA Papers.
^̂ Iron Age. CXXXIII (January 25; 1934); p. 42,
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Yet, Johnson quickly added: "If I had only nine words with which to
address you, I would rise here and say: 'Keep prices down--for God's
1Asake, keep prices down»'"
A tense, under the surface feud had been developing between Johnson 
and the FTC for some time» Johnson and Federal Trade Commissioner March 
had been conferring on the basing point system in steel and the FTC had 
given a secret report on that subject to Roosevelt» The President had 
issued an executive order giving the FTC and the Justice Department juris­
diction to pass on complaints against code practices» In a statement ac­
companying the order Roosevelt had said: "Conceptions as to what practices
are monopolistic and are beyond the allowable area of the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act will thereby be enabled to rest upon realistic founda­
tions of the place to be accorded to concentrated capital and cooperative 
effort in our modern economic civilization»"^^ Johnson attacked the FTC 
almost immediately for a "dismal and complete failure" in improving indus­
trial conditions and added:
There was— and there is— about as much cooperation between the Federal 
Trade Commission and industry as there is between a lion tamer with a 
black-snake whip, a revolver and a strong-backed chair, standing in a 
cage with six great jungle cats snapping and snarling on six star spangled 
hassocks— that is their version of economic planning and industrial 
self-government» Yet that is the condition that these economic genii 
want to restore»20
Johnson added that if the NRA oppressed anyone, "it oppresses people who
are not willing to accord decent wages and proper hours to human labor and
I am willing to take any man to the hustings on that statement— including
^̂ ÎSld», p. 41» °̂Ifeiji,, P» 42,
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21those professional dialecticians»"
The steel industry found itself projected into the midst of the
controversy between Johnson on the one hand and the antitrust Senators
and the FTC on the other, because that industry was nearly always used as
an example of monopoly and price fixing» Tower quickly issued a statement
to Justify the industry's price policy stating that "without the open
price provision of the steel code, the industry would be practically
helpless in making any effective contribution to the Administration's
recovery effort»" He did admit that when prices were known the natural
tendency was "toward a uniformity in prices which comes about because
each company is determined to meet the lowest offer of its competitor."
This resulted, held Tower, in other factors, such as quality and service,
becoming more important than price, "Thus, it will be seen that competition
has not been lessened in the industry by the open price policy»" wrote the
AISI official, "but rather has been intensified and turned into new and
22more healthy and constructive channels»”
Eugene Grace also defended steel's pricing policy» Writing for 
Scribner's Magazine. Grace stated: "What the steel industry has done with
the price structure is to put it on a basis similar to that of retail
trade, with announced prices for its merchandise so that the public will 
know the rock-bottom figure, and will be sure that everyone else is buying 
at the same price from any one supplie r , T h e  industry also paused to 
back Johnson in his struggle» Denouncing Borah and the FTC, Iron Age
^̂ i32iji» ^^aià», p, 36»
^^Reprint of article by Eugene G, Grace, "Industry and the Recovezy 
Act," Scribner's Magazine. XCV (Februaxy, 1934), n»p.
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editorialized:
We doubt if there is aiy other man who, under similar conditions could 
have made a better score to date. One of the reasons why industry should 
support General Johnson is that he has kept his organization so free 
from brain trusters and constitution busters* It is the most practically 
minded set-up of the entire alphabetical a r r a y * 2 4
The NRA controversy was making strange bedfellows*
Yet, in spite of his blustery attacks on critics of NRA and defense of 
him ty Industry, Johnson was being forced to yield to pressure* Continued 
complaints against code provisions and the attacks by Borah and %re caused 
Johnson to create an Industrial Appeals Board late in January 1934, to which 
appeals of NRA rulings could be taken by "the little men*" Johnson also 
revealed that he had written the President's executive order allowing com­
plaints to be taken to the FTC and the Department of Justice* He then 
appointed Whiteside as his special assistant on credit and finance to look 
after the needs of "smaller business where the difficulty of obtaining 
credit may be one of the severest handicaps in competing with larger enter- 
prises*" The greatest concession Johnson made, however, was to announce 
that on March 5 a "field day for criticisms" would be held in Washington 
for all code authorities*
The day before Johnson made his code conference announcement the 
Consumers Advisory Board submitted a memorandum to him requesting revisions 
of NRA codes which he had promised. The memorandum was accompanied by a 
request that it be released to the press for publication. Johnson knew, 
however, that the public was aroused over price increases and non-compliance
^^Iron Age. CXXXIII (February 1, 1934), p. 13*
^%id*. p* 39* (February 22, 1934), p* 39*
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with code provisions, and he therefore refused to release a report which 
would reveal that the administration was not united at a time when he- was 
calling for people to come to Washington to offer criticisms on the opera­
tions of NRAo But the Research and Planning Division sided with the CAB, 
and Johnson, not wanting to produce an open break in his organization,
released the report in time for it to make front page headlines the day
27the Code Conference opened in Washington» The report recommended the 
elimination of the basing point system and the substitution of the f»o»b» 
mill price» It proposed the total elimination of price fixing, substi­
tuting price filing with the government instead of Code Authorities»
Government supervision of cost accounting was called for to establish
28minimum prices and limitation of production was approved» The Con­
sumers Board appeared to at last have come into power»
Some 4200 representatives of Code Authorities converged on Washington 
for the opening day of March 5< Roosevelt opened the session with one of 
his longest speeches since taking office and said that since criticisms of 
the NRA had been concerned with details and not the basic law itself, "we 
should feel encouraged that we are on the right track and can go forward»" 
The first object, said the President, was to create more consuming power 
by further reduction of hours and wage increases. He concluded by stating 
that although the NRA was created for the emergency, that it "must be
permanent for all the rest of our lives," There did not seem to be much
29enthusiasm for the speech in the audience.
^^Campbell, Consumer Representation, pp, 73-74, 
^^Iron Age. CXXXIII (March 8, 1934), p. 30, 
^^Literary Digest. CXVII (March 1?, 1934), P« 7.
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Johnson followed Roosevelt®s lead by making twelve definite sugges­
tions for code changes, most of them in answer to complaints which had been 
plaguing him for monthso The General recommended a more uniform and equitable 
rule of national price stabilization and further measures against price 
rises occurring faster than an increase in purchasing power. He called 
for certainty of protection against monopoly control and oppression of 
small enterprises and for an improved method for prompt and effective com­
pliance. For Code Authorities Johnson advocated adequate labor and consumer 
representation in advisory capacities and a uniformity of government repre­
sentation.^^ Telling the delegates that the NRA intended to force compliance, 
Johnson added:
Of course we can't succeed without public support of what we are 
trying to do, and I want to warn non-compliers that we are not 
only going out to revive public sentiment for the Blue Eagle but
under specific orders from the President, we are reorganizing to
enforce the penal sections of the act. Regardless of publicity,
I have been too gentle. We deliberately delayed action because of 
misunderstandings but— if I may lapse into the vernacular— * You 
ain't seen nothin' yet®.31
Johnson concluded his speech by attacking "underhanded, tricky, dishonest"
criticism and then turned the meeting over to the critics barring only
"personal aspersions" and "attacks on the law itself.
The number of Code Authority representatives attending the field 
day was so great that Johnson divided the group into five sections which 
met at the Department of Commerce auditorium and at various hotels.
Johnson moved from location to location trying to get a sense of what the
3°Iron Age. CXXXIII (March 8, 1934), p. 301.
(March 15, 1934), P» 438.
^^iterarv Digeat. CXVII (March 10, 1934), p. 5.
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complaints actually were and their sourceso Yet, in spite of Johnson^s 
initial admission of NRA ingierfection and his warnings to critics and 
non-compliers, there was a veritable barrage of criticism, Cong>laints 
ranged from that of a Communist who said that he party was in "basic 
disagreement with the NRA" to those who suggested only minor code changes, 
One speaker grew so excited that he thrust a lighted cigar into his hip 
pocket and did not notice it until it began to burn. The only point on 
which all seemed to agree was that certain businesses were "chiseling" 
on Code operations. Summarized, the criticisms offered by Code Authority 
representatives indicated that certain provisions of codes, such as open 
price filing, clauses forbidding selling below cost and control of pro­
ductions, were tending to keep prices high to the consumer, stifling 
conqpetition and forcing all members of a code to conform to the stronger 
members' domination of Code Authorities,^^ Yet, Walter Tower, who repre­
sented AISI, defended the steal code Ipy telling one group that his indus­
try's price policy was established to protect the small producer and 
consumer,^
Johnson concluded the session with another of his famous speeches.
He told the representatives that a year before they had been in "complete 
and utter disrepute" but that Roosevelt had given them a chance for rehabili­
tation, With an appeal to their vanity he said: "We have to plan our way
out of this mud hole and that must be done by hard-boiled businessmen and 
not by academicians," He challenged them: "Nothing like it has ever hap­
pened in the history of the world. It is as inq)ortant as the Council of 
Nieea or the Treaty of Verdun," Johnson concluded Tpy exhorting his listeners
^^bid,. p, 6. ^Iron Age. CXXXIII (March I5, 1934), p. 37.
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to "play the game»"^^
Yet, in spite of the Roosevelt and Johnson appeals, threats, and 
exhortations and their allowing NRA critics to vent their emotions in a 
public forum, prices continued to rise and complaints were not silenced.
The Nation commented on the field day, saying that it raised "the ques­
tion whether a planned recovery effort dominated ty business interests 
does not multiply and intensify the contradictions of capitalism rather 
than resolve them. For the machinery improvised under the Recovery Act 
has done only one thing effectively: it has raised prices, or permitted
manufacturers to raise prices," The Nation writer concluded: It is
apparent that business has made rather a mess of it, A series of what 
are in effect cartels have been set up and, as in Germany, the wage 
gains of labor have been wiped out by the prices labor has to pay for 
consumers* goods," Complaints also continued to come into Washington 
from those who claimed NRA codes were hurting them financially.
Meanwhile, the FTC was proceeding with its congressional mandate to 
investigate the operation of the steel code. An attorney for the Commission 
wrote Richberg on February 14 asking the cooperation of either Richberg or 
Shannon to furnish material for the study, Richberg replied that Shannon 
would cooperate in the investigation but enqphasized that it was NRA policy 
to enforce the provisions of the codes itself and, falling that, it should 
recommend to the President the cancellation or modification of codes of
35gohlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 132,
c m m i  (March 21, 1934), p, 318.
277
offending members The information supplied to the FTC tqr Shannon is 
not known, but the Commission had been carefully studying the steel in­
dustry pricing policies since the 1924 Pittsburgh Plus case. There was 
also public evidence given on the operation of the steel code, as in 
February when the Chevrolet Motor Company announced that it was reducing 
its steel allotments to major steel cong»anies and placing orders among 
smaller producers in an effort to "spank** the leading concerns for the 
steel code price provisions. Chevrolet even threatened to buy the 
Corrigan-HcKinney Steel Conqpany in order to produce its own steel.
The FTC also used its power to go into AISI records and was certainly 
in contact with Mjye and Borah. The latter senator received a number 
of complaints on the operation of the steel code, A hardware dealer 
called the code the "STEAL CODE" and protested against the basing point 
system by saying that the steel industry had "chiseled us and our cus­
tomers out of millions of d o l l a r s . A  west coast manufacturer of sheet
steel products charged that steel prices were maintained through an agree-
40ment between U« S« Steel and Bethlehem Steel. And a steel construction 
corporation charged collusion between the steel industry and the NRA, 
stating that "the NRA was acquainted with the monopolistic clause in 
question even before it was formally placed in front of them by the 
American Iron and Steel Institute.
^^Eugene W. Burr to Richberg, Februaxy 14, 1934; and Richberg to 
Burr, February 15, 1934. NRA Papers.
^®Iron Age. CXXXIII (February 8, 1934), p. 38,
39Walter B, Richards to Borah, February 28, 1934. Borah Papers.
knW. J, Boyle to Borah, March 6, 1934, Borah Papers,
4lLackawanna Steel Construction Co. to Borah, March 21, 1934. Borah Papers.
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The Federal Trade Commission transmitted its report to Roosevelt on 
March 19. It charged that the Steel Code Authority was absolutely con­
trolled by Bethlehem and U» S, Steel and that prices had been greatly ad­
vanced soon after the code went into effect. Direct increases in base 
prices amounted to $2 to $3 a ton on capital goods and $2 to $5 a ton on 
consumer goods. But, it also found that "phantom” transportation charges
added to the price, and uniform extras had been increased as much as 800 
1̂2percent. On the basing point system the commission held to its historic 
position:
When an industry proceeds on the premise that it is unfair for com­
petitive sellers to share the natural advantages of their locality 
with the buyers in that locality, it is in essense the monopoliza­
tion by the sellers to the exclusion of the buyers of the natural 
advantages inherent in the natural resources of that locality. To 
monopolize the advantages inherent in natural resources is little 
different from monopolizing the physical resources themselves.^3
The conclusion reached in the FTC report was:
A distinct conflict of means and objectives exists between the 
provisions of the code and the Commission's order in the Pittsburgh 
Plus case. That conflict raises questions not only of legal iz^ort 
but of basic economic implication. Departure from hitherto accepted 
policies of governmental concern over the maintenance of fair conqpe- 
tition is, however, evident. Nevertheless it has been assumed thus 
far that the departure has the sanction of a Congressional mandate 
embodied in the National Industrial Recoveiy Act.^
The FTC thus concluded that while only the courts could decide what the
Congressional mandate actually was, the NEIA could still use its powers
under the act to refuse sanction and to modify monopolistic practices.
li2"Federal Trade Commission Report on the Steel Code,” March 19,
1934 (mimeographed), pp. 55-60.
^^ibid.. p. 54. p. 69. p. 70,
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An attack on the FTC report was not long in coming» Donald Richberg 
called the report incomplete and unrevealing of anything which the NRA did 
not already know and was trying to correct. He said the real choice be­
fore the American people between the policies of the FTC and the NRA was: 
"Shall the policy of NRA be continued and advanced, so that we may give an 
adequate trial to a program of government cooperation in fostering the 
in^rovement of business and a lasting improvement of economic conditions—  
or shall we return to the older policy of limiting governmental influence 
upon trade and industry to alternating sunshiny days of grants of special 
privilege and rainy deys of prosecutions to compel a fair and free com­
petition among business enterprises so endowned with power by law, that
46neither fair nor free competition can ever exist among them," Richberg 
stated that the NRA had already recommended, or would recommend, four im­
portant changes in the steel code. One was that basing points for all 
products be established at, or very near, production points. Secondly, 
delivered prices should include only actual transportation charges* Third, 
that price policies were under study and that recommendations would be 
made prior to May 31, Finally, the constitution of the Steel Institute 
should be revised to make it conform more closely to the general principles 
of code administration which had been developed out of NRA es^erience.^^
The American Iron and Steel Institute also issued a public statement 
of rebuttal. The AISI report held that the FTC had exceeded its mandate 
by presenting arguments instead of facts, and that even its evidence was
46"Commentary on the Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the 
Steel Code" by Donald Richberg, n.d. (mimeographed), p. 138-A.
pp, 135-136.
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incomplete. The Institute charged that the FTC, which was not in synqwthy 
with the NRA anyway, had "given ear to a small minority of purchasers of 
steel products who have made complaints mainly seeking to continue against 
their competitors discriminatory advantages which they enjoyed prior to 
the effective date of the Code," Mazy products were still being manufac­
tured and sold at a loss, said the AISI statement, and prices were still 
too low. The report concluded:
Whether or not the system of quoting prices adopted in the Code con­
forms to certain theories of economics, it is the system under which 
the Industry has been built up in this country. It is the only sys­
tem by which conditions of fair competition among members of the 
Industry and among the users of steel products can be established 
and maintained. The use by the Industry of any other system of quot­
ing prices would result in grave dislocations of producing activities 
and of relations between producers and purchasers of steel products.
It would increase rather than decrease unemployment and would defeat 
rather than accomplish the purpose of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, The Steel Industry believes that it is particularly to be re­
gretted that a Government body clothed with judicial or semi-Judicial 
powers should make any report or rwommendation which admittedly is 
based on incomplete investigation,^
Thus, the positions of the NRA and the steel industry seemed to have been
close and in opposition to another arm of government. The Nation saw this
battle in perspective when it said that the significance was to show that
the government had two agencies attempting to function at the same time
tlQon theories which were diametrically opposed, ^
The growing disaffections with the NRA caused Roosevelt to take two 
additional steps toward the I^e-Borah-FTG position in March, First, after 
reading a Brookings Institution study by George Terborgh entitled Price
hQ"AISI Reply to FTC Steel Code Report," March 20, 1934 (typescript), 
NRA Papers,
^̂ NaiiSlû» cxxmil (î ril 4, 1934), pp, 383-384,
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Control Devices In NRA C o d e s . Roosevelt appointed a cabinet committee 
with Frances Perkins as chairman to study the inqplications of price 
p o l i c y . T h e  second step was the creation of the National Recovery Re­
view Board. Johnson later wrote that the Review Board was his idea be­
cause he was told "it would avoid a Senatorial investigation," and that 
he himself suggested in a "moment of total aberration" the name of
COClarence Barrow for chairman.^ %e, however, had talked of the NRA with 
Barrow on a train the previous Januaiy and it has been said that he sug­
gested Barrow.Whoever selected Barrow, Roosevelt appointed him after 
Judge Samuel Seabury had declined the post. Johnson had been told by 
Roosevelt to make his peace with % e  and when the General went to the 
Senator's office an agreement was reached on the Board, its chairman, and 
the right of Njye to choose the other four members. % e  thereupon appointed 
four small businessmen from various parts of the country to the Review 
Board.
Barrow and his wife moved to Washington in March. This great attorney 
for the "little fellow" had been connected with dozens of cases, a list of 
which read like an honor roll in the fight for civil liberties. The 
New York Times gave a vivid description of Barrow: "At 77 his face is
lined and seamed with.the scars of his battles, and the rebellious lock
^^Washington, 1934. ^^Schlesinger, Coming of the New Beal, p. 135,




53-'̂ Irving Stone, Clarence Barrow for the Befense (New York, 1941),
u. S, Congressional Record. 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1934, LXXVIII,
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of hair that used to fall over his right eye has thinned to a wisp, but he 
still has the compressed lips and unflinching eyes of the fighter.This  
was to be Darrow^s last big crusade, and he joined it with vigor. He ap­
pointed Lowell B. Mason as his legal counsel and W. 0. Thonqoson, his former 
Chicago law partner, as his assistant. The Darrow Investigation of NRA has 
been called "the beginning of Johnson's decline." Yet, Johnson, who had 
never met Darrow but was a great admirer of him perhaps thought that if the 
attorney issued a report he did not like that it could be disposed of as 
had been the unfavorable recommendations of his own Consumers Advisory 
Board and the Division of Research and Planning.
The entire board went to see Johnson in his Commerce Department 
office where Johnson told Darrow that he was providing him offices next 
to his own. Johnson then told Darrow to investigate the codes and let him
know if they were "all right." When Darrow inquired what he was to do if 
he did not find the codes all right, Johnson answered r "Then you report to 
me. I am the big cheese here." Darrow replied that he did not care to 
operate that way and promptly led the board to the White House where 
Roosevelt promised them a free hand. The next day the President signed 
an executive order making the board responsible to him rather than to 
Johnson. To make hie independence complete Darrow promptly set up head­
quarters in the Willard Hotel, where bedrooms became offices during the 
day and the hotel ballroom the hearing room, and went to work. To Darrow
^^Naw York Times. May 27, 1934, II, p, 2.
^^Lowell Mason, "Darrow vs. Johnson" North American Review.COmVIII (December, 1934), p. 525.
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work meant exactly that. He would wake up at two o'clock in the morning 
with an idea and telephone an aide to transmit orders. He worked fourteen 
to sixteen hours a day, including Sundays, and at hearings often had to 
be reminded to adjourn for the sake of the witnesses and staff
As soon as it was learned that the Review Board had set up head­
quarters, complaints began to pour in by telephone, telegraph, and post 
office. The original two bedrooms grew to four and fourteen offices were 
rented in an uptown office building, Johnson later wrote that members 
of the NRA, who ate in a Willard Hotel dining room next to one where 
narrow's staff ate, reported to him that "a newspaper campaign to knock 
NRA into a cocked hat was to be started at once, based on ary dirt the 
Darrow Board could dig up,"^^ It was true that the activities of Darrow 
commanded front page news, but there is no evidence that any newspaper 
campaign was launched against the NRA, anymore than many newspapers 
had already been hostile,
A week after the board had been organized the first hearing was held 
in the hotel meeting room. The board sat a long table at one end and 
chairs were provided for witnesses and reporters. The first day's pro­
ceedings, however, were such a failure that before they ended most re­
porters had left the room. This first hearing proved unsuccessful be­
cause the complainants were small manufacturers of electric light bulbs 
who dwelt upon acts which had occurred before NRA codes even went into 
operation. With the exception of an occasional quip from Darrow, the
5?Stone, Darrow for the Defense, pp. 508-510.
^^ason, "Darrow vs, Johnson," p, 526. ^^Johnson, Blue Eagle, p. 272,
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hearing developed into long, rambling speeches from witnesses, rehashes 
of testimony already broaght out in hearings before NRA and bickering 
among the participantso At the end of the day Darrow called Mason into 
his room and instructed him that no other con^lainant would be allowed 
to testify until he had been interviewed in advance. This procedure was 
supposed to eliminate persons who had unjustified con^laints and restrict 
them to facts once they got on the stand. From that day on the board 
members worked ten to fourteen hours a day, including Saturdays and most 
Sundays, but the proceedings ran smoothly and quickly.
The Darrow Board held hearings for four months. During that time 
it received 3»375 complaints, reported on 34 codes and held 57 public 
h e a r i n g s T h e  steel code probably received more attention than any 
other. On April 4 Mason introduced the FTC Report on the steel code 
into evidence and then Otto Swanstrom, a Duluth steel product manufac­
turer was called to testify. He stated that he had been in business 
since 1908 and had been one of the original opponents of the Pittsburgh 
Plus system. Once the FTC ruling had been rendered, however, he claimed 
that the multiple basing point system had still forced him to pay $6.6o 
in phantom freight. In 1918 he went to see James Farrell of U. S. Steel 
who reduced his price for steel until the freight charge was eliminated, 
but once the steel code went into effect he was again assessed a phantom 
freight of five dollars a ton. Swanstrom then visited both Shannon and
^^ason, "Darrow vs. Johnson," p. 526,
S, Congressf Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings. S. Rea. 79. 
Investigation of the NRA. ?4th Cong., 1st Seas,, 1935, p. 1095, Hereafter 
cited as Senate Investigation of NRA.
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62AISI officials several times but said he could get no satisfactions 
Hoyt Moore, counsel for AISI, questioned Swanstrom briefly, but his real 
concern was with the FTC report, Moore asked for several months to pre­
pare an answer to the report but he was refused by the Review Board,
On April 19 the Darrow Board convened to hear the testimony of 
Hoyt Moore and Walter Tower, Mason knew little about the steel industry, 
so had hired Frank Fetter as his adviser. The Princeton economics pro­
fessor sat in the audience during the first day of hearings and drilled 
questions into Mason during the night,When Moore took the stand a 
long wrangle took place, with Moore strenuously objecting to the FTC 
report being accepted as fact and Darrow insisting that it would be 
accepted unless Moore could refute it. Without this controversy being 
settled, Moore put Tower on the stand. The afternoon session was given 
to routine discussions by Tower on how the code was written and the 
fair practices objective of the code, punctuated by pointed questions and 
oft-times sarcastic comments by Darrow and Mason, The next morning 
Darrow began the hearing by asking Moore how much time he needed to ques­
tion Tower, Moore answered "about two days," and Darrow answered that he 
would be allowed half an hour to finish, Darrow said: "I do not care
anything about his opinion on the code, and I do not care anything about 
his counting a million ties or rails or things of that sort, I really 
do not know much about how his long dreary story fits into this pic-
^^"Darrow Board Hearings," pp, 1-12,
^%ason, "Darrow vs. Johnson," p, 529° ^^Ibid.. p, 529°
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turso"^^ Much more time was spent on exchanges between Moore and Darrow 
about the time needed to finish the testimony until Darrow said Moore 
could have the rest of that day, a half day Saturday and all day Mondayo 
After a stormy afternoon in discussing the basing point system the hear­
ing was adjourned until the following Tuesday, with Moore stating that 
he was not certain what AISI"s position on his returning would be, but 
that he would cooperate with Mason»^^
Mason and Moore had had an argument about whether certain papers 
were available in AISI offices and over the weekend Mason sent two 
investigators to New York to find out» These agents were not allowed 
into AISI offices» As Mason later wrote: "We had then the unique sit­
uation of a code authority, having legislative and Judicial power granted 
to it ly the United States government, refusing to let another branch of 
the government examine its records»"̂ '̂  The next day Mason received a 
letter telling him that Moore and Tower would not reappear in Washington» 
Mason contended that the steel industry was attempting to hold up the 
Review Board's report on the steel code because the original code expired 
within a month and they did not want an adverse report» Since Moore re­
fused to cooperate in the hearings, however, Darrow drew up his report 
based on the FTC findings»^®
After only two or three weeks of hearings Darrow received the first 
of an eventual total of three letters from Roosevelt asking the board to 
hurry its proceedings in order to issue its report» Already, however, one
Darrow Board Hearings," pp» 38-159» ^^Ibid». pp» 161-287» 
^^Mason, "Darrow vs» Johnson," p» 530» ^^Ibid»
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board member, Johii F« Sinclair, had written to Roosevelt telling him that 
in so short a time it was impossible to investigate all complaints and
that any report he received from Darrow would necessarily be incomplete
and largely inconclusiveBut the first report came anyway on May 3»
70signed by all members of the board but Sinclair, Roosevelt said that
he would study the document over the weekend and release it early in the
71week if it were not "too profane," For seventeen days, however, there
was no word on the report. The President did say at his news conference
on May 9 that the report was so bulky that he had turned copies of it
over to the FTC, the Justice Department, and NRA for analysis and sum- 
72marization,'
On May 11 Johnson was forced to hold a news conference of his own. 
Certain senators were again putting pressure on him— this time by suggest­
ing that he intended to have the report suppressed, Johnson denied this, 
saying that he was carrying out the President's request for an analysis 
and summary. But the General probably revealed the true reason for the 
delay when he said that since he had recommended the Review Board, he had 
the right to issue a reply at the same time the report was released, Hye 
must have been delighted when he commented: "If General Johnson wants
to make an answer it will take him longer than a week to prepare it. If 
the administration had wished to make the Darrow report a best seller it
^%enate .Investigation of NRA. p, 2$89,
^°New York Times. May 4, 1934, P« 13, May 5, 1934, p. 2.
f^lbid,. May 10, 1934, p, 4,
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73it could not have undertaken a better course than it has so far»"
The Darrow report was finally made public on May 20 after an armed 
guard had been stationed all night at the Commerce Department printing 
offices where the report was published to keep any copies of documents
fjU
from "being smuggled outo" The report reviewed eight codes, one of 
which was that for steel* It condemned the failure of the AISI to 
cooperate with the Review Board and then generally followed the conclu­
sions of the FTC on the code* Small enterprises were being oppressed 
"by the gross absurdities of what is called the ^basing point* system or 
phantom freight rates*" It condemned the absolute control of the industry 
by larger companies through the Steel Institute as "harmful, monopolistic 
and oppressive*" And it concluded its report on the steel code by recommend­
ing its revision toward a removal of the evils enumerated. The other seven 
codes received the same treatment and the Review Board concluded: "All
con^etition is savage, wolfish and relentless; and can be nothing else. * * * 
Big business begins by making it impossible for the small men to survive; 
and, after he is eliminated, it turns upon the weakest of the common
ncaggressors*"
To intensify this blast at the administration * s philosophy and policy 
of recovery, Darrow and Thompson issued a supplementary report of their
own, claiming that "the Federal Trade Commission is far superior to the
NRA as an enforcing and fact-finding agency*" The choice for the American
May 12, 1934, p* 34* May 19, 1934, p. 1.
^"Report of the National Recovery Review Board," May 3, 1934
(mimeographed), pp* 10-24* NRA Papers*
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people, according to Darrow and Thompson, was between "monopoly sus­
tained by government" and "a planned econoiqy, which demands socialized 
ownership and control." Then the two old radical lawyers presented their 
choice: "The hope for the American people, including the small business
man, not to be overwhelmed ty their abundance lies in the planned use of 
America’s resources following socialization."^^ The main report had been 
enough to set off one of the most fantastic verbal wars Washington had 
ever witnessed, but the second was like waving a red flag.
Johnson immediately roared back at Darrow. Of the board’s report
he said: "A more superficial, intemperate and inaccurate document . . «
I have never seen." He then asked Roosevelt to dismiss the board because
it was not acting in good faith, it was promoting its own purposes, and
if it continued it would "in^air seriously the usefulness of the National
77Recovery Administration."'' Johnson then turned to the supplementary re­
port. He publicly commented: "Stripped of its shadowy verbiage, this
means that the choice of the American people is between Fascism and 
Communism, neither of which can be espoused by anyone who believes in our 
democratic institutions of self-government; nor can any public official 
who has taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States 
adopt or officially advocate such a program."^® Richberg also released 
a statement on the handling of the steel code by the Darrow board. He
^^"Supplementary Report of Clarence Darrow and William 0. Thompson," 
May 3» 1934 (mimeographed), n.p. NRA Papers.
^^Johnson to Roosevelt, May 15, 193%. NRA Papers.
78"Comment by General Johnson on the Darrow and Thompson Supplementary 
Report," May 17, 1934 (mimeographed), n.p. NRA Papers.
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stated that "the Board in its ignorance of the conqplicated operations
of this industry has produced a certain amount of misinformation which
will not help in working out an intelligent revision of the Steel Code
in the public interesto" Richberg also castigated the board for not
asking for NRA assistance in its investigation and concluded that the
79report "simply makes a mockery of public service,"
All was not well within the Review Board, either, for John Sinclair 
resigned soon after the report had been sent to Roosevelt, characteriz­
ing the board^s work as "sloppy, one-sided" and showing an "utter disre­
gard for fair play,"^^ But Darrow also had some-Uiing to say. He told 
the press that apparently Johnson and Richberg were "under the impression 
that the National Recovery Act is their personal property" because they 
"broke into shrieks of rage at the suggestion that operations are not 
perfect or susceptible of improvement," Darrow then warned Richberg to 
keep his "staff of expert evasionists" together for the next report be­
cause they would not have three weeks to prepare their reply, Johnson 
could not resist getting in the last word by saying that all the Review 
Board had done was "to render a conjectural opinion on insufficient and 
improper evidence, to emit a sociological essay, and to conclude that 
the only hope of the country is the socialism of Karl Marx and Soviet
Qa
Russia," The White House remained noncommittal but said the Darrow
^^"Richberg Comments on the Darrow Report," n«d« (mimeographed), 
n.p, NRA Papers,
p» 2589.
^^New York Times. May 22, 193%, p, 2,
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Board would end its work on June lo This date had not been specified in the
executive order creating the board and caused one member of the board to ex-
82press surprise»
The Review Board did not quit business on June 1 and issued two more 
reports» In the meantime Ifye and Huey Long had begun their attacks on the 
NBA and Johnson once again» Two days after the first Darrow report, Ifye 
said that "under the N»R»A» monopolies and trusts have become more power­
fully entrenched than ever they were entrenched before»" Long charged
that the NRA was "a universally disliked organization»"®^ The next day 
%re attacked Johnson» Referring to the intending trip of Roosevelt to 
Hawaii, he said: "For Heaven"s sake take Mr» Johnson along to Hawaii
0 / 1
with you» Let him create a code for the Sugar Trust»" In letters to 
constituents Borah was also sounding the clarion call» To one person 
he wrote: "I sincerely hope that we may so arouse public opinion so
as to force a change in the program» So long as matters continue as they
Or
are now, I can see no chance for recovery»" ^ And to another Borah wrote: 
"The people will realize someday that these combinations and monopolies 
are bleeding them white. All this hypocritical talk about bettering the
conditions of the people while these monopolies are destroying small busi-
86ness and gourging consumers will some of these days have an end."
P« 1.
®^U. So Congressional Record. 73d Cong», 2d Sess., 1934, LXXVIII, 
pp. 9234 and 9236.
1^ 0» P» 9320»
®%orah to Anna L» Shepherd, August 2, 1934. Borah Papers.
86Borah to Herman J. Brown, November 14, 1934. Borah Papers.
292
By this time, however, a public opinion counterattack had begun.
A Tulsa steel executive wrote Congressman Wesley Disney that the steel 
code had been the "salvation" of his small firm.®^ Another small company 
official stated that "if all the managers of small industries were con­
sulted instead of demogogic politicians who are thinking more of their 
political interests than the business interests of the country we would
in our opinion hear a story far different than that carried in the FTC
88Report." Borah was also receiving numerous telegrams and letters pro­
testing the stand he had taken on the NRA. The president of Lukens 
Steel Company wrote that the steel code had actually made competitive 
conditions so vigorous that small companies were able to continue in
Oq
business. The Labor Advisory Board unanimously joined Johnson in
suggesting that the Darrow Board be terminated, charging that it had
"pandered to the worst elements in our political and economic life."^^
A Literary Digest press survey showed that public opinion was much
divided on the Darrow report,Johnson again took to the attack,
commenting to a national radio audience: "Just think of it— the
greatest forward social movement of our day and age is to be sabotaged
92to advance the selfish interest of a handful of demagogues."
®^Frank B, Lond to Wesley E, Disney, March 10, 1934, NRA Papers,
^^elegram from Kilhy Car and Foundry Company to Simpson, March 21, 
1934, NRA Papers,
®^Robert W, Walcott to Borah, March 23» 1934, Borah Papers,
^°New York Times. May 24, 1934, p. 1.
^^Literary Digeat. CXVII (June 2, 1934), p, 8; June 9, 1934, pp, 11-12. 
^̂ NewL York Times. June 1, 1934, p, 6,
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The Review Board continued its work undaunted, however, issuing its 
second report=™this time to Roosevelt and the press concurrently=-on June 
11» Again the report attacked various codes (steel was not included) and 
Johnson himself» The report accused the General of "sinister** action and 
stated that: "In our Judgment, the rule of the military commander is
totally unsuited to the genius, habits, traditions or psychology of the 
American people, and xdiolly ineffectual in meeting the present national 
crisis »"^^ With this report William Thompson resigned from the Board, 
accusing it of going too easy on the NRA because the Darrow committee was
gittrying to "reestablish itself in the good graces" of Johnson.^ Johnson's 
reply to the second report was more temperate. He charged that the second 
report was "even more inaccurate and inconsequential than the first.
The last Darrow report came on June 28» Once again the steel code 
was attacked, but by that time the revised code had been approved* Never­
theless, the Review Board found that the code's changes had been minor 
and some new provisions were "mere attempts to bolster the monopolistic 
system set up under the original code»"^^ The final verbal barrage be­
tween the two antagonists came after the report was made public* Johnson 
was at his sarcastic best when he replied:
But here we have dear old Clarence Darrow at his sweetest— at 
last. . . * Here, finally, is a flash of heat lightning in the 
sunset sky— scintillatingly brilliant but illuminating nothing* » . ,
I love Clarence Darrow for his flair for the underdog* He was the 
greatest Juzy lawyer of his time, and perhaps of all time* Nobody
^^Ibid*. June 12, 1934, p* 1, June 14, 1934, p* 15»
^^Ibldo, June 28, 1934, p. 1» 
q6"Third Report of the National Recovery Review Board," June 28,
1934 (mimeographed), p. 69. NRA Papers»
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in the world was ever more adept in convincing twelve men that 
another man, who had bombed sornebod̂ r, or poisoned someboc^, or
taken a Kanaka for a ride in the most approved gangster style,
or, with some psychotic urge, taken a little boy out into the 
Michigan dunes and beaten the life out of him, hadn”t either 
bombed, or poisoned, or ridden or beaten aiqrbocbr.97
Johnson said that he would still rather spend an hour talking with Darrow
98than anyone but bid him goodbye with, "Dear Clarence, reoulescat l,n oace."̂  
Roosevelt formally ended the life of the Darrow Board on June 30, 
but two weeks later Darrow fired the parting shots He said in Duluth of 
the NRA that "the trouble with this method is that nobody has been in 
charge who is schooled in political economy— nothing but amateurso" He 
said somebody had simply suggested NRA to Roosevelt and he had taken its
"I won't mention the man he put at the head of it," Darrow quipped* "I
heard he is a military man, not a statesmans"**
*®Il2li« **IbU., July 15, 1934, p. 5.
CHAPTER X
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE NRA AND THE STEEL CODE
While the Darrovr°Johnson feud had been transpiring, the steel 
Industry and the NRA had been working on the revision of the steel code. 
The original code was due to expire on May 31 and neither side wished 
to see it terminated. As early as January the Iron Age editorialized: 
"If the iron and steel industry is to profit by its investment in social 
progress, it must continue to operate under the provisions of its code 
of fair competition much longer than May 31, This fact is fully recog­
nized the leaders of the industry, and the progress made thus far in 
the administration of the Code is of far more importanoe to the future 
of the business than to the immediate present,"^ Many steel leaders 
did not envisage the NRA as a permanent situation, however, as Ifyron 
Taylor, chairman of U, S. Steel, stated onqphatioally in April. But 
the next month Tower went on nationwide radio and warned that a return 
to pre-code conditions in the steel industry might be fatal to the whole 
recovery program.
Members of the NRA had no thought of the steel code not continuing, 
but they did know from experience and from the criticisms coming in that 
some changes would have to be made. Even before the original code had 
been approved, Rlohberg had written Johnson that "the Steel Code, as 
submitted, raises very serious legal questions and this Code cannot be
4ron Age. CXXXIII (January 4, 1934), P» 4?.
^Literary Digest. CXVII (^rll 14, 1934), p. 9.
^Iron_ Aae. CHXIII (May 10, 1934), p. 35.
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approved until these questions have been answered,This attitude was 
expressed before the original code was modified and accepted, but there 
were few important changes forced by the NRA, When the Nye-Borah-FTG- 
Darrow criticisms began to fill the Washington air, both Richberg and 
Johnson constantly took the position that nothing new was being revealed 
and that it was fully intended that the steel code would be modified.
For example, Johnson stated in regard to the FTC report on the steel 
code: "We know there are a few things the matter with the steel code,
but, generally speaking, I don't think a great deal." Yet, he admitted:
"The basing point probably is wrong; we knew that from our attendance at 
the steel code authority meeting, but I am not going to get too excited 
about it; I am going to be sure. When it is necessary to change one of 
these things we are going to change."^
There is little known about the negotiations which transpired be­
tween the NRA and AISI, Late in April, Richberg and Simpson met with 
the Code Authority to discuss the code revision,^ Other conferences 
must have been held during early May with negotiations being conducted 
1:̂ Richberg and Simpson, Johnson acted in his usual role, as the fol­
lowing memorandum from Richberg to Johnson reveals :
Steel Code Committee coming to ny office for conference at 11 a.m,
today. Following your previous policy, I assume you prefer to have 
Simpson and me make as much progress as possible before bring you 
in. However, you may wish to drop in for a time and say "hello" to 
those present./
^Memorandum from Richberg to Johnson, August 2, 1933» NRA Papers,
Îron Age. CXXXIII (April 26, 193%), P. 34. (Hay 3, 1934), p, 43.
^Richberg to Johnson, May l6, 1934, NRA Papers.
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Shannon had drawn an extensive list of revisions which he thought should 
be made, with alternate suggestions in case some were not accepted. Of 
the more important proposals, he thought that the ten=day waiting period 
on price filing should be eliminated or greatly reduced and that a pro­
vision should be inserted into the code making it unlawful for ary mem­
ber to use coercive measures to get another member to either file a par­
ticular price or to withdraw a price already filed. He also wanted to 
allow members to vote on the list of extras before they became effective 
and proposed that allowances be made for transportation charges ty other 
than rail freight. As far as the basing point system was concerned, he 
advocated either a change to a group mill base system or adding a number 
of new basing point. To eliminate the problem of enforcing coda provi­
sions on non-members. Shannon proposed making most sections of the code 
binding on all industry members whether signatory to the code or not. 
Finally, Shannon wanted to eliminate all the regulations and resolutions 
promulgated by the Code Authority, especially those applying to jobbers 
and the fabrication-in-transit rule, and to incorporate the essential 
provisions into the code. He would then have limited the power of the
O
Code Authority to interpret the code provisions. Thus, Shannon's ex­
perience with the operation of the code gave him a good insight into 
those provisions, or the lack of provisions, which were causing the 
greatest difficulties for the NRA.
Others were also interested in the revision of the steel code. On 
April 7 a member of the FTC called Shannon and said that if the NRA were
^Memorandum by Shannon on Revision of Steel Code, May 25» 1934,
NRA Papers,
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planning to revise the code that the Commission wanted to present some
9information on the matter. The industrial adviser on the steel code
also reported that he had talked with a businessman who thought that the
basing point system should be retained even if modifications had to be
made and that price filing was necessary, although the waiting period
should be shortened,It has already been stated that Tighe of the
Amalgamated and many of the Rank and File Committee wanted an open
hearing on the code. When William Green requested such a hearing, how»
ever, Johnson replied that "in view of an industry-wide strike now
threatened, no such hearing on purely economic and technical questions
which the President must decide oould have any useful purpose and it
could have a very harmful e f f e c t , G r e e n  still persisted, however,
and in a memorandum to Johnson four days later said that the code in its
present form should not be renewed. He said that the Labor Advisory Board
was not satisfied with the code because it had not relieved unen#lqyment,
12increased purchasing power, or provided improved labor relations.
On May 29, Johnson informed Roosevelt that the Steel Code Authority 
had agreed to a revised code based on changes insisted upon by the NRA re­
sulting from "Justifiable complaints and criticisms" of the code and sug­
gestions made by the Code Authority to "in^rove the workability of the 
Code and the fair applications of its requirements," Johnson called the 
small number of complaints received against the code "largely theoretical"
Q^Unsigned Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Mrs, Plummer of 
the FTC, April 7, 1934, NEIA Papers,
^^John V, W, Rsynders to Simpson, May 18, 1934, NRA Papers,
^^Johnson to Green, May 25, 1934, NRA Papers,
12Green to Johnson, May 29, 1934, NRA Papers,
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on the ground that "they might operate in aid of monopolistic practicesc" 
Yet, he claimed that the industry was "highly cwnpetitive" and that small 
enterprises had actually been helped by the operation of the code. He 
further stated that the multiple basing point system should be retained 
"to maintain existing areas of production and channels of distribution 
and to prevent violent dislocations." Johnson did admit that the most 
serious complaints had come from those who claimed violations of Section 
7a but stated that workers would not benefit from cancellation of the 
code. Johnson concluded by recommending that Roosevelt approve the 
revisions but suggested that he direct the NRA and FTC to study the bas­
ing point system.
Roosevelt issued an executive order on May 30, 193%, approving the 
revised steel code and putting it into effect on June 11. In a statement 
released with the order Roosevelt stated that the economic emergency made 
it necessary to retain the basing point system but that the revisions 
"illustrate the desirability of working toward the end of having prices 
quoted on the basis of areas of production and the eventual establishment 
of basing point coincident with all such areas, as well as the elimination 
of artificial transportation charges in price quotations." Then Roosevelt 
directed the FTC and the NRA to conduct a study of the basing point sys- 
tem. The revised code which the President approved represented little 
concession to critics of the steel industry. The Code Authority was 
stripped of its power to set a fair base price if it decided that a company
^^Johnson to Roosevelt, May 29, 1934. NRA Papersc 
^^Executive Order of May 30» 1934. NRA Papers.
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had filed too low a price. This power had never been used aigrway. The ten 
day waiting period for changing filed prices was removed altogether. A ges­
ture was made to those who had protested against being always charged the 
all«rail freight rate by inserting a provision allowing a company to reduce 
the rail rate when water or truck transportation was used. The basing point 
system was retained in the revised code but a number of new basing points 
were added 'to meet the chief complaints from consumers. The other changes 
were very minor ones.^^
Thus, the steel industry weathered the storm of reports, investiga­
tions and public opinion without having to yield mary of the policies which 
it had followed since the NRA was enacted. The NRA itself, however, faced 
its final year of operation with mounting criticism of its policies and 
deep internal strife. Hugh Johnson wrote before the NRA was declared un­
constitutional that "the Little Man Issue, as such, is political buncombe 
but in the controversy here there is an issue on which all that has been 
done under the Recovery Act may be completely annihilated."^^ Johnson 
believed this but neither he nor Roosevelt oould ignore the public outcry. 
The Chamber of Commerce, one of the earliest advocates of the NRA idea, was 
wavering in its support of the Blue Eagle and Henry I Harriman, its presi­
dent, said that business was still not willing "to cast loose from its old 
moorings and strike out on an uncharted sea of experiment.
Yet, Hugh Johnson began a new crusade to arouse public support for,
^^Johnson to Roosevelt, May 29» 1934, NRA Papers.
Johnson, Blue Eagle, p. 2?4.
^^New York Times. May 4, 1934, p. 1; and May 23, 1934, p. 5»
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and compliance with, the NRA and Roosevelt announced that he would
"stand pat" on the general principles of the NRA through 1935 and that
he would use his cross-country summer trip to survqy the results of NRA 
18operationso Stepped-up code enforcement was also begun in the summer
of 1934 with surprise raids on garment shops in New York and arrests of
19their owners for violations of NRA wages and hours* There was also an
attempt, however, in view of charges that only small businesses were
being prosecuted, to rid the NRA of what might be called "nuisance codes*"
Late in May, Roosevelt exempted service trades, such as beauty and barber
shops, cleaners, (fyers and pressera, and such concerns from the fair trade
practices of codes and announced that no open-price provision of codes for
20such industries would be enforced.
Yet, the whole question of price poliçy, with its implication of 
monopolistic control and oppression of small business, could not be de­
ferred* The Consumers Advisory Board was in open attack on certain code 
price provisions* Dexter Keezer, the Board's executive director, charged
that the more rigid price control provisions were "leading to a species
21Of bootlegging by those who have devised means to thwart them*" And
the Board's chairman, Mary Harriman Rumsey, stated that minimum price
controls had become price fixing and warned that the CAB would work to
22eliminate price fixing provisions from 4^0 codes* Johnson was attuned 
to these criticisms, for on June 1 he told the International Ladies Gar-
May 24, 1934, p. 1. May 11, 1934, p. 1*
May 28, 1934. p. 1* ^^lild*, May 19, 1934, p* 4.
June 22, 1934, p* 17*
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ment Workers Union that no more price fixing provisions would be allowed
in codes o This statement caused great confusion among administrators who
were negotiating new codes or revisions in old codes and caused buyers to
23refuse to place orders thinking that prices would go down immediately»
On June 7 Johnson issued Office Memorandum 228 formally announcing the 
banning of all price protection clauses in codes» The protests from in­
dustry were so great, however, that Johnson quickly announced the next
oh,day that the new rule did not apply to codes already in effect, Al- 
though this modification exempted about 90 percent of codified industry, 
a change in policy was clearly indicated.
Two other steps were taken to answer criticisms of the NRA codes.
On June 29, Roosevelt ordered that henceforth all bids on local, state, 
and municipal contracts, prices oould be quoted at as much as 13 percent 
below official code prices»^^ The steel industry was not pleased with 
this polioy, calling it a "code-smashing fiat."^* But once more this 
ruling was in answer to oonqplaints from government agencies which had 
been receiving identical bids from the steel, cement, and other indus­
tries, Then on July 15, Johnson created a three-man Industrial Appeals 
Board to hear complaints from the "Little Fellow" and to make recommenda­
tions to Johnson on what action to take,^? This was the type of board 
which Darrow had recommended and was a concrete result of the Review
June 2, 1934, p. 1.
Z^ïron Age. CXXXIII (June 14, 1934), p. 42.
Z^Blue Basle. July 2, 1934, p. 1. ^̂ Iron Age. GXXXIV (July 5, 1934), p. 49< 
^̂ ïïfflLÏaüLÎlaaa» July i5* i934, p. 5.
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Board hearings»
While the NRA lumbered on, attempting nov to avoid a collapse before 
mounting criticism over its policies and failure to bring the recovery it 
had promised, an internal struggle was ensuing within the Recovery Administra­
tion» As early as February 193%, Johnson was "tearfully" telling Bernard 
Baruch that "he oouldn"t stand it much longer and wanted to resign»" The 
pressure on Johnson was becoming greater and he continued to work too long 
and hard, smoke too many cigarettes and still disappeared occasionally for 
a weekend drinking bout» Yet, Johnson's troubles also came from his right- 
hand man, Donald Richberg» The NRA legal counsel had always maintained that 
he was not really Johnson's enqployee and, moreover, Richberg had a penchant 
for internal intrigue» Richberg contended that Johnson frequently suggested 
that they both should resign so that the President oould appoint a board 
to administer the NRA, Johnson would add: "But I don't see how I can 
resign just yet»" Richberg charged that in long talks with the President, 
Roosevelt told him that he wanted Johnson to retire,^* Whether Richberg's 
allegations are true or not, he did send an increasing number of letters 
to Roosevelt undermining Johnson's position,Richberg and other cabinet 
members were finally able to persuade Roosevelt that Johnson was too great 
a liability for the administration and in September one of the General's
^^ckes. Diary. p« 148,
29See files of Richberg*s association with the Progressive Party in 
Richberg Papers,
30Richberg, Hv Haro, p, ip4, lokes confirms that as early as June 
1934, Roosevelt wanted Johnson to take a month's vacation and that a 
cabinet board would have been appointed to fill Johnson's place (Diarv.
p, 173)0
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31numerous resignations vas finally accepted.^
The National Industrial Recovery Board was appointed on September 27
to administer the NRA and end one-man rule. The NIRB was cw^posed of its
chairman, S, Clay Williams, Sidney Hillman, Leon Marshall and Walter Hamdl-
ton, and was placed under the general supervision of the Industrial Emer-
32gency Committee, which Richberg headed. Richberg had long been suspect 
by industrialists for his old labor ties and many of his statements made 
while serving NRA did not change their attitudes. Even in the month of 
Johnson's resignation Richberg criticized the steel code, being the longest 
in existence, written almost entirely by the industry and administered with 
a minimum of government control. "Its administration requires the expendi­
ture of $500,000 annually and a force of employees who," claimed Richberg, 
"if established by the Government, would be called a bureaucrat.Yet, 
after attending a Code Authority meeting the next month, he told the press 
that he contemplated no changes in the steel code and said that he was 
very pleased with its operations.It seems as if Richberg*s ascendancy 
in government had led to more conservative positions and caused one steel 
leader to write him saying that he could not "let the opportunity pass to 
express my sincere appreciation of the constructive position that you have 
been taking with respect to the relation between government and business.
31See Richberg Papers, Boxes 1 and 2.
S^iokes, ÊJjja, p. 198. ^^lue Eagle. Ootober 1, 1934, p. 1.
3*ïron Age. GXXXIV (September 27, 1934), p. 54A.
^^Charles R. Hook to Rlohberg, November 23, 1934, Richberg Papers.
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Richberg was not solely responsible for running the NRA as Johnson 
had been, however, and the NIRB had to find a new formula to keep the organ­
ization afloat» The CAB and the Legal Division were both pushing for a 
consolidation and simplification of the whole Recoveiy Administration* s 
operation and an end to price fixing and monopolistic practices. For 
the steel industry the reports on the basing point system brought back 
into the area of controversy those two oft-discussed matters.
The basing point system, as has alreacly been demonstrated, was 
"the heart of the trade-practioe phase of the industiy's procedure under 
the code."^* In August, Blackwell Smith, acting general counsel, told 
Johnson that the NRA and FTC had already expressed differing opinions 
about the basing point system and that the study must "reconcile these 
opinions and develop a consistent polioy on the part of the Government." 
Smith suggested that the steel industzy should be allowed to explain its 
position before the two agencies but should not be a member of the study 
group. Finally he urged that the study should state facts and not be 
"an occasion for publicity or political controversy."^^ At the first 
meeting between the FTC and the NRA, Maloolm Sharp, professor of law at 
the University of Chicago whom the NRA had engaged to aid in the study, 
echoed Smith's attitude that the steel industry should be consulted but 
not be made members of the group. Sharp also warned that the study not 
become a prosecutor's document but should stick to facts
^^Galloway, Industrial Planning, p. 159.
^^Smith to Johnson, August 8, 193̂ . NRA Papers.
^^emorandum by Malcolm Sharp, August 10, 1934. NRA Papers.
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A week later Sharp reported that a sharp difference had arisen 
between the NRA and the FTC* The NRA representatives were insisting, that 
the stndsr be confined only to basing points in order to secure industry
cooperation, while the FTC wanted the stu<%y to include "the system by 
which prices are determined at basing points*" In an attempt to compro­
mise Sharp stressed that this would be only the first in a series of 
stadies*^^ But the FTC would not compromise and stated that it regarded 
the study "as an opportunity to demonstrate the unsoundness of the 
treatment of competition as a whole, by the Administration," Tho AISI 
officials knew the attitude of the FTC and suggested that the NRA make its 
study separately from the Commission* Sharp agrsed, recommending that the 
NRA conduct its own study with the steel industzy and only exchange infor­
mation with the FTC,^
By Ootober, Richberg recommended that Roosevelt call the Attorney 
General, the chairman of the FTC, and Richberg to the White House to define 
the relationship between these three groups* Sometime in the next few 
days the split between the NRA and FTC beoame complete, and both agencies 
began their own studies, FTC investigators went to the offices of the 
Steel Institute requesting access to their records. However, Tower re­
fused to let them see any files which pertained to jobbers. Regulation
KoNine, liquidated damages, extras, and deductions* The AISI counsel 
. August 17, 1934* NRA Papers,
kn
August 25» 1934, NRA Papers*
^^Richberg to Stephen Early, Ootober 8, 1934, NRA Papers,
^^Tower to FTC, October 26, 1934, NRA Papers.
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informed Richberg of the Institute’s position, justl^ng it on the 
basis of the "biased" report the FTC had made on the steel code and be­
cause he believed the PTC was expanding the scope of the stuc^ whioh 
Roosevelt had ordered*Rlohberg informed the FTC that he concurred 
with the Institute's restrictions and added: "I hqpe that it may be 
possible for the Commission and the KRA at least to confine themselves
to the same field of stu^y, so that if joint oonolusions are not pos­
sible (lAioh I hope may be possible) at least the separate oonolusions 
may a U  arise out of consideration of the same subjeot matter,"
Joint conclusions or consideration of the same subject matter was 
not evident in the separate reports on the basing point system issued by
the FTO and NRA on Noveaber )0, 1934, The NRA report followed the posi­
tion which had been taken by the administration almost from the beginning.
It was acknowledged that there was waste in cross-hauling and that cer­
tain purchasers were burdened with artificial freight rates, but the NRA 
report asserted that the basing point spatem tended "to be as servioeable 
a form of competition as a system in which there is more incentive for a 
producer to lower his base price as a means of extending his sales area, 
rather than doing this by merely absorbing freights and discriminating."
Yet, the NRA recognized that certain changes were necessary but rejected the 
oft-proposed change to foO.b, mill pricing as being "too uncertain and 
disturbing in its effects to be seriously considered at this time,"
^%oyt A, Moore to Richberg, October 26, 193̂ * NRA Papers,
^^^ohberg to the Chairman of the FTC, November 6, 1934,
NRA Papers,
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Instead) the recommendation vas made that any revised code should change
the multiple basing point system to the group mill base system and that
a limitation be placed on freight absorption. Finally) the NRA report
recommended that if it appeared that this suggestion could not be effected,
then consideration should be given to abandon all price provisions in the 
I l kcode,
The FTC report, as expected, contrasted sharply with the NRA report. 
Not only the basing point system but a wide range of code provisions were 
attacked. Jobber regulations, transportation charges, uniform extras and 
the administration of code administration in general were denounced.
While not specifically calling for f,o»b, mill pricing, the FTC recommended 
the elimination of the multiple basing point system by allowing court tests 
under the Sherman Act, The Commission denied that the basing point system 
singly allowed price fixing but stated that it was price fixing. The addi­
tion of more basing points in the revised code were held not to have cor­
rected the abuses. Some amendments, "heralded as restraints upon price
fixing," had no real value at all. Only price competition served as a
46regulator of prices, the Trade Commission concluded.
The basing point reports were not publicly released until March, 
but already NRA officials were analyzing the differences between the two. 
Sharp thought that the FTC had not assumed as inqolacable a position as it
^^"Report of the National Recovery Administration on the Operation 
of the Basing Point System," Novemtger 6, 1934 (mimeographed), pp. 172-174, 
NRA Papers.
46"Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Operation of the 
Basing Point System," November 30, 1934 (mimeographed), pp. 1 oaeaim,
NRA Papers,
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had in the pasto Moreover, he contended that if one did not take too 
seriously the part of its report which had been disposed of in the NRA 
report, and confined analysis to the Commission's recommendations, then 
there seemed to be a way open to agreement between the two agencies and 
the steel industry. Sharp's conversations with Walter Tower had revealed 
that the AISI official thought the proper solution to the basing point 
controversy was the establishment of basing points for all centers pro­
ducing a surplus. Sharp thought that this might also represent the 
position of Eugene Grace of Bethlehem Steel and his recent election as 
president of AISI might be a further help in getting a satisfactory
bnmodification of the basing point system. '
Once the reports became public, however, the steel industry vented 
its wrath on the FTC. The Commission, commented Iron Age, "seized upon 
the instruction to study the basing point system as a pretext to launch 
0 « • an attack." The report itself was called "a biased, inaccurate and 
misleading statement" on both the basing point system and the steel code. 
The NRA report, on the other hand, received generous praise in the trade
journal, being called a "remarkable and exhaustive study . , « clearly
bgand accurately set forth." Tower, however, simply told Sharp that he 
considered the NRA report more "synqpathetio" than that of the FTC, whioh 
Sharp reported "seemed to be faint praise." Sharp further concluded 
that the Institute officials did not take either report very seriously
bnSharp to Shannon, December 17, 193̂ o NRA Papers.
^Iron Age. GXXXV (March 21, 1935), p. 44.
^̂ îfeüo, p. 41. ®̂Sharp to Shannon, March 28, 1935. NRA Papers.
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Meanwhile, the NIRB had again been tackling the subject of priceso 
Another "field day" for criticisms was held in Washington from January 9 
through January 12, 1935» with some 300 witnesses representing industry, 
labor, and the consumer presenting testimony® The CAB charged that the 
original purpose of the law had been lost sight of and asserted that price 
fixing and monopolistic conditions had been fixed through the codes®
Once again the Consumers Board recommended limitation of price and pro­
duction controls and more representation for the public on Code Author­
ities®^^ The majority of industry spokesmen, however, continued to 
demand some form of price regulation and open price filing was the method 
most often advocated®By April the NIRB had made its decision: open
price filing was necessary to insure fair conqoetition® "Open-price fil­
ing is a device," stated the Recovery Board, "price fixing is a business 
polioy in operation®
The NRA was rushing headlong into oblivion, however® On February 
20, 1935» Roosevelt asked Congress to extend the Recovery Act for two 
years» suggesting that some revisions would be necessary but that "the 
fundamental purposes and principles of the Act are sound®Business in 
general, nevertheless, had been wavering for some time in its support of 
the NRA® On December 1?, 193^» ninety business leaders had gathered at
^^Iron Age. CXXXV (January 10, 1935)» p® 52®
^^Blue Eagle. January l6, 1935, P® 1®
April 29» 1935, P® 4®
^^Public Panera of Franklin D® Roosevelt. IV, pp® 79-83®
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White Sulphur Springs» Virginia, and had voted to ask for only a one year 
extension of the act, As the new year progressed, however, the Chcnber 
of Oommeroe began to abandon its shaky policy of cooperation with tiie New 
Deal and by May 1935» even Henry Harriman was criticizing the NRA,̂  ̂ The 
general public was also wavering in its support of the NRAo At a movie 
theatre in Philadelphia the crowd greeted the appearance of Father Charles 
Coughlin and Hugh Johnson, who was still thought of as the personification 
of tiie Blue Eagle, "with about an equal amount of laughter,"
For the steel industry the question was not only the extension of 
the Recovery Act but another revision of the steel code. From some steel 
concerns there continued to come complaints. One correspondent wrote that 
although there had been almost a hundred percent conqpliance with the code 
in the beginning because of fear, there had come to be more and more vio­
lations, at first by only the "bolder ones" but "when they went unpunished 
those not so bold engaged in the same practices until now violations are 
almost universal,Another writer protested extending the life of the 
NRA at all, claiming that the steel code placed the entire industry under 
the control of the two or three largest cix^anies,^ A strong plea for 
the ending.of the NRA ea^eriment was made in a letter to the editor of
^^iUiam H, Wilson, "How the Chamber of Commerce Viewed the NRA:
A Re-examination," Mid-America. XLIV (April, 1962), pp. 105*107»
^*Ira Jewell Williams to Congressman F» L, Oassaway, March 30,
1935» Oassaway Papers, University of Oklahoma Library.
^fjohn D. Roberts to Shannon, April 15, 1935» NRA Papers,
®̂W, P, Sin^on to Congressman Leo Kocialkowski, April 17,
1935» NRA Papers,
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the New York Herald Tribuneo The writer, who signed only his initials in
attacking the steel code, wrotes
Let*s wipe out or revise these discriminating codes which are 
favoring price fixing by big business, and let the man with the 
best price wino Let*s return to Mr, Hoover ŝ rugged individualism 
of the small man that built up this country and deflate those 
"brass bellies" who, with the aid of Washington, are putting this 
country on the rooks o The small man does not need codes to help 
him. He wants to be left alone and have his mind free for con­
structive thought and not have to spend the best part of his time 
consulting code and law books.59
Even the Steel Code Authority was found by Siiq>son to be in "a gloony
frame of mind, being not cheerful either as to their own affairs or the
general state of affairs in the nation.
Yet, Shannon had to go ahead with plans for a revision of the steel
code to conform with any changes which might be made in the Recovery Aot.
On April 20, Rlohberg attended the meeting of the Steel Code Authority and
dlsouased with them the "form In which the NIRA should be oontinued."^^
That same day Shannon wrote Sharp asking him to try to get away from his
teaching duties to help In revising the oode.̂ ^ A few weeks later Sharp
wrote that he thought the industry would be ready' to yield its provision
against construction of new steel capacity and to make some changes in
its pricing policy. Sharp concluded:
If the Industzy continues to be as interested in keeping its code
to New York Herald Tribune. April 20, 1935, n.p,
^^Slmpson to Shannon, March 15, 1935. RRA Papers.
April 20, 1935.
^^Shannon to Sharp, i^il 20, 1935. HRA Papers.
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In operation as it has been heretofore, the executives should be 
ready to make the reasonable improvements on which we have been 
insisting. The comments on the basing point study have been in­
teresting in this respect; and I was particularly struck with the 
statement from Pittsburgh that the industry was almost unanimously 
in favor of the code— as we know it to be--and was furthermore 
quite satisfied with its administration,
There is little doubt that the steel industry wanted to retain its code as 
long as it did not have to yield its policies, either in code provisions or 
code administration.
But continuance of the steel code depended upon extension of the 
Recovery Act and the form in whioh the act was retained. In mid-Ĵ ril, 
Richberg wrote Roosevelt that if the NRA legislation were "sufficiently 
devitalised to conform to the anti-monopoly ideas of Senators Borah and 
sye, it will in my opinion be made so ineffective and unworkable that it 
would be worse than no law," Rlohberg added that sinoe he oould not sup­
port suoh a bill he urged that, "before any concessions are made to the 
defeatist position whioh some of your fMLends are sinoeraly urging because
of their lack of information and experience," Roosevelt study the situation 
6kcarefully. The President, however, did not clearly designate anyone to 
devise mere than "halfway plans" and merely suggested slight revisions of 
the aot. As Rsymond Holey stated* "This throwing-up of the presidential 
hands was the signal for a long, aorimonious wrangle before the Finanoe 
Committee of the Senate,
The Senate Finanoe Committee began its Lengthy hearings on the NRA,
^^Sharp to Shannon, May k, 1933» NRA Papers.
^^chberg to Roosevelt, April 13* 1935» NRA Papers,
^ W e y ,  After .Seven.Years, p, 304»
314
which were called an investigation, in March. Testifying were businessmen, 
labor and consumer spokesmen, and local, state, and national government 
officials. Harry Babcock, attorney for the FTC, again resumed the attack 
on the steel code. Calling the basing point system price fixing, Babcock 
concluded that "only aims of a blindly selfish character can account for 
the arbitrary abnormalities and flagrant fictions which are inherent in 
the basing-point system.Lowell Mason joined the FTC's attack by con­
tending that if anti-trust decisions and the steel code were placed side 
ly side, it would be found that the words "thou shalt not" had been sup­
planted with the words "thou must."^^ The testimony of Babcock and Mason 
was supplemented hy statements of steel company executives. An attorney 
for a Jersey City company complained that, although raw steel the company 
purchased only came from New York on a ferry or through the Holland Tunnel,
Buffalo was the basing point, and an extra four dollars~a ton for phantom
68freight had to be paid. The president of a small rolling mill concluded 
that the basing point system with its (Aantom freight charges "tends to put
the small mill out of business and as long as the steel code is dominated
69by the larger mills, we have no chance for any relief."
The two star witnesses at the hearings were the old antagonists—
Hugh Johnson and Clarence Darrow. The General was in top form as he told 
the Committee of the great hopes and objectives whioh the NRA had. He 
freely admitted, however, that progress had not been as rapid as he had 
hoped, that "rotten provisions" had crept into certain codes, that Code
**3enate Investigation of NRA. p. 294. p. 1100,
po 1155. p. 1163.
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Authorities were not prc^erly organized and that the administration had not
been very efficiente Topically making himself the center of the controversy,
Johnson contended that "such faults as arose were due to my bad admiMstra-
tion rather than a bad law» " Johnson pled for a continuation of his heroic
experiment, saying "that to destroy NoR»A» because there are these creaky
joints in its structure would be like burning down your house to get rid of
a few rats in the attic»" Johnson recommended the elimination of many codes
and the consolidation of others and closed by stating: "May I reiterate
my belief that we must take our capitalistic system in hand. » ». To my
mind we should not go back to what has failed, we should not go forward to
communism or fascism, but we must do something, and let us stiek to the
70middle of the road»"' Like Johnson, Darrow was at his typical best.
Fully aoknowledging that his sympathies lay with small business as compared
with big business, the aged lawyer charged that the Recovery Act was written
by and administered for the "rich man." When asked if he thought anything
in the NRA were worth saving, Darrow answered that he was not certain, but
71that the present law was bad. '
After the hearings were completed, Finanoe Committee Chairman Pat 
Harrison introduced amendments whioh forbade price fixing except in 
natural resources' Industries, limited the power of Code Authorities and 
gave the FTC powers over certain features of the bill. "Champ" Clark of
Missouri then introduced a resolution which would have extended the
Recovery Act in its present form until March 1936, and the resolution 
passed by a large majority. The bill was reported out of the Committee
pp. 2181-2184 and 2416. ^̂ Ibid.. pp. 299-310.
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early in May. Not only did this move shock the administration, but both
labor and business leaders in general charged that such a brief extension
would amount to a virtual abandonment of the NRA, The House had to have
its turn, however, and there the administration thought that it would get 
72what it wantedo On May 14 Richberg reported that the NRA was proceeding
on the assumption that there would be an extension of the law and that code
revisions would be a lengthy process o Two days later Roosevelt met with
the NIRB and approved a list of recommendations which the Board presented.
An extension of the NRA for two years, a code revision period of three to
six months f ioqproved legislative mandate to guide NRA administration and
74a consolidation and strengthening of the whole system were called for,'
The entire matter, however, was to be taken out of the hands of
the administration, industry, and consumers by the Supreme Court, There 
had, of course, been mmerous litigations over various provisions of the 
Recoveiy Act, but the NRA had fared rather well. Up to April 1935, some 
206 oases had been tried in federal courts, with favorable rulings for 
the government in 186 cases. Sixty-five separate district judges had 
granted permanent injunctions against violators of code provisions and 
there had been nineteen criminal convictions,^^ There was also a question 
of public opinion. As one writer stated, the New Deal had suoh great pop­
ular support that if the Supreme Court ever declared the NIRA unconstitu­
tional, the public resentment would be so great that the people would
f^Iron Age. CXXXV (May 2 and 9, 1935), pp, 55 and 58,
(May 16, 1935), V» 5U ^Slue Eagle. May 17, 1935, p. 1. 
^%iohberg. The Rainbow, pp, 210-211,
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agree to a constitutional amendment taking away the Court's power in such
76cases.
In tho spring of 1935; however, court decisions began to run more against 
DIRA than previously. The Recovery Administration seemed to be avoiding a 
true court test of the major provisions of the law and this assumption ap­
peared more likely when the government withdrew an appeal before the Supreme 
Court on a ease in which a U, S, District Judge had dismissed a suit against 
the Belcher Lumber Con^any on the grounds that the Recovery Act was uncon­
stitutional,^^ The action by the government was met in many quarters with 
hostility* The president of the National Association of Manufacturers called 
upon the Justice Department to allow the case to be decided before the Re­
covery Act was extended because "it is only through a clear definition of 
Federal Authority in the industrial field that the uncertainty whioh ob­
structs recovery can be allayed,"^®
Another case to test the validity of the Recovery Act was coming to 
fruition at this time, however. Two brothers named Schechter who operatad 
a live poultry business had been charged with violations of the code for 
their business* In the fall of 193% they were tried and convicted by a 
New York federal district court* In an appeal before the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals on kppil 1, 1935; a three-panel court, including Judge 
Learned Hand, upheld the previous decision* Two of the judges, however,
"^^aurice Finkelstein, The Dilemma of the Supreme Court,,Is the 
N.R*A* Constitutional (New York, 1933); FP» 10-11*
^^Riohberg, The Rainbow, p. 215*
7®Iron Awe. C m v  (April 4, 1935); p. 53».
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overturned that part of the conviction applying to wages and hours because 
they decided that the Schechters did a purely intrastate b u s i n e s s A  
Justice Department official informed Riohberg the next day that the defen-
80. dants would apply immediately to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, 
Richberg notified Roosevelt that public opinion had been very unfavorable 
on the Belcher case, causing difficulty in enforcement of codes and «trength- 
ening the hostility of Congress to the extension of the NIRA, He therefore 
recommended that the Justice Department be allowed to cooperate in bringing 
the Schechter case to the Court, Richberg emphasized that a good ease could
remove many of the difficulties facing the NRA but that ignoring the situa-
8ltlon would "gradually destroy the industrial recovery program,"
Richberg thought that the Schechter appeal would be a genuine teat 
case because the Court would have to rule on all the essential features 
of the Recovery Act, He knew, however, that it was not as ideal a case 
from the NRA viewpoint as one involving a purely inter-state business, 
Roosevelt gave his approval and the Department of Justice asked Richberg 
to participate in preparing the case. In presenting his argument before 
the Supreme Court Richberg emphasized the underlying purposes of NIRA 
which was necessitated by the economic emergency and the solution sought 
through federal legislation and its administration. But the Court did 
not concur. On May 2? the Court handed down a unanimous opinion ruling 
that Congress could not regulate intrastate commerce and that it had
^^BLue.Eagle. April 5» 1935» P« 1»
SoQ, S, Arnold to Richberg, April 2, 1935, Riohberg Papers,
81Richberg to Roosevelt, April 3» 1935» Riohberg Papers,
exceeded its authority in delegating essentially legislative powers to the 
executive branch» In the words of Justice Cardozo°s concurring opinion: 
"This is delegation running riot»" And on the interstate commerce issue, 
he wrote: "There is no penumbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here»"^^
The Schechter decision threw the administration into an uproar» Hugh 
Johnson rushed to the White House with a plan for a new act which could 
stand the court test» Richberg also had a plan, while Raymond Moley and 
Felix Frankfurter wanted a constitutional amendment specificially giving
On
Congress the power to regulate industry» ^ Oklahoma Congressman Qassaway 
wrote a constituent that the Courtis decision had thrown the nation "into 
the most pitiful chaotic condition that it has ever been thrown into in 
the history of our nation," and suggested that Congress might remain in
0]U
session through August to enact a new Recovery Aot» Roosevelt made his 
angry speech about the "horse-and=buggy" attitude of the Court and talked 
about a new NRA, but the Blue Eagle was clearly dead»
The attitude of the steel industry toward the Schechter decision 
was a strange one indeed» Iron Age, which had maintained rather stead­
fast support of the NIRA and the steel code throughout its life, hailed 
the decision as stopping the "trend toward State socialism»" Its editor 
wrote:
The Supreme Court has spoken» By unanimous decision, it has turned 
thumbs down on the brain trusters and constitution "busters" who 
for two years have been attempting to butld a super-government in
®^iehberg. The Rainbow, pp» 217-222» 
®%oley. After Seven Years, p» 306»
8kP. L» Qassaway to Carl Portman, Hay 28, 1935» Qassaway Papers.
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America, a consolidated clan of bureaucracies having the assumed 
power to make and enforce our laws» » » » The Supreme Court deci­
sion will go far toward restoring business confidence and to en­
couraging our great army of fear-frozen investment dollars to go 
to worko Steel and capital goods industries will shortly feel the 
impetus of renewed buying that will follow the smashing of the 
strange gods and brazen images of a regimented economy and a philo­
sophy of scarcity. The Schechter chicken has broken the American 
goose step.85
Iron Age nevertheless, reported that the Court decision had stunned the
steel industry and created confusion, even though district sales offices
had been instructed by their home offices to maintain all code prices and
86commercial practices«
Only a few days passed before steel industry leaders could decide 
what their new policy would be. Tom Qirdler, president of Republic 
Steel, stated that "during the past two years a new spirit of cooperation 
and fair play had grown up in the steel industry to the benefit of employees, 
customers and the industry itself, and I believe steel men everywhere will 
support any effort on the part of the government to develop a constructive 
program which will preserve these benefits." Other steel executives did 
not publicly support any government program-but did announce no fundamental 
change in policy. As one steel official asserted: "We will go right along
just the same as under the code. We will pay the same wages, maintain the 
same prices and "play the game* the same as if we had a oode."^^ On June 6 
more than 200 steel executives met at AISI headquarters in Washington and 
unanimously voted to continue the fair trade practices inaugurated by the
^hron Age. CXXXV (May 30, 1935), p. 57.
p. 63.
June 6, 1935, p. 61.
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code. When asked if price filing would be maintained, Eugene Grace
replied that prices had already been filed for the third quarter and that
88he hoped prices would be maintained at their present level.
On June 1 all deputy administrators were informed that Code Author­
ities no longer had any legal status and should be notified of that
fact. Shannon promptly wrote Tower of what he was probably already well 
89aware. A few days later Shannon also wrote Tower telling him that he
had been directed to request that all Code Authority records be sent to
the Research and Planning Division, but Tower replied that disposition of
90their records had already been made on advice of counsel. All that re­
mained for Shannon to do, as for all deputy administrators, was to com­
pile a history of the operation of his code. In an attempt to secure 
information of how the code had affected members of the steel industry, 
questionnaires were sent to the 206 companies which had been members of 
the code, and to AISI. By December 1, 1935» only nine companies had 
replied to the request, four companies had written their refusal to
answer and the remaining had not even acknowledge the questionnaire.
91Cooperation from AISI had been almost non-existent. Moreover, Tower
92even refused to help the NRA staff frame the questions. Shannon’s 
legal adviser’s whole experience with the steel industry must have
®®Iiili., June 13, 1935, pp. 44-45.
89Prentiss L« Coonley to Shannon, June 1, 1935; and Shannon to Tower, 
June 3, 1935. NRA Papers.
^^Wayne P. Ellis to Shannon, June 6, 1935; and Tower to Shannon,
June 12, 1935. NRA Papers.
^^Memorandum by A. G. White, December 1, 1935. NRA Papers.
92Shannon to J. M. Clark, August 27, 1935° NRA Papers.
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colored his reply to a question from Leon C. Marshall as to his thoughts
on a new bill for industrial control, because he answered: "Over a
period of some years I have held firmly to the opinion that rigid control
of industry in this country by the federal government is needed in order
to accomplish the securing by labor of a larger share of the national
income, the protection of the consumer against the avarice of large
93aggregations of capital and the preservation of small enterprise»"
With the demise of the NRA began to come the assessment which has 
remained rather standard in history and economic studies» That tradi­
tional story has the NIRA as a poorly conceived act which generated 
some enthusiasm for a time, then began to break down because of over­
expansion and faulty administration» Finally, the Supreme Court rescued 
the administration from its dilemma by declaring the aot unconstitutional » 
At the time few persons disagreed with that analysis» Hugh Johnson de­
fended his brain child by claiming that the NRA created more jobs than all 
the other emergency agencies combined and did it naturally without drains 
on the federal treasuryo And Johnson asserted that the NRA did more than
that:
It abolished child labor» It ran out the sweatshops» It established 
the principle of regulated hours, wages, and working conditions» It 
went far toward removing wages from the area of predatory competition» 
It added to the rights and freedom of human labor»?*
And there is much truths in these claims»
Yet, admirable though these accomplishments may be, assuming that
^^Burr To Ansell to Shannon, August 29, 1935» NRA Papers»
9^Johnson, Blue Eagle, pp» ix-x»
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the NRA was solely responsible for them, the aot was designed to promote 
recovery as well as reform» The most objective economic analysis of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act concluded that in achieving recovery, the 
Blue Eagle was a failure» A Brookings Institution study found that while 
the objective of the Recovery Act had been to increase purchasing power by 
raising wages and holding prices down, both prices and wages advanced»
And even this method was wrong because it should have sought to increase
95purchasing power by holding down both wages and prices» Another econo­
mist saw the fault in NRA policy as allowing price fixing in individual
96industries without reference to price fixing in other industries»
Herbert Hoover condemned the whole idea as one of a regimented "economy
of scarcity— an idea that increased costs, restricted production and
97hampered enterprise will enrich a nation»"' And there is truth in these 
denunciations »
Recently, however, at least two commentators have been willing to 
follow more closely the reasoning of Hugh Johnson and to expand on his 
zeal for the NRA» The first, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr», has written that 
the reason the NRA has received such a bad verdict is because those 
making the assessment have proceeded from the classical model of the 
competitive market» Schlesinger thinks that most mistakes attributed to
^^Lyon, National Recovery .Administration, pp» 871-874.
^^Benjamin H» Anderson, "Government Economic Planning and Prices," 
The Chase Economic Bulletin. XVI (April 18, 1936), p. 2]»
9?Herbert C» Hoover, Addresses Doon the American Road (New York, 
1938), p. 47»
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the NRA resulted from faulty administration and policy» and not in the
noble goals of economic stabilization and social decency» As an-example»
he wrote that the idea of price fixing was not wrong but that allowing
business to fix prices was» But above all Schlesinger thinks that the
Blue Eagle "helped break the chains of economic fatalism" and gave the
American people "new confidence in their capacity to work out their
9 8economic salvation» Like Schlesinger, John Kenneth Galbraith has writ­
ten that the idea of the NIRA was neither bad nor unrealistic, but he
thinks that the contrary assessment has become part of the "folk wisdom"
99of the nation and cannot be changed»Perhaps a definitive analysis 
and assessment of the NIRA in general can be made when there are more 
studies on the subject» In the most recently published work on the Blue 
Eagle, Sidney Fine states: "It is not easy to generalize about the
NoIoRsA» since its history is so much a history of individual codes 
rather than of policy formulated at the top and then uniformily applied,"
As Fine so accurately points out, the records for the study of individual 
codes are "available in embarassing abundance»"^®®
If the history of the steel code is typical of the way all codes 
were written and administered, then both the proponents and detractors 
of the NRA will find comfort» For those, such as Alfred Bingham, who 
thought that the act was designed to aid the small businessman and con­
sumer but was transformed because big business gained control of the
^^Schlesinger, Coming of. the New Deal, pp. 1?2-176,
99john Kenneth Galbraith, The Liberal Hour (New York, 1964), pp, 74-75»
l°°Sidney Fine, The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle (Ann Arbor,
1963), p. 430»
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codes, the case of the steel code was will reinforce that assertion»
To those, such as Gerard Swope, J» W» Hook and other industry leaders 
who yearned for industrial self «government, the operation of the steel 
code met their desires» The steel code was industrial self-government 
without restraint» Neither the President of the United States, nor Hugh 
Johnson, nor the Federal Trade Commission, nor Borah and Nye could force 
the steel industry to yield on its price or labor policies»
While more research needs to be done to answer many of the ques­
tions raised as to the effects of the steel code, a number of conclu­
sions are clear» The depression crisis led the steel industry, as well 
as other big industries, to advocate economic planning» But from the 
very start the steel industry wanted to be thn planning agent, free of 
restrictions or influence by the public, the government, and labor»
The American Iron and Steel Institute, which had long been the spokesman 
of cooperation in the industry, was responsible for drafting the code, 
and in negotiations with the government over code provisions, proved to 
be a shrewd bargainer» Moreover, the AISI was responsible for adminis­
tering the provisions of the code and, in effect, continually added to 
the provisions with its legislative authority» With such powers the steel 
industry was effective in controlling the business actions and practices 
of all its members»
Administration members expressed concern from time to time about this 
unbridled power of the industry to control its own affairs» The economic 
power of the steel industry was so great, however, that the NRA most often
101 ' 'Alfred M. Bingham, Insurgent America; Revolt of the Middle-
Classes (New York, 1935)» P» 181»
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plead with executives of AISI to "play the game" or, at most, made veiled 
threats which were never carried out* Cooperation of such a great industry 
was essential to the nation*s recovery and the administration simply could 
not afford to alienate steel industry leaderso At the same time the ini- 
tially=>promised cooperation between government and industry never material­
ized» The steel industry posed an almost arrogant disregard for the public 
interest, and there did not seem to be any public official who was willing 
to challenge it» It is also very debatable whether such cooperation could 
have had a very long life at any rate, for antitrust sentiment was still 
strong among the American people, many politicians, and even small business­
men»
Under the steel code prices did advance at a rate almost equal to 
wages, but also thé eight-hour day was secured generally for steelworkers» 
The steel industry was the most implacable opponent of those who held 
that Section ?a meant that national labor unions could organize steelworkers 
and bargain for them; yet, most industry officials, even Ernest Weir, 
recognized the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively if 
only in company unions, And the experience of the steelworkers in their 
fight with the industry from 1933 to 1935 contributed materially to their 
tactics and victory in the mills in the late 1930*s»
Thus, as Fine suggests, perhaps the most that can be hoped for at 
this time are studies of individual codes with a postponement of a final 
assessment of the ERA until more are completed» In the case of the steel 
code much economic analysis is needed to determine the economic effects of 
the code*s operation» Nevertheless, the operation of the Code of Fair
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Competition of the Iron and Steel Industry offers the future historian 
a superb case stuttjr of one very important code»
APPENÏÏTX
IRON AND STEPL INDDSTRY 
^proved August 19» 19331 Effective August 29» 1933
— — ? "  .
Executive Order
An application having been duly made, pursuant to and in full 
oomplianoe with the provisions of Title I of t&S Rational Industrial 
Recovery Act» approved. June 16, 1933» for iqr Jq^roval a Code of Fair 
Ĉ ngiètitlon for the Iron and Steel Industry», «ad hearings having been 
held thereon .and the. Administrator having,.randered his report together 
with his recommendations and finding with respect thereto» and the Admin- 
istrator having found that the said Code of Fair Ccsqpetition complies in 
all respects with he pertinent provisions of Title I of said Act *«nd that 
the requirements of clauses (l) and (2) of subsection (a) of Section 3 of 
said Act have been met:
NOW, THEREFORE, I Franklin 0» Roosevelt, President of the United 
States, pursuant to the authority vested ih mé By Title I of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, approved June l6, 1933» and otherwise, do adopt 
and approve the report, recommendations and findings of the Administrator 
and do order that the said Code of Fair Competition be and it is hereby 
approved.
Approval Recommended:
(signed) HUGH S. JOHNSON, Administrator
(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The White House,
August 19, 1933o
CODE OF FAIR CGNPETITION OF THE 
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY
Article I 
Definitions
Wherever used in this Code or in any sdhédule appertaining hereto 
the terms hereinafter in this Article and in Schedule E annexed hereto 
defined shall, unless the context shall otherwise clearly indicate, have 
the respective meanings hereinafter in this Artiple and in such Schedule 
E set forth. The definition of any such term in the singular shall apply
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to the ose of such term In the plural and vice versa.
Section 1. The term "the United States" means and includes sQ.1 
of the territory of the United States of America on the North American, 
continent.
Section 2. The term "the President" means th6 President of the 
United States of America.
Section 3* The term "products" mfeans only pig iron, iron or steel 
Ingots and the rolled or drawn iron or atèèl prdduets which are generally 
named In Schedule F to the Code as at thé timè in effect and standard 
Tee rails of more than 6o pounds per yard, angle bars and rail joints, or 
any of such products.
Section 4. The term "the Industry**' miahS ihd includes the business 
of producing in the United States and séllin* (abducts, or any of them.
Section 5« The term "member of the Ihdustiy" means and includes 
any person, firm, association or corporktioh operating a plant or plants 
in the United States for the production of products, or any of them.
Section 6, The term "the Code" mUns ahd includes this Code and all 
Schedules annexed hereto as originally approved by the President and all 
amendmmnts hereof and thereof made as hereinafter in Article XII provided,
oecvion 7. The term "member of the Code" means any member of the 
Industry ĥo shall have become a member of the Code as hereinafter in 
Section 3 of Article III provided.
Section 8, The term "the Institute" means American Iron and Steel 
Institute, a New York membership oorperAtion.
Section 9» The term "the Board of Directors" means the Board 
of Directors (as from time to time constituted) of the Institute.
Section 10. The term "the Seoretiry" means the Secretary of the 
Institute at the time in offio®.
Section 11. The term "the Treasurer" meAns the treasurer of the 
Institute at the time in office.
Section 12. The term "unfair practice" means and includes any act 
described as an unfair practice in Schedule ft annexed hereto.
Section 13, Wherever used in the Code with reference to the In-, 
dustry or any member of the Industry or any member of the Code, unless the 
context shall otherwise clearly indicate.
(a) The term "plant" means only a plant for the production
of one or more products in the Industry;
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(b) the term "prices" include only prices for products produced
in the Industry;
(c) the term "wages" includes only wages for labor performed in
the Industry;
(d) the term "labor" means only labor performed in the Industry;
(e) the term "hours of labor" or "hours of work" includes only
hours of labor or hours of work in the Industry; and
(f) the term "employee" means only an employee in the Industry,
Section 14, The term "the National Industrial Recovery Act" means 
the National Industrial Recovery Act as approved by the President, June 
16, 1933.
Section 15. The term "the effective daté of the Code" means the 
date on which the Code shall have been approved by the President pursuant 
to the National Industrial Recovery Act,
Section l6. The term "the Administrator" means the Administrator 
appointed by the President under the National Industrial Recovery Act and 
at the time in office.
Section 17» The term "the Administration" means the agency established 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 2 Of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act.
Article II 
Purpose Of the Code
Section 1« The Code is adopted pursuant to Title I of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act,
Section 2, The purpose of the Code is to effectuate the policy of 
Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act insofar as it is applicable 
to the Industry,
Article III 
Membership in thé Code
Section 1, It is of the essence of the Qode that all members of 
the Industry which shall comply with the provisions of the Code shall be 
entitled to participate in its benefits upon the terms and conditions set 
forth in the Code,
Section 2, Any member of the Industry is eligible for membership in 
the Code,
Section 3. Any member of the Industry desiring to become a member 
of the Code may do so by signing and delivering to the Secretary a letter 
substantially in the form set forth in Schedule A annexed hereto.
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Section 4. The rules and regulations in respect of meetings of 
members of the Code are set forth in Schedule 6 annexed hereto.
Article IV
Hours of Labor, Rates of Pay and Other Conditions of Employment
Section 1. Pursuant to subsection (a) of Section 7 of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act and so long as the Code shall be in effect, the 
Code shall be subject to the following conditions;
(l) That enç)laiyees shall have the right to organise and bar­
gain collectively through représentatives of their own choosing, 
and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion 
of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such 
representatives or in self-orgànifcâtiôii, or in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of dôlleôtivê bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection$
(2) that no enqplcyee and no one seeking employment shall be 
required as a condition of ei^ld^èht to join any company union 
or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor 
organization of his own choosing; and
(3) that eiq)loyers shall comply With the maximum hours of 
labor, minimum rates of pay, a M  Ôthif Qbndltions of employment, 
approved or prescribed by the President,
Section 2, Since the beginning of the present depression and the 
consequent reduction in the total number of hours of work available in 
the Industry, its members have made every éffoï*t to distribute, and with 
a remarkable degree of success have distributed, the hours of work avail­
able in their plants so as to give employment to the maximum number of 
employees. It is the intention of the Industry to continue that policy 
insofar as practicable, to the end that the policy of Title I of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act may be effeetueted, and that work in the 
Industry shall insofar as practicable be distributed so as to provide.em­
ployment for the employees normally éttachèd to the Industry* The. basic 
processes in the Industry are of a continuous Oharacter and they cannot 
be changed in this respect without sérions advèrse effect upon production 
and enqcloyment. As demand for the products of the Industry and, therefore, 
for labor shall increase, hours of labor for employees in the Industry 
must necessarily increase; but, except in the case of executives, those 
employed in supervisory capacities and in technical work and their re­
spective staffs and those employed in âhérgency work, insofar as practi­
cable and 30 long as employees qualified for the work required shall.be . 
available in the respective lacalitiôs tdiere such work shall be required 
and having due regard for the varying demands of the consuming and. 
processing industries for the respective products, none of the members of 
the Code shall cause or permit any employee to work at an average of more
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than 40 hours per week In apy six months period or to work more than 48 
hours or more than 6 days in any one weeko On or after November 1, 1933» 
as soon as the members of the Code shall be operating at 60^ of capacity, 
they shall adjust the operations of their plants so that, except as to 
executives, those en^loyed in supervisory capacities and in technical 
work and their respective staffs and those en^loyed in emergency work, 
they will establish the 8-hour day for all their eiq>loyee8« For the pur­
poses of this Section 2 the first six months period for each enplcyee in 
the employ of any member of the Code at the effective date thereof shall 
begin with that date, and the first six months period for any employee 
thereafter employed by any member of the Code shall begin with the date of 
employment of such enqployee by such member, After the date of the esqploy- 
ment by any member of the Code of any enqployee such member shall not know­
ingly permit such employee who also Shall have performed work for one or 
more other employers to work for such mëmbëf such number of hoars as would 
result in a violation of the Code had All such work been performed for such 
member.
Section 3« None of the members of thé Code shall employ in or about 
its plants in the Industry any persoh under 16 years of age.
Section 4. Throughout the history of the Industry geographical wage 
differentials have existed, due in the main to differences in living coats 
and general economic conditions and the ability adequately to man the in­
dustries in the respective localities. The establishments in the Industry 
in the different localities have been developed under such differences in 
wages and, after a survey of the matters bearing on such differences in the 
various sections of the United States, for the purposes of this Article IV 
the wage districts described in Schedule C aiUléxed hereto have been es­
tablished.
Section 5* Until changed by amendment of the Code as hereinafter in 
Article XII provided, the minimum rates of pay per hour which shall be paid 
by members of the Code for common labor (hot including that of apprentices 
and learners) in the Industry in the respective wage districts described 
in such Schedule C shall be the rates sit forth in Schedule D annexed 
hereto. None of the members of the Codé shall pay common laborers (not 
including apprentices and learners) in its eaplcy in the Industry in any such 
district any rate of pay less than the rate specified for such districts 
in such Schedule D, and any violation of this provision of the Code shall 
be deemed an unfair practice. Such rates of pty shall not, however, be 
understood to be the maximum rates of pay for their respective districts, 
but, until changed as aforesaid, none of the mèmbers of the Code shall be 
required to pay its common laborers in the Industry in any of such districts 
a rate of pay higher than the rate specified for such district in such 
Schedule D, except as such member shall have agreed to pay such higher rate 
in any agreement heretofore or hereafter made by such member with,its em­
ployees, Until this provision shall have been changed by amendment as 
aforesaid, each member of the Code will pay to each of its employees in 
the Industry who on July 14, 1933» vas receiving pay at a rate of pay per
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hour in excess of the rate of pay per hour then being paid by such mem­
ber for common labor a rate of pay per hour which shall be at least 15$ 
greater than that which such employee was then receiving; provided, how­
ever, that the foregoing provision shall not be so construed as to re­
quire argr member of the Code to make any increase in the rate of pay 
per hour to be paid by such member tb ary of its employees in any wage 
district that will result in a rate of pay per hour which shall be higher 
than the rate of pay per hour paid to employees doing substantially the 
same or kind of labor in the same wage district by apy other member
of the Code which shall have increased its rates of pay per hour in ac­
cordance with such provision. In the case of en^loyees (not including 
apprentices and learners) performing work for which they are paid per 
piece of work performed, the minimum rete of pay which each member of 
the Code shall pay for such work shall .be., sufficient to produce at the 
average rate of performance of such work at the time prevailing at the 
plant of such member where such work is performed the minimum rate of 
pay per hour provided in the Code for common labor at such plant.
Article V 
Production and New Capacity
Section U  It is the concensus of opinion in the Industry that it 
is not necessary, in order to effectuate the policy of Title I of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, to make any specific provision in the 
Code for controlling or regulating the volume of production in the Indus­
try or for allocating production or sales among its members, It is be­
lieved that the elimination of unfair practices in the Industry will 
automatically eliminate any over*production therein and any alleged in­
equities in the distribution of production and sales among its members. 
Adequate provision shall be made under thé Code for the collection of 
statistics regarding production and of.other data from which it may be 
determined from time to time whether over-production in the Industry 
exists and whether in the circumstances ary restriction of production 
is necessary in order to effectuât* the policy of Title I, The Board 
of Directors shall furnish to the .Administrator summaries or com­
pilations of such statistics and other data in reasonable detail.
Should it at ary time in the eirsumetances as they shall then exist ap­
pear to the Board of Directors- that the policy of such Title I will not 
be effectuated in the Industry because of the fact that through the Code 
production therein is not controlled and. regulated, then the Board of 
Directors is hereby empowered, subject to the approval of the President 
after such conference with,.or hearing-of interested persons, as he may 
prescribe, to make, modify or rescind auch rules and regulations for the 
purpose of controlling and regulating production in the Industry, including 
the fixing of such liquidated damages, for violations of such rules and 
regulations, as such Board shall-been, to■ be necessary or proper in order 
to effectuate the policy of suoh-..Title I. All such rules and regulations 
from time to time so made and in effect shall be binding upon each member 
of the Code to which notice thereof shall have been given.
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Section 2o It is aleo the consensus of opipion in the Industry 
that, until such time as tho-demand for its products cannot adequately 
be met by the fullest possible-use of existing capacities for produc­
ing pig iron and steel ingots, -such capaoities shbuld not be increased, 
Aooordingly, unless and until the Code shall have been amended as herein­
after prbvided so as to-persdt it, none of the members of the Code shall 
initiate the oOnstruetion of any.new blast furnace or open hearth or 
Bessemer steel capacity, % e  President may, however, suspend the opera­
tion of the provisions of this Section,
Article VT 
Admlnistrati-on-of the Code
Section 1. The administration af the Code shall be under the direc­
tion of the Board of Dlreotora, The ..Board of Directors shall have all the 
powers and duties conferred upon. i.t by-the Code and generally all such 
other powers and duties as shall be necessary or proper to enable it fully 
to a<hainieter the Code emd to effectuate its purpose.
Section 2. The Secretary shall, act -as Secretary under the Code.
Under the direction of the Board of. Directors, he shall keep all books 
(except books of acoowit) and recordaUinder the Code and, except as such 
Board shall otherwise provide, shall oollect, file and collate all sta­
tistics and-other information required by the Board of Directors for the 
proper administration- of the Code.
Section 3> The Treaewper «shall aot, as Treasurer under the Code
and, under the direetioa of the. Board of DLfbctors, he shall have custody
of, and have charge of the disposition of, all' funds collected under the 
£ode| and he shall keep proper books of account showing the collection 
and disposition thereof.
Section 4. The Board of Directors shall have power from., time, to 
time (a) to appoint and remove, and to fix the compensation of , all 
-such other officers and emploÿees and all suoh accountants » attorneys 
and experts, as -tha-sMd shall deem neceabary or-prop^ for the
purpose of admipdstering the Code and (b) to fix the compenŝ -tion of the 
Secretary and the Treasurer for their services in acting- under the Code.
Section 5, The expenses of adbsinistering the Code shall be borne 
by the members thereof. The Board of Directors may from time to time 
make such assessments on account of such expanses against the members 
of the Code as it shall deem proper and such assessments shall be payable 
as suoh Board shall specify» The part of such expenses which shall be 
assessed against each member -of the Code shall bear the same relation 
to the total-thereof as the number of votes whi<^, pursuant to the pro­
visions of-'t̂ e Code, such mwnber might oast-at a meeting of thé members 
thereof held at the time of aiy such assessment shall bear to the total 
number of -votes that might be east 'Uiereat by clU- the then members of 
the CodSrr Failure of-ai^ member of the Code to pay the amount of ay 
assessment against such member for a period of thirty days after the 
date on which it became payable shall constitute a violation of the Code,
-
Section 6, The Board of Directors may from time to time appoint 
such committees as it shall deem necessary or proper in order to effec» 
tuate the purpose of the Code, and it may delegate to any such committee 
generally or in particular instances such of the powers and-duties of the 
Board of Directors under the Code as such Board shall deem necessary or 
proper in order to effectuate such purpose* Any member of any such com­
mittee may be a member of-the Board of Directors or an officer or a
director of a member of the Code or a person not having any official 
connection with any member of the Code or with the Insti^"t‘i, as the 
Board of Directors shall deem proper»
Section 7» The members of the Code recognize that questions of 
public interest are or may be involved in its administration. Accord­
ingly, representatives of the Administration consisting of the Admin­
istrator and one or two other persons appointed by him (who shall be 
persons not having or representing interests antagonistic to the in­
terests of members of the Industry) shall be given full opportunity at 
such times as shall be reasonably convenient to discuss with the Board 
of Directors or any committee thereof any matters relating to the ad­
ministration of the Code and to attend meetings of the Board at which 
action on apy such matters shall be undertaken and to make recommenda­
tions as to methods or measures of administering the Code. Due notice 
of all such meetings-of the Board of Directors shall be given to such 
representatives of the Administration. The records of the Board of 
Directors relating in any way to the administration of the Code shall be 
open to such representatives at all reasonable times. They shall be 
afforded by the Board of Directors complete access at all times to all 
records, statistical material or other information furnished or readily 
available to the Board of Directors in connection with, or for the pur­
poses of, the administration of the Code. The Board of Directors, acting 
directly or through one or more committees appointed by it, shall give 
due consideration to all requests or recommendations made by such re­
presentatives of the Administration and render every possible assistance 
to such representatives in obtaining full information concerning the 
operation and administration through reports that may be made to him 
from time to time ty such representatives, and to the end that the 
President may be assured that the Code and the administration thereof 
do not promote or permit monopolies or monopolistic practices, or eliminate 
or oppress small enterprises, or operate to discriminate against them and 
to provide adequate protection of consumers, competitors, employees and 
others concerned and that they are in furtherance of the public interest 
and operate to effectuate the purposes of Title I of the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act.
Article VII 
Prices and Terms of Payment
None of the members of the Code shall make any sale of any product 
at a price or on terms and conditions more favorable to the purchaser thereof
3)6
than the-price, terms or conditions established by such member in accor­
dance with the provisions of Schedule E annexed hereto, and in effect at 
the time of such sale; nor, except as otherwise provided in such-Schedule 
E, shall any member cf the Gode-make any- contract of sale of aiy product 
at a price or on terms and conditions more favorable to the-purchaser 
thereof than the price, terms and conditions established as aforesaid and 
in effect at the time of the making of such contract of sale.
Article VIII 
Unfair Practices
For all purposes of the Code the acts described in Schedule-H 
annexed hereto shall constitute unfair practices• Such unfair practices 
and all other practices which shall be declared-to be unfair practices by 
the Board of Directors as provided in paragraph M of such Sohedule H-or 
by apy amendment to the Code adopted as hereinafter in Article XII pro­
vided and at the time in effect shall be deemed to be unfair methods of 
competition in commerce within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act as amended, and the using or employing of any of them shall be deemed 
to be a violation of the Code and any member of the Industry which shall 
directly, or indirectly through any officer, employee, agent or repre­
sentative, knowingly use or employ any of such unfair practices shall be 
guilty of a violation of the Code,
Article IX 
Reports and Statistics
Section 1. The Board of Directors shall have power from time to 
time to require each member of the Code to furnish to the Secretary for- 
the use of the Board of Directors such information concerning the pro­
duction, shipments, sales, and unfilled orders of such member and the 
hours of labor, rates of pay and other conditions of employment at the 
plant or plants of such member and such other information as the Board 
of Directors shall deem necessary or proper in order to effectuate the 
purpose of the Code and the policy of Title I of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, The Board of Directors may require that any such informa­
tion be furnished periodically at such times as it shall specify and may 
require that any or all information furnished be sworn to or otherwise 
certified or authenticated as it shall prescribe. Failure of any member 
of the Code promptly to furnish to the Secretary information required by 
the Board of Directors and substantially in the form prescribed by it 
shall constitute a violation of the Code, The Board of Directors shall not 
require any information regarding trade secrets or the names of the cus­
tomers of any member of the Code,
Section 2. Any or all information furnished to the Secretary by 
any member of the Code shall be subject to checking for the purpose of 
verification hy an examination of the books and accounts and records of 
such member by any accountant or accountants or other person or persons
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designated by the Board of Directors and shall be so checked for such 
purpose, if the Board of Directors shall require it. The cost of such 
examination shall be treated as an expense of administering thê  Code-; 
provided, however, that, if upon such examination any such information 
shall be shown to have been incorrect in any material respect,-such 
cost shall be paid by the member of the Code which furnished such infor­
mation.
Section 3» The Board of Directors shall require the members of 
the Code from time to time to furnish such information as shall be nec­
essary for the proper administration of the Code,
Section 4« To the extent that the Board of Directors may deem- 
that apy information furnished to the Secretary in accordance with the 
provisions of the Code is of a confidential character in the interest 
of the member of the Code which shall have furnished it and that the 
publication thereof is not essential in order to effectuate the polipy 
of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, such information 
shall be treated by the Board of Directors and by the other members of the 
Code, if any knowledge of it shall have come to then, as strictly confi­
dential; and no publication thereof to anyone or in any manner shall be 
made other than in combination with similar information furnished by other 
members of the Code, in which case the publication shall be made only in 
such manner as will avoid the disclosing separately of suoh confidential 
information.
Section 5> Summaries of compilations in reasonable detail of all 
information which shall be furnished to the Secretary pursuant to the 




Section 1, Any violation of any provision of the Code by any 
member of the Industry shall constitute a violation of the Code by such 
member.
Section 2, Recognizing that the violation by any member of the 
Code of any provision of Article VII or of Schedule E of the Code will 
disrupt the normal course of fair competition in the Industry and cause 
serious damage to other members of the Code and that it will be impos­
sible fairly to assess the amount of such damage to any member of the 
Code, it is hereby agreed by and among all members of the Code.that each 
member of the Code which shall violate any such provision shall pay to the 
Treasurer as an individual and not as treasurer of the Institute, in trust, 
as and for liquidated damages the sum of $10 per ton of any products sold 
by such member in violation of any such provision.
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Section 3» Except in cases for which liquidated damages are fixed 
in the Code and in cases which shall give rise to actions in tor+ In f''"nr 
of one or more members of the Code for damages suffered by it or t th? 
Board of Directors shall have power from time to time to establish tne 
amount of liquidated damages payable by any member of the Code upon the 
commission by such member of any act constituting an unfair practice under 
the Code and a list of the amounts so fixed shall from time to time be 
filed with the Secretary. Upon the commission by ai%r member of the Code 
of any act constituting an unfair practice under the Code and for which 
liquidated damages are not fixed in the Code or which does not give rise 
to an action in tort in favor of one or more members of the Code for 
damages suffered by it or them, such member shall become liable to pay to 
the Treasurer as an individual and not as treasurer of the Institute, in 
trust, liquidated damages in the amount at the time established by the 
Board of Directors for such unfair practice and specified in the list 
then on file with the Secretary as aforesaid.
Section 4, All amounts so paid to or collected by the Treasurer
under this Article X or under Section 4 of Schedule E of the Code shall
be held and disposed of hy him as part of the funds collected under the 
Code and each member of the Code not guilty of the unfair practice in 
respect of which ary such amount shall have been paid or collected shall
be credited with its pro rata share of such amount on account of any and
all assessments (other than damages for violation of any provision of the 
Code) due or to become due from such member under the Code, or, in the 
case of any excess, as shall be determined by the Board of Directors, 
such pro rata share to be computed on the same basis as the last previous 
assessment made against such member on account of the expenses of admin­
istering the Code as hereinbefore in Section 5 of Article VI provided.
All rights of ary person who shall at ary time be the Treasurer in re­
spect of ary amounts which shall be payable to him because of the com­
mission by any member of the Code of ary act constituting an unfair 
practice under the Code, whether payable under the provisions of this 
Article X or under ary other provision of the Code, shall pass to and 
become vested in his successor in office upon the appointment of such 
successor.
Section 5» Each member of the Code by becoming such member agrees with 
every other member thereof that the Code constitutes a valid and binding 
contract by and among all members of the Code, subject, however, to the 
provisions of Section 6 of Article XI, and that, in addition to all penalties 
and liabilities inposed by statute, any violation of any provision of the 
Code by ary member thereof shall constitute a breach of such contract 
and shall subject the member guilty of such violation to liability for 
liquidated damages pursuant to the provisions of the Code. Each member of 
the Code by becoming such member thereby assigns, transfers and delivers 
to the Treasurer as an individual and not as treasurer of the Institute, in 
trust, all rights and causes of action whatsoever which shall thereafter 
accrue to such member under the Code for such liquidated damages by reason 
of any violation of the Code by any other member thereof, and thereby desig­
nates and appoints, the Treasurer as such individual the true and lawful
339
attorney°ln»fact of such member to demand-,-sue for, eolleot end receipt 
for any and all amounts which shall be owing to such member in respect ci 
arqr such right or cause of action, and to compromise, settle, satisfy «md 
discharge any such right or cause of action, all in the name of such mem­
ber or in the name of the Treasurer individually, as he shall elect.
Section 6. Anything in the Code to the contrary notwithstanding, 
the Board of Directors by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the whole 
Board may waive any liability for liquidated damages imposed by or pur­
suant to any provision of the Code for any violation of any provision 
thereof, if in its discretion it shall decide that such violation was 
innocently made and that the collection of suoh damages will not to any 




Section lo Any notice, demand or request required or permitted to 
be given to or made upon any member of the Code shall be sufficiently 
given if mailed postage prepaid addressed to such member at the address 
of such member on file with the Secretary. A waiver in writing, signed 
by any member of the Code of any such notice, demand or request and de­
livered to the Secretary shall be deemed to be the equivalent of a notice, 
demand or request duly given or made, whether or not such waiver was signed 
and delivered before the time when such notice, demand or request was re­
quired or permitted to be given or made.
Section 2. Nothing contained in the Code shall be deemed to con­
stitute the members of the Code partners for any purpose. None of the 
members of the Code shall be liable in ary manner to anyone for any act
of any other member of the Code or for any act of the Board of Directors,
the Treasurer or the Secretary, or any committee, officer or en^loyee 
appointed under the Code. None of the members of the Board of Directors
or of any committee appointed under the Code, nor the Treasurer, nor the
Secretary, nor any officer or employee appointed under the Code, shall be 
liable to anyone for any action or omission to act under the Code, except 
for his wilful misfeasance or nonfeasance. Nothing contained in the Code 
shall be deemed to confer upon anyone other than a member of the Code 
any right, claim or demand whatsoever not expressly provided by statute 
against any member of the Code or against the Treasurer or the Secretary 
or any officer or enqployee appointed under the Code.
Section 3« As soon as members of the Industry which would, if then 
members of the Code, have the right to cast at least 75i> oî all the votes 
that might be cast at a meeting of the members of the Code, if all members 
of the Industry were then members of the Code and present at such meeting, 
shall sign and deliver to the Secretary letters substantially in the form 
set forth in Schedule A annexed hereto, the Board of Directors shall sub­
mit the Code to the President pursuant to the provisions of Title I of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act and, upon the approval of the Code by the
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President pursuant to the-provisions of such Title I, it shall constitute 
a binding contract by and among the members of the Code and the provisions 
thereof shall be the standards of fair competition for the Industry; sub­
ject, however, to amendment or termination as hereinafter in ^ticle XII 
provided, and subject also to the provisions of Section 6 of this Article 
XI.
Section 4. To the extent required or made possible by or under the 
provision of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act the provi­
sions of the Code shall apply to and be binding upon every meadser of the 
Industry whether or not suoh member shall be a member of the Code. No 
member of the Industry which shall not also be a member of the Code-shall 
be entitled to vote at any meeting of members of the Code or to any other 
right, power or privilege provided in the Code for the members thereof.
Section 5° The Board of Directors shall have power from time to 
time to interpret and construe the provisions of the Code, including, but 
without any limitation upon the foregoing, the power to determine what 
are products within the meaning of that term as it is used in the Code.
Any interpretation or construction placed upon the Code by the Board of 
Directors shall be final and conclusive upon all members of the Code.
Section 6, The members of the Code recognize that, pursuant to 
subsection (b) of Section 10 of the National Industrial Recovery Aot, the 
President may from time to time cancel or modify ary order, approval, 
license, rule or regulation issued under Title I of said Act,
Article XII 
Amendments— Termination
Section 1, The Code may be amended at ary time in the manner in 
this Section 1 provided. The changing of ary schedule hereto or the 
addition hereto of ary new schedule shall constitute an amendment of the 
Code. All amendments shall be proposed by the Board of Directors by vote 
of the majority of the members thereof at the time in office. Each amend­
ment so proposed shall be submitted to a meeting of the members of the 
Code which shall be called for such purpose upon notice given in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 1 of Schedule B and Section 1 of Article XI 
of the Code. If at such meeting members of the Code having the right to 
cast at least 75^ of all the votes that might be cast at such meeting, 
if all the members of the Code were present thereat, shall vote in favor 
of the adoption of such amendment, such amendment shall be submitted by 
the Board of Directors to the President for approval, if approval thereof 
by him shall then be required ty l&w. Every such amendment shall take 
effect as a part of the Code upon the adoption thereof by the members of 
the Code as above provided and the approval thereof by the President, if 
approval thereof by him shall be required as aforesaid.
Section 2. The Code shall continue in effect for a period of ninety 
(90) days after the effective date--thereof, in order to afford to the Presi­
dent an opportunity to determine upon the recommendations of the repre­
sentatives of the Administration, for which provision has heretofore bean 
made in Article VI, whether its provisions will effectuate the purposes of 
Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, as further defined in 
said Article VI, subject, however, to amendment at any time as herein­
before provided, and also subject to the reserved power of the President uu 
cancel or modify his approval thereof# The Code shall continue in effect 
after the expiration of said period of ninety (90) days in the absence of 
the exercise of such reserved power on the part of the President, or in 
the absence of the exercise by members of the Code of the power which they 
hereby reserve to terminate the Code at aiy time after the expiration of 
said period of ninety (90) days by the same action by them as is above 
provided for the amendment thereof# When so terminated all obligations and 
liabilities under the Code shall cease, except those for unpaid assess­
ments theretofore made in accordance with the provisions of the Code - 
and those for liquidated damages theretofore accrued under any provision 
of the Code.
Schedule A 
Form of Letter of Assent to the Code
, 19 .
To the Secretary of
American Iron and Steel Institute,
Empire State Building,
New York, N, Y#
Dear Sir;
The undersigned, desiring to become a member of the Code of Fair 
Competition of the Iron and Steel Industry, a copy of which is annexed 
hereto marked Annex A, hereby assents to all of the provisions of said 
Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code), and, effective as of the 
date on which the Code shall have been approved by the President of the 
United States of America as therein provided, or as of the date on which 
this letter shall have been delivered, if delivery thereof shall have 
been made subsequent to the date of which the Code shall have been ap­
proved by said President as aforesaid, by the signing and delivery of this 
letter becomes a member of the Code and effective as aforesaid hereby 
agrees with every person, firm, association and corporation who shall then 
be or thereafter become a member of the Code that the Code shall consti­
tute a valid and binding contract between the undersigned and all such 
other members#
Effective as aforesaid, pursuant to Section 5 of Article X of said
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Code, the undersigned (a) hereby assigns, transfers and delivers to the 
Treasurer under the Code, as an individual and not as treasurer of Meri» 
can Iron and Steel Institute, in trust, all rights and causes of aetion 
whatsoever hereafter acoruing to the undersigned under the Cede for 
liquidated damages by reason of any violation thereof by anyone, and (b) 
hereby designates and appoints said Treasurer as such individual the true- 
and lawful attornqy-in-faot of the undersigned, to demand, sue for, 
collect and receipt for any and all amounts which shall be owing to the 
undersigned in respect of any such right or cause of action, and to 
oompromlse, settle, satisfy and discharge any such right or cause of 
action, all in the name of the undersigned or in the name of said 
Treasurer, as said Treasurer shall elect.
For all purposes of Section 1 of Article XI of the Code the ad­
dress of the undersigned, until it shall file with the Secretary of 
American Iron and Steel Institute written notice of a change of such 




The Rules and Regulations in Respect of Meetings of Members of the Code
Section 1, A meeting of members of the Code may be called and held 
at any time by order of the Board of JMreotors or, by members of the Code 
having the right to cast at least 50$ of all the votes that might be cast 
at such meeting, if all the members of the Code were present thereat, on 
not less than three days' notice to each of such members stating the time 
and place of such meeting and the purposes thereof.
Section 2. At each meeting of the raembers of the Code each member 
thereof shall have as many votes as shall equal the quotient obtained by 
dividing hy 500,000 the aggregate amount in dollars of the invoiced value 
of the products delivered by such member for consunçtion within the United 
States during the preceding calendar year. Fractions in such quotient 
shall be disregarded; provided, however, that each member of the Code shall 
have at least one vote. All questions as to the number of votes idiich each 
member of the Code shall be entitled to cast at any meeting of the members 
thereof shall be determined by the Board of Directors* Any person or firm 
who shall be a member of the Code may, and any association or corporation 
which shall be a member of the Code shall, vote at meetings of the members 
of the Code by proxy in writing duly executed by such member and filed with 
the Secretary* Any such proxy may be for a specified meeting or be a 
general proxy for any or all meetings that may be held until such proxy 
shall have been revoked by an instrument in writing duly executed by the 
member of the Code which gave such proxy and filed with the Secretary*
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Section 3» At each meeting of the members of the Code, members there­
of having the right to cast at least 75'̂  of all the votes that might be 
cast at such meeting, if all the members of the Code were present thereat, 
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at such meeting.
Schedule C 
Description of Wage Districts
lo Eastern District:
Comprises that part of the United Stated which is north of the State of 
Virginia and east of a line drawn north and south through the most easterly 
point of JU.toona, Pennsylvania; that part of the State of Maryland which 
is west of such line; and the Counties of Monongalia, Marion and Harrison 
in the State of West Virginiao
2o Johnstown District:
Comprises Cambria County and the City of Altoona in the State of 
Pennsylvania.
3o Pittsburgh District:
Comprises the Counties of Westmoreland, Fayette, Greene, Washington, 
Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Armstrong and Jefferson and that part of the 
County of Clearfield which is west of a line drawn north and south through 
the most easterly point of Altoona, all in the State of Pennsylvania.
it-, Youngstown Valley District:
Comprises the Counties of Lawrence, Mercer and Venango in the State of 
Pennsylvania and the Counties of Trumbull, Mahoning and Columbiana in the 
State of Ohio.
5. North Ohio River District:
Comprises the cities along the Ohio River north of the City of Parkers­
burg, West Virginia, and the Counties of Belmont and Jefferson in the 
State of Ohio and the Counties of Marshall, Ohio, Brook and Hancock in 
the State of West Virginia.
6. Canton, Massillon and Mansfield District:
Comprises the Counties of Stark, Tuscarawas, Summit and Richland in the 
State of Ohio,
7. Cleveland District:




Comprises that part of the State of Nev York west of a line drawn- 
north and south throu^ the most easterly point of Altoona, Pennsylvania, 
and Erie County in that State o
9» Detroit-Toledo District:
Comprises the Counties of Seneca and Lucas in the State of CMo and 
the Counties of Monroe, Lenawee, Jaokson, Wayne, Oakland, Macomb and 
Washtenaw in the State of Miohigan,
10« South Ohio River District:
Comprises the State of Kentucky, the City of Parkersburg, West Virginia, 
the cities along the Ohio River south of said City, the Counties of Guern­
sey, Muskingum, Jackson and Butler in the State of Ohio and the County of 
Wood in the State of West Virginia.
11. Indiana-Illinois-St. Louis District:
Ccmprises all the State of Indiana, except the County of Lake; all the 
State of Illinois, except the Counties of Lake and Du Page and the Chicago 
Switching District; the City of St. Louis and the County of St. Louis in 
the State of Missouri; and the County of Rock in the State of Wisconsin.
12. Chicago District:
Comprises the Chicago Switching District; the Counties of Lake and Du 
Page in the State of Illinois; the County of Lake in the State of Indiana; 
and the Counties of Kenosha, Racine and Milwaukee in the State of Wisconsin.
13. Southern District:
Comprises all that part of the United States south of the States of 
Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, and the States of Texas 
and Oklahoma, but does not include the County of Jefferson in the State 
of Alabama,
14. Birmingham District:
Comprises the County of Jefferson in the State of Alabama.
15> Kansas City District:
CoD^rises the County of Jackson in the State of Missouri. 
l6. Duluth District:
Comprises the County of St. Louis in the State of Minnesota.
3^5
170 Colorado District:
Commises the State of Colorado»
18. Utah District:
Comprises the State of Utah.
19o Seattle District:
Comprises the County of King in the State of Washington and the County 
of Multonomah in the State of Oregon.
20. Los Angelas District:
Comprises the County of Los Angeles in the State of California.
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Concerning Prices and Terms of Payment
Section 1. Wherever used in the Code the terms hereinafter in this 
Section 1 defined shall, unless the context shall otherwise clearly indicate.
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have the respective meanings hereinafter in this Section 1 set forth.
The definition of any such term in the singular shall apply to the use 
of such term in the plural and vice versa,
(a) Until Schedule F of this Code shall have been amended as in
Article XII of the Code provided, the term ̂ basing point” for argr product 
means one of the places listed in such Schedule F as a basing point for 
such product. Thereafter the term shall mean one of the places listed in
such Schedule F as at the time in effect as a basing point for such pro­
duct,
(b) The term "base price" of any product means the price for such 
product f,o,b, a basing point, before any extras in respect of such pro­
duct shall be added or any discounts for early payment or deductions 
shall be allowed or made,
(c) The term "period of free credit" means the period of time be­
tween the date of a shipment of a product to the purchaser of such 
product and the date from and after which such purchaser shall be re­
quired to pay interest on the purchase price of such product or any part 
thereof which shall not have been paid prior to the expiration of such 
period,
(d) The term "date of invoice" means the date of the invoice of 
any product,
(e) The term "discount for early payment" means the amount of the 
deduction allowed for the payment of an invoice of products before the 
expiration of the period of free credit in respect thereof,
(f) The term "an affiliated group" means one or more corporations 
connected through stock ownership with a common parent corporation, if
(l) at least 75^ of the stock of each of such corporations (except such 
common parent corporation) is owned directly by one or more of the other 
corporations, and (2) such common parent corporation owns directly at 
least 75^ of the stock of at least one of the other corporations. The 
term "an affiliated company of a member of the Code" means (1) a corp­
oration which is one of an affiliated group that also includes such mem­
ber of the Code, or (2), in case the member of the Code is a person, 
firm or association, a corporation at least 75$ of the stock of which is 
owned by such member. For the purposes of this paragraph (f) the term 
"stock" does not include non-voting stock which is limited and preferred 
as to dividends.
Section 2, Each member of the Code shall, within ten days after 
the effective date of the Code, file with the Secretary a list showing 
the base prices for all its products, and from and after the e:q)iration 
of such ten days such member shall at all times maintain on file with the 
Secretary a list showing the base prices for all its products and shall 
not make aqy change in such base prices except as provided in this
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Schedule Eo Each such list shall state the date upon which it shall be­
come effective, which date shall be not less than ten days after the 
date of filing such list with the Secretary; provided, however, that the 
first list of base prices filed by any member of the Oede aa above-pro­
vided shall take effect on the date of filing thereof • None of ̂ e  base 
prices shown in any list filed by any member of the Gode as herein pro­
vided shall be changed except by the filing by suoh member with Secretary 
of a new list of its base prices, which shall bsooms ef-feotive on the 
effective date therein specified which shall not be less than ten days 
after the date on which such new price list shall have been so filed»
In the case of pipe of sizes or kinds which are sold on a list and dis­
count basis, for the purposes of this Section 2 the list of base jmriees 
shall consist of a price list and one or more basing discount lists, 
from which the base prices of such pipe shell- be determined; provided, 
however, that in the case of oil country tubular goods there shall be 
filed in lieu of a list of base prices a price list and one or more 
basing discount lists from which the delivered prices of such goods shall 
be determined.
Section 3» Except as hereinafter otherwise provided in respect of 
standard Tee rails of more than 60 pounds per yard, angle bars and rail 
joints, the base price for apy product shown in any list of base prices 
filed by a member of the Code in accordance with the provisions of the 
foregoing Section 2 shall be as follows: (a) If such member shall operate
a plant for the production of such product which is located as a basing 
point for suoh product, f,o,b, such basing point, or (b), if such member 
shall operate a plant for the production of such product which is not 
located at a basing point for suoh product, foOeb, the basing point for 
such product nearest in terms of all-rail freight rates to such plant, or
(c), if any Gulf or Pacific Coast port shall be listed as a basing point 
in Schedule F of the Code as at the time in effect, f»o,b, cars dock 
suoh port. Except as otherwise provided in this Schedule E, each member 
of the Code shall file with the Secretary and maintain on file with him 
a list showing the base price for each of its products for each basing 
point for such product at which a plant of such member for the manu­
facture of such product shall be located and for each basing point for 
such product which shall be nearest in terms of all-rail freight rates to 
any plant of such member for the manufacture of such product not located 
at a basing point for such product; and, if any Gulf or Pacific Coast 
port shall be listed in such Schedule F as a basing point for a product, 
such member may show in such list its base price for suoh product at such 
basing point. All base prices shown in the list so filed shall constitute 
the published base prices of suoh member for the products and for the 
basing points shown in such list. Except as aforesaid, none of the mem­
bers of the Code shall file any list of base prices showing any price for 
any of its products other than the base price for such product f,o,b, the 
basing point or basing points for suoh product as hereinbefore provided. 
The published base price of each such member for amy product (except 
standard Tee rails of more than 60 pounds per yard, angle bara and rail 
joints) for any basing point for such product other than that or those
shown in the list of base prices so filed by such member shall be deemed 
to be the lowest base price for such product at such other basing point 
which shall be shown in the list of base prices filed by any other mem­
ber of the Code and then in effecto All base prices for standard Tee- 
rails of more than 60 pounds per yard and all base prices for angle bar^ 
and rail joints shall be f.Oob* mill of the producer thereof, or, in the 
case of rails, angle bars and rail joints carried ty water from a^y At­
lantic Coast or Gulf port to any Gulf or Pacific Coast port, Coiofc, the 
port of destination. Lists of prices filed with the Secretary pursuant 
to the foregoing Section 2 and to this Section 3 shall be open to inspec» 
tion at all reasonable times by anyone,.............
Section 4, Except as otherwise provided in this Schedule E of the 
Code, all prices quoted and billed ly any member of the Code for any 
product (except standard Tee rails of more than-60 pounds per yard, 
angle bars and rail joints and oil country tubular goods, which shall 
be quoted and-billed as hereinafter provided) sold ̂  such member from 
and after ten days after the effective date of-the Code shall be delivered 
prices, which (disregarding the extras, if any, required by and the deduc­
tions, if any, that may be made pursuant to, the provisions of the Code) 
shall be not less than the sum of (a) the published base price of such 
member for such product effective at the time of the sale thereof and (b) 
the all-rail published tariff freight rate charges from the basing point 
on which such base price is based to the place of delivery to the pur­
chaser thereof or, (l) if such place of delivery shall be at such basing 
point, the published tariff switching charges to suoh place of delivery 
from the plant of any member of the Code for the production of such 
product at such basing point nearest in terms of such switching charges 
to such place of delivery; or, (2) if such place of delivery shall be at 
a Gulf or Pacific Coast port that is listed in Schedule F as a basing 
point, the published tariff switching charges to such place of delivery 
from the dock for discharging products nearest in terms of such switching 
charges to such place of delivery; provided, however, that (a) in any case 
which such product shall be delivered by other than all-rail transporta­
tion, the member of the Code selling such product may allow to the pur­
chaser a reduction in the delivered price otherwise chargeable under this 
Section 4 at a rate which shall have been previously approved by the 
Board of Directors and filed with the Secretary; and (b) in the case of 
plates, shapes or bars intended for fabrication for an identified structure, 
for the purpose of establishing the delivered price thereof, the place of 
delivery shall be deemed to be the freight station at or nearest to the 
place at which such structure is to be erected, and not the shop of the 
fabricator; and (c) subject as hereinafter in this Section 4 provided, if 
any list of prices filed with the Secretary at the time in effect shall 
show a specified rate of deduction by aiy member of the Code pursuant to
this Schedule E and from the price of any product to be allowed by such
member on any sale of such product to any jobber for resale, such member
may, from and after the date on which such list shall have become ef­
fective, allow to any Jobber to whom such member shall sell such product 
for resale a reduction from such price to such jobber for such product at 
a rate not greater than the rate so shown in such list; and provided.
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further, that the Board of Directors by the affirmative vote of three« 
fourths of the whole Board may permit ary member of the Codo-in special 
instances or members of the Code generally to sell or contract for the 
sale of any product produced by such member or - members at a base price 
which shall be less than the then published base price of suoh mendDer-or 
members for suoh product at the respeotive basing points therefor of such 
members, if by such vote such Board shall determine that the making of 
such sale or contract of sale at such less base price is in-the interest- 
of the Industry or any other branch of industry and will not tend to 
defeat the policy of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act by 
making possible the using or employing of an unfair practice. The 
Board of Directors shall prescribe such rules and regulations as it shall 
deem proper ly which the question of whether or not any purchaser or 
prospective purchaser of any product for resale is a jobber shall be 
determined, and in granting-any permission as aforesaid, the Board of - 
Directors shall prescribe such rules and regulations in respect thereof 
as in its judgment shall be necessary in order to insure to the members 
of the Code that action in accordance with apy suoh permission shall not 
result in an unfair practice; and hereafter such Board may by like vote 
rescind any permission so granted or modify, cancel or add to any rules 
and regulations so prescribed. The Secretary shall send to each member 
of the Code a copy of all suoh rules and regulations prescribed by such 
Board with respect to the determination of the question of whether a pur­
chaser or prospective purchaser for resale is a jobber and he shall give 
notice in writing of all action so taken by the Board of Directors to each 
member of the Code which at the time shall be engaged in producing the 
kind of product in respect of which any such perittésiOn was granted.
Before any member of the Code shall allow any sddh deduction to any jobber 
or sell for resale to any purchaswer who shall a jobber any pro­
duct pursuant to any permission so granted to Such mernoer, such member 
shall secure from such jobber or such other purchaser an agreement sub­
stantially in a form theretofore approved by the Board of Directors and 
filed with the Secretary whereby suoh jobber or other purchaser will not, 
without the approval of the Board of Directors, sell such product to any 
third party at a price which at the time of the sale thereof shall be 
less than the price at which such member might at that time sell such 
product to such third party, and (b) that, if such jobber or such other 
purchaser shall violate any such agreement, he shall pay to the Treasurer 
as an individual and not as treasurer of the Institute, in trust, as and 
for liquidated damages the sum of $10 per ton of any product sold by such 
jobber or such other purchaser in violation thereof. Except as aforesaid, 
all prices quoted and billed by any member of the Code for standard Tee 
rails of more than 60 pounds per yard, angle bars and rail joints sold by 
it from and after ten days after the effective date of the Code (disre­
garding extras and deductions as aforesaid) shall be not less than the 
published base price of such member for such rails, angle bars and rail 
joints effective at the time of the sale thereof f.o.b. mill of the pro­
ducer, or, in the case of rails, angle bars or rail joints carried by 
water from any Atlantic Coast for Gulf port to any Gulf or Pacific Coast 
port, c.i.f, the port of destination. Except as aforesaid, all prices 
quoted and billed by any member of the Code for oil country tubular goods
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sold by it from and after ten days after the effective date of the- Code 
(disregarding extras and deductions as aforesaid) shall be not less than 
the delivered price for such goods determined by deducting from the pub­
lished list price of such member for such goods effective at the time of 
the sale thereof the published basing discounts applicable to such goods 
effective at suoh time. In case at the effective date of the Code apy 
valid, firm contract to which a member of the Code shall be a party shall 
exist for a definite quantity of any product or for all or a substantial 
part of the requirements of the purchaser thereof (a) at a fixed price, 
or (b) at a price that can be definitely determined in accordance with the 
provisions of such contract, or (c) at the market price for such product 
at the date when a definite quantity thereof shall be specified under 
such contract and such contract covered a sale of 20^ or more of the total 
quantity of such product produced and sold in the United States in the 
calendar year 1932, it is recognized that such contract will tend to es­
tablish the market price for such product during the remainder of its 
life and that if the other members of the Code which produce and sell 
such product shall by the foregoing provisions of this Schedule E be 
prevented from selling such product during the remainder of the life of 
such contract at as favorable a price and on as favorable terras and 
conditions as those provided for in such contract, then unfair competi­
tion as between the member of the Code which shall be a party to such 
contract and the other members thereof and also as between the other 
party to such contract and its competitprs may result. Accordingly, 
anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, during the remainder 
of the life of such contract any member of the Code may sell such pro­
duct at a price and on terms and conditions as favorable as (but not more 
favorable than) the price, terms and conditions provided for in such 
contract.
Section 5" The Board of Directors sb"li have power on its own ini­
tiative, or on the complaint of any member of the Code, to investigate 
any base price for any product at any basing point shown in any list filed 
with the Secretary by any member of the Code, and for the purpose of the 
investigation thereof to require such member to furnish such information con­
cerning the cost of manufacturing such product as the Board of Directors 
shall deem necessary or proper for such purpose,. If the Board of Directors 
after such investigation shall determine that such base price is an unfair 
base price for such product at such basing point, having regard to the cost 
of manufacturing such product, and that the maintenance of such unfair 
base price may result in unfair competition in the Industry, the Board of 
Directors may require the member of the Code that filed the list in which 
such unfair base price is shown to file a new list showing a fair base price 
for such product at such basing point, which fair base price shall become 
effective immediately upon the filing of such list. If such member of 
determination by the Board of Directors file a new list showing such fair 
base price for such product at such basing point, the Board of Directors 
shall have power to fix a fair base price for such product at such basing 
point, which fair base price, however, shall not be more than the base 
price of any other member of the Code at that time effective for such pro­
duct at such basing point and in respect of which the Board of Directors
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shall not theretofore have begun an investigation or a complaint shall 
not have been made by apy member of the Code. When the decision of such 
Board fixing such fair base price shall have been filed with the Secre­
tary and the Secretary shall have given notice thereof to such member, 
such fair base price shall be the base price of such member for such 
product at such basing point, until it shall have been changed as in the 
Code provided.) A notice of all decisions of the Board of Directors 
under this Section 5, together with the reasons therefor, shall be filed 
with the Presidents
Section 6, The Board of Directors by the affirmative vote of a 
majority of the whole Board may establish maximum rates of discount and 
maximum periods of free credit, other than those specified in Schedule 
0 of the Code, which may be allowed by any member of the Code with re­
spect to the sale of any product or products to Jobbers for resale as 
permitted by the provisions of Section 4 of this Schedule E, The Secre­
tary shall give notice in writing of any action taken by the Board of 
Directors in accordance with the provisions of this Section 6 to each 
member of the Code which at the time shall be engaged in producing the 
kind of product in the sale of which any suoh other rates or periods shall 
have been established by such action. Except as aforesaid and except as 
elsewhere in this Schedule E of the Code otherwise provided, the maximum 
rates of discount for early payment and the maximum periods of free cre­
dit which may be allowed hy any member of the Code shall be the rates 
and periods specified in said Schedule Except as aforesaid, all in­
voices for products sold by any member of the Code after the effective 
date of the Code shall bear interest from and after the expiration of 
the period of free credit at a rate which shall be not less than the 
then current rate established by the Board of Directors and filed with 
the Secretary. Nothing in the Code contained shall prevent any member 
of the Code from allowing credit to any purchaser or allowing any pur­
chaser to delay payment in respect of any invoice for a longer period 
than the maximum period of free credit specified in such Schedule G or 
such other maximum period as shall be established in accordance with the 
provisions of this Section 6; but, if any member of the Code shall allow 
credit to any purchaser or allow any purchaser to delay payment in re­
spect of any invoice for a period longer than such maximum period of 
free credit, then such member shall charge and collect interest on the 
amount in respect of which credit shall be so allowed or the payment of 
which shall have been so delayed at a rate not less than the current rate 
established and filed as aforesaid.
Section 7, Except as in this Schedule E of the Code otherwise 
provided, any extras added to, and any deductions made from, the base 
price for any product sold by any member of the Code in determining 
its quoted or billed price for such product shall be uniform for all 
members of the Code, The rates of such extras and of such deductions 
shall be those approved from time to time by the Board of Directors as 
being in accordance with the trade practice customary in the Industry at 
the effective date of the Code and as meeting the requirements of the 
Code. Lists showing suoh rates shall be filed with the Secretary and
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shall be open to inspection at all reasonable times by anyone» In ease 
any member of the Code shall sell any produet to whiph any such rate of 
extra or deduction shall apply» except as aforesaid* such membw-shall 
add an extra at-a rate idiioh shall not be less- than the rate of extra 
a^p^icable to such product theretofore approved by the Board of Directors 
as aforesaid and at the time in effect and #one of the members of the Code 
shall make any deduction at a rate that shall be more favorable to the 
purchaser of such product than the rate of deduction applicable to suoh 
product theretofore approved by the Board-of-Directore as aforesaid and 
at the time in effect; provided* hotrever, -that nothing in the Code con­
tained shall be so oonstrued ae-to-prevent-any o»mber of the Code from 
selling or contracting to sell any product foreuse by the purchaser thereof 
in the manufacture of articles for shipaent in eaqiort trade within the 
meaning-of the term "export trade” as it is used in the Export Trade Act 
under an agreement by such- member of the Code with-such purchaser that, 
when such articles-shall have been shipped in such export trade, such 
member of the Code- shall make an- allowance at-a rate approved by the 
Board of Directors and a statement of the- a^roval of which shall there­
tofore have been filed with the- Secretary*-jrhi-oh rate in the opinion of 
such Board shall be sufficient to enable such-member of the Code or such 
purchaser to meet foreign competition in the sale and delivery of such 
product or suoh articles, as the case may be, -
Section 8, ine practice oi snipping products on consignment may 
result in unfair competition and it is the intention of the Industry to 
eliminate such practice as soon as possible after the effective date of 
the Code, Accordingly, except to the extent necessary to carry out ar­
rangements existing on the effective date of the Code and which shall 
have been reported to the Board of Directors, from and after such date 
none of t^e members of the Code shall deliver products, other than pipe, 
on consignment except to an affiliated company of such member. All 
arrangements for the delivery by any member of the Code of products on 
consignment (other than consignments to an affiliated company of such 
member and other than consignments of pipe) existing on the effective 
date of the Code shall be terminated on or before June 30, 193̂ » and all 
stock held on consignment on that date shall either be sold to the 
consignee or possession thereof shall be taken by the consignor. The 
Board of Directors shall investigate problems presented in the elimina­
tion of consigned stocks of pipe and shall recommend to the members of 
the Code which shall be parties to then existing arrangements with respect 
to shi^hents of pipe on consignment (other than consignments from a member 
of the Code, to an affiliated ooaqpapy) such action in respect thereof as 
such. Board shall deem proper and designed to accon̂ l-ish the termination 
of all such arrangements (other than as aforesaid) at as early a date as 
possible.
Section 9» For all purposes of this Schedule B, a delivery of any 
product made pursuant to a contract of sale ^all bo- regarded as a sale 
thereof made at the time of the making of such contract. Except in the 
case of a product required by a purchaser for a specified definite contract 
of such ourohaser with a third party at a fixed price, nope of the members
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of the Code shall make any contract of sale of any product by the terms of 
which the shipment of such product is not required to be completed before 
the end of the calendar quarter-year ending not more than four months after 
the date of the making of such contract»
Section 10» Nothing in the Code contained, however, shall be so 
construed as to prevent the performance by any member of the Code of a 
valid, firm contract existing and to which it is a party at the effective 
date of the Code for a definite quantity of any product or for all or a 
substantial part of the requirements of the purchaser thereof (a) at a 
fixed price, or (b) at a price that can be definitely determined, in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of such contract, or (c) at the market price 
for such product at the date when a definite quantity thereof shall be 
specified under such contract» If any member of the Code shall, at the 
effective date thereof be a party to any contract for the sale, of any 
product by such member which by its terms is to continue after December 31, 
1933# and by its terms the price to be paid for such product by the, other 
party to such contract is related to the market price thereof at the date 
when a definite quantity thereof may be specified under such contract and 
may be less than suoh market price, then such member shall within thirty 
days after the effective date of the Code file a copy of such contract 
with the Secretary in order that the Board of Directors may consider it 
and take such action in respect thereof consistent with the rights and 
obligations of the parties to such contract as such shall deem
proper»
Section 11» A sale made any member of the Code indirectly 
through any affiliated company of such member shall be dee^^^ to be a 
sale made by such member»
Section 12» Nothing in the Code contained 3hajLi.be deemed to apply 
to or affect the sale of any product for direct.shipment in export trade 
by any member of the Code within the meaning of the term "export trade" 
as it is used in the Export Trade Act or, unless and to the extent that 
the Board of Directors shall otherwise determine, the sale of any product 
by any such member for direct shipment to the Phillippines, Hawaii or 
Porto Rico or other insular possessions of the United States of America.
Section 13. If and to the extent requested by the Administrator, 
all decisions of, permissions and approvals given and rules and re­
gulations made by, the Board of Directors pursuant to any provisions of 
this Schedule E shall be reported to him»
Schedule P
List of Basing Points
The places hereinafter in this Schedule F listed are the casing points 





























































*Except as otherwise shown in this Schedule F, the Gulf Ports are 
Mobile, Alabama; New Orleans, La,; and Orange, Port Arthur, Beaumont, Bay­
town, Galveston and Houston, Texas.
**The Pacific Coast ports are San Pedro (includes Wilmington) and San 
Francisco (includes Oakland), Cal.; Portland, Ore.; and Seattle (includes 








Ingots, Blooms, Billets and Slabs— Alloy: 
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Buffalo, N, Yo 
Chicago, 111,
Ingots^ Blooms, Billets and Slabs— Carbon: 
Pittsburgh, Pa<>
Buffalo, No Yo 
Cleveland, Oo 
Gary, Indo


















Pig Iron-Foundry, Malleable, Open Hearth Basic and Bessemer:






















Granite City, 111. 
Detroit, Mich.
Everett, Mass,
Standish, N, Y. 
Johnson City, Tenn,
Evanston, 111.
Pipe--Standard, Line Pipe and Oil Countiy Tubular Products:










Buffalo, N. Y. 
Chicago, 111. 
Birmingham, Ala. 
St. Louis, Ho. 
Kansas City, Mo.
Railroad Track Spikes: 
Pittsburgh, Pa. 















































Buffalo, No Y. 
Chicago, 111.
Strip Steel— Cold-Rolled: 
Pittsburgh, Pa 
Cleveland, 0.








Buffalo, N. Yo 
Chicago, 111.
Birmingham, Ala. (standard shapes only)













Wheels, Car, Rolled Steel;
Pittsburgh, Pa.














































Maximum Rates of IHsoount for Early Payment and 
Maximum Periods of Free Credit
Maximum Ratee of Discount for Early Payment:
In the case of products shipped from plants located eaet of the 
Mississippi River to Pacific Coast Ports and «Aloh «hall be Invoiced 
from such plants— i of 1$, if the Invoice of such products shall be paid 
within 25 days from the date of suoh invoice; In all other cases— i of 
1$, If the Invoice -of such products shall be paid within 10 days from the 
date-of such Invoice; provided, however» In the latter cases, that any 
member of the Code may allow such discount of of 1$ for payment within 
10 days on the basis of settlements three times In each month, as follows:
(1) On Invoices for products dated from the 1st to the 20th, Inclu­
sive, In any month, such discount may be allowed on payment of such In­
voices on or before the 20th of such month;
(2) On Invoices for products dated from the 11th to the 20th,
Inclusive, In any month, such discount may be allowed on payment of such 
Invoices on or before the 30th of each month; and
(3) On Invoices for products dated from the 21st to the end of
any month, such discount may be allowed on payment of such Invoices on or 
before the 10th of the next following month.
Any discount allowed In accordance with the provisions of this Schedule 
G shall apply only to the Invoiced value of the products specified therein 
and not to any part of the transportation charges on such products.
Maximum Periods of Free Credit:
In the case of products shipped from plants located east of the 
Mississippi River to Pacific Coast ports and which shall be Invoiced 
from such plants— ^5 days; In all other cases—30 days.
Schedule H 
List of Unfair Practices
For all purposes of the Code the following described acts shall 
constitute unfair practices:
A. Making or promising to any purchaser or prospective purchaser 
of any product, or to any officer, employee, agent or representative of 
any such purchaser or prospective purchaser, any bribe, gratuity, gift or 
other payment or remuneration, directly or Indirectly.
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B, Procuring, otherwise than with the consent of any* neoher of 
the Code, &ny informatien ooncernlng the business of such member which is 
propsrly regarded by it as a trade secret or confidential within its or­
ganization, other ^an information relating to a violation of any provi­
sion of the Code# ..
Co Imitating or simulating any design, style, mark or brand used 
by any other member of the Codeo
Do Using or substituting any material superior in quality to that 
specified by the purchaser of any product or using or substituting ary 
material or aiy method of manufacture not in accord with any applicable 
law, rule or regulation of any governmental authority#
Eo Cancelling in whole or in part, or permitting the cancellation 
in whole or in part of, any contract of sale of any product, except for 
a fair consideration, or paying or allowing to any purchaser in connec­
tion with the sale of any product any rebate, commission, credit, dis­
count, adjustment or similar concession other than as is permitted by the 
Code and specified in the contract of sale#
Fo Disseminating, publishing or circulating any false or misleading 
information relative to any product or price for any product of any mem­
ber of the Code, or the credit standing or ability of any member thereof 
to perform any work or manufacture or produce any product, or to the 
conditions of employment among the employees of any member thereof#
Go Inducing or atteng>ting to induce by any means any party to a 
contract with a member of the Code to violate such contract#
H, Aiding or abetting any person, firm association or corporation 
in any unfair practice.
I# Making or giving to any purchaser of any product any guaranty or 
protection in any form against decline in the market price of such product#
J# Stating in the invoice of any product as the date thereof a date 
later than the date of the shipment of such product, or including in any 
invoice any product shipped on a date earlier than the date of such invoice.
K, Making any sale or contract of sale of any product under any 
description which does not fully describe such product in terms customarily 
used in the industry.
L. Rendering to any purchaser of any product in or in connection 
with the sale of such product any service, unless fair compensation for such 
service shall be paid by such purchaser.
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Mo Any violation of any other provision of the Code, whether or 
not therein expressed to ^  such, or using or en^loying any praotioe 
net hereinabove in this Schedule H described which the Board of Directors 
by the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the whole Board shall have 
declared to be a practice that would tend to defeat the policy of Title 
I of the National Industrial Recovery Act and, therefore, an unfair 
practice, and of which deterÈination by such Board the Secretary shall 
have given notice to the members of the Code and to the President.
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